Mathematical Logic and Its Applications 2020

The issue "Mathematical Logic and Its Applications 2020" contains articles related to the following three directions: Descriptive Set Theory (3 articles). Solutions for long-standing problems, including those of A. Tarski and H. Friedman, are presented. Exact combinatorial optimization algorithms, in which the complexity relative to the source data is characterized by a low, or even first degree, polynomial (1 article). III. Applications of mathematical logic and the theory of algorithms (2 articles). The first article deals with the Jacobian and M. Kontsevich’s conjectures, and algorithmic undecidability; for these purposes, non-standard analysis is used. The second article provides a quantitative description of the balance and adaptive resource of a human. Submissions are invited for the next issue "Mathematical Logic and Its Applications 2021

The Ramsey property and degrees in the analytical hierarchy

In Chapter I we review some known results about the Ramsey theory for partitions of reals, and we present a certain two-person game such that if either player has a winning strategy then a homogeneous set for the partition can be constructed, and conversely. This gives alternative proofs of some of the known results. We then discuss possible uses of the game in obtaining effective versions and prove a theorem along these lines. In Chapter II we study the structure of initial segments of the Δ12n+1-degrees, assuming Projective Determinacy. We show that every finite distributive lattice is isomorphic to such an initial segment, and hence that the first-order theory of the ordering of Δ12n+1-degrees is undecidable. In Chapter III we extend Friedberg's Jump Inversion theorem to Q2n+1-degrees, after noticing that it fails tor Δ12n+1-degrees. We assume again Projective Determinacy.</p

Views from a peak:Generalisations and descriptive set theory

This dissertation has two major threads, one is mathematical, namely descriptive set theory, the other is philosophical, namely generalisation in mathematics. Descriptive set theory is the study of the behaviour of definable subsets of a given structure such as the real numbers. In the core mathematical chapters, we provide mathematical results connecting descriptive set theory and generalised descriptive set theory. Using these, we give a philosophical account of the motivations for, and the nature of, generalisation in mathematics.In Chapter 3, we stratify set theories based on this descriptive complexity. The axiom of countable choice for reals is one of the most basic fragments of the axiom of choice needed in many parts of mathematics. Descriptive choice principles are a further stratification of this fragment by the descriptive complexity of the sets. We provide a separation technique for descriptive choice principles based on Jensen forcing. Our results generalise a theorem by Kanovei.Chapter 4 gives the essentials of a generalised real analysis, that is a real analysis on generalisations of the real numbers to higher infinities. This builds on work by Galeotti and his coauthors. We generalise classical theorems of real analysis to certain sets of functions, strengthening continuity, and disprove other classical theorems. We also show that a certain cardinal property, the tree property, is equivalent to the Extreme Value Theorem for a set of functions which generalize the continuous functions.The question of Chapter 5 is whether a robust notion of infinite sums can be developed on generalisations of the real numbers to higher infinities. We state some incompatibility results, which suggest not. We analyse several candidate notions of infinite sum, both from the literature and more novel, and show which of the expected properties of a notion of sum they fail.In Chapter 6, we study the descriptive set theory arising from a generalization of topology, κ-topology, which is used in the previous two chapters. We show that the theory is quite different from that of the standard (full) topology. Differences include a collapsing Borel hierarchy, a lack of universal or complete sets, Lebesgue’s ‘great mistake’ holds (projections do not increase complexity), a strict hierarchy of notions of analyticity, and a failure of Suslin’s theorem.Lastly, in Chapter 7, we give a philosophical account of the nature of generalisation in mathematics, and describe the methodological reasons that mathematicians generalise. In so doing, we distinguish generalisation from other processes of change in mathematics, such as abstraction and domain expansion. We suggest a semantic account of generalisation, where two pieces of mathematics constitute a generalisation if they have a certain relation of content, along with an increased level of generality

Arbeitsgemeinschaft: The Geometric Langlands Conjecture

The Langlands program is a vast, loosely connected, collection of theorems and conjectures. At quite different ends, there is the geometric Langlands program, which deals with perverse sheaves on the stack of $G$-bundles on a smooth projective curve, and the local Langlands program over $p$-adic fields, which deals with the representation theory of $p$-adic groups. Recently, inspired by applications to p-adic Hodge theory, Fargues and Fontaine have associated with any $p$-adic field an object that behaves like a smooth projective curve. Fargues then suggested that one can interpret the geometric Langlands conjecture on this curve, to give a new approach towards the local Langlands program over $p$-adic fields

Discrete Geometry

[no abstract available

Methods, Goals and Metaphysics in Contemporary Set Theory

This thesis confronts Penelope Maddy's Second Philosophical study of set theory with a philosophical analysis of a part of contemporary set-theoretic practice in order to argue for three features we should demand of our philosophical programmes to study mathematics. In chapter 1, I argue that the identification of such features is a pressing philosophical issue. Chapter 2 presents those parts of the discursive reality the set theorists are currently in which are relevant to my philosophical investigation of set-theoretic practice. In chapter 3, I present Maddy's Second Philosophical programme and her analysis of set-theoretic practice. In chapters 4 and 5, I philosophically investigate contemporary set-theoretic practice. I show that some set theorists are having a debate about the metaphysical status of their discipline{ the pluralism/non-pluralism debate{ and argue that the metaphysical views of some set theorists stand in a reciprocal relationship with the way they practice set theory. As I will show in chapter 6, these two stories are disharmonious with Maddy's Second Philosophical account of set theory. I will use this disharmony to argue for three features that our philosophical programmes to study mathematics should have: they should provide an anthropology of mathematical goals; they should account for the fact that mathematical practices can be metaphysically laden; they should provide us with the means to study contemporary mathematical practices