Information enforcement in learning with graphics : improving syllogistic reasoning skills

This thesis is an investigation into the factors that contribute to good choices among graphical systems used in teaching, and the feasibility of implementing teaching software that uses this knowledge.The thesis describes a mathematical metric derived from a cognitive theory of human diagram processing. The theory characterises differences among representations by their ability to express information. The theory provides the factors and relationships needed to build the metric. It says that good representations are easily processed because they are more vivid, more tractable and less expressive, than poor representations.The metric is applied to abstract systems for teaching and learning syllogistic reasoning, TARSKI'S WORLD, EULER CIRCLES, VENN DIAGRAMS and CARROLL'S GAME OF LOGIC. A rank ordering reflects the value of each system predicted by the theory and the metric. The theory, the metric and the systems are then tested in empirical studies. Five studies involving sixty-eight learners, examined the benefit of software based on these abstract systems.Studies showed the theory correctly predicted learners' success with the circle systems and poorer performance with TARSKI'S WORLD. The metric showed small but clear differences in expressivity between the circle systems. Differences between results of the learners using the circle systems contradicted the predictions of the metric.Learners with mathematical training were better equipped and more successful at learning syllogistic reasoning with the systems. Performance of learners without mathematical training declined after using the software systems. Diagrams drawn by learners together with video footage collected during problem solving, led to a catalogue of errors, misconceptions and some helpful strategies for learning from graphical systems.A cognitive style test investigated the poor performance of non-mathematically trained learners. Learners with mathematics training showed serialist and versatile learning styles while learners without this training showed a holist learning style. This is consistent with the hypothesis that non-mathematically trained learners emphasise the use of semantic cues during learning and problem solving.A card-sorting task investigated learners' preferences for parts of the graphical lexicon used in the diagram systems. Preferences for the EULER lexicon increased difficulty in explaining the system's poor results in earlier studies. Video footage of learners using the systems in the final study illustrated useful learning strategies and improved performance with EULER while individual instruction was available.Further work describes a preliminary design for an adaptive syllogism tutor and other related work

Existence, knowledge & truth in mathematics

This thesis offers an overview of some current work in the philosophy of mathematics, in particular of work on the metaphysical, epistemological, and semantic problems associated with mathematics, and it also offers a theory about what type of entities numbers are. Starting with a brief look at the historical and philosophical background to the problems of knowledge of mathematical facts and entities, the thesis then tackles in depth, and ultimately rejects as flawed, the work in this area of Hartry Field, Penelope Maddy, Jonathan Lowe, John Bigelow, and also some aspects of the work of Philip Kitcher and David Armstrong. Rejecting both nominalism and physicalism, but accepting accounts from Bigelow and Armstrong that numbers can be construed as relations, the view taken in this work is that mathematical objects, numbers in particular, are universals, and as such are mind dependent entities. It is important to the arguments leading to this conception of mathematical objects, that there is a notion of aspectual seeing involved in mathematical conception. Another important feature incorporated is the notion, derived from Anscombe, of an intentional object. This study finishes by sketching what appears to be a fruitful line of enquiry with some significant advantages over the other accounts discussed. The line taken is that the natural numbers are mind dependent intentional relations holding between intentional individuals, and that other classes of number - the rationals, the reals, and so on - are mind dependent intentional relations holding between other intentional relations. The distinction in type between the natural numbers and the rest, is the intuitive one that is drawn naturally in language between the objects referred to by the so-called count nouns, and the objects referred to by the so-called mass nouns

Scientific Progress on the Semantic View : An Account of Scientific Progress as Objective Logical and Empirical Strength Increments

The aim of this master thesis is to make a convincing argument that scientific progress can be spoken of in objective terms. In order to make this argument I will propose a philosophical theory of scientific progress. Two concepts will be constructed with this aim in mind, both which are types of strength measures on scientific theories. The first concept, that of logical strength, pertains to the way a theory may exclude, or permit less, model classes compared to another theory. The second concept, that of empirical strength, pertains to an objective measure of the informational content of data models, defined in terms of Kolmogorov complexity. This latter idea stems from communication and computational theory. Scientific progress is then defined as the interaction, or the stepwise increases, of these two strength measures. Central for the conception of a scientific theory is the philosophical framework known as The Semantic View of Scientific Theories. This view can briefly be characterized as an empirical extension of Tarskian model-theory. Another central notion for this theory of scientific progress is the philosophical or metaphysical thesis called structural realism. Both will accordingly be explained and argued for. Finally, as a test on this proposed theory of scientific progress, it will be applied to two examples of theory transition from the history of physical theory. I conclude that the proposed theory handles these two cases well

The continuum hypothesis : independence and truth-value

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Philosophy, 1974.MIT Humanities Library copy: issued in two vols.Leaf number 84 used twice. Also issued as a two-volume set.Includes bibliographical references (leaves 217-258).by Thomas S. Weston.Ph.D

Topological Foundations of Cognitive Science

A collection of papers presented at the First International Summer Institute in Cognitive Science, University at Buffalo, July 1994, including the following papers: ** Topological Foundations of Cognitive Science, Barry Smith ** The Bounds of Axiomatisation, Graham White ** Rethinking Boundaries, Wojciech Zelaniec ** Sheaf Mereology and Space Cognition, Jean Petitot ** A Mereotopological Definition of 'Point', Carola Eschenbach ** Discreteness, Finiteness, and the Structure of Topological Spaces, Christopher Habel ** Mass Reference and the Geometry of Solids, Almerindo E. Ojeda ** Defining a 'Doughnut' Made Difficult, N .M. Gotts ** A Theory of Spatial Regions with Indeterminate Boundaries, A.G. Cohn and N.M. Gotts ** Mereotopological Construction of Time from Events, Fabio Pianesi and Achille C. Varzi ** Computational Mereology: A Study of Part-of Relations for Multi-media Indexing, Wlodek Zadrozny and Michelle Ki

A study in empirical knowledge: The preconditions and structure of measurement

This is an epistemological study, in which measure ment is taken as a paradigm of perceptual recognition---a notion in which perception is joined with judgment as a factor in understanding. Hence it has proved necessary to give an analysis of such recognition in general, with metric contexts as a special case. This has been done in terms of a very weak fundamental form of 'theory', as a form of basic comprehension, in which language (as part of the theories analysed) is not essentially involved, but treated as a special development. One type of theory is given thorough formal analysis: those 'recognitive theories' whose elements are taken, in the theory itself, to be recognized directly from perception, or extrapolated as in principle recognizable. Another type consists of 'substantive theories', seen as constructed to provide deeper understanding of the reality underlying recognized structures, but essentially involving elements not taken to be recognizable: this type receivesonly informal treatment, in terms of its associations with the first (especially in measurement). Special consideration is (unusually) given to attention and neglect,not in psychological terms, but as theory-guided selection from total experience. Neglect is seen not merely as negation of attention, but often a positive strategy (in measurement, strictly determined). Part I introduces the basic concepts, distinguishing the general approach from other relevant traditionsfoundational studies in measurement (Suppes et al.); linguistic analysis; some epistemologies (e.g., Goodman); philosophy of science. Part II sets up the formal analysis. Part III applies this analysis to contexts of measurement, with examples (only distance is fully treated others only in synopsis). Probability assessment is analysed as distinct from measurement. Part IV examines consequences for wider philosophical questions: language-based problems of knowledge and meaning; Wittgenstein's 'private language': and theory-based considerations of ontology; identity; truth, falsity and error; and observation in science.<p

Does Nietzsche have a coherent view of truth?

Anyone intending to write about Nietzsche faces an immediate problem - How is one to interpret him? I tackle this methodological issue in my first Chapter and set out the various modes of interpretation usually adopted. I also discuss the status of the Nachlass and indicate a personal position with regard to the use of these unpublished notes. In Chapter 2 I focus on whether Nietzsche does have a theory of truth. Early on he claims that truth is an illusion, but I argue that this position is untenable. Some American commentators attribute a pragmatic theory of truth to Nietzsche, but the textual evidence for this is lacking. As for the Coherence Theory, Nietzsche would only have accepted this if he espoused subjective idealism. He clearly rejects all forms of idealism. He was also firmly opposed to the Metaphysical Correspondence Theory. However, there is some evidence that he would have accepted a more conventional view of truth. My third Chapter is more psychological, focusing on motivation. Will to Power is the central concept here and I analyse this in detail. It turns out to be a Janus-faced concept. Internal Will to Power gets linked to asceticism and the Will to Truth, whilst external Will to Power is tied to the creation of values. The final Chapter is really a defence of objectivity. Perspectivism is frequently misinterpreted by Continental thinkers. I try to combat their relativistic readings and argue for a mature perspectivism. The latter does not entail a rejection of truth as commonsensically understood. My Conclusion is that Nietzsche is seeking to establish a more elaborate view of belief which acknowledges the body as a primary source of motivation

What is truth?

I defend the correspondence theory of truth, according to which a statement’s truth consists in a relation of correspondence with extralinguistic fact. There are well-known objections to this view, which I consider and rebut, and also important rival accounts, principal among which are so-called deflationist theories and epistemic theories. Epistemic theories relate the concept of truth to our state of knowledge, but fail, I argue, to respect the crucial distinction between a criterion of truth and the meaning of truth: the view that one cannot do semantics, or metaphysics, without addressing epistemic issues is rejected by this work. Against epistemic theories, I illustrate how truth is independent of epistemic considerations. Deflationism is the more popular of the rival accounts and has gained considerable momentum over the past two decades. It is therefore dealt with in greater detail by this work. Deflationist theories exploit the paradigmatic ‘“Snow is white” is true iff snow is white’ biconditional to argue for an insubstantialist account, according to which truth is conservative with respect to non-semantical facts. On this view, truth’s raison d’être is merely to perform the useful expressive function of generalising over possibly infinite sets of assertions. Against deflationist theories, I claim that the work done by Jeffrey Ketland and Stewart Shapiro conclusively demonstrates how truth is informationally additive over non-semantic facts, while deflationism itself is also an excessively impoverishing theory, inadequate to the tasks it purports to accomplish. This work also defends the thesis that Alfred Tarski’s well-known theory of truth is an authentic correspondence theory. To say this is to say that the clauses of a Tarskian truth-definition can be interpreted in terms of a relation of correspondence that holds between true sentences and the states of affairs they describe. I provide a precise account of what the correspondence in question consists in, claiming that true sentences are homomorphic images of facts, i.e. a true sentence represents, in a form-preserving manner, the truth-making facts in it. This gives precise expression to Wittgenstein’s thesis that true sentences picture the world