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## Generalisations and descriptive set theory

Wontner, N.J.H.

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\section*{VIEWS FROM A PEAK

## generalisations and descriptive set theory <br> $\mathrm{CO}_{5} 3 \mathrm{y}$ <br> $\mathrm{CO}_{5} 3 \mathrm{y}$社

## Views from a peak:

## Generalisations and Descriptive Set Theory

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For further information about ILLC-publications, please contact
Institute for Logic, Language and Computation
Universiteit van Amsterdam
Science Park 107
1098 XG Amsterdam
phone: +31-20-525 6051
e-mail: illc@uva.nl
homepage: http://www.illc.uva.nl/

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Views from a peak Generalisations \& Descriptive Set Theory

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door Edward James Hugh Wontner
geboren te Pembury

## Promotiecommissie

| Promotor: | prof. dr. B. Löwe | Universiteit van Amsterdam |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Copromotores: | dr. L. Incurvati <br> dr. L. Galeotti | Universiteit van Amsterdam <br> Overige leden: |
|  | prof. dr. Y. Venema <br> dr. B. van den Berg <br> prof. dr. S.J.L. Smets <br> prof. dr. P. Ehrlich | Universiteit van Amsterdam |
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Faculteit der Natuurwetenschappen, Wiskunde en Informatica
for those who walk a distant land
$N$ Armstrong
K Armstrong
A GI Wontner

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## Chapter 1

## Introduction

This dissertation has two main themes. One is descriptive set theory, the other is generalisation in mathematics. Each of the main chapters (Chapters 3 to 7 ) develops on these themes. Chapters 3 to 6, and the preliminary Chapter 2 are mathematical, whilst the concluding Chapter 7 is philosophical in approach. We first give a general introduction to the dissertation, including a schematic portrait of each chapter, and state the main mathematical results.

### 1.1 General introduction

Our mathematical focus is descriptive set theory. The real numbers are one of the key objects of mathematics, and are studied from different perspectives. Real analysis typically takes an axiomatic approach, where the 'real numbers' can mean any model of the (second-order) theory of the real numbers (see e.g. [180]), i.e. any Dedekind-complete ordered field. Meanwhile, descriptive set theory typically takes the reals to be suitable simple sets, e.g. the Baire space $\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)$, the Cantor space $\left(2^{\omega}\right)$, or indeed $\mathscr{P}(\omega)$. These sets do not share all the properties of the ordered field of real numbers (see pages 3 \& 116), but are sufficiently close to the real field (see page 11) and are so set-theoretically convenient that they are a good compromise for descriptive set theorists. Ultimately, the roots of descriptive set theory are in real analysis and set-theoretical questions about the real numbers; the connection remains strong (see 16 for a modern introduction to these connections). Descriptive set theory falls under the larger heading of set theory. Set theory itself has two over-arching themes: the study of the infinite, and the foundations of mathematics. Descriptive set theory draws on both of these themes, notably the former. Chapter 3 is closely connected with the second of these themes, the subsequent chapters are more close to the first theme.

We start with Chapter 2, which contains a general set of preliminaries which applies to all the mathematical chapters. This lays down our notation, principal definitions, and some initial basic theory. Each mathematical chapter begins with a sketch of the chapter itself, and a statement of any additional notation required or specific to that chapter. Throughout each chapter, we include open questions as they arise in the development of theory.

In Chapter 33, we draw on the rôle of set theory in the foundation of mathematics: one of the major research directions in set theory distinguishes and compares set theories, particularly on the basis of the use of the Axiom of Choice (AC) in the theories in question. We study the effect of $A C$ on descriptive set theory. Among the fragments of AC of the form $\mathrm{AC}_{X}(Y), \mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)$, has a special position. Most uses of $A C$ in ordinary mathematics are required because we want theorems to hold in general; when specialising the results to concrete mathematical objects, they can often be proved in ZF. However, the uses of AC in the basic foundations of analysis are needed even when working with concrete mathematical objects such as the reals or the complex numbers. The fragment of AC most fundamental in this respect is $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)$. Like AC itself, $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)$ does not follow from $Z F$, and there are pathological models of $\mathrm{ZF}+\neg \mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)$. In such models, the behaviour of the reals, real analysis, and topology can vary wildly from the corresponding theory in ZFC (see [5], [66, Chapter 56], [109], [113], [152|). Bizarre happenings include that the reals can be a countable union of countable sets [32, page 146], or all subsets of the reals can be Borel (Theorem 2.1.7).

Chapter 3 looks at fragments of $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)$ called descriptive choice principles. These restrict $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)$ to those sequences of sets of reals which have a particular description, i.e. ensure that these sequences have choice functions. These descriptive choice principles can be compared to uniformisation in descriptive set theory (as in [161, Chapter 4]): uniformisation asks whether a particular pointclass has choice functions of a certain low complexity. Here, we ask what it takes for those pointclasses to have a choice function at all. We focus on the descriptions of sequences of sets of reals given by the projective pointclasses. Choice principles like this were studied by Kanovei in [109], who proved a first separation theorem for some of these principles. The main result of this chapter improves on Kanovei's result, with a method based on Jensen forcing. We construct models which separate uniform projective choice principles of different levels from one another. We also give something of a flavour of what descriptive set theory is like without AC.

The subsequent mathematical chapters concern generalised descriptive set theory, and its connection to real analysis. (Classical) descriptive set theory views the real numbers as suitable simple sets, like $2^{\omega}$ and $\omega^{\omega}$. This lends itself to generalisations for cardinals $\kappa>\omega$, which yields the $\kappa$-Baire space $\left(\kappa^{\kappa}\right)$ and the $\kappa$-Cantor space $\left(2^{\kappa}\right)$. This approach is known as generalised descriptive set theory. Generalised descriptive set theory draws more strongly on the second theme of set theory, the study of the infinite. It is a contemporary research area with strong links to e.g. model theory, determinacy, combinatorial set theory, and the classification of uncountable structures (see, for example, [117]).

As generalised descriptive set theory has progressed, a great deal of classical descriptive set theory has been generalised from $2^{\omega}$ and $\omega^{\omega}$ to $2^{\kappa}$ and $\kappa^{\kappa}$. Let's give a small taste of the generalisations of Borel and analytic structure (anticipating Chapter (6). Much more can be found in e.g. [6], or [68]. Exactly in analogy to the classical case, if $\kappa^{<\kappa}=\kappa$, then the following hold for $2^{\kappa}$ and $\kappa^{\kappa}$ : the spaces are $\kappa$ additive, basic open sets are closed, the spaces have weight $\kappa$, the topologies are of size $2^{\kappa}$, and $\left(\kappa^{\kappa}\right)^{n}$ is homeomorphic to $\kappa^{\kappa}$ [68, pages 8-9]. Several of the classically equivalent definitions of being a projection of a closed set (i.e. $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{1}^{1}$ ) have also been
shown equivalent in the generalised case, e.g. being a projection of a Borel set, a projection of a $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{1}^{1}$ set, or a continuous image of a closed set [68, Theorem 19].

In other cases, the structure in the generalised setting is disanalogous to the classical structure of Borel and analytic sets. For example, if $\kappa^{<\kappa}=\kappa$, then the Borel sets are a strict subset of the $\boldsymbol{\Delta}_{1}^{1}$ sets, if $V=\mathrm{L}$ then the codeable Borel sets (i.e. the sets with a 'specified instruction' for how to build them from basic open sets) are exactly the $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{1}^{1}$ sets, and it is consistent that the $\boldsymbol{\Delta}_{1}^{1}$ sets are a strict subset of the codeable Borel sets [68, Theorem 18]. Under the same assumption, there is a closed subset of $\kappa^{\kappa}$ which is not a continuous image and of $\kappa^{\kappa}$, and there is an injective continuous image of $\kappa^{\kappa}$ which is not Borel [135]. All of these examples are false in the classical case with $\omega^{\omega}$.

In Chapters 4 to 6, we focus on the connection between real analysis and generalised descriptive set theory. Our main objective is to develop a theory of generalised real analysis on ordered fields of high cardinality ( $>2^{\aleph_{0}}$ ), which resembles classical real analysis on the real numbers, just as how generalised descriptive set theory on the $\kappa$-Baire space is in analogy to (classical) descriptive set theory on the Baire space.

The spaces of generalised descriptive set theory, like $\kappa^{\kappa}$ and $2^{\kappa}$, are no good for this generalised real analysis because these sets have no algebraic (field) structure: just like $\omega^{\omega}$, the set $\kappa^{\kappa}$ has an order structure, but its order has no compatible field structure (see page 116). So, to generalise real analysis, our approach is somewhat more axiomatic: in each generalisation, we specify conditions on a field, $\mathbb{K}$, such that this field generalises the real numbers in the requisite way for the generalisation in question.

Equipped with an algebraic generalisation of the real numbers, generalised real analysis can start in earnest. This is the main project of Chapters 4 and 5 . Generalised real analysis is part of the long tradition of generalising the field of real numbers (for a survey, see $\mid 52$ ). We see this in early analysis on the surreal numbers [2, 80 and the hyperreal numbers. More recent developments include the generalisation of $\mathbb{R}$ by Asperó and Tsaprounis [8] and some further analysis on the surreal numbers [39, 62, 179]. The immediate mathematical jumping-off point is Galeotti's introduction of a generalisation of the reals, $\left.\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}, 73,74,75\right]$. We extend the initial work on the generalised real analysis of $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ sequences in e.g. [25, 76|. This $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ will be our principal example of an ordered field of large cardinality (see Theorem 2.3.13 and Section 2.3.5), though we state our results axiomatically where possible.

Chapters 4,5 , and 6 build on this connection in different ways. In Chapter 4 we develop the theory of generalised real analysis of functions. Along with the broader connections that generalised real analysis has with other areas of mathematics, this chapter has close links to the model theory of ordered fields 127, 172, 188, generalisations of continuity (e.g. [166]), and studies of real analysis as completeness [44. We define a number of generalisations of continuity, both novel and from the literature. The focal notions are $\kappa$-continuity, $\kappa$-supercontinuity, and sharpness. We then prove generalisations of classical theorems from real analysis for these generalisations of continuity. Some of these generalisations of classical theorems hold independently of the choice of $\kappa$, whilst others depend strongly on
the properties of $\kappa$. A localisation of the inherently global notion of $\kappa$-continuity is also mentioned.

In Chapter 5, we sketch the outlook for developing notions of infinite sum on high cardinality fields. We state some natural desiderata that such notions of sum would be expected to satisfy. The outlook is not hopeful: there are no notions of sum which simultaneously satisfy even the most basic properties of a sum (Theorem 5.2.3).

We then analyse notions of infinite sum, including both those from the literature and those that arise naturally, with the intention to develop a robust generalisation of real analysis. When summation and integration have been studied, the perspective has been more model-theoretic [179, Definition 39], or combinatorial (e.g. on the surreals, see [62, page 35]). Our approach is more analytical. Unlike the model-theoretic perspective, we do not restrict ourselves to (an extension of) the language of fields. Instead, we allow ourselves the full power of a background set theory. We also do not in general assume that our field is initial in surreals (pace parts of Sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.4), unlike other approaches to infinite sums (e.g. [179]). We aim to have a notion of infinite sum which is somehow correlated to the basenumber of the field in question, rather than countably infinite sums. This makes our approach distinct from e.g. infinite sums of Hahn fields which supervene on countable sums (Section 5.3.3). Our approach connects to work on transfinite generalisation of the Hessenberg sums on ordinals (e.g. in [133] and its bibliography). Here, we approach sums as they are used in real analysis proper. For the notions of sum we analyse, we establish which of these desiderata they satisfy.

On the basis of our discussion of sums, we define a generalised 'long' notion of a polynomial. Our generalisation of polynomials is aimed at a generalisation of Weierstraß' Approximation Theorem, which we show fails for (standard) polynomials.

Chapter 6 is closer in spirit to generalised descriptive set theory proper. It analyses the notion of $\kappa$-topology which arises from the generalisation of real analysis in the previous two chapters, particularly for the notion of $\kappa$-continuity. This contrasts with the ordinary approach to generalised descriptive set theory, which takes as its starting point the ordinary ('full') topology on the spaces in play. This leads to corresponding $\kappa$-topological generalisations of Borel and analytic sets. We are particularly interested in the cases where $\kappa$ is inaccessible or even weakly compact, which makes the generalised descriptive set theory very well-behaved. We focus on the bounded $\kappa$-topology on $\kappa^{\kappa}$ as the canonical topological space of generalised descriptive set theory, including generalised notions of a Borel hierarchy and analytic sets. We also develop the corresponding theory on $2^{\kappa}$ and certain ordered spaces, e.g. $\left(\kappa^{*} \sqcup \kappa\right)^{\kappa}$ and $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$.

In Chapter 7, we leave the mathematical foreground, take a large step back, and consider the bigger philosophical picture. The previous chapters concern generalisations of descriptive set theory and real analysis, but the question remains of what a generalisation is in mathematics. The final chapter is helps remedy this, by giving a philosophical account which explicates generalisation in mathematics. Our approach draws on those of the philosophy of mathematical practice and
mathematical change. The account is informed by the mathematical developments of the previous chapters, particularly Chapter 4 . We have two core questions: what are mathematical generalisations? Secondly, why do mathematicians generalise at all?

For the first question, like the artist-turned-art critic, we use our experience from Chapters 3 to 6 to give some insight into the mechanics of generalisation as a process. We use this to help provide a typology for these generalisations and others from the literature (the species), and of accounts of generalisation. We compare generalisation to other processes of change in mathematical practice, notably abstraction and domain expansion. We then analyse syntacticist accounts of the nature of generalisations based on the literature, and suggest instead a semanticist account, based on content.

In answering the second question, we assess whether certain traditional accounts of the motivation of mathematical change fit generalisations.

Our core conclusions are that 1) generalisation in mathematics is a sui generis process of mathematical change which cannot be reduced to other processes, 2) neither explantoriness nor simplicity is necessary for the success of a generalisation, and 3) a syntacticist account of the nature of generalisation is untenable, we must instead opt for a form of semanticism.

### 1.2 Main mathematical results

In this section, we state our main mathematical results from Chapters 3 to 6.
In Chapter 3, we study fragments of AC which are defined using descriptive pointclasses. Such choice principles were first considered by Kanovei [109], who proved certain separation theorems. Our main result generalises those of Kanovei:

Theorem 3.2.4 (Separation Theorem). For every $n \geq 1$, there is a model of ZF $+\mathrm{DC}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \boldsymbol{\Pi}_{n}^{1}\right)+\neg \mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ;\right.$ unif $\left.\Pi_{n+1}^{1}\right)+\neg \mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \mathbf{C t b l}\right)$.

By compactness, we also can construct a model with the following properties:
Corollary 3.2.7. There is a model of $\mathrm{ZF}+\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ;\right.$ unifProj $)+\neg \mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \mathbf{C t b l}\right)$.
In Chapter 4, we study the generalisations of real analysis on large cardinality fields, particularly on $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$. Many results are independent of the choice of $\kappa$, whilst others depend substantially on the properties of $\kappa$. We summarise the former results as follows, using $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ as it satisfies all of the requisite conditions (see page (75). Let $\kappa^{<\kappa}=\kappa$, and let $f: \mathbb{R}_{\kappa} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ :

1. If $f$ is $\kappa$-continuous, then $f$ is $\operatorname{IVT}\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}\right)$ and $\operatorname{OMT}\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}\right)$ (Theorem 4.2.3 \& Proposition 4.2.13).
2. If $f$ is $\kappa$-continuous, then $f$ is $\operatorname{EVT}\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}\right)$ if and only if $f$ is $\kappa$-supercontinuous (Corollary 4.2.21).
3. If both $f$ and $x \mapsto f(x)-x$ are $\kappa$-continuous, then $f$ is $\operatorname{BFPT}\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}\right)$; however, there are $\kappa$-supercontinuous functions that are not $\operatorname{BFPT}\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}\right)$ (Propositions $4.2 .14 \& 4.2 .16$.
4. If $f$ is $\kappa$-supercontinuous, then $f$ is $\operatorname{BVT}\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}\right)$ and $\operatorname{Rolle}\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}\right)$ (Propositions 4.2 .25 \& 4.2.19).
5. If both $f$ and $x \mapsto f(x)+a . x+b$ are $\kappa$-supercontinuous, then $f$ is $\operatorname{MVT}(\mathbb{K})$, $\operatorname{CVT}\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}\right)$, and $\operatorname{PDT}\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}\right)$ (Proposition 4.2.26).

We also show that, on certain large cardinality fields, the $\kappa$-continuous and $\kappa$ supercontinuous functions are not closed under uniform convergence (Proposition 4.2.28). In Section 4.3, we give a generalisation turns on a property of the cardinal, $\kappa$, extending the work in (25] and [76]:

Theorem4.3.11. Let $\mathbb{K}$ be a $\kappa$-spherically complete ordered field $\mathbb{K}$ where $\mathrm{bn}(\mathbb{K})=$ $\kappa$. Then the following are equivalent:

1. $\kappa$ has the tree property,
2. EVT(K, sharp), and
3. $\operatorname{BVT}(\mathbb{K}$, sharp $)$.

In Chapter 5. we characterise and study candidate notions of infinite sums on large cardinality fields. We give full statements of the properties of a sum, $S$, in Section 5.1. In rough terms: $S$ satisfies Ext if it extends finite addition, Lin if it is linear in its arguments, Conc if the concatenation of two $S$-summable sequences is itself $S$-summable, whilst Comp generalises Weierstraß' M-test: if a non-negative $S$-summable sequence $s$ pointwise bounds a non-negative sequence $t$, then $t$ is $S$ summable. Then no non-trivial sum satisfies all four conditions (Theorem 5.2.3). Instead, we establish which of the desired properties for a notion of infinite sum our candidates satisfy. This is summarised in Table 1.1.

Table 1.1 includes two further natural properties: Ind, where the $S$-sum of a sequence is invariant under sequential reorderings, and $\mathbf{E l}$, where a sequence is $S$-summable if and only if its contraction is. In Table 1.1, ( $\exists$ ) means that there is an infinite support, positive, summable sequence. The grey columns indicate the four incompatible properties from Theorem 5.2.3.

|  | Section | Ext | Lin | Conc | Comp | $(\exists)$ | Ind | El |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| finmod | 5.3 .1 | no | yes | no | no | yes | no | no |
| infmod | 5.3 .1 | no | yes | no | no | yes | no | no |
| supfin | 5.3 .2 | yes | yes | yes | yes | no | yes | yes |
| simple | 5.3 .2 | no | no | no | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| point | 5.3 .3 | yes | yes | yes | no | yes | no | yes |
| seq | 5.3 .4 | yes | no | no | no | yes | yes | yes |
| $\int$ | 5.3 .5 | yes | yes | yes | yes | no | yes | yes |

Table 1.1: The main properties of the candidate notions of sum

We show that Weierstraß' Approximation Theorem fails in a strong way for (ordinary) polynomials (Proposition 5.4.1):

Proposition 5.4.1. If $\mathbb{K}$ is an rcf with $\mathrm{bn}(\mathbb{K})=\kappa$, then there is a $\kappa$-supercontinuous function that is not uniformly approximated by polynomials.

In Chapter 6, we study the $\kappa$-topologies of the previous two chapters, and their resultant generalised descriptive set-theoretic structure. We give several characterisations of the $\kappa$-Borel sets, most importantly:
Lemma 6.2.12, Let $\kappa$ be inaccessible. For every Borel $_{\kappa}$ set $X \subseteq \kappa^{\kappa}$, there is a unique family $\mathcal{F}(B) \subseteq \kappa^{<\kappa}$, and a unique conelike partition, $\mathcal{P}(B)=\left\{P_{s}: s \in\right.$ $\mathcal{F}(B)\}$, such that $\mathcal{F}(B)$ and $\mathcal{P}(B)$ are optimal for $B$.

This allows us to prove a further characterisation of the tree property (in the form of the weakly compact cardinals amongst the inaccessibles, see Lemma 6.2.16 and Remark 6.2.18) and the following link to the full topology:
Theorem 6.3.32, Let $\kappa$ be weakly compact. If $A$ is weakly analytic then $\mid \operatorname{cl}(A) \backslash$ $A \mid \leq \kappa$.

We show that Lebesgue was right for projections of $\kappa$-Borel sets:
Corollary 6.3.4. If $\kappa$ is inaccessible, either:

1. $Y$ is $\kappa$-additive, in which case $C \subseteq X$ is $\kappa$-closed if and only if $\pi_{1}(D)=C$ for some $\kappa$-closed set $D$ in $Y \times X$, or
2. $Y$ is not $\kappa$-additive, in which case $\pi_{1}(D)=C$ for some $D$ which is $\kappa$-closed in $Y \times X$ if and only if $C=X \backslash \bigcap_{\alpha \in \lambda} O_{\alpha}$ where $O_{\alpha}$ are $\kappa$-open and $\lambda<\kappa$.
But the other standard notions of analyticity yield a proper hierarchy of complexity:
Corollary 6.3.51. 1. Let $\kappa$ be inaccessible. Let $X$ be a dense linear order. Let $Q \subseteq X$ be order dense in $X$. Suppose that, for all $(\lambda, \mu)$-gaps in $X, \lambda, \mu \leq \kappa$. Let $X$ have the $Q$-interval $\kappa$-topology. Strong $X$-analyticity implies, but is not implied by, intermediate $X$-analyticity, and intermediate $X$-analyticity implies weak $X$-analyticity.
3. Let $\kappa$ be weakly compact. Then strong analyticity implies, but is not implied by, intermediate analyticity, and intermediate analyticity implies, but is not implied by, weak analyticity.
We show the failure of Suslin's theorem for these notions on $\kappa^{\kappa}$ (and $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$, with a comment on $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$, see Corollaries 6.3.43 and 6.3.47, and Remark 6.3.44):
Theorem 6.3.18. The following proper inclusions hold:
4. $\operatorname{Bor}_{\kappa} \subsetneq\left\{A \subseteq \kappa^{\kappa}: A\right.$ is weakly bianalytic $\}$,
5. $\operatorname{Bor}_{\kappa} \subsetneq\left\{A \subseteq \kappa^{\kappa}: A\right.$ is intermediately bianalytic $\}$, and
6. Bor $_{\kappa} \nsubseteq\left\{A \subseteq \kappa^{\kappa}: A\right.$ is strongly analytic $\}$ and $\operatorname{Bor}_{\kappa} \nsubseteq\left\{A \subseteq \kappa^{\kappa}: \kappa^{\kappa} \backslash A\right.$ is strongly analytic $\}$.
In analogy to the classical case, we show that we can construct $2^{\kappa}$ many distinct $\kappa$-topologies which are nevertheless fully isomorphic:
Corollary 6.4.4. Let $\kappa$ be inaccessible. There are $2^{\kappa}$-many non- $\kappa$-homeomorphic $\kappa$-topologies on $\kappa^{\kappa}$ whose full topology is fully homeomorphic to $\left(\kappa^{\kappa},\left\langle\tau_{b}\right\rangle_{\infty}\right)$.

## Chapter 2

## Preliminaries

Throughout, our basic notation is drawn from [75], [103], [108, and [112].

### 2.1 Notation and set theory

### 2.1.1 Sequences, trees, and cardinals

We use the standard notation for cardinals, ordinals, sequences, and trees, from e.g. [75, Chapter 1] or [103]. We use a non-standard notation for sequence variables: blackboard bold letters such as $火$ and $y$ are indicating that these objects are sequences, i.e. functions in $X^{\alpha}$ with ordinal domain $\alpha$ and range in a given set $X$. In this situation, we write $\mathcal{K}=\left(x_{\beta}\right)_{\beta \in \alpha}$ to specify the coordinate of the sequence and say the length of $x$ is $\alpha$, written $\operatorname{len}(x)=\alpha$. For any sets $a$ and $b$, we write $a^{\wedge} \mathfrak{K}^{\complement} b$ for the sequence $\mathfrak{x}^{\prime}=\left(x_{j}^{\prime}\right)_{1+\alpha+1}$ where $x_{0}^{\prime}=a, x_{1+j}^{\prime}=x_{j}$ and $x_{1+\alpha}^{\prime}=b$. If y is also a sequence, we write $\mathfrak{x}^{\wedge} \mathrm{y}$ for the concatenation of $火$ and $y$. If $\alpha$ is an ordinal, and $a$ is a set, we let $\bar{a}_{\alpha}$ be the constant sequence of length $\alpha$, where each coordinate is $a$.

Let $X$ and $Y$ be sets, and let $Y$ have a fixed element, $0_{Y}$ (e.g. $Y$ is a monoid). For each $f: X \rightarrow Y$, we define the support of $f$ by $\operatorname{supp}(f):=\{x \in X: f(x) \neq$ $\left.0_{Y}\right\}$. Similarly, if $y \in Y^{\alpha}$, then $\operatorname{supp}(y)=\left\{\beta \in \alpha: y_{\beta} \neq 0_{Y}\right\}$.

Definition 2.1.1 (Trees). 1. A set-theoretic tree is a partially ordered set, $(T,<)$, such that for all $t \in T,\{s \in T: s<t\}$ is well-ordered by $<$, with a unique element, $r$, such that for all $t \in T, r \leq t$.
2. A descriptive set-theoretic tree is a set $T \subseteq X^{<\alpha}$, where $X$ is a set, $\alpha$ is an ordinal, and $T$ is closed under taking subsequences.

Every descriptive set-theoretic tree is a set-theoretic tree, with the ordering $\subsetneq$. In Chapter 3, we focus on set-theoretic trees, and descriptive set-theoretic trees included in $\omega^{<\omega}$. Otherwise, our trees are on larger cardinals, e.g. in Chapter 6, our target spaces are $\kappa^{\kappa}$ and $2^{\kappa}$ (defined in Section 2.1.2), which are naturally viewed as descriptive set-theoretic trees. As it is clear from context, we ambiguously refer to both as trees.

The subsequent definitions are common to both notions of tree, where descriptive set-theoretic trees are ordered by $\subsetneq$. We say that $b \subseteq T$ is a branch if it is a maximal chain of $T$. We let [ $T$ ] be the set of branches of $T$. We say that $s \in T$ is a leaf of $T$ if there is no $t \in T$ such that $s \subsetneq t$. If $T$ has no leaves, we say that $T$ is pruned. We say a tree is perfect if for every $t \in T$ there are $s, s^{\prime}$ such that $s \neq s^{\prime}$ and $t \frown s, t \frown s^{\prime} \in T$. For $s, t \in T$, we say that $s \perp t$ if neither $s \subseteq t$ nor $t \subseteq s$, and if $A \subseteq T$, we say that $s \perp A$ if for all $t \in A, s \perp t$. If some $s \in T$ has more than one successor, then the stem of $T$, $\operatorname{stem}(T)$, is the unique $s \in T$ of the lowest level which has more than one successor. We define $T_{t}:=\{s \in T: s \subseteq t \vee t \subseteq s\}$.

Now assume $T$ is descriptive set-theoretic. We write $[T] \subseteq X^{\alpha}$, as each maximal chain can be viewed as an $火 \in X^{\alpha}$. The $\alpha^{\text {th }}$ level of $T$ is the set $\{s \in T: \operatorname{len}(s)=\alpha\}$, we denote it $\operatorname{Lev}_{\alpha}(T)$. If $\kappa$ is a cardinal, we call $T$ a $\kappa$-tree if $T \subseteq \kappa^{<\kappa}, T$ has height $\kappa$, and for all $\alpha<\kappa,\left|\operatorname{Lev}_{\alpha}(T)\right|<\kappa$. If $A \subseteq T$, we define $\downarrow A:=\{t \in T: \exists a \in$ $A(a \leq t)\}$. Define $\delta(T)=\left\{s \in \kappa^{<\kappa} \backslash \downarrow T: \forall \alpha<\operatorname{len}(s)(s\lceil\alpha \in \downarrow T)\}\right.$, we call $\delta(T)$ the frontier of $T$.

Throughout, we use $\kappa, \lambda$, and $\mu$ for cardinals. We call a set $C \subseteq \kappa$ a club if it is closed and unbounded [103, page 91]. The intersection of $<\kappa$ many clubs on $\kappa$ is itself a club [103, Theorem 8.3]. A cardinal, $\kappa$, is regular if $\operatorname{cof}(\kappa)=\kappa$, otherwise it is singular. We say $\kappa$ is a strong limit if whenever $\alpha<\kappa$ is a cardinal, $2^{\alpha}<\kappa$. If $\kappa$ is regular and a strong limit, $\kappa$ is called inaccessible. We say that $\kappa^{<\kappa}=\kappa$, if for all $\alpha \in \kappa \backslash\{0\}, \kappa^{\alpha}=\kappa$. Note that if $\kappa^{<\kappa}=\kappa$, then $\kappa$ is regular (as, for any infinite cardinal, $\kappa^{\operatorname{cof}(\kappa)}>\kappa$ ). Likewise, if $\kappa$ is inaccessible, then $\kappa^{<\kappa}=\kappa 103$, 5.21, page 60].

Definition 2.1.2. A cardinal $\kappa$ has the tree property is every $\kappa$-tree has a branch of length $\kappa$. If $\kappa$ is inaccessible and has the tree property, we call $\kappa$ weakly compact.
Definition 2.1.3. A $\kappa$-Aronszajn is a $\kappa$-tree with no branch of length $\kappa$.
Hence, $\kappa$ has the tree property if and only if there are no $\kappa$-Aronszajn trees.
Definition 2.1.4. A $\kappa$-tree, $T$, is called well-pruned if for all $x \in T, \mid\{y \in T: x \subseteq$ $y\} \mid=\kappa$.
Lemma 2.1.5 (Kunen, [129, Lemma III.5.27]). If $\kappa$ is regular, then there is a $\kappa$-Aronszajn tree if and only if there is a well-pruned $\kappa$-Aronszajn tree.

In Chapters 4 to 6, we are mainly concerned with situations where regular $\kappa>\omega$, often also assuming that $\kappa^{<\kappa}=\kappa$. In Chapter 6, we often assume $\kappa$ is inaccessible, though we remark on when weaker cardinal assumptions are sufficient. Throughout, we note which assumptions on $\kappa$ are necessary for the results to hold.

### 2.1.2 Real numbers and other spaces

In this section, we introduce our principal topological spaces, assuming familiarity with basic topological notions, preempting a more systematic and thorough discussion in Section 2.2.1.

We let $\mathbb{Q}$ be the ordered field of rationals and $\mathbb{R}$ be the ordered field of the real numbers, defined as the Cauchy completion of $\mathbb{Q}$. These are topological spaces by their order topology.

If $X$ is any set and $\alpha$ any ordinal, we let $N_{s}:=\left\{火 \in X^{\alpha}: s \subseteq k\right\}$. The collection $\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{b}}:=\left\{N_{s}: s \in X^{<\alpha}\right\}$ forms a topology basis (cf. Section 2.2.1) and the topology generated by it is called the bounded topology on $X^{\alpha}$. The sets $\omega^{\omega}, 2^{\omega}, \kappa^{\kappa}$, and $2^{\kappa}$ equipped with their bounded topologies are called the Baire space, Cantor space, $\kappa$-Baire space, and $\kappa$-Cantor space, respectively.

Note that the elements of $\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{b}}$ are clopen in the bounded topology, so the Baire and Cantor spaces are zero-dimensional. We can identify finite products of the Baire space with the Baire space via Cantor's pairing function $\ulcorner\cdot, \cdot\urcorner: \omega \times \omega \rightarrow \omega$ : for $x, y \in \omega^{\omega}$, we let $f(x, y)(n):=\ulcorner x(n), y(n)\urcorner$; then $f: \omega^{\omega} \times \omega^{\omega} \rightarrow \omega^{\omega}$ is a homeomorphism. Similarly, if $A=\left(A_{n}: n \in \omega\right)$ where $A_{n} \subseteq \omega^{\omega}$, we can identify it with the set $\widehat{A}:=\left\{n^{\frown} x: x \in A_{n}\right\}$ while preserving basic topological features of the set (e.g. if $\widehat{A}$ is open or closed, then all $A_{n}$ must be open or closed).

The spaces $\mathbb{Q}, \mathbb{R}, \omega^{\omega}$, and $2^{\omega}$ are classic examples of Polish spaces, i.e., separable and completely metrisable topological spaces. Par abus de langage, but as usual in descriptive set theory, we call the elements of $\omega^{\omega}$ real numbers or reals in Chapter 3. even though it is not homeomorphic the ordered field of real numbers; however, the notation $\mathbb{R}$ is reserved for the ordered field.

### 2.1.3 Axioms of set theory

We mostly work in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF) and Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice (ZFC). In Chapter 3, our base theory is ZF; in all other chapters, our base theory is ZFC. If we wish to emphasise that a result uses $A C$, we indicate this by writing "(AC)"; similarly, if we wish to emphasise that a result does not use AC, we indicate this by writing " $(Z F)$ ". We write ZF $^{-}$for ZF without the power set axiom and the collection scheme instead of the replacement scheme. Likewise, we write ZFC $^{-}$for ZF $^{-}+$AC. (See 78 for a discussion of this theory and why collection has to be substituted for replacement.)

The Axiom of Choice, AC, states that every family of non-empty sets has a choice function. A fragment of AC is a statement $\Phi$ such that ZFC $\vdash \Phi$ but ZF $\forall \Phi$. There is a huge literature on fragments of $A C$, and one major industry is showing the equivalence or separation of pairs of fragments; a classic source for this is 95.

The Axiom of Choice can be stratified into fragments based on the index set of the family and the domain the non-empty sets come from. If we write $\mathrm{AC}_{X}(Y)$ for "every family indexed by elements of $X$ of non-empty subsets of $Y$ has a choice function", then AC is equivalent to " $\mathrm{AC}_{X}(Y)$ holds for all sets $X$ and $Y$ ". Amongst these fragments of $A C$, the countable axiom of choice for reals, denoted $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)$, is particularly important for the purposes of descriptive set theory and real analysis. We note that there are models of $Z F$ where $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)$ (and hence AC ) fails, e.g. the Feferman-Lévy model (see Theorem 2.1.7). Furthermore, we write $A C_{\omega}$ for the statement "for all sets $X, \mathrm{AC}_{\omega}(X)$ holds" and call this the Axiom of Countable Choice.

For any set, $X$, a relation $R \subseteq X \times X$ is called total if for all $x \in X$ there is a $y \in Y$ such that $x R y$. For $X \neq \emptyset, \mathrm{DC}(X)$ states that for every total relation $R \subseteq X \times X$, there is a sequence $\left(x_{n}\right)_{n \in \omega} \in X^{\omega}$ such that $x_{n} R x_{n+1}$ for all $n \in \omega$.

Then, DC is the statement that for all non-empty $X, \mathrm{DC}(X)$ holds. It is well known that DC implies $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}$, and indeed $\mathrm{DC}(X)$ implies $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}(X)$ (e.g. [205, Proposition 1.2.1]). Once more, in our setting, the most relevant fragment is $D C\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)$ which is of particular importance in descriptive set theory and real analysis.

The fragments $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)$ and $\mathrm{DC}\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)$ can themselves be stratified into a family of smaller fragments that will be the main topic of Chapter 3.

Let $\Xi$ be any collection of countable sequences of sets of reals. Then we write $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \Xi\right)$ for the statement "every countable sequence of non-empty sets of reals in $\Xi$ has a choice function".

Let $\Gamma$ be any collection of sets of reals. Using the zero-dimensionality of the Baire space, we identify $\omega^{\omega}$ and $\omega^{\omega} \times \omega^{\omega}$ via a homeomorphism (see Section 2.1.2, page (11). Thus, if $R \subseteq \omega^{\omega} \times \omega^{\omega}$, we say that $R$ is in $\Gamma$ if the homeomorphic image of $R$ in the Baire space is in $\Gamma$. We write $\mathrm{DC}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \Gamma\right)$ for the statement "for any $X \in \Gamma$ and any total relation $R \subseteq X \times X$ that is in $\Gamma$, there is a sequence $\left(x_{n}\right)_{n \in \omega} \in X^{\omega}$ such that for all $n \in \omega$, we have $x_{n} R x_{n+1}$ ", called the axiom of dependent choices for $\Gamma$ relations.

We give two examples: let Ctbl be the set of countable sets of reals; we say that a sequence of sets is in Ctbl if all of its members are countable. Let Closed be the set of closed sets of reals (later denoted by $\boldsymbol{\Pi}_{1}^{0}$; see Section 2.1.4; we say that a sequence of sets is in Closed if all of its members are closed. Then $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \mathbf{C t b l}\right)$ is the same principle that is sometimes known as $\operatorname{CAC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)$ in the literature, whilst $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ;\right.$ Closed) corresponds to " $\omega$ 频 is countably Loeb" (cf. [21, page 442], 114, page 15], [115, page 3]).

### 2.1.4 Descriptive pointclasses

Throughout this dissertation, particularly Chapters 3 and 6, we are concerned largely with definable sets, either of Polish spaces or their large cardinality analogues. In our context, a pointclass is a collection of subsets of Polish spaces.

In this section, we define the pointclasses of Borel and projective sets and their definable analogues, being especially sensitive to the choice-free context of Chapter 3. All pointclasses defined will be referred to as descriptive pointclasses. In Chapter 6, we define their generalisations to $\kappa$-topologies. Our notation is based on [103, §25] and [161, Chapter 3].

## Borel sets

Let $X$ be a Polish space. We define the following pointclasses:

1. $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{1}^{0}(X):=\{A \subseteq X: A$ is open $\}$,
2. $\boldsymbol{\Pi}_{\xi}^{0}(X):=\left\{X \backslash A: A \in \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{\xi}^{0}(X)\right\}$,
3. if $\lambda>0$, then $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{\lambda}^{0}(X):=\left\{\bigcup_{n \in \omega} A_{n}: A_{n} \in \bigcup_{\xi \in \lambda} \Pi_{\xi}^{0}(X)\right\}$,
4. $\mathcal{B}(X):=\bigcup_{\xi \in \operatorname{Ord}}\left(\Sigma_{\xi}^{0}(X) \cup \Pi_{\xi}^{0}(X)\right)$, which we call the Borel sets of $X$, and
5. $\Delta_{n}^{0}(X):=\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{n}^{0}(X) \cap \Pi_{n}^{0}(X)$.

As usual, we code Borel sets by well-founded trees: let $\mathcal{T}$ be the set of wellfounded trees $T \subseteq \omega^{<\omega}$; we can define by recursion a function $\phi: \mathcal{T} \rightarrow \mathscr{P}(X)$ such that each $\varphi(T)$ is a Borel set (e.g. [103, page 504]). We say that $B \subseteq X$ is codeable Borel if there is a Borel code $T$ such that $\phi(T)=B$, and write $\mathcal{B}^{*}(X)$ for the set of all codeable Borel sets. By a simple induction, using $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}(X)$ to pick the codes in the case of countable unions, every Borel set has a Borel code, i.e. $\mathcal{B}(X)=\mathcal{B}^{*}(X)$. This fails without AC; in the ZF-context, we only have the following result.

Lemma 2.1.6 (ZF; Fremlin, 66, Proposition 562Da]). If $X$ is a Polish space, then $\Pi_{2}^{0}(X), \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{2}^{0}(X) \subseteq \mathcal{B}^{*}(X) \subseteq \mathcal{B}(X)$.

Without AC, Lemma 2.1.6 is optimal (see Theorem 2.1.7).
The usual inclusion hierarchy between the Borel pointclasses is a ZF-result, as it can be easily checked by observing that the standard proof does not use any choice: for any Polish space $X$ and $0<\xi<\eta$, we have that:


So, the Borel sets form a (not necessarily strictly) increasing hierarchy. If, for any $\alpha, \boldsymbol{\Delta}_{\alpha}^{0}(X)=\boldsymbol{\Delta}_{\alpha+1}^{0}(X)$, then all subsequent pointclasses are the same (we say in this case that the hierarchy collapses at $\alpha$ ). The smallest $\alpha$ where this happens is called the length of the Borel hierarchy.

Let $X, Y$ be Polish spaces. If $s \in X$ and $t \in Y$, we define $A_{s}=\{y \in Y$ : $(s, y) \in A\}$ and $A_{t}=\{x \in X:(x, t) \in A\}$ and call these sets the slices of $A$. We say that a set $U \in X \times Y$ is universal for $\Gamma$ if $U \in \Gamma(X \times Y)$ and for all $X \in \Gamma(X)$, there is a $y \in Y$ such that $U_{y}=A$.

In ZFC, we prove that the Borel hierarchy does not collapse by constructing universal sets for each Borel pointclass (as in [103, page 141]). If $X$ is a perfect Polish space, we can recursively define universal sets for all codeable $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{\alpha}^{0}(X)$ sets (where $\alpha<\omega_{1}$ ); thus, assuming $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}(X)$, we have universal sets for $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{\alpha}^{0}(X)$, which implies that the hierarchy does not collapse at $\alpha$ (see, e.g. [103, Corollary 11.3]). Using the regularity of $\omega_{1}$ (which follows from $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)$ ), we obtain that for all perfect Polish spaces, the length of the Borel hierarchy in $X$ is $\omega_{1}$; in ZF, this cannot be proved; here, the best lower bound is 4 , as the next collection of results shows

Theorem 2.1.7. In ZF, we can prove that $\Pi_{3}^{0} \neq \Sigma_{3}^{0}$. However, there is a model of ZF where $\omega^{\omega}$ is a countable union of countable sets and $\omega_{1}$ is singular. In particular, in this model, $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)$ fails, $\mathcal{B} \neq \mathcal{B}^{*}, \boldsymbol{\Pi}_{4}^{0}=\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{4}^{0}=\mathscr{P}\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)$, and $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{3}^{0} \nsubseteq \mathcal{B}^{*}$ (hence $\Pi_{3}^{0} \nsubseteq \mathcal{B}^{*}$ ).

[^0]Proof. The first statement can be found in [5, Ex 3.38] or [154, 2.1]. One model witnessing the second statement is known as the Feferman-Lévy model (originally [59], for a detailed construction, see [104, page 142]).

In fact, in ZF , if $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{3}^{0} \subseteq \mathcal{B}^{*}$, then $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \mathbf{C t b l}\right)$ holds [5, Ex 21.24]. $\mathrm{L}^{2}$
Note that $\mathcal{B}^{*}$ is obviously closed under complementation and contains all open sets, so if it is closed under countable unions, it forms a $\sigma$-algebra, and therefore $\mathcal{B}=\mathcal{B}^{*}$. Thus, in the Feferman-Lévy model, $\mathcal{B}^{*}$ is not closed under countable unions. This failure to be closed under countable unions is at the heart of many of the pathologies of set theory without $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)$ (cf. Section 3.1 for more on this). It is not known to the author whether we can construct a model where $\mathcal{B}$ is proper and $\mathcal{B} \neq \mathcal{B}^{*}$ :

Question 2.1.8. Is there a model of ZF where $\mathcal{B}^{*} \subsetneq \mathcal{B} \subsetneq \mathscr{P}\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)$ ?

## Projective sets

Let $X$ and $Y$ be Polish spaces. If $A \subseteq X \times Y$, we say that the projection of $A$ into the first coordinate is $\pi(A):=\{x \in X: \exists y((x, y) \in A)\}$. We now define the projective hierarchy. Let $n \in \omega$. Then a set $A \subseteq X$ is:

1. $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{0}^{1}(X)$ if it is $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{1}^{0}(X)$,
2. $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{n+1}^{1}(X)$ if it is the projection of a $\Pi_{n}^{1}\left(X \times \omega^{\omega}\right)$ set,
3. $\Pi_{n}^{1}(X)$ if it is the complement of a $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{n}^{1}(X)$ set,
4. $\boldsymbol{\Delta}_{n}^{1}(X)$ if it is both $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{n}^{1}(X)$ and $\boldsymbol{\Pi}_{n}^{1}(X)$, and
5. projective if it is $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{n}^{1}(X)$ for some $n \geq 1$; we denote the class of projective sets by $\operatorname{Proj}(X)$.

As before, we obtain in ZF, that for $n<m$, we have:


Hence, the projective sets form an increasing hierarchy. However, in this case, the recursive construction of the universal sets does not require $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)$ (since no countable unions are involved) and therefore, if $X$ is a perfect Polish space, we can

[^1]prove the existence of universal sets for all $\Sigma_{n}^{1}(X)$ and therefore the strictness of the projective hierarchy in ZF.

In the ZF-context, Suslin's theorem places the codeable Borel sets at the bottom of the projective hierarchy.

Theorem 2.1.9 (ZF; Suslin's Theorem, [66, Theorem 562F]). $\mathcal{B}^{*}(X)=\Delta_{1}^{1}(X)$.
With $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)$, Theorem 2.1.9 yields $\mathcal{B}(X)=\boldsymbol{\Delta}_{1}^{1}(X)$, but without $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)$, the latter can be far from true: the strictness of the hierarchy implies that $\Sigma_{1}^{1}\left(\omega^{\omega}\right) \neq$ $\mathscr{P}\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)$, but in the Feferman-Lévy model, we have that $\Sigma_{3}^{0}\left(\omega^{\omega}\right) \nsubseteq \Sigma_{1}^{1}\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)$ (see Theorem 2.1.7).

In contrast to this, we can show in ZF that the set $\mathbf{C t b l}$ of countable subsets of $\omega^{\omega}$ is contained in $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{1}^{1}$ : clearly $\mathbf{C t b l} \subseteq \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{2}^{0}$ (as all singletons are closed), then use Lemma 2.1.6 and Theorem 2.1.9. Therefore, in ZF, we obtain the following chain of strict inclusions:

$$
\text { Ctbl } \varsubsetneqq \Sigma_{1}^{1} \varsubsetneqq \cdots \varsubsetneqq \Sigma_{n}^{1} \varsubsetneqq \Sigma_{n+1}^{1} \varsubsetneqq \cdots \nsupseteq \text { Proj. }
$$

## Lightface hierarchies

The Borel and projective sets measure complexity from the perspective of topology. We also have a syntactic notion of complexity, i.e. a measurement of the complexity of the sentences defining the sets in question. We recall some standard definitions for defining projective sets, for more detail, see 161 .

Let $\mathcal{L}^{2}$ be the language of second-order arithmetic, and

$$
\mathcal{A}^{2}:=\left(\omega, \omega^{\omega}, \text { ap },+, \times,<, 0,1\right)
$$

be the structure of (full) second-order arithmetic, where ap : $\omega^{\omega} \times \omega: \omega$ is the function $\operatorname{ap}(r, k)=r(k)$. Let $\exists^{0}, \forall^{0}$ and $\exists^{1}, \forall^{1}$ be the first-order and second-order quantifiers respectively.
Definition 2.1.10. Let $n \in \omega$. A formula, $\varphi$, in $\mathcal{L}^{2}$ is called:

1. $\Sigma_{0}^{0}$ if it contains no second-order quantifiers, and every first-order quantifier is bounded by some term,
2. $\Pi_{n}^{0}$ if it is the formula $\neg \psi$ for some $\Sigma_{n}^{0}$ formula, $\psi$,
3. $\Sigma_{n+1}^{0}$ if it is the formula $\exists^{0} k \psi$ for some $\Pi_{n+1}^{0}$ formula, $\psi$,
4. arithmetical if it is $\Sigma_{m}^{0}$ or $\Pi_{m}^{0}$ for some $m$,
5. $\Sigma_{1}^{1}$ if it is the formula $\exists^{1} r \psi$ for some arithmetical $\psi$,
6. $\Pi_{n}^{1}$ if it is the formula $\neg \psi$ for some $\Sigma_{n}^{1}$ formula, $\psi$, and
7. $\Sigma_{n+1}^{1}$ if it is the formula, $\exists^{1} r \psi$ for some $\Pi_{n}^{1}$ formula, $\psi$.

A formula of $\mathcal{L}^{2}$ with $\ell$ free second-order variables defines a subset of $\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)^{\ell}$, giving rise to the lightface hierarchies of sets of reals. In contrast, we call the Borel and projective classes boldface pointclasses.

Definition 2.1.11. Let $r \in \omega^{\omega}$. We say that $A \subseteq \omega^{k} \times\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)^{\ell}$ if $\Sigma_{n}^{0}(r)$ if there is $\varphi$ be a formula of $\mathcal{L}^{2}$ with $k$-many free first-order variables and $\ell$-many second-order variables which is $\Sigma_{n}^{0}$, such that $A=\left\{s \in \omega^{k} \times\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)^{\ell}: \mathcal{A}^{2} \vDash \varphi(s, r)\right\}$. Likewise for $\Pi_{n}^{0}(r), \Sigma_{n}^{1}(r)$, and $\Pi_{n}^{1}(r)$. We say that $A$ is $\Delta_{n}^{0}(r)$ if it is $\Sigma_{n}^{0}(r)$ and $\Pi_{n}^{0}(r)$, so too for $\Delta_{n}^{1}(r)$. If $r$ is computable, we write $\Sigma_{n}^{0}, \Pi_{n}^{0}, \Delta_{n}^{0}, \Sigma_{n}^{1}, \Pi_{n}^{1}$, or $\Delta_{n}^{1}$ for $\Sigma_{n}^{0}(r)$, $\Pi_{n}^{0}(r), \Delta_{n}^{0}(r), \Sigma_{n}^{1}(r), \Pi_{n}^{1}(r)$, or $\Delta_{n}^{1}(r)$, respectively. If $A$ is $\Sigma_{n}^{0}$ or $\Pi_{n}^{0}$, we say that $A$ is arithmetical. If $A$ is $\Sigma_{n}^{1}$ or $\Pi_{n}^{1}$, we say that $A$ is analytical or lightface projective.

The relationship between the boldface and the lightface pointclasses is stated in Addison's theorem.

Theorem 2.1.12 ( $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)$; Addison's Theorem). For any set $A \subseteq \omega^{\omega}, A$ is $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{n}^{0}$ if and only if $A$ is $\Sigma_{n}^{0}(r)$ for some $r \in \omega^{\omega}$, and likewise for $\boldsymbol{\Pi}_{n}^{0}, \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{n}^{1}$, and $\boldsymbol{\Pi}_{n}^{1}$.

Proof. E.g. 108, Proposition 12.6].
We remark that the backwards direction of Addison's Theorem holds in ZF.

## Analytic sets

Of particular interest in analysis is the first level of the projective hierarchy. The $\Sigma_{1}^{1}$ sets are also called the analytic sets. There are a number of equivalent characterisations of analytic sets, some are stated in Proposition 2.1.13.

For any function $f: X \rightarrow Y$, we define $\operatorname{Graph}(f):=\{(x, f(x)) \in X \times Y:$ $x \in X\}$. We call a function $f: X \rightarrow Y$ between Polish spaces $X$ and $Y$ Borel $^{*}$ if $\left\{g^{-1}\left(U_{n}\right): U_{n} \in \mathcal{B}\right\}$ is a family of codeable Borel sets which is codeable (in the sense of [66, 562J]), where $\mathcal{B}$ is an enumerated base for $Y$.

Proposition 2.1.13 (ZF). Let $X$ be a Polish space. Let $A \subseteq X$ be non-empty. The following are equivalent:

1. $A$ is $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{1}^{1}(X)$.
2. there is a continuous $f: \omega^{\omega} \rightarrow X$ such that $A=f\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)$ ("strongly analytic"),
3. there is a $B \in \mathcal{B}^{*}\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)$ and a continuous function $f: \omega^{\omega} \rightarrow X$ such that $A=f(B)($ "intermediately analytic"), and
4. there is a Borel* function $f: \omega^{\omega} \rightarrow X$ such that $A=f\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)$ ("weakly analytic").

Proof. Part 1. to Part 2. and Part 2. to Part 3. are trivial. For Part 3. to Part 4. fix an $x_{0} \in B$ and define the following function:

$$
h(x):= \begin{cases}x & \text { if } x \in B \\ x_{0} & \text { otherwise } .\end{cases}
$$

This $h$ is obviously Borel*. By [66, 562Md], $f$ is Borel*. Finally, Borel* functions are closed under composition by [66, 562Mb] so $f \circ h: \omega^{\omega} \rightarrow B$ is Borel* and $A=f \circ h\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)$.

Note that, in ZF, if $f$ is continuous, then $\operatorname{Graph}(f) \in \Pi_{1}^{0}(X \times Y)$. Hence, as usual, Part 2. implies Part 1. so it suffices to prove Part 4. implies Part 2.

The proof is a choice-free version of the standard proof (in e.g. [112, Proposition 14.4(ii)]). As projections are obviously continuous, it suffices to check that the graph of a Borel* function is analytic. Using Theorem [2.1.9, this reduces to checking the codeable version of the Borel Graph Theorem [112, Proposition 12.4], i.e. if $g$ is Borel*, $\operatorname{Graph}(g) \in \mathcal{B}^{*}(X \times Y)$.

For this, let $\left\{U_{n}: n \in \omega\right\}$ be an enumeration of $\mathcal{B}$. Let $(x, y) \notin \operatorname{Graph}(g)$. Then $y \neq g(x)$. Hence, there are disjoint open $U_{n}, U_{m}$ in $Y$ such that $y \in U_{n}$ and $g(x) \in U_{m}$. Since $g$ is Borel $^{*}, g^{-1}\left(U_{m}\right) \in \mathcal{B}^{*}(X)$, and contains $x$. Then $g^{-1}\left(U_{m}\right) \times U_{n} \in \mathcal{B}^{*}(X \times Y)$, contains $(x, y)$, and is disjoint from $\operatorname{Graph}(g)$. Let $I \subset \mathbb{N}^{2}$ be the set of pairs $\left(n_{x, y}, m_{x, y}\right)$ such that there is a pair $(x, y) \in X \times Y$ such that $y \neq g(x)$, where $\left(n_{x, y}, m_{x, y}\right)$ are minimal (in the $\mathbb{N}^{2}$ ordering) so that $y \in U_{n_{x, y}}$ and $g(x) \in U_{m_{x, y}}$. So, $(X \times Y) \backslash \operatorname{Graph}(g)=\bigcup_{(n, m) \in I} g^{-1}\left(U_{m}\right) \times U_{n}$. As $\left\{g^{-1}\left(U_{n}\right): n \in \mathcal{B}\right\}$ is a codeable family of $\mathcal{B}^{*}(X)$ sets, $\left\{g^{-1}\left(U_{n}\right) \times U_{m}: m, n \in \mathcal{B}\right\}$ is a codeable family of $\mathcal{B}^{*}(X \times Y)$ sets. So, $(X \times Y) \backslash \operatorname{Graph}(g)$ is a codeable union of Borel* sets. By [66, 562 Ka$],(X \times Y) \backslash \operatorname{Graph}(g)$ is Borel*. Hence, $\operatorname{Graph}(g)$ is Borel*.

We look at three corresponding definitions of analyticity given in Proposition 2.1.13 in Chapter 6 and observe that in the generalised setting, the equivalence need not hold (see Corollary 6.3.51).

### 2.1.5 Models of set theory

Here we describe the main models of set theory which we use in Chapter 3. Our notation is based on [103, Chapter 13].

For an infinite regular cardinal, $\kappa$, let $\mathbf{H}_{\kappa}$ be the collection of all sets whose transitive closure has cardinality $<\kappa$. Then each $\mathbf{H}_{\kappa}$ is a transitive model of ZFC ${ }^{-}$ [129, Theorem II.2.1]. For Chapter 3, we use $\mathbf{H C}:=\mathbf{H}_{\omega_{1}}$, which we call the hereditarily countable sets.

We say that a model of a theory is a ctm if it is a countable transitive model. A model of ZFC is called an inner model if it is transitive and contains all the ordinals.

In Chapter 3, we use a standard model of ZFC, the constructible universe, denoted by L. The constructible universe was first introduced by Gödel $79 \|$ ) and is an inner model of ZFC which satisfies GCH [103, §13]; its construction can be relativised to a set $A$.

Definition 2.1.14. Let $\mathcal{L}$ be the language of set theory with an additional unary relation. Let $A$ be any set. A set $X \subseteq M$ is definable over $M$ relative to $A$ if there is a formula $\varphi$ in $\mathcal{L}$, and $p_{0}, \ldots, p_{n} \in M$ such that $X=\{x \in M:(M, \in, A \cap M) \vDash$ $\left.\varphi\left(x, p_{0}, \ldots, p_{n}\right)\right\}$. Let $\operatorname{def}_{A}(M)$ be the collection of sets definable over $M$ relative to $A$.

Definition 2.1.15. Let $A$ be a set. We recursively define $\mathrm{L}[A]$ :

1. $\mathrm{L}_{0}[A]:=\emptyset$,
2. for all $\alpha, \mathrm{L}_{\alpha+1}[A]:=\operatorname{def}_{A}\left(\mathrm{~L}_{\alpha}[A]\right)$,
3. if $\lambda$ is a limit, $\mathrm{L}_{\lambda}[A]:=\bigcup_{\alpha \in \lambda} \mathrm{L}_{\alpha}[A]$, and
4. $\mathrm{L}[A]:=\bigcup_{\alpha \in \operatorname{Ord}^{2}} \mathrm{~L}_{\alpha}[A]$.

If $x \in \mathrm{~L}[A]$, we that $x$ is constructible relative to $A$. We write $\mathrm{L}_{\alpha}:=\mathrm{L}_{\alpha}[\emptyset]$, $\mathrm{L}:=\mathrm{L}[\emptyset]$, say that a set is constructible if it is constructible relative to $\emptyset$, and we write $V=\mathrm{L}$ for the statement "every set is constructible". Obviously, L satisfies $V=\mathrm{L}$. Gödel also showed that there is a definable global well-order on L, i.e. a well-order $\leq_{\mathrm{L}}$ such that for all $x, y \in \mathrm{~L}, x \leq_{\mathrm{L}} y$ or $y \leq_{\mathrm{L}} x$. For many more details on L and constructibility, see [45, 103, 108].

In Chapter 3, we use HC to define projective sets of reals. For this, we define the Lévy hierarchy on formulae in the language of set theory, and a corresponding hierarchy of sets of HC:
Definition 2.1.16. Let $n \in \omega$. Let $\varphi$ be a formula in the language of set theory. We say that $\varphi$ is:

1. $\Sigma_{1}$ if every quantifier is bounded,
2. $\Pi_{n}$ if $\varphi$ is the formula $\neg \psi$ for a $\Sigma_{n}$ formula, $\psi$, and
3. $\Sigma_{n+1}$ if $\varphi$ is the formula $\exists x \psi$ for a $\Pi_{n}$ formula, $\psi$.

Definition 2.1.17. Let $n \in \omega$. If $A \subseteq \mathbf{H C}$, then we say that $A$ is:

1. $\Sigma_{n}^{\mathrm{HC}}\left(\right.$ or $\left.\Pi_{n}^{\mathrm{HC}}\right)$ if there is a $\Sigma_{n}\left(\right.$ or $\left.\Pi_{n}\right)$ formula, $\varphi$, with exactly one free variable such that $A=\{x \in \mathbf{H C}: \mathbf{H C} \vDash \varphi(x)\}$, and
2. $\Sigma_{n}^{\mathrm{HC}}\left(\right.$ or $\left.\Pi_{n}^{\mathrm{HC}}\right)$ if there is a $\Sigma_{n}\left(\right.$ or $\left.\Pi_{n}\right)$ formula, $\varphi$, with at least one free variable, and some $p_{0}, \ldots, p_{k} \in \mathbf{H C}$ such that $A=\{x \in \mathbf{H C}: \mathbf{H C} \vDash$ $\left.\varphi\left(x, p_{0}, \ldots, p_{k}\right)\right\}$.
We say that $A$ is $\Delta_{n}^{\mathrm{HC}}$ if it is $\Sigma_{n}^{\mathrm{HC}}$ and $\Pi_{n}^{\mathrm{HC}}$, and likewise for $\Delta_{n}^{\mathrm{HC}}$.
We end this section with the setup for a technical lemma which we use in Lemma 3.3.33.
Lemma 2.1.18. Let $n \geq 1$. A set of reals is $\Sigma_{n+1}^{1}$ if and only if it is $\Sigma_{n}^{\mathrm{HC}}$.
Proof. By e.g. 103, Lemma 25.25]
Lemma 2.1.19. The restriction of the global well-order on $\mathrm{L},<_{\mathrm{L}} \backslash \mathbf{H C}^{2}$ on $\mathbf{H C}^{\mathrm{L}}$, is $\Delta_{1}^{\mathrm{HC}}$.
Proof. See e.g. [111, §4.3, page 19].
Lemma 2.1.20. For each $n>2$, there is a universal $\Sigma_{n-2}^{\mathbf{H C}}$ set $\Gamma \subseteq \omega_{1} \times \mathbf{H C}$.
Proof. Recall that there is a set $U \subseteq\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)^{2}$ which is universal for $\Sigma_{n-1}^{1}$ 161, 3F.6]. In $\mathrm{L}, \mathbf{H C}=\mathrm{L}_{\omega_{1}}$, so $|\mathbf{H C}|=\omega_{1}=\left|\omega^{\omega}\right|$ [45, Lemma 1.1vii]. So, there is a bijection $b: \omega_{1} \times \mathbf{H C} \rightarrow\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)^{2}$. By Lemma 2.1.19, $b$ can be chosen with low complexity. Then by Lemma 2.1.18, $b(U)$ is universal for $\sum_{n-2}^{\mathrm{HC}}$ sets of $\omega_{1} \times \mathbf{H C}$.

### 2.1.6 Absoluteness

In Chapter 3, we need to 'locate' sets of reals in different models of set theory, i.e. we need to make sure that we have suitably equivalent sets (which satisfy the same relevant properties) in different models, and have a way to describe these sets. For this, we use absoluteness, a particular property of formulae. Hence, we require the syntactic characterisation of sets of reals from Section 2.1.4. We first describe absoluteness, and then we state some facts concerning the absoluteness of sentences defining sets of real numbers. Our notation is based on [103, §25] and [161, Chapter 3].

If $M$ is a model of set theory, $N$ is a submodel of $N$, and $\varphi$ is a formula in the language of set theory, we say that $\varphi$ is absolute between $M$ and $N$ if for all $x_{0}, \ldots, x_{n} \in N, M \vDash \varphi\left(x_{0}, \ldots, x_{n}\right)$ if and only if $N \vDash \varphi\left(x_{0}, \ldots, x_{n}\right)$. Any formula with only bounded quantifiers is absolute between transitive models of set theory (by, e.g. [103, Lemma 12.9]).

We are interested in absoluteness for formulae of strictly richer complexity. Some sentences of second-order arithmetic are not absolute, indeed there is a $\Sigma_{3}^{1}$ formula which is true in L but not in $\mathrm{L}[r]$, for a non-constructive real $r$ [205, §1.2.8]. But formulae of lower complexity are absolute:

Theorem 2.1.21 (Analytic Absoluteness). Every $\Sigma_{1}^{1}$ and $\Pi_{1}^{1}$ formula is absolute between transitive models of $\mathrm{ZF}+\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)$.

Proof. E.g. 103, Theorem 25.4].
As an immediate consequence, $\Sigma_{2}^{1}$ formulae are upwards absolute for transitive models of $\mathrm{ZF}+\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)$, and likewise $\Pi_{2}^{1}$ formulae are downwards absolute for such models. Meanwhile, $\Sigma_{2}^{1}$ formulae need not be downwards absolute in such models, but are in larger models:

Theorem 2.1.22 (Shoenfield Absoluteness). Every $\Sigma_{2}^{1}$ and $\Pi_{2}^{1}$ formula is absolute between inner models of $\mathrm{ZF}+\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)$.

Proof. E.g. 103, Theorem 25.20].

### 2.1.7 Forcing and symmetric extensions

In Chapter 3, the proof of the main theorem uses a forcing-like argument, which defines a forcing-like relation dependent on the complexity of the sentences involved.

The method of forcing was first introduced by Cohen to prove that there is a model of ZFC which violates the continuum hypothesis ( $\aleph_{1}=2^{\aleph_{0}}$ ), as narrated in [32]. Ever since its introduction, forcing has been one of the central methods of set theory. We assume the reader has a basic familiarity with forcing, so we fix our notation, based on [129]. For an introduction to forcing, see [103] or 129.

Let $M$ be a model of $\mathbf{Z F}^{-}$or $\mathbf{Z F}$, and let $\mathbb{P}$ be a partial order. In the context of forcing, we call $\mathbb{P}$ the forcing notion and the elements $p \in \mathbb{P}$ the forcing conditions. If there is an $r \in \mathbb{P}$ such that $r \leq p$ and $r \leq q$, then we say that $p$ and $q$ are compatible, and write $p \not \Perp q$, otherwise, we say that $p, q$ are incompatible, and
write $p \perp q$. If $E \subseteq \mathbb{P}$ and $p \in Q$, we write $p \perp E$ if for all $q \in E, q \perp p$. Then $E$ is called predense if there is no $E \in \mathbb{P}$ such that $p \perp E$. A forcing notion, $\mathbb{P}$, has the countable chain condition (c.c.c.) if every antichain in $\mathbb{P}$ is countable.

If $G$ is a $\mathbb{P}$-generic filter over $M$, we write $M[G]$ for the forcing extension of $M$ by $G$, and for a $\mathbb{P}$-name, $\sigma$, we denote its interpretation by $G$ by $\sigma_{G}$. As usual, for $x \in M$, we let $\check{x}$ be the standard $\mathbb{P}$-name for $x$ [129, Definition IV.2.9].

We work with a variant of product forcing in Chapter 3; here we define standard product forcing. For more details, see [129, Chapter V]. If $\left(\mathbb{P}_{n}\right)_{n \in \omega}$ is a sequence of forcing notions, we say that $\mathbb{P}$ is the $\omega$-product forcing notion with finite support (of $\left.\left(\mathbb{P}_{n}\right)_{n \in \omega}\right)$ if $\mathbb{P}$ consists of sequences $\left(p_{n}\right)_{n \in \omega}$ so that for each $n, p_{n} \in \mathbb{P}_{n}$ and $\left\{n \in \omega: p_{n} \neq 1\right\}$ is finite. This $\mathbb{P}$ is ordered in the natural way, $\left(p_{n}\right)_{n \in \omega} \leq\left(q_{n}\right)_{n \in \omega}$ if and only if for all $n, p_{n} \leq q_{n}$.

Throughout Chapter 3, we only consider products of forcing notions whose generic filters are uniquely determent by a real in the extension. So, we characterise the generics like so:
Remark 2.1.23. Let $G$ be a $\mathbb{P}$-generic filter and let $i \in I$. Then $\{p(i): p \in G\}$ is a $\mathbb{P}_{i}$-generic filter. We denote it by $G^{i}$ and the unique generic real corresponding to $G^{i}$ by $x_{G}^{i}$. If $J \subseteq I$, we define $G \upharpoonright J:=G \cap \mathbb{P} \upharpoonright J$. Then $G \cap \mathbb{P} \upharpoonright J$ is a $\mathbb{P} \upharpoonright J$-generic filter over $M$.

We let $\mathbb{S}$ be the set of all perfect trees of $2^{<\omega}$, ordered by inclusion. We call this Sacks forcing. If $T \in \mathbb{S}$ and $t \in T$, then $T_{t} \in \mathbb{S}$ and every node in $T_{t}$ is compatible with $t$.

Let $\mathbb{C}:=\left\{\left(2^{<\omega}\right)_{t}: t \in 2^{<\omega}\right\}$, ordered by inclusion. We call this the (arboreal version of) Cohen forcing.

Forcing extensions typically preserve AC from the ground model to the extension; to overcome this we use a variation of a symmetric extension, to ensure that only a fragment of $A C$ is satisfied in the model. Using symmetric extensions, Cohen also showed that there is a model of $\mathrm{ZF}+\neg \mathrm{AC}$. As $\mathrm{L} \vDash \mathrm{ZFC}, \mathrm{AC}$ is independent of ZF. Roughly, Cohen defined an inner model, $N$, such that $M \subseteq N \subseteq M[G]$, by evaluating only those names which are symmetric with respect to a group of automorphism, hence the name symmetric submodel. For an introduction to symmetric submodels and symmetric extensions, see [46] or [104, §5.2]. We assume the reader has a basic familiarity with classical examples of symmetric extensions, so we fix notation.

Let $M$ be a transitive model of ZFC, and $\mathbb{P}$ be a forcing notion in $M$. If $\pi: \mathbb{P} \rightarrow \mathbb{P}$ is an order-preserving bijection, we say that $\pi$ is an automorphism.
Definition 2.1.24. Let $\pi: \mathbb{P} \rightarrow \mathbb{P}$ be an automorphism. We recursively extend $\pi$ to the set of $\mathbb{P}$-names like so:

1. $\pi(\emptyset):=\emptyset$,
2. $\pi(\sigma):=\{(\pi(\tau), \pi(p)):(\tau, p) \in \sigma\}$.

Likewise, for every sentence $\varphi$ in the forcing language, there is a formula $\pi(\varphi)$ formed by replacing every $\mathbb{P}$-name $\sigma$ by the in $\varphi$ by $\pi(\sigma)$. As $\mathbb{P}$ is a dense embedding, for every sentence $\varphi$ in the forcing language, and every forcing condition $p \in \mathbb{P}$, we have that $p \Vdash \varphi$ if and only if $\pi(p) \Vdash \pi(\varphi)$.

A set $F \subseteq \mathscr{P}(S)$ is called a filter on $S$ if $F$ is non-empty and closed under supersets and finite intersections. If $\mathcal{G}$ is a group and $F \subseteq \mathscr{P}(\mathcal{G})$ is a filter over $\mathcal{G}$, we say that $F$ is normal if for every $K \in F$ and every $g \in \mathcal{G}$, the conjugate $g K g^{-1} \in F$.

Let $M$ be a model, and $\mathbb{P}$ be a forcing notion in $M$. Let $\mathcal{G}$ be a group of automorphisms of $\mathbb{P}$ in $M$. Let $\sigma$ be a $\mathbb{P}$-name. We define $\operatorname{sym}(\sigma):=\{\pi \in \mathcal{G}$ : $\pi(\sigma)=\sigma\}$. Let $F$ be a normal filter of subgroups of $\mathcal{G}$. We call $\sigma$ symmetric if $\operatorname{sym}(\sigma) \in F$, and hereditarily symmetric if $\sigma$ is symmetric and every $\mathbb{P}$-name in $\sigma$ is hereditarily symmetric. Let $G$ be a $\mathbb{P}$-generic filter over $M$. The symmetric submodel, $N$, associated to $F$ and $G$ is defined like so $N:=\left\{\sigma_{G}: \sigma\right.$ is a hereditarily symmetric $\mathbb{P}$-name in $M\}$.

Theorem 2.1.25. Let $M$ be a transitive model of ZFC, $\mathbb{P}$ a forcing notion in $M$, $\mathcal{G}$ a group of automorphisms of $\mathbb{P}$ in $M, F$ a normal filter of subgroups of $\mathcal{G}$ in $M$, and $G$ a $\mathbb{P}$-generic filter over $M$. Then the symmetric submodel, $N$, associated to $F$ and $G$ is a transitive model of ZF such that $M \subseteq N \subseteq M[G]$.

Proof. E.g. [104, Theorem 5.14].

### 2.2 Topological and order-theoretic notions

### 2.2.1 Topologies and $\kappa$-topologies

Here we give a very brief outline of the topology necessary for Chapters 4 to 6 . Chapter 6 contains a much more sustained development of $\kappa$-topologies and their descriptive set theory, so we leave most detail for there. The notion of a $\kappa$-topology was first introduced in [2] in studying subfields of the surreal numbers (defined in Section 2.3.5), and has been studied more recently in e.g. [74 and [75]. Our notation for topologies is standard, e.g. [164], whilst our notation for $\kappa$-topologies follows [2, Chapter 0] and [74, §3.2].

Let $\overline{\mathcal{A}} \subseteq \mathscr{P}(X)$ be a family of subsets of a set, $X$. We say that $\mathcal{A}$ is a subbasis on $X$ if $\cup \mathcal{A}=X$. It is a basis on $X$ if it is a subbasis and closed under finite intersections. We say that $\mathcal{A}$ is a topology on $X$ if it is a basis and closed under arbitrary unions. If $\mathcal{A}$ is a basis on $X$, then $\langle\mathcal{A}\rangle_{\infty}:=\left\{A \subseteq X ; \exists \mathcal{A}_{0} \subseteq \mathcal{A}(A=\right.$ $\left.\left.\bigcup \mathcal{A}_{0}\right)\right\}$ is a topology on $X$, the topology generated by $\mathcal{A}$. By convention, $\bigcup \emptyset=\emptyset$, so $\emptyset$ is an element of all topologies.

If $\kappa$ is a cardinal, a basis $\mathcal{A}$ is called a $\kappa$-topology on $X$ if $\mathcal{A}$ is closed under unions of size $<\kappa$, and $X \in \mathcal{A}$. Similarly, if $\mathcal{A}$ is a basis on $X$, then $\langle\mathcal{A}\rangle_{\kappa}:=$ $\left\{A \subseteq X ; \exists \mathcal{A}_{0} \subseteq \mathcal{A}\left(\left|\mathcal{A}_{0}\right|<\kappa\right.\right.$ and $\left.\left.A=\bigcup \mathcal{A}_{0}\right)\right\} \cup\{X\}$ is a $\kappa$-topology on $X$, the $\kappa$-topology generated by $\mathcal{A}$. Again, $\emptyset$ is an element of all $\kappa$-topologies. Clearly, every topology is a $\kappa$-topology and every $\kappa$-topology is a basis (that generates a full topology).

For any $\kappa$-topology, $\tau$, we define its weight by:

$$
\operatorname{wei}(\tau):=\min \left\{|\mathcal{A}|: \mathcal{A} \text { is a basis and } \tau=\langle\mathcal{A}\rangle_{\kappa}\right\} .
$$

If wei $(\tau)<\kappa$, then $\tau$ is a topology.

Elements of a ( $\kappa$-)topology are called ( $\kappa$-)open, and their complements are called ( $\kappa$-)closed. If $A \subseteq X$ is any set, then $\operatorname{cl}(A):=\bigcap\{B \subseteq X: A \subseteq B$ and $B$ is closed $\}$ is closed and called the closure of $A$.

A set $\mathcal{A} \subseteq \mathscr{P}(X)$ is called an algebra on $X$ if $A$ is closed under relative complements with $X$ and under finite unions. We call $\mathcal{A}$ a $\kappa$-algebra if $\mathcal{A}$ is an algebra and closed under unions of size $<\kappa$.

We use the standard notion of a metric $d$ on a set $X$. If $d$ is a metric on $X$, then $\{B(x, \varepsilon): x \in X$ and $\varepsilon>0\}$ where $B(x, \varepsilon):=\{y \in X: d(x, y)<\varepsilon\}$ forms a basis of the $d$-metric topology. As usual, in a topological space $(X, \mathcal{A})$, a subset is called dense if it meets every non-empty open set; a space is called separable if it has a countable dense set and completely metrisable if there is a complete metric $d$ on $X$ such that $\mathcal{A}$ is the $d$-metric topology. A topological space is a Polish space if it is separable and completely metrisable.

Following [1, §2.1], a $\kappa$-metric on $X$ is a function $d: X^{2} \rightarrow \mathbb{G}^{\geq 0}$ which obeys the standard rules of a distance $(\forall x \in X(d(x, x)=0)$, symmetry, and the triangle inequality), such that $\mathbb{G}$ is an ordered Abelian group where $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{G})=\kappa$. We say that a topology is $\kappa$-metrisable if it admits a compatible $\kappa$-metric (for more details, see [1] or [75, §2.3.2]). As space, $X$, is called $\kappa$-Polish if it is (Cauchy) completely $\kappa$-metrisable, and wei $(X) \leq \kappa$ [1, Definition 2.3].

## Continuity and $\kappa$-Continuity

In complete generality, if $\mathcal{A}$ and $\mathcal{B}$ are families of subsets of $X$ and $Y$, respectively, then a function $f: X \rightarrow Y$ is called $\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B}$-continuous if the $f$-preimage of sets in $\mathcal{B}$ is in $\mathcal{A}$. If $\mathcal{A}$ and $\mathcal{B}$ are topologies on $X$ and $Y$ and the choice of topologies is clear from the context, we also just say that $f$ is continuous. The dual notion is a function such that all $f$-images of sets in $\mathcal{A}$ are in $\mathcal{B}$. In the case of topological spaces, we say that such a function is open.

The notion of $\kappa$-continuity is related in the same way to the notion of $\kappa$ topology: if $\mathcal{A}$ and $\mathcal{B}$ are $\kappa$-topologies on $X$ and $Y$ and the choice of $\kappa$-topologies is clear from the context, we also just say that $f$ is $\kappa$-continuous; similarly, $f$ is called $\kappa$-open if $f$-images of $\kappa$-open sets are $\kappa$-open.

The notion of $\kappa$-continuity can be traced to [2, §2.01]; our notation follows [74, 75. We remark that if $\mathcal{A} \subseteq \mathscr{P}(X)$ and $\mathcal{B} \subseteq \mathscr{P}(Y)$ are bases and $\lambda \leq \lambda^{\prime}$ are (regular) cardinals and we generate the $\lambda$ - and $\lambda^{\prime}$-topologies $\langle\mathcal{A}\rangle_{\lambda},\langle\mathcal{B}\rangle_{\lambda},\langle\mathcal{A}\rangle_{\lambda^{\prime}}$, and $\langle\mathcal{B}\rangle_{\lambda^{\prime}}$, then if a function is $\lambda$-continuous, it is $\lambda^{\prime}$-continuous. As a consequence, we obtain the following fact.
Fact 2.2.1. Let $\mathcal{A}$ and $\mathcal{B}$ be bases on $X$ and $Y$ respectively. Consider the topologies and $\kappa$-topologies generated from $\mathcal{A}$ and $\mathcal{B}$. Then for any function $f: X \rightarrow Y$, each of the following properties implies the next:

1. $f$ is $\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B}$-continuous.
2. $f$ is $\kappa$-continuous.
3. $f$ is continuous.

The reverse implications do not hold in general (see Proposition 4.1.3 and Example 4.1.4.

### 2.2.2 Orders

Our notation for orders and ordered fields is based on 42 and 75 .

## Total orders

All orders are assumed to be total unless otherwise stated. Let $(\mathbb{O},<)$ be an order. If $A, B \subseteq \mathbb{O}$, we write $A<B$ if every $a \in A$ and $b \in B$ are such that $a<b$. A convex subset of $\mathbb{K}$ is a $C \subseteq \mathbb{O}$ such that if $a<c<b$ with $a, b \in C$ and $c \in \mathbb{O}$ then $c \in C$. If $\mathbb{O}$ is a linear order and $a, b \in \mathbb{O}$, then we write $(a, b):=\{x \in \mathbb{O}: a<x<b\}$, $(-\infty, b):=\{x \in \mathbb{O}: x<b\}$, and $(a, \infty):=\{x \in \mathbb{O}: a<x\}$. Likewise, we define $[a, b],(-\infty, b],[a, \infty)$ as usual. If $a, b \in \mathbb{O}$, we call each of $(a, b),[a, b],[a, b)$, and $(a, b]$ an interval in $\mathbb{O}$. If $a \in \mathbb{O}$, we call each of $(a, \infty),(-\infty, a),[a, \infty),(-\infty, a]$ an improper interval in $\mathbb{O}$.

If $Q \subseteq \mathbb{O}$, we let $\mathcal{B}=\{(p, q): p, q \in Q \cup\{ \pm \infty\}\}$ and observe that this is a basis on $\mathbb{O}$ in the sense of Section 2.2.1. We call it the $Q$-interval basis. The $\kappa$-topology $\langle\mathcal{B}\rangle_{\kappa}$ is called the $Q$-interval $\kappa$-topology on $X$. If this $\kappa$-topology is a topology, we call it the interval topology or order topology.

Let $\operatorname{coi}(\mathbb{O})$ be the smallest cardinal $\lambda$ such that there is a set $S \subseteq \mathbb{O}$, with $|S|=\lambda$, such that for every $x \in \mathbb{O}$, there is an $s \in S$ with $s<x$. We call $Q \subseteq \mathbb{O}$ order dense in $\mathbb{O}$ if for all $a, b \in \mathbb{O}$, where $a<b$, there is a $q \in Q$ such that $a<q<b$. If $\lambda$ is the smallest cardinal such that there is a set $Q \subseteq \mathbb{O}$ such that $Q$ is order dense in $\mathbb{O}$ and $|S|=\lambda$, we say wei $(\mathbb{O})=\lambda$ (or, to disambiguate, $\operatorname{owei}(\mathbb{O})=\lambda){ }^{3}$ If $S \subseteq \mathbb{O}$ is order dense in $\mathbb{O}$, then wei $(\mathbb{O})=\operatorname{wei}(S)$.

We say that $\mathbb{O}$ is called $\eta_{\kappa}$ if for all $L, R \subseteq \mathbb{O}$ where $L<R$ and $|L \cup R|<\kappa$, there is an $x \in \mathbb{O}$ such that $L<\{x\}<R$. Being $\eta_{\kappa}$ means there are no $\kappa$-clopen sets in the order $\kappa$-topology. We say that $\mathbb{D}$ is a dense linear order if it is an $\eta_{0}$-order (equivalently, for any $x, y \in \mathbb{O}$ with $x<y$, there is a $z \in \mathbb{O}$ such that $x<z<y$ ).

Theorem 2.2.2 (Hausdorff, [88], [178, Ex 9.23(2)]). Any two $\eta_{\kappa}$ orders of cardinality $\kappa$ are order isomorphic.

Definition 2.2.3. We say that $\mathbb{O}$ is $\kappa$-spherically complete if for all sequences of closed nested intervals, $\left(\left[a_{\alpha}, b_{\alpha}\right]\right)_{\alpha \in \lambda}$ with $\lambda<\kappa$, we have $\bigcap_{\alpha \in \lambda}\left[a_{\alpha}, b_{\alpha}\right] \neq \emptyset$.

Note that if $\mathbb{O}$ is $\eta_{\kappa}$ then $\mathbb{O}$ is $\kappa$-spherically complete.
If $\mathbb{O}$ is any total order and $x_{0}<\ldots<x_{n}$ any finite sequence in $\mathbb{O}$, it splits $\mathbb{O}$ into $n+2$ intervals $I_{0}:=\left(-\infty, x_{0}\right], I_{1}:=\left[x_{0}, x_{1}\right], \ldots, I_{n}:=\left[x_{n-1}, x_{n}\right], I_{n+1}:=\left[x_{n}, \infty\right)$, overlapping in the points of the sequence. We can think of a function $f: \mathbb{O} \rightarrow \mathbb{O}$ as split into the $n+2$ many functions $f_{k}: I_{k} \rightarrow \mathbb{K}\left(\right.$ for $\left.0 \leq k \leq n_{1}\right)$ by $f_{k}:=f \upharpoonright I_{k}$. In this case, we say that the $f_{k}$ can be glued together to yield $f$. If there is a finite sequence such that all of the $f_{k}$ have property $P$, we say that $f$ is piecewise $P$. E.g. we can consider piecewise constant, piecewise monotone, or piecewise strictly monotone functions.

[^2]
### 2.2.3 Gaps

An order, $\mathbb{O}$, may have order-theoretic gaps. For this, we again follow the notation in 42 and 75 .

Definition 2.2.4. Let $\mathbb{O}$ be an order. If $L, R \subseteq \mathbb{O}$ are such that $|\mathbb{O} \backslash(L \cup R)| \leq 1$, $L<R, L$ has no least upper bound, and $R$ has no greatest lower bound, then we say that the pair $(L, R)$ is an almost gap in $\mathbb{O}$ (also called quasicuts, [128, §2]). If, in addition, $L \cup R=\mathbb{O}$, then we call $(L, R)$ a gap.

An almost gap, $(L, R)$, in an ordered group, $\mathbb{G}$, is called a $(\lambda, \mu)$-(almost )gap if $\operatorname{cof}(L)=\lambda$ and $\operatorname{cof}(R)=\mu$.

Every $a \in \mathbb{O}$ defines an almost gap, $((-\infty, a),(a, \infty))$, and every almost gap is either defined from an $x \in \mathbb{O}$ or is a gap. Let $\operatorname{Ded}(\mathbb{O})$ be the Dedekind completion of $\mathbb{O}$ (i.e. the set $\mathbb{O} \cup\{G: G$ is a gap in $\mathbb{O}\}$ ). Note that the set of almost gaps in $\mathbb{O}$ is order isomorphic to $\operatorname{Ded}(\mathbb{O})$.

If $A \subseteq \mathbb{O}$, let $\operatorname{hull}_{\mathrm{L}}(A)=\{z \in \mathbb{O}: \forall x \in A(z<x)\}$, and $\operatorname{hull}_{\mathrm{R}}(A)=\{z \in \mathbb{O}:$ $\forall x \in A(x<z)\}$. We define the top and bottom of $A$ like so:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \operatorname{top}(A):= \begin{cases}\sup (A) & \text { if } \sup (A) \text { exists, } \\
\left(\mathbb{O} \backslash \operatorname{hull}_{\mathrm{R}}(A), \operatorname{hull}_{\mathrm{R}}(A)\right) & \text { if } A \text { has no supremum and } \\
\infty & \text { is bounded above, }\end{cases} \\
& \operatorname{bot}(A):= \begin{cases}\inf (A) & \text { otherwise. } \\
\left.\operatorname{hull}_{\mathrm{L}}(A), \mathbb{O} \backslash \operatorname{hull}_{\mathrm{L}}(A)\right) & \text { if } A \text { has no infimum and } \\
-\infty & \text { is bounded below, }\end{cases} \\
& -\infty \quad \text { otherwise. }
\end{aligned}
$$

If $\operatorname{top}(A)$ is a gap, we call it the gap defined by $A$. Suppose $G=(L, R)$ is a gap in $\mathbb{O}$. If $a<L$, we write $a<G$, and we define $(a, G]:=\{x \in \mathbb{O}: a<x<G\}$, likewise for $a<G$ and $[G, a]$. When it is clear that $G$ is a gap, we write $G \in(a, b)$ to means $a<G<b$, and so on.

Note that we can also define a function based on splitting $\mathbb{D}$ at gaps, e.g. into $f:(-\infty, G) \rightarrow \mathbb{O}, g:(G, \infty) \rightarrow \mathbb{O}$. However, we reserve the notation piecewise $P$ for glueing partial functions on closed intervals (i.e. convex which have endpoints, not 'endgaps').

### 2.3 Fields

### 2.3.1 Ordered algebraic structures

As usual, algebraic structures are called ordered, if they have a total order that is compatible with the algebraic operations. Thus, $\mathbb{G}=(G,<,+, 0)$ is an ordered group if $(G,+, 0)$ is a group, $(G,<)$ is a total order and for all $x, y, z \in G$, if $x<y$, then $x+z<y+z$. Similarly, $\mathbb{K}:=(K,<,+, \times, 0,1)$ is an ordered field if
$(K,+, \times, 0,1)$ is a field and $(K,<)$ is a total order such that for all $x, y, z \in K$ ，if $x<y$ ，then $x+z<y+z$ and if $x, y>0$ ，then $x \times y>0$ ．As usual，we also write $x . y$ or $x y$ for $x \times y$ ．All ordered fields $\mathbb{K}$ contain a copy of the rational numbers，so without loss of generality，we assume that $\mathbb{N} \subseteq \mathbb{Q} \subseteq \mathbb{K}$ ．A field $\mathbb{K}$ is Archimedean if for all $x, y \in \mathbb{K}^{>0}$ ，there is an $n \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $x<n$ ．y．An $x \in \mathbb{K}$ is finite if there is an $n \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $-n<x<n$ ；we denote the set of finite elements by FIN．

Let $\mathbb{G}$ be an ordered group．If $a, b, c \in \mathbb{G}$ are such that $a+b=c$ ，we write $c-b=a$ ．The length（or diameter）of an interval，$[a, b], \operatorname{len}([a, b]):=b-a$ ， likewise for $(a, b),(a, b]$ ，and $[a, b)$ ．We denote $\mathbb{G}^{>0}:=\{x \in \mathbb{K}: x>0\}$ and $\mathbb{G}^{\geq 0}:=\{x \in \mathbb{G}: x \geq 0\}$ ．We call the coinitiality of $\mathbb{G}^{>0}$ the basenumber of $\mathbb{G}$ ，and denote it $\mathrm{bn}(\mathbb{G})$（as in［75，§1．3．4］，［191，Theorem viii］）．

If $\mathbb{G}$ is an ordered group，we say that $x$ and $y$ are equivalent，in symbols $x \equiv y$ ， if $|x| \leq n|y|$ and $|y| \leq m|x|$ for some $n, m \in \mathbb{N}$ ．We call $\Gamma(\mathbb{G}):=(\mathbb{G} \backslash\{0\}) / \equiv$ the value set of $\mathbb{G}$ and write $O(x):=\{y \in \mathbb{G}: x \equiv y\} \in \Gamma(\mathbb{G})$ ．If $\Gamma(\mathbb{G})$ is a group，we call it the value group of $\mathbb{G}$ ．

Ordered fields have the interval topology generated by their order；this gives rise to a notion of convergence for sequences in the usual way：if $\lambda$ is a limit ordinal， a sequence $火 \in \mathbb{K}^{\lambda}$ tends to $\ell$ if，for all $\varepsilon>0$（in $\mathbb{K}$ ，not just in $\mathbb{R}$ ！），there is an $\beta<\lambda$ such that for all $\gamma>\beta,\left|x_{\gamma}-\ell\right|<\varepsilon$ ．In which case，we write $\lim _{\beta \rightarrow \lambda} x_{\beta}=\ell$ ．We likewise define convergence on $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})$－metric spaces，$(X, d)$ ，where $d$ takes values in $\mathbb{K} \geq 0$ ．A function $f: \mathbb{K} \rightarrow \mathbb{K}$ is sequentially continuous if whenever $火$ tends to $\ell$ and $f(\mathrm{x})$ is the pointwise image of the sequence $火$ under $f$ ，then $f(\mathrm{x})$ tends to $f(\ell)$ ． Clearly，all continuous functions are sequentially continuous（e．g．180，Theorem 4．8］）．

If $\mathbb{K}$ is an ordered field where $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})=\kappa, \kappa$－spherical completeness is equivalent to $\kappa$－intersections of nested sequences of open intervals being empty 25，Lemma 2．4］．

If $\mathbb{K}$ is an ordered field，$a, b \in \mathbb{K}, \mathcal{X}=\left(x_{\beta}\right)_{\beta \in \alpha}, y=\left(y_{\beta}\right)_{\beta \in \alpha} \in \mathbb{K}^{\alpha}$ are sequences， let the pointwise sum and scalar multiplication be defined as usual：$a . \mathfrak{x}+y+b=$ $\left(a . x_{\beta}+y_{\beta}+b\right)_{\beta \in \alpha}$ ．

We write $\mathbb{K}[X]$ for the set of polynomials with coefficients in $\mathbb{K}$ and write $p(x)=$ $a . X^{n}$ etc．for $p \in \mathbb{K}[X]$ ．We say $\mathbb{K}$ is an $r c f$ if it is a real closed field，i．e．there is no $n<\omega$ and no $a_{0}, \ldots, a_{n} \in \mathbb{K}$ such that $\left(a_{0}\right)^{2}+\ldots+\left(a_{n}\right)^{2}=-1$ ，for all $a \in \mathbb{K}$ ， there is a $b \in \mathbb{K}$ such that $a=b^{2}$ or $a=-b^{2}$ ，and every polynomial $p \in \mathbb{K}[X]$ with odd degree has a root［144，page 94］．

For any $\mathbb{K}$ ，we define the $\left(\mathbb{K}\right.$－）rational function as $\mathbb{K}(X):=\left\{\frac{p}{q}: p, q \in \mathbb{K}[X]\right.$ and $q \neq 0\}$ ．

The following theorem is a strengthening of Hausdorff＇s Theorem 2．2．2．
Theorem 2．3．1（Erdős，Gillman，Henriksen［57，Theorem 2．1］）．Any two ordered rcfs of cardinality $\kappa$ that are $\eta_{\kappa}$ orders are ordered field isomorphic．

We use the following version of［25，Lemma 2．12（3）］（for fields which are not necessarily Cauchy complete）in the proof of Theorem 4．3．3．

Lemma 2．3．2．Let $\mathbb{K}$ be an ordered field with $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})=\kappa$ ．Let $C$ be a convex subset of $\mathbb{K}$ ．

1. If $\operatorname{coi}(\operatorname{top}(C))<k$ and $C$ has no supremum, then there is an $\varepsilon \in \mathbb{K}^{>0}$ such that for all $a \in C$ we have $a+\varepsilon \in C$.
2. If $\operatorname{cof}(\operatorname{bot}(C))<k$ and $C$ has no infimum, then there is an $\varepsilon \in \mathbb{K}^{>0}$ such that for all $a \in C$ we have $x-\varepsilon \in C$.
3. If $\operatorname{coi}(\operatorname{top}(C))<\kappa, \operatorname{cof}(\operatorname{bot}(C))<\kappa$, and $C$ has no infimum and supremum, then there is an $\varepsilon \in \mathbb{K}^{>0}$ such that for all $a \in C$ we have $(a-\varepsilon, a+\varepsilon) \subset C$.

Proof. Note that Part 3. follows by Parts 1. and 2., and that Part 2. follows from Part 1. considering $\{-a: a \in C\}$. So, it suffices to prove Part 1.

It is enough to show that there is an $\varepsilon \in \mathbb{K}^{>0}$ such that for all $a \in \operatorname{top}(C)$ we have $a-\varepsilon \in \operatorname{top}(C)$. Indeed, in that case for all $b \in C$ and $a \in \operatorname{top}(C)$, we have that $b<a-\varepsilon$, and therefore $b+\varepsilon<a$ since $\mathbb{K}$ is an ordered field.

Assume that for all $\varepsilon \in \mathbb{K}^{>0}$, there is an $a \in \operatorname{top}(C)$ such that $a-\varepsilon \notin \operatorname{top}(C)$. Since $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})=\kappa$ and $\operatorname{coi}(\operatorname{top}(C))<\kappa$, there is an $a \in \operatorname{top}(C)$ such that, for all $\varepsilon \in \mathbb{K}^{>0}$, we have that $a-\varepsilon \notin \operatorname{top}(C)$. But then, for all $b \in \mathbb{K}$ such that $b<a$, we have that $b \notin \operatorname{top}(C)$. Therefore, $a=\operatorname{top}(C)$, so $a$ is the supremum of $C$. But this contradicts our assumptions.

### 2.3.2 Gaps in fields

Non-Archimedean ordered fields always have gaps: remember from Section 2.2.2 that FIN $:=\{x: x$ is finite $\}$ and let INF $:=\{x: x>0\} \backslash$ FIN. Then bot(INF) is an $(\omega, \lambda)$-gap for some $\lambda($ as $\operatorname{cof}($ FIN $)=\omega)$.

Proposition 2.3.3 (Folklore). Let $\mathbb{G}$ be an ordered group. If $\mathbb{G}$ has a $(\lambda, \mu)$-gap, then it has a $(\mu, \lambda)$-gap.

Proof. Let $(L, R)$ be a $(\lambda, \mu)$-gap in $\mathbb{G}$. For any $X \subseteq \mathbb{G}$, let $-X:=\{-x: x \in X\}$. Then $(-R,-L)$ is a $(\mu, \lambda)$-gap.

As usual, if $X \subseteq \mathbb{K}$ and $a, b \in \mathbb{K}$, we write $a \cdot X+b:=\{a \cdot x+b: x \in X\}$ and $\frac{1}{X}:=\left\{\frac{1}{x}: x \in X\right.$ and $\left.x \neq 0\right\}$. Using the field properties, we can also scale and translate gaps, to form an algebra of gaps (expanding the description in [63, §2]). If $G=(L, R)$ is a gap, we write $a \cdot G+b:=(a . L+b, a \cdot R+b)$ and $\frac{1}{G}:=\left(\frac{1}{L}, \frac{1}{R}\right)$. Note that this operation may not change the gap at all, e.g. $n$. bot(INF) $+m=\operatorname{bot}($ INF $)$ for each $n, m \in \mathbb{N}$.

Proposition 2.3.4 (Folklore). Let $\mathbb{K}$ be an ordered field.

1. If $(L, R)$ is a $(\lambda, \mu)$-gap, $G$, in $\mathbb{K}, d \in \mathbb{K}$, and if $L<c$ for some constant $c \in \mathbb{K} \backslash\{0\}$, then $c . G+d$ is a gap. If $c>0$ then $c . G+d$ is a $(\lambda, \mu)$-gap, otherwise $c . G+d$ is a $(\mu, \lambda)$-gap.
2. If $(L, R)$ is a $(\lambda, \mu)$-gap, $G$, then $\frac{1}{G}$ is a $(\mu, \lambda)$-gap.
3. If $(L, R)$ is a $(\mu, \lambda)$-gap in $\mathbb{K}, x, y \in \mathbb{K}$, and $x<y$, then there is a $(\mu, \lambda)$-gap between $x$ and $y$. So, the $(\mu, \lambda)$-gaps are order dense in $\mathbb{K}$.

Proof. Parts 1. and 2. are clear (a similar result is in 44, Lemma 3.7]). Part 3. follows from Parts 1. and 2. let $G$ be a $(\lambda, \mu)$-gap in $\mathbb{K}$. Let $G<r \in \mathbb{K}$, let $y-x<\frac{1}{r^{\prime}}$ and let $m=\max \left(r, r^{\prime}\right)$. By scaling, there is a $(\lambda, \mu)$-gap in $\left(0, \frac{1}{m}\right)$. So, by shifting, there is a $(\lambda, \mu)$-gap in $\left(x, x+\frac{1}{m}\right) \subseteq(x, y)$.

Proposition 2.3.5 (Folklore). Let $\mathbb{G}$ be an $\eta_{\kappa}$-ordered group where wei $(\mathbb{G})=\kappa$. If $(L, R)$ is a $(\lambda, \mu)$-gap, then at least one of $\mu, \lambda$ equals $\kappa$, and $\omega \leq \mu, \lambda \leq \kappa$. If, in addition, $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{G})=\kappa$, then if $A$ is a $(\mu, \lambda)$-almost gap, then $\omega \leq \mu, \lambda \leq \kappa$.

Proof. First, suppose for contradiction that both $\mu, \lambda<\kappa$. Take a cofinal sequence $\left(a_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \mu}$ and a coinitial sequence $\left(b_{\beta}\right)_{\beta \in \lambda}$ with $G$ respectively. As $\mathbb{G}$ is an $\eta_{\kappa}$ order, there is an element $r \in \mathbb{G}$ such that $a_{\alpha}<r<b_{\beta}$ for all $\alpha \in \mu, \beta \in \lambda$, contradicting that $L \cup R=\mathbb{G}$. Next, we bound $\lambda$. As wei $(\mathbb{G})=\kappa$, there is some $Q \subseteq \mathbb{G}$ which is order dense, with $|Q|=\kappa$, so there is a $Q$-sequence which is coinitial in $R$, hence $\lambda=\operatorname{coi}(R) \leq \kappa$. If $\operatorname{coi}(R)<\omega$ then $\operatorname{coi}(R)=1$, so $R$ has a maximum, so $L, R$ do not define a gap, a contradiction. The bounds for $\mu$ are analogous.

For almost gaps, the last case is that $A$ is defined by $x \in \mathbb{G}$. As $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{G})=\kappa, A$ is a $(\kappa, \kappa)$-almost gap, as we can approximate $x$ by a sequence in an order dense subset, $Q$, where $|Q|=\kappa$.

A gap $G$ is called Cauchy if there is a strictly increasing Cauchy sequence, $x^{x}$, such that $\operatorname{top}(\mathrm{x})=G$. An ordered field is Cauchy complete if every Cauchy sequence converges, i.e. there are no Cauchy gaps.

### 2.3.3 Integer parts and ordinal embeddings

We discuss various ways to identify analogues of the integers and the ordinals within ordered fields.

Let $\mathbb{K}$ be an ordered field and $Z \subseteq \mathbb{K}$ be a subring of $\mathbb{K}$. We call $Z$ a set of integer parts of $\mathbb{K}$ if it is discrete and if for any $x \in A$, there is $z \in Z$ such that $z \leq x<z \oplus 1$. We write $Q(Z):=\left\{\frac{z}{z^{\prime}} \in \mathbb{K}: z, z^{\prime} \in Z, z^{\prime} \neq 0\right\}$ for the set of fractional parts of $\mathbb{K}$ associated to $Z$.

If $\mathbb{K}$ is a field that has a set of integer parts, then by [125, Lemma 29b], all sets of integer parts are order isomorphic and hence the same cardinality; thus, we can define $\mathrm{i}(\mathbb{K})$ to be the cardinality of any of these sets of integer parts.

Proposition 2.3.6 (Folklore). Let $\mathbb{K}$ be an ordered field. If $Z$ is a set of integer parts, then owei $(\mathbb{K})=i p(\mathbb{K})$.

Proof. First, we prove that $\operatorname{ip}(\mathbb{K}) \geq$ owei $(\mathbb{K})$. Note that $Q(Z)$ is dense in $\mathbb{K}$, (e.g. [145, page 499]). As $|Z|=|Z|^{2}=|Q(Z)|$, we have that $|Z| \geq$ owei( $\left.\mathbb{K}\right)$.

Then we prove that $\operatorname{ip}(\mathbb{K}) \leq$ owei $(\mathbb{K})$. Let $Q$ be order dense in $\mathbb{K}$. Then, for any $z \in Z$, there is a $q \in Q$ such that $q \in(z, z+1)$. So $|Z| \leq|Q|$, so the result follows.

Any rcf has a set of integer parts [162]; we shall see very clear examples in Section 2.3.5.

## Ordinal embeddings

Let $\mathbb{K}$ be an ordered field with $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})=\kappa$. We equip $\kappa$ with the commutative, associative, and cancelative Hessenberg operations (cite[page 5]galeotti2019theory, [189, page 366], written as $\alpha \oplus \beta$ and $\alpha \otimes \beta$. A map $e: \kappa \rightarrow \mathbb{K}$ is called an ordinal embedding if it is a monomorphism of $(\kappa, \oplus, \otimes)$ into $(\mathbb{K},+, \times)$ and $\operatorname{Ran}(e)$ is cofinal in $\mathbb{K} \nmid$ We sometimes call the elements of $\operatorname{Ran}(e)$ the almost ordinals of $\mathbb{K}$. Note that $\omega=\mathbb{N} \subseteq \mathbb{K}$ and that $e\lceil\omega=\mathrm{id}$.

Corollary 2.3.7 (Folklore). If $\mathbb{K}$ is an $r c f$, then there is an ordinal embedding $e: \operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K}) \rightarrow \mathbb{K}$.

Proof. This is a consequence of results discussed in Section 2.3.5. rcfs are orderedfield isomorphic to initial subfields of the surreal numbers No (by [51, page 1232]), and those have ordinal embeddings by Theorem 2.3.10.

### 2.3.4 Exponential fields

The following definitions are taken from [54, §6] and [126, page 22]. A function $\ln : \mathbb{K}^{>0} \rightarrow \mathbb{K}$ is called a logarithm if it is a group monomorphism from $(\mathbb{K}>0, \times, 1)$ to $(\mathbb{K},+, 0)$ satisfying $\ln (y) \leq y-1$ for every $y \in \mathbb{K}^{>0}$. If $\ln$ is a logarithm, its functional inverse $\exp :=\ln ^{-1}: \operatorname{Ran}(\ln ) \rightarrow \mathbb{K}$ is called an exponential.

An ordered field is called logarithmic if it has a logarithm; it is called exponential if it has a surjective logarithm (equivalently, if it has an exponential with domain $\mathbb{K})$. On an exponential field with an exponential exp, we write $x^{y}:=\exp (y \cdot \ln (x))$.

Proposition 2.3.8. Let $\mathbb{K}$ be an exponential rcf such that for all $x>1$ and $y>0$, $x^{y}>1$, and $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})=\kappa$. Then for any set of integer parts, $Z$, on $\mathbb{K}$, there is an $m \in \mathbb{K}$ such that $\left|\left\{n \in Z^{\geq 0}: n<m\right\}\right|=\kappa$.

Proof. If $\mathbb{K}$ is exponential and $x>1$ and $y>0, x^{y}>1$. Then note that if $\alpha<\beta<\kappa$, then $\omega^{1 \oplus \frac{1}{\alpha}} \oplus 1>\omega^{1 \oplus \frac{1}{\beta}}>\omega$. So, there are $\kappa$-many integer parts in $\left[0, \omega^{2}\right]$.

### 2.3.5 Famous fields and where to find them

In this section, we provide the definitions and basic properties of some of the fields we shall use in this thesis, in particular, the field $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$. Our notation follows 36, 42, 75, 80.

## Surreal numbers

The surreal numbers, introduced by Conway and denoted by No, are the class of binary sequences $\bigcup_{\alpha \in \mathbf{O n}_{n}}\{0,1\}^{\alpha}$, ordered lexicographically, so that $0<$ 'undefined' $<1$, e.g. $0100<010<0101$. A subfield of No is called initial if it is closed under initial segments. We let $\mathrm{No}_{<\kappa}=\bigcup_{\alpha \in \kappa}\{0,1\}^{\alpha}$ and $\mathrm{No}_{\leq \kappa}=\bigcup_{\alpha \leq \kappa}\{0,1\}^{\alpha}$, both ordered by the order inherited from No.

[^3]Theorem 2.3.9 (Conway; e.g. [36, page 23]). Every non-empty convex set $X$ of surreal numbers has a unique element of minimal length, called the simplest element of $X$.

The class No is a Cauchy-complete class which is satisfies the axioms of an rcf, and is $\eta_{\kappa}$ for every $\kappa$ [36, Theorem 25]. Moreover, every rcf is isomorphic to an initial subfield of No 51, page 1232], in particular, the reals $\mathbb{R}$ are contained within $\mathrm{No}_{\leq \omega}$.

The ordinals embed into No by $\alpha \mapsto \overline{1}_{\alpha}$; and No has a canonical set of integer parts: let Oz be the class defined in [36, Definition page 45].

Theorem 2.3.10 (Ehrlich, [51, Theorem 20]). If $\mathbb{K}$ is an initial subfield of No, then $\mathbb{K} \cap O z$ is a set of integer parts for $\mathbb{K}$.

We can equip $\mathbb{K} \cap O z$ with the Hessenberg operations, which yields an ordinal embedding from $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})$ into $\mathbb{K}$.

We call $\mathrm{No}_{<\kappa}$ the $\kappa$-rationals and denote it by $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$ (see [74] and [80, page 29]). The set $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$ is a field which inherits much of the structure of No, e.g. $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$ is an rcf [2].

Proposition 2.3.11 (Folklore, e.g. [74, Propositions 3.4.3 \& 3.4.4]). If $\kappa>\omega$ is $\kappa^{<\kappa}=\kappa$, then $\left|\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}\right|=\operatorname{bn}\left(\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}\right)=\operatorname{wei}\left(\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}\right)=\kappa$ and $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$ is an $\eta_{\kappa}$-order.

## Galeotti's field $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$

We call a gap Veronese if and for each for all $\varepsilon \in \mathbb{K}^{>0}$, there are $\ell \in L$ and $r \in R$ such that $r<\ell+\varepsilon\left[75\right.$, page 37] ${ }^{5}$ We define the Veronese completion of $\mathbb{K}$, denoted by $\operatorname{VC}(\mathbb{K}):=\mathbb{K} \cup\{(L, R):(L, R)$ is a Venonese gap in $\mathbb{K}\}$. Ordered in the obvious way, $\operatorname{VC}(\mathbb{K})$ is an ordered field [74, Theorem 2.2.7].

Theorem 2.3.12 (Folklore, e.g. [42, Proposition 3.5]). A totally ordered field is Veronese complete if and only if it is Cauchy complete.

Galeotti's field $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ is defined by $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}:=\mathrm{VC}\left(\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}\right) \cdot{ }^{6}$ We have that $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa} \subsetneq \mathrm{No}_{\leq \kappa}$ and that it is an initial subfield of No. In general, $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ is only well-behaved under the assumption of $\kappa^{<\kappa}=\kappa$, so this will be our general assumption.

Theorem 2.3.13 (Galeotti [25, Theorem 3.6], [73, Theorem 4]). Let $\kappa>\omega$ and suppose $\kappa^{<\kappa}=\kappa$. Up to ordered field isomorphism, $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ is the unique ordered field such that $\operatorname{bn}\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}\right)=\kappa$, $\operatorname{wei}\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}\right)=\kappa, \mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ is an $\eta_{\kappa}$-order, $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ is an rcf, and $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ is Cauchy complete.

Under our general assumption $\kappa^{<\kappa}=\kappa$, consider $O z_{\kappa}:=O z \cap \mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$. Since $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ is an initial subfield of No, by Theorem 2.3.10, this is a set of integer parts. By Proposition 2.3.6, we have the following:

Corollary 2.3.14. If $\kappa^{<\kappa}=\kappa$, then $\operatorname{ip}\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}\right)=\kappa$.

[^4]In fact, it can be shown that $Q\left(\mathrm{Oz}_{\kappa}\right) \subseteq \mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$ : a regular $\kappa$ is is closed under ordinal multiplication, so, by [48, Proposition 4.7(iii)] and [51, Theorem 20], the Conway normal forms of $\mathrm{Oz}_{\kappa}$ are a strict subset of the Conway normal forms of $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$. Hence, $\mathrm{Oz}_{\kappa} \subseteq \mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$, and as $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$ is a field, $Q\left(\mathrm{O}_{\kappa}\right) \subseteq \mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$. However, we do not know whether $Q\left(\mathbf{O z}_{\kappa}\right)=\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$.

## The field $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ is exponential

For $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$, if $\lambda$ is a cardinal (or indeed an $\varepsilon$-number), then $\mathbb{Q}_{\lambda}$ is exponential and is an elementary extension of $\mathbb{R}$ with real exponentiation ( 48 , page $174 \&$ Corollary 5.5]; the same holds for No). Hence, Proposition 2.3 .8 holds for $\mathbb{Q}_{\lambda}$. As $\exp$ is continuous, if $\mathbb{K}$ is exponential, then $\overline{\mathbb{K}}^{C}$ is exponential (by the standard argument, as in [187, page 107]). So, $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ is exponential.

Indeed, by the algebra of limits on $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}, \mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ is such that for all $x>1$ and $y>0$, $x^{y}>1$. Hence, by Proposition 2.3.8, there are integer parts of $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ which have $\kappa$-many positive integer parts below them.

## Gaps in the field $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$

By Proposition 2.3.5, every $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ gap is a $(\kappa, \lambda)$ - or $(\kappa, \lambda)$-gap for some $\omega \leq \lambda \leq \kappa$, we can show that $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ has gaps of all of these types, hence is not Dedekind complete. If one of $\mu, \lambda<\kappa$ then these gaps are easily defined:

Example 2.3.15. Let $\omega \leq \lambda<\kappa$ be a cardinal. Define $L_{\lambda}=\left\{x \in \mathbb{R}_{\kappa}: x\right.$ there is an ordinal $\alpha<\lambda$ such that $x<\alpha\}$. Then $L_{\lambda}, \mathbb{R}_{\kappa} \backslash L_{\lambda}$ defines a ( $\kappa, \lambda$ )-gap, denoted $\neg \lambda$, and $-(\neg \lambda)$ defines a $(\kappa, \lambda)$-gap.

So, $\neg \omega=\operatorname{bot}(\mathrm{INF})$. $\square$ These $\neg \lambda$ witness the $(\lambda, \kappa)$ - and $(\kappa, \lambda)$-gaps for all $\lambda<\kappa$. Only ( $\kappa, \kappa$ )-gaps remain. To this end, we next generalise Dales \& Woodin's version of Sierpiński's construction from $\omega_{1}$ to $\kappa$ [42], [189, Remark page 463-464]. This gives a specific construction which shows that $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ has a $(\kappa, \kappa)$-gap. For this, we recall the notion of a Hahn field.

## Hahn fields

To show that $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ has a $(\kappa, \kappa)$-gap, we use a slightly different construction, based on Dales and Woodin's [42], using the notion of a Hahn field. We return to these in Section 5.3.3.

Definition 2.3.16 (following e.g. [72, Chapter VIII §5]). Let © be any ordered set and $\kappa$ be a cardinal with $\kappa^{<\kappa}=\kappa$. We define

1. $\mathbb{H}(\mathbb{R}, \mathbb{O}):=\left\{f \in \mathbb{R}^{\mathbb{D}}: \operatorname{supp}(f)\right.$ is well-ordered $\}$, and
2. $\mathbb{H}_{\kappa}(\mathbb{R}, \mathbb{O}):=\left\{f \in \mathbb{R}^{\mathbb{O}}: \operatorname{supp}(f)\right.$ is well-ordered and $\left.|\operatorname{supp}(f)|<\kappa\right\}$.
[^5]For $x \in \mathbb{O}$, we define $(f+g)(x):=f(x)+g(x)$ and $f \leq g$ if $f(x) \leq g(x)$ where $x=\min (\operatorname{supp}(f) \cup \operatorname{supp}(g))$. Then $(\mathbb{H}(\mathbb{R}, \mathbb{O}),+, \leq)$ is an ordered group, called the Hahn group of $\mathbb{O}$; similarly, we call $\left(\mathbb{H}_{\kappa}(\mathbb{R}, \mathbb{O}),+, \leq\right)$ the $\kappa$-Hahn group of $\mathbb{O}$. If $\mathbb{O}$ is a divisible ordered group, we can define a multiplication on $\mathbb{H}(\mathbb{R}, \mathbb{O})$ and $\mathbb{H}_{\kappa}(\mathbb{R}, \mathbb{O})$ by

$$
(f \times g)(x):=\sum_{y+z=x} f(y) \cdot g(z)
$$

(see [42, page 41] for the argument that this is well-defined and has the desired properties) and $(\mathbb{H}(\mathbb{R}, \mathbb{O}),+, \times, \leq)$ becomes an ordered field, called the Hahn field of $\mathbb{O}$ [87; again similarly, we call $\left(\mathbb{H}_{\kappa}(\mathbb{R}, \mathbb{O}),+, \times, \leq\right)$ the $\kappa$-Hahn field of $\mathbb{O}$.

We think of these as formal power series: if $I \subseteq \mathbb{O}$ and $r: I \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, we think of $r$ as the formal power series $\mathrm{S}_{i \in I} r(i) X^{i}$. If $f \in \mathbb{H}(\mathbb{R}, \mathbb{O})$, then $f$ represents the formal power series $\mathrm{S}_{i \in \operatorname{supp}(f)} f(i) X^{i}$.

Every ordered field is isomorphic to a subfield of a Hahn field [35, §4], [72, page $60]$. The order used in the construction of a $\kappa$-Hahn field can be recovered via the value set.

Proposition 2.3.17. If $\kappa>\omega, \kappa^{<\kappa}=\kappa$, and $\mathbb{O}$ is an ordered set, then $\mathbb{O}=$ $\Gamma\left(\mathbb{H}_{\kappa}(\mathbb{R}, \mathbb{O})\right)$.

Proof. A straightforward generalisation of 42, Definition 1.26].
We follow the construction in [42, Chapters $1 \& 2$ ]: let $S_{\kappa}:=\{0,1\}^{\kappa}$ and $Q_{\kappa}:=$ $\left\{火 \in S_{\kappa}:\left\{\alpha<\kappa: x_{\alpha}=1\right\}\right.$ has at least 2 elements and has a maximum $\}$. Ordered lexicographically, $S_{\kappa}$ and $Q_{\kappa}$ are ordered sets. Then define $G_{\kappa}:=\mathbb{H}_{\kappa}\left(\mathbb{R}, Q_{\kappa}\right)$ to be the $\kappa$-Hahn group of $Q_{\kappa}$ and $R_{\kappa}:=\mathscr{H}_{\kappa}\left(\mathbb{R}, G_{\kappa}\right)$ to be the $\kappa$-Hahn field of $G_{\kappa}$.

Proposition 2.3.18 (Folklore). Let $\kappa>\omega$, and suppose $\kappa^{<\kappa}=\kappa$. Then $R_{\kappa}$ is an $\eta_{\kappa}$ rcf of size $\kappa$.

Proof. By [42, Theorem 2.15(iv)], $R_{\kappa}$ is an rcf. Observe that $\left|Q_{\kappa}\right|=\kappa$, so $G_{\kappa}=$ $\bigcup_{\alpha \in \kappa}\left\{f \in \widehat{\mathbb{R}^{Q_{\kappa}}}:|\operatorname{supp}(f)|=\alpha\right\}$, hence $\left|G_{\kappa}\right|=\kappa^{<\kappa}$. As $\kappa^{<\kappa}=\kappa,\left|G_{\kappa}\right|=\kappa$. By exactly the same reasoning $\left|R_{\kappa}\right|=\kappa$.

We show that $Q_{\kappa}$ is $\eta_{\kappa}$ (building on [42, Proposition 1.43]): if $L<R$ and $|L \cup R|<\kappa$, then there is some $\alpha<\kappa$ such that for every $\left(x_{\gamma}\right)_{\gamma \in \kappa} \in L \cup R$, for all $\beta>\alpha$ we have $x_{\beta}=0$. Fix the least such $\alpha$. Now we define an $x$ such that $L<x<R$ : let $x_{\alpha}=1$. For $\beta \in \kappa \backslash\{\alpha\}$, let $x_{\beta}=1$ if there is $\ell \in L$ such that $\ell_{\beta}=1$ and the first point of disagreement between $\ell$ and $\ell^{\prime}$ is no earlier than $\beta$ for each smaller $\ell^{\prime} \in L$, i.e. $\ell^{\prime} \leq_{Q_{\kappa}} \ell$. Otherwise, let $x_{\beta}=0$. Then $x$ will do [42, Proposition 1.9(iii)]. As $Q_{\kappa}$ is $\eta_{\kappa}$, so $G_{\kappa}$ is $\eta_{\kappa}$ : let $L, R \subseteq G_{\kappa}$ are such that $L<R$ and $|L \cup R|<\kappa$. As $Q_{\kappa}$ is $\eta_{\kappa}$, there is an $x \in Q_{\kappa}$ such that $\left\{O(\ell) \in Q_{\kappa}: \ell \in L\right\}<x<\left\{O(r) \in Q_{\kappa}: r \in R\right\}$. So, there is some $y \in R_{\kappa}$ such that $O(y)=x$. Then $L<y<R$. The same argument shows that $R_{\kappa}$ is $\eta_{\kappa}$.

Corollary 2.3.19. Let $\kappa>\omega$ and suppose $\kappa^{<\kappa}=\kappa$. Then the fields $R_{\kappa}$ and $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$ are isomorphic.

Proof. Follows directly from Proposition 2.3.11 \& 2.3.18 and Theorem 2.3.1.

A $(\kappa, \kappa)$-gap in $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$
We are working under the assumption that $\kappa>\omega$ and $\kappa^{<\kappa}=\kappa$.
Proposition 2.3.20 (Following [42, Proposition 1.11(ii)] ). There is a $(\kappa, \kappa)$-gap in $Q_{\kappa}$.

Proof. For each $0<\alpha<\kappa$, let $u_{\alpha}=0 \smile \overline{1}_{\alpha+1}{ }^{〔} \overline{0}_{\kappa}, d_{\alpha}=1 \frown \overline{0}_{\alpha}{ }^{\complement} 1 \frown \overline{0}_{\kappa}$, so $u_{\alpha}, d_{\alpha} \in$ $Q_{\kappa}$. Then $u_{\alpha}<d_{\beta}$ for all $\alpha, \beta \in \kappa$. There is no $x \in Q_{\kappa}$ such that $u_{\alpha}<x<d_{\beta}$ for all $\alpha, \beta \in \kappa$, as the only elements of $S_{k}$ with this property are $0^{\wedge} \overline{1}_{\kappa} \notin Q_{k}$ and $1^{\wedge} \overline{0}_{\kappa} \notin Q_{k}$. So, $\left(u_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \kappa}<\left(d_{\beta}\right)_{\beta \in \kappa}$ defines a $(\kappa, \kappa)$-gap in $Q_{\kappa}$.

Proposition 2.3.21. If $\mathbb{G}$ is an ordered group with value set $\Gamma(\mathbb{G})$ and $\Gamma(\mathbb{G})$ has a $(\mu, \lambda)$-gap, then $\mathbb{G}$ has a $(\mu, \lambda)$-gap.

Proof. Exactly as in [42, Proposition 1.24].
Corollary 2.3.22. Both $G_{\kappa}$ and $R_{\kappa}$ have $(\kappa, \kappa)$-gaps.
Proof. By Proposition 2.3.20, $Q_{\kappa}$ has a $(\kappa, \kappa)$-gap. By Proposition 2.3.17 and the definitions of $G_{\kappa}$ and $R_{\kappa}$, we have that $Q_{\kappa}=\Gamma\left(G_{\kappa}\right)$ and $G_{\kappa}=\Gamma\left(R_{\kappa}\right)$. Then apply Proposition 2.3.21 twice.

By Corollary 2.3.19, this gives us a $(\kappa, \kappa)$-gap in $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$; we now just need to show that it is preserved in $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$.

Proposition 2.3.23 (Folklore). If $\mathbb{K}$ is a non-Archimedean ordered field, then $\Gamma(\mathrm{VC}(\mathbb{K}))=\Gamma(\mathbb{K})$.

Proof. By e.g. [42, Definition 2.8], if $O(a) \neq O(b)$ then $O(a+b)=\min (O(a), O(b))$ for any $a, b \in \mathbb{K}$. Let $x \in \mathbb{V C}(\mathbb{K}) \backslash \mathbb{K}$. So, $x=\lim _{\alpha \rightarrow \kappa} x_{\alpha}$ for some Cauchy sequence $\left(x_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \kappa}$, and for all $\varepsilon>0$ there is some $\alpha$ such that for all $\beta>\alpha,\left|x-x_{\beta}\right|<\varepsilon$. Hence also, there is some $\gamma$ such that for all $\delta>\gamma, O\left(x_{\delta}-x\right)>O(x)$. So, by the triangle inequality, for all $\zeta>\max \{\alpha, \gamma\}, O\left(x_{\zeta}\right)=O\left(x+\left(x_{\zeta}-x\right)\right)=O(x)$. Hence, $\Gamma(\mathrm{VC}(\mathbb{K})) \subseteq \Gamma(\mathbb{K})$. The converse inclusion is trivial.

Now Proposition 2.3 .23 shows that $\Gamma\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}\right)=\Gamma\left(\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}\right)=\Gamma\left(R_{\kappa}\right)=G_{\kappa}$. Corollary 2.3 .19 shows that $G_{\kappa}$ has a $(\kappa, \kappa)$-gap; thus, by Proposition 2.3.21, $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ has a $(\kappa, \kappa)$ gap.

### 2.3.6 Field embeddings

If $\mathbb{K}$ and $\mathbb{L}$ are ordered fields, we write $\mathbb{L} \hookrightarrow \mathbb{K}$ if there is an ordered-field embedding from $\mathbb{L}$ to $\mathbb{K}$ (see [178, Chapter 8] for some background). Our focus is when $\mathbb{Q} \hookrightarrow \mathbb{K}$, $\mathbb{R} \hookrightarrow \mathbb{K}$, and $Q \hookrightarrow \mathbb{K}$, where $Q$ is a subfield of rational parts of $\mathbb{K}$ (as in Section 2.3.3). If $\mathbb{K}$ is an ordered field, then $\mathbb{Q} \hookrightarrow \mathbb{K}$ (e.g. [96, Exercise 2.5.1]).

Proposition 2.3.24. If $\mathbb{K}$ is an $\eta_{1} r c f$, then there is an order embedding from $\mathbb{R}$ into $\mathbb{K}$.

Proof. As $\mathbb{K}$ is an $\operatorname{rcf}, \mathbb{Q} \hookrightarrow \mathbb{K}$. Let $e: \mathbb{Q} \rightarrow \mathbb{K}$ be a witnessing field embedding. So, if $x \in \mathbb{R} \backslash \mathbb{Q}$, there are countable $L, R \subseteq \mathbb{Q}$ such that $\mathbb{Q}, L<\{x\}<R$ and if $y \in \mathbb{R}$ and $L<\{y\}<R$, then $x=y$. Then as $\mathbb{K}$ is $\eta_{1}, e(L)<z_{x}<e(R)$ for some $z \in \mathbb{K}$. For each $x \in \mathbb{R} \backslash \mathbb{Q}$, choose some $z_{x}$. Then $e \cup\left\{\left(x, z_{x}\right): x \in \mathbb{R} \backslash \mathbb{Q}\right\}$ is an order embedding from $\mathbb{R}$ into $\mathbb{K}$.

Only certain order embeddings are ordered-field embeddngs. If $\mathbb{K}$ is $\eta_{2^{x_{0}}}$, we can strengthen Proposition 2.3 .24 to an ordered-field embedding. This is already known for $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ :

Proposition 2.3.25 (Folklore). Let $\kappa>\omega$ and suppose $\kappa^{<\kappa}=\kappa$. Then $\mathbb{R} \hookrightarrow \mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ and $\mathbb{R} \hookrightarrow$ No.

Proof. That $\mathbb{R} \hookrightarrow$ No is exactly [80, Theorem 4.3]. For $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$, we note $\mathbb{R} \hookrightarrow \mathrm{No}_{\leq \omega} \subseteq$ $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$.

We can prove the general fact model-theoretically (see 144 for an introduction). If $M, N$ are structures in the same language, $\mathcal{L}$, and there is an embed$\operatorname{ding} j: M \rightarrow N$ such that for every $\mathcal{L}$-formula, $\varphi(x)$, and every x $\in M^{<\omega}$, $M \vDash \varphi(\mathbb{x}) \Longleftrightarrow N \vDash \varphi(j(x))$, then we say that $j$ is an elementary embedding 144 , Definition 2.3.1]. A model $M \vDash T$ is called $\kappa$-universal if for every $N \vDash T$ such that $|N|<\kappa$, there is an elementary embedding from $N$ to $M$ 144, Definition 4.3.16].

If $\lambda \geq 2^{\aleph_{0}}$, then an rcf, $\mathbb{K}$, is $\eta_{\lambda}$ if and only if it is $\lambda$-saturated in the sense of model theory [26, Proposition 5.4.2]. This $\lambda$-saturation implies $\lambda^{+}$-universality [144, Lemma 4.3.17]. As $|\mathbb{R}|=2^{\aleph_{0}}$, if $\lambda \geq 2^{\aleph_{0}}$, then there is an elementary embedding from $\mathbb{R}$ to $\mathbb{K}$. But an elementary embedding is automatically an ordered field embedding. We summarise this like so:

Remark 2.3.26. If $\mathbb{K}$ is an $r c f$ and $\eta_{\lambda}$ for some $\lambda \geq 2^{\aleph_{0}}$, then there is an elementary embedding in the language of ordered fields from $\mathbb{R}$ into $\mathbb{K}$, hence $\mathbb{R} \hookrightarrow \mathbb{K}$.

In models where $\aleph_{1}<2^{\aleph_{0}}$, we do not know whether $\eta_{1}$-ness suffices.
More generally, we can ordered-field embed a subfield of rational parts into any rcf, $\mathbb{K}$ : let $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})$ have the Hessenberg operations. By Proposition 2.3.7, embed $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})$ into $\mathbb{K}$. Hence, $Q(\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})) \hookrightarrow \mathbb{K}$. This $Q(\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K}))$ is (ordered-field isomorphic to) Asperó and Tsaprounis' bn $(\mathbb{K})-\mathbb{Q}[8$, page 10]. Subfields of rational parts sometimes play an analogous rôle to that of $\mathbb{Q}$ for the reals (see the cardinality arguments using $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$ in Sections 6.2.3 and 6.3.4), but it is unclear how much analysis is common to fields with ordered-field isomorphic subfields of rational parts.

## Chapter 3

## Descriptive Choice Principles and How to Separate Them

This chapter is based on joint work with Lucas Wansner (Universität Hamburg); both contributors contributed equally to this work. All definitions, statements, and proofs of this chapter were jointly written and will form part of a joint publication [206]; the material is similarly included in Wansner's doctoral dissertation 205, Chapter 3] which therefore has significant overlap with this chapter.

In this chapter, we study the interplay between very weak fragments of AC and descriptive set theory. We define descriptive choice principles, a family of subfragments that stratify $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)$ and prove separation results for them. Kanovei proved the first separation theorem for some of these principles 109. In this chapter, we improve on his result.

In Section 3.1, we define our descriptive choice principles and discuss their basic properties; in Section 3.2, we discuss previous separation theorems and state our main result (the Separation Theorem (3.2.4) and its corollaries. Finally, the technical Section 3.3 provides the proof of the main result. The beginning of Section 3.3 will give a roadmap through the proof of the main theorem and its related concepts (page 38).

### 3.1 Descriptive choice principles

If $\Gamma$ is any of the descriptive pointclasses defined in Section 2.1.4, we say that a countable sequence, $A=\left(A_{n}\right)_{n \in \omega}$, of sets of reals is in $\Gamma$ if all of its members are; we say that it is uniformly in $\Gamma$ if $A \in \Gamma$ and the set $\widehat{A} \in \Gamma$ (where $\widehat{A}$ was the set of reals encoding the entire sequence; see page 11). We write unif $\Gamma$ for the collection of countable sequences that are uniformly in $\bar{\Gamma}$. We remind the reader that without $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)$, descriptive pointclasses can fail to be closed under countable unions (see page 14). Uniformity is a remedy for this problem: if $\Gamma$ is any boldface or lightface projective pointclass and $A=\left(A_{n}\right)_{n \in \omega}$ is uniformly in $\Gamma$, then $\bigcup_{n \in \omega} A_{n} \in \Gamma$.

In Section 2.1.3, we introduced the fragments $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \Xi\right)$ meaning "every countable sequence of non-empty sets of reals in $\Xi$ has a choice function" and $\mathrm{DC}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \Gamma\right)$ referring to the principle of dependent choices for relations in $\Gamma$.

Applying these definitions to our descriptive pointclasses, we obtain the following principles:

$$
\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \Gamma\right), \mathrm{DC}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \Gamma\right), \mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \text { unif } \Gamma\right), \text { and } \mathrm{DC}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \text { unif } \Gamma\right) .
$$

We call these fragments descriptive choice principles and the latter two uniform. Clearly, for any descriptive pointclass $\Gamma$, we have that $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \Gamma\right)$ implies $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ;\right.$ unif $\left.\Gamma\right)$ and that $\mathrm{DC}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \Gamma\right)$ implies $\mathrm{DC}\left(\omega^{\omega} ;\right.$ unif $\left.\Gamma\right)$.

Proposition 3.1.1 (ZF). The principle $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \boldsymbol{\Delta}_{2}^{0}\right)$ holds.
Proof. We show that we can canonically pick an element from any $\boldsymbol{\Delta}_{2}^{0}$ set: by Hausdorff's Difference Lemma, every $\Delta_{2}^{0}$ set of reals, $A$, can be written as an $\alpha$ difference of closed sets for some $\alpha<\omega_{1}$ [5, Theorem 7.16]. So, there is a sequence of closed sets of reals, $\left(C_{\beta}\right)_{\beta \in \alpha}$, such that

$$
A=\operatorname{Diff}_{\beta<\alpha} C_{\beta}:=\left\{x \in \bigcup_{\beta<\alpha} C_{\beta}: \text { the least } \beta<\alpha \text { such that } x \notin C_{\beta} \text { is odd }\right\} .
$$

With extra care, such a sequence can be uniquely specified (for a detailed specification, see [5, 3.E.1, page 57]). Let $A \neq \emptyset$ be a $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{2}^{0} \cap \Pi_{2}^{0}$ set of reals, and let $\left(C_{\beta}\right)_{\beta \in \alpha}$ be the corresponding sequence. It suffices to define a canonical real in $A$ from $\left(C_{\beta}\right)_{\beta \in \alpha}$. There is a minimal $\beta<\alpha$ which is even such that $C_{\beta} \supsetneq C_{\beta+1}$. Let $\left\{O_{n}: n \in \omega\right\}$ enumerate the basic open sets and let $n \in \omega$ be the minimal element such that $O_{n} \cap C_{\beta+1}=\emptyset$ and $O_{n} \cap C_{\beta} \neq \emptyset$. Since $O_{n} \cap C_{\beta}$ is closed, there is a unique pruned tree $T \subseteq \omega^{<\omega}$ such that $[T]=O_{n} \cap C_{\beta}$. The left-most branch of $T$ yields a real in $A$.

The following relationships between descriptive choice principles hold in ZF.
Theorem 3.1.2 (ZF; 109 ). Let $n \geq 1$.

1. $\mathrm{DC}\left(\omega^{\omega}, \boldsymbol{\Pi}_{1}^{1}\right)$ holds,
2. $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ;\right.$ unif $\left.\Pi_{n}^{1}\right)$ is equivalent to $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ;\right.$ unif $\left.\Sigma_{n+1}^{1}\right)$,
3. $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ;\right.$ unif $\left.\boldsymbol{\Pi}_{n}^{1}\right)$ is equivalent to $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ;\right.$ unif $\left.\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{n+1}^{1}\right)$,
4. $\mathrm{DC}\left(\omega^{\omega} ;\right.$ unif $\left.\Pi_{n}^{1}\right)$ is equivalent to $\mathrm{DC}\left(\omega^{\omega} ;\right.$ unif $\left.\Sigma_{n+1}^{1}\right)$,
5. $\mathrm{DC}\left(\omega^{\omega} ;\right.$ unif $\left.\boldsymbol{\Pi}_{n}^{1}\right)$ is equivalent to $\mathrm{DC}\left(\omega^{\omega} ;\right.$ unif $\left.\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{n+1}^{1}\right)$,
6. $\operatorname{DC}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \Pi_{n+1}^{1}\right)$ implies $\operatorname{DC}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \boldsymbol{\Pi}_{n}^{1}\right)$, and
7. $\mathrm{DC}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \boldsymbol{\Pi}_{n}^{1}\right)$ implies $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ;\right.$ unif $\left.\boldsymbol{\Pi}_{n}^{1}\right)$.

Proof. Part 1. is [109, §3.4, Theorem 3] (essentially due to Luzin and Novikov, (136). Parts 2. to 6. are 109, §2, Theorems 2.5 and 2.6] (a summary in English can be found in [95, Note 61]). The proof of Part 7. follows the pattern of the proof of $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)$ from $\mathrm{DC}\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)$ : fix an $n$, and let $\left(A_{k}\right)_{k \in \omega}$ be in unif $\boldsymbol{\Pi}_{n}^{1}$. Consider the relation $R:=\left\{(x, y): \exists n\left(x \in A_{k} \wedge y \in A_{k+1}\right)\right\}$. It is obvious that $R$ is $\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{n+1}^{1}$, then use Part 5.

In Section 2.1.4, we discussed that without $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)$, the Borel hierarchy can behave very badly and diverge from the codeable Borel hierarchy. The following result by Ikegami and Schlicht shows that this is not true anymore if we assume the weakest of the (boldface) projective choice principles.

Theorem 3.1.3 (ZF; Ikegami \& Schlicht). The following are equivalent:

1. $\mathcal{B}^{*}$ is closed under countable unions,
2. $\mathcal{B}=\Delta_{1}^{1}=\mathcal{B}^{*}$, and
3. $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \boldsymbol{\Delta}_{1}^{1}\right)$.

Proof. Cf. 98, Remark 3.22].
Ikegami \& Schlicht show that each of these statements implies that $\omega_{1}$ is regular. This also answers a question of Moore [158, pages 181-182]: his axioms " $\mathcal{B} \subseteq \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{1}^{1 "}$ [158, 3.6.5] and " $\mathcal{B}=\boldsymbol{\Delta}_{1}^{1}$ " $[158,3.6 .6]$ are equivalent, and so " $\mathcal{B}=\boldsymbol{\Delta}_{1}^{1}$ " is not a result of $\mathrm{ZF} \square$

The statement "countable unions of countable sets of reals are countable" is usually referred to as the Countable Union Theorem denoted by UT $\left(\aleph_{0}\right)$ 95, Form 6]. Note that there are models of $\mathrm{ZF}+\mathrm{UT}\left(\aleph_{0}\right)$ where $\mathcal{B}=\mathscr{P}\left(\omega^{\omega}\right) \neq \mathcal{B}^{*},{ }^{2}$ Theorem 3.1.3 therefore implies that UT $\left(\aleph_{0}\right)$ does not imply $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \Delta_{1}^{1}\right)$.

### 3.2 Separating descriptive choice principles

As descriptive pointclasses need not be closed under countable unions in ZF, we focus on the uniform descriptive choice principles, which avoid the problems of closure under countable unions. Based on what we have already seen, we observe that the uniform and non-uniform principles are not in general equivalent.

Proposition 3.2.1. There is a model of $\mathrm{ZF}+\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ;\right.$ unif $\left.\boldsymbol{\Pi}_{1}^{1}\right)+\neg \mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \boldsymbol{\Pi}_{1}^{1}\right)$.
Proof. By Theorem 3.1.2, $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ;\right.$ unif $\left.\boldsymbol{\Pi}_{1}^{1}\right)$ holds in ZF; by Theorem 3.1.3, $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \boldsymbol{\Pi}_{1}^{1}\right)$ does not.

We show that these are in fact distinct for all $n \geq 1$ (see Figure 3.1). We mention other known separation results.

Theorem 3.2.2 (Kanovei, $[109 \mid)$. For each $n \geq 1$, there is a model of $\mathrm{ZF}+$ $\mathrm{DC}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \boldsymbol{\Pi}_{n}^{1}\right)+\neg \mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ;\right.$ unif $\left.\Pi_{n+1}^{1}\right)$.

Theorem 3.2.3 (Friedman, Gitman, \& Kanovei, $67 \mid$ ). There is a model of ZF + $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)+\neg \mathrm{DC}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \Pi_{2}^{1}\right)$. Therefore, for $n \geq 2, \mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \Pi_{n}^{1}\right)$ does not imply DC $\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \Pi_{n}^{1}\right)$.

Our main result is a strengthening of Kanovei's Theorem 3.2.2.

[^6]Theorem 3.2.4 (Separation Theorem). For every $n \geq 1$, there is a model of $\mathrm{ZF}+\mathrm{DC}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \boldsymbol{\Pi}_{n}^{1}\right)+\neg \mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ;\right.$ unif $\left.\Pi_{n+1}^{1}\right)+\neg \mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \mathbf{C t b l}\right)$.

We can represent this pictorially, with double arrows representing implications, and dashed lines representing the separation between layers due to Theorem 3.2.4. Clearly, if $\Gamma, \Gamma^{\prime}$ are descriptive classes such that $\Gamma^{\prime} \supseteq \Gamma$, then $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \Gamma^{\prime}\right)$ implies $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \Gamma\right)$, so our inclusions of descriptive classes naturally give an implication diagramme for the axiom fragments as displayed in Figure 3.1. The diagramme forms a rectangular solid where the back side consists of the boldface principles, the front side of the lightface principles, the left side of the non-uniform principles, and the right side of the uniform principles.

We obtain the following immediate consequences of the Separation Theorem 3.2 .4 (using Lemma 3.1.2).

Corollary 3.2.5. There is a model of ZF $+\mathrm{DC}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \mathbf{P r o j}\right)+\neg \mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \mathbf{C t b l}\right)$.
Proof. Clear from Theorem 3.2.4 and compactness.
Corollary 3.2.6. For every $n \geq 1$, there is a model of $Z F+\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \operatorname{unif} \boldsymbol{\Pi}_{n}^{1}\right)+$ $\neg \mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ;\right.$ unif $\left.\Pi_{n+1}^{1}\right)$.
Corollary 3.2.7. There is a model of $\mathrm{ZF}+\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ;\right.$ unifProj $)+\neg \mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \mathbf{C t b l}\right)$.
Corollary 3.2 .6 separates the horizontal slices of the diagramme on the uniform side from each other. In the diagramme, this is shown by the dashed line between $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ;\right.$ unif $\left.\Pi_{n}^{1}\right)$ and $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ;\right.$ unif $\left.\Pi_{n+1}^{1}\right)$, indicating that there is no implication from the lower horizontal slice to the higher slice.

Corollary 3.2 .7 separates the boldface non-uniform part of the diagramme from the uniform part by showing that the strongest uniform principle does not imply the weakest non-uniform boldface principle. This is shown by the dashed line between $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \mathbf{C t b l}\right)$ and $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ;\right.$ unif $\left.\boldsymbol{\Pi}_{1}^{1}\right)$ in Figure 3.1. So, in particular, $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{n}^{1}\right)$ implies, but is not implied by, $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ;\right.$ unif $\left.\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{n}^{1}\right)$.

Furthermore, since $\mathbf{C t b l} \subseteq \Sigma_{2}^{0}$, our results separate all non-trivial non-uniform Borel descriptive choice principles from the uniform descriptive choice principles. 3

Corollary 3.2.8. There is a model of $\mathrm{ZF}+\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ;\right.$ unifProj $)+\neg \mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{2}^{0}\right)$.

### 3.3 The proof of the Separation Theorem

Kanovei's original approach to separating descriptive choice principles in 109 involved inner models.

We shall define a notion of an $n$-slicing forcing (Section 3.3.1) and prove that if there is such an $n$-slicing forcing notion, the Separation Theorem (Theorem 3.2.4) holds (Section 3.3.2).

Thus, all that remains to be shown is the existence of $n$-slicing forcing notions. We call this the Slicing Theorem (Theorem 3.3.15).

[^7]

Figure 3.1: Implication diagramme of the fragments of $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)$

The proof of the Slicing Theorem is covered in Sections 3.3.3 \& 3.3.4 first, we discuss the Kanovei-Lyubetsky Lemma (Theorem 3.3.43), a technical tool. We introduce Jensen forcing, a forcing notion that was used to create $\Pi_{2}^{1}$-singletons, extract a relevant property from it that we call $n$-Jensen (Definition 3.3.65) and then use the Kanovei-Lyubetsky Lemma to prove the existence of $n$-Jensen forcings (Theorem 3.3.66); finally, we construct an $n$-slicing forcing notion from an $n$-Jensen forcing notion (page 65).

### 3.3.1 Slicing forcing notions

In this section, we define the property of being $n$-slicing which is central for our proof.

As an illustration of the motivation for this, consider the standard construction of a model of $\mathbf{Z F}+\neg \mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega}, \mathbf{C t b l}\right)$ in a symmetric extension 103, Example 15.50]: we take an ordinary $\omega$-product of a forcing notion and make sure that the symmetric extension does not have a choice function for some countable collection of countable sets. In this standard construction, the descriptive complexity of this failure of choice is not known.

In our construction, we preserve enough choice by ensuring that the forcing notion is $n$-slicing (Definition 3.3.13). Note that this notion deals with a product notion of length $\omega$, the $\omega$-slice-product (Definition 3.3.2), but one of the key technical results of our proof, the Kanovei-Lyubetsky Lemma (see Theorem 3.3.43) works for $\left(\omega_{1} \times \omega\right)$-products (see Question 3.3.44); thus, we later have to modify the standard construction in the following way: we take an $\left(\omega_{1} \times \omega\right)$-product, then ignore the later reals and only consider the countable $\omega \times \omega$ corner of the $\omega_{1} \times \omega$ grid to produce the countable collection of countable sets.

This means that only the initial $\omega$-many slices of the product matter for the model we construct. Hence, we define our filter such that the permutation of the subgroups in the filter can move any finite initial subsequence of $\omega_{1}$, but fixes every entry $\geq \omega$. Formally: let $\xi \leq \omega_{1}$ be an ordinal and let $\left(\mathbb{P}_{\nu}\right)_{\nu \in \xi}$ be a sequence of forcing notions.

Definition 3.3.1. We define the $\omega$-slice-product of $\left(\mathbb{P}_{\nu}\right)_{\nu \in \xi}$ with finite support as the set $\mathbb{P}$ of all partial functions $p$ such that $\operatorname{Dom}(p) \subseteq \xi \times \omega$ is finite and for every $(\nu, k) \in \xi \times \omega, p(\nu, k) \in \mathbb{P}_{\nu}$ ordered by:

$$
p \leq q \Longleftrightarrow \forall(\nu, k) \in \operatorname{Dom}(q)(p(\nu, k) \leq q(\nu, k))
$$

We say $\mathbb{P}$ has length $\xi$, denoted $\operatorname{len}(\mathbb{P})=\xi$.
Definition 3.3.2. If, for every $\nu<\omega_{1}$, we have that $\mathbb{Q}=\mathbb{P}_{\nu}$, then we say $\mathbb{P}$ is the $\omega$-slice-product of $\mathbb{Q}$ with finite support of length $\xi$. Let $I \subseteq \xi \times \omega$. For $A \subseteq \mathbb{P}$, we define $A \upharpoonright I:=\{p \upharpoonright I: p \in A\}$.

Then for every $\mathbb{P}$-generic filter $G, G \upharpoonright I$ is a $\mathbb{P} \upharpoonright I$-generic filter.
Next, let $\xi=\omega_{1}$. We define $\operatorname{Aut}\left(\omega_{1} \times \omega, \omega\right)$ as the group of all bijections $\pi$ of $\omega_{1} \times \omega$ such that for every $\nu \in \omega_{1}, \pi(\{\nu\} \times \omega)=\{\nu\} \times \omega$.

Definition 3.3.3. Let $p \in \mathbb{P}$ and let $\pi \in \operatorname{Aut}\left(\omega_{1} \times \omega, \omega\right)$. We define $\pi^{*}(p):=p^{\prime}$ with $\operatorname{Dom}\left(p^{\prime}\right)=\pi(\operatorname{Dom}(p))$ and for $i \in \operatorname{Dom}\left(p^{\prime}\right), p^{\prime}(i)=p\left(\pi^{-1}(i)\right)$. So, every automorphism $\pi \in \operatorname{Aut}\left(\omega_{1} \times \omega, \omega\right)$ induces an automorphism $\pi^{*}$ on $\mathbb{P}$. Let $\mathcal{G}:=$ $\left\{\pi^{*}: \pi \in \operatorname{Aut}\left(\omega_{1} \times \omega, \omega\right)\right\}$ be the group of all such automorphisms on $\mathbb{P}$.
Definition 3.3.4. We say $\mathcal{S} \subseteq \mathcal{P}\left(\omega_{1} \times \omega\right)$ is a set of slices if, for every $s \in \mathcal{S}, s$ is of the form $X \times \omega$, where $X \subseteq \omega_{1}$.
Definition 3.3.5. Let $\mathcal{S} \subseteq \mathcal{P}\left(\omega_{1} \times \omega\right)$ be a set of slices and for every $s \in \mathcal{S}$, let $H_{s}:=\left\{\pi^{*}: \forall(\nu, k) \in s(\pi(\nu, k)=(\nu, k))\right\} \subseteq \mathcal{G}$ be the subgroup of all $\pi^{*}$ such that $\pi$ point-wise fixes $s$. We define $\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{S}}$ to be the filter on the subgroups of $\mathcal{G}$ generated by $\left\{H_{s}: s \in \mathcal{S}\right\}$.

Proposition 3.3.6. For any set of slices $\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{S}}$ is normal.
Proof. A simple algebraic check: let $\pi \in \operatorname{Aut}\left(\omega_{1} \times \omega, \omega\right)$ and $H \in \mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{S}}$. Then there is an $s \in \mathcal{S}$ such that $H_{s} \subseteq H$. It suffices to show that $H_{s} \subseteq \pi^{*} H\left(\pi^{*}\right)^{-1}$. Let $\tau \in \operatorname{Aut}\left(\omega_{1} \times \omega, \omega\right)$ be such that $\tau^{*} \in H_{s}$. So, every $(\nu, k) \in s$ is fixed by $\left(\pi^{*}\right)^{-1} \circ \tau^{*} \circ \pi^{*}$. So, $\left(\pi^{*}\right)^{-1} \circ \tau^{*} \circ \pi^{*} \in H_{s} \subseteq H$. Hence,

$$
\pi^{*} \circ\left(\left(\pi^{*}\right)^{-1} \circ \tau^{*} \circ \pi^{*}\right) \circ\left(\pi^{*}\right)^{-1}=\tau^{*} \in \pi^{*} H\left(\pi^{*}\right)^{-1}
$$

Definition 3.3.7. Let $G$ be a $\mathbb{P}$-generic filter and $\mathcal{S}$ be a set of slices. We write $V(G, \mathcal{S})$ for the symmetric submodel associated to $\mathcal{F}_{\mathcal{S}}$ and $G$.
Lemma 3.3.8. Let $\left(\mathbb{P}_{\nu}\right)_{\nu \in \omega_{1}}$ be a sequence of forcing notions, let $\mathbb{P}$ be the $\omega$-sliceproduct of $\left(\mathbb{P}_{\nu}\right)_{\nu \in \omega_{1}}$ with finite support, let $\mathcal{S} \subseteq \mathcal{P}\left(\omega_{1} \times \omega\right)$ be a set of slices, and let $G$ be a $\mathbb{P}$-generic filter. Let $X$ be a set of ordinals. If $X \in V(G, \mathcal{S})$, then there is an $s \in \mathcal{S}$ such that $X \in V[G\lceil s]$.

Proof. Let $\sigma$ be a symmetric $\mathbb{P}$-name for $X$, let $s \in \mathcal{S}$ be such that $H_{s} \subseteq \operatorname{sym}(\sigma)$, and let $p \in G$ be such that $p$ forces that $X$ is a set of ordinals. We define a $\mathbb{P}\left\lceil s\right.$-name $\sigma^{\prime}$ such that $\sigma_{G\lceil s}^{\prime}=\sigma_{G}=X$. Let $\sigma^{\prime}:=\{(\check{\xi}, q \upharpoonright s): q \in \mathbb{P}$, and $q \leq p$, and $q \Vdash \check{\xi} \in \sigma\}$.

First, we prove $\sigma_{G} \subseteq \sigma_{G \mid s}^{\prime}$. Let $\xi \in \sigma_{G}$. Then there is a $q \in G$ such that $(\check{\xi}, q) \in \sigma$. As $G$ is a filter, there is an $r \in G$ which witnesses that $p$ and $q$ are compatible. Hence, $r \leq p$ and $r \Vdash \check{\xi} \in \sigma$. Then $(\check{\xi}, r \upharpoonright s) \in \sigma^{\prime}$, so $\xi \in \sigma_{G \mid s}^{\prime}$.

Next, we prove $\sigma_{G\lceil s}^{\prime} \subseteq \sigma_{G}$. Let $\xi \in \sigma_{G \mid s}^{\prime}$. Then there is a $q \in G \upharpoonright s$ such that $(\check{\xi}, q) \in \sigma^{\prime}$. Hence, there is an $r \leq p$ such that $q=r \upharpoonright s$ and $r \Vdash \check{\xi} \in \sigma$. We suppose for a contradiction, that $q \Vdash \Vdash \check{\xi} \in \sigma$. Then there is a $q^{\prime} \leq q$ such that $q^{\prime} \Vdash \check{\xi} \notin \sigma$. Hence, $q^{\prime}$ and $r$ are incompatible, but agree on $s$ as functions. Let $\pi \in H_{s}$ be such that $\operatorname{Dom}(r) \cap \pi\left[\operatorname{Dom}\left(q^{\prime}\right)\right] \subseteq s$. Then $\pi^{*}\left(q^{\prime}\right)$ and $r$ are compatible, as they agree on their common domain. By construction $\pi^{*} \in H_{s} \subseteq \operatorname{sym}(\sigma)$, so $\pi^{*}\left(q^{\prime}\right) \Vdash \pi^{*}(\check{\xi}) \notin \pi^{*}(\sigma)$ and hence $\pi^{*}\left(q^{\prime}\right) \Vdash \check{\xi} \notin \sigma$. But this is a contradiction since $r$ and $\pi^{*}\left(q^{\prime}\right)$ are compatible. Hence, $q \Vdash \check{\xi} \in \sigma$ and so $\xi \in \sigma_{G}$.
Lemma 3.3.9. Let $\left(\mathbb{P}_{\nu}\right)_{\nu \in \omega_{1}}$ be a sequence of forcing notions, let $\mathbb{P}$ be the $\omega$-sliceproduct of $\left(\mathbb{P}_{\nu}\right)_{\nu \in \omega_{1}}$ with finite support, let $\mathcal{S} \subseteq \mathcal{P}\left(\omega_{1} \times \omega\right)$ be a set of slices, and let $G$ be a $\mathbb{P}$-generic filter. Then:

1. for every $s \in \mathcal{S}, V[G\lceil s] \subseteq V(G, \mathcal{S})$ and
2. for every set of ordinals $X, X \in V(G, \mathcal{S})$ if and only if there is some $s \in \mathcal{S}$ such that $X \in V[G\lceil s]$.
Proof. For Part 1., let $X \in V[G\lceil s]$. Then there is a $\mathbb{P}\lceil s$-name $\dot{X}$ such that $\dot{X}_{G \upharpoonright s}=X$. Since $\mathbb{P} \upharpoonright s \subseteq \mathbb{P}, \dot{X}$ is also a $\mathbb{P}$-name and $\dot{X}_{G}=X$. Hence, it is enough to show that every $\mathbb{P} \upharpoonright s$-name is hereditarily symmetric. Let $\sigma$ be a $\mathbb{P} \upharpoonright s$-name, let $\pi^{*} \in H_{s}$, and let $(\tau, p) \in \sigma$. By assumption, $p \in \mathbb{P} \upharpoonright s$ and $\pi^{*}$ fixes $s$, so $\pi^{*}(p)=p$. Hence, $\pi^{*}(\sigma)=\left\{\left(\pi^{*}(\tau), \pi^{*}(p)\right):(\tau, p) \in \sigma\right\}=\left\{\left(\pi^{*}(\tau), p\right):(\tau, p) \in \sigma\right\}$. By induction, $\sigma$ is hereditarily symmetric.

The backwards direction of Part 2. follows immediately from Part 1. whilst the forwards direction is exactly Lemma 3.3.8.

So, a real $x \in \omega^{\omega}$ is in $V(G, \mathcal{S})$ if and only if $x \in V[G\lceil s]$ for some $s \in \mathcal{S}$. Then note that a choice function for countable is a countable sequence of reals. So, a countable family, $\mathcal{F}$, of non-empty sets of reals has a choice function in $V(G, \mathcal{S})$ if and only if $\mathcal{F}$ has a choice function in $V[G\lceil s]$ for some $s \in \mathcal{S}$. We exploit this fact to show that some descriptive choice principles fail in $V(G, \mathcal{S})$. However, we also need to retain some descriptive choice in $V(G, \mathcal{S})$. For this, we need a different approach. Hence, we define the following property:

Definition 3.3.10. Let $\mathbb{P}$ be an $\omega$-slice-product with finite support of a sequence $\left(\mathbb{P}_{\nu}\right)_{\nu \in \omega_{1}}$ of forcing notions and let $\mathcal{S} \subseteq \mathcal{P}\left(\omega_{1} \times \omega\right)$ be a set of slices. We say $\mathbb{P}$ is $n$-absolute for $\mathcal{S}$-slices if, for every $s \in \mathcal{S}$, every $\Sigma_{n}^{1}$ formula with real parameters $V[G\lceil s]$ is absolute between $V[G\lceil s]$ and $V[G]$.

Definition 3.3.11. A set of slices $\mathcal{S} \subseteq \mathcal{P}\left(\omega_{1} \times \omega\right)$ is unbounded if, for every $s \in \mathcal{S}$, $\{\nu:\{\nu\} \times \omega \subseteq s\}$ is unbounded in $\omega_{1}$. We say $\mathbb{P}$ is $n$-absolute for slices if, for every unbounded set of slices $\mathcal{S}, \mathbb{P}$ is $n$-absolute for $\mathcal{S}$-slices.

By Theorem 2.1.22, any $\omega$-slice-product with finite support of length $\omega_{1}$ is 2 -absolute for slices. However, 3 -absoluteness for slices is not automatic:

Example 3.3.12. Let $\mathbb{P}_{0}$ be random forcing (i.e. $\left\{A \in \mathcal{B}\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)\right.$ : the Lebesgue measure of $A$ is positive , ordered by inclusion, as in (103, page 243]). For all $\nu \in \omega_{1} \backslash\{0\}$, let $\mathbb{P}_{\nu}=\mathbb{C}$ (i.e. Cohen forcing). Let $\mathbb{P}$ be the $\omega$-slice-product of $\left(\mathbb{P}_{\nu}\right)_{\nu \in \omega_{1}}$ with finite support, and let $G$ be $\mathbb{P}$-generic over L. Then $\mathrm{L}[G]$ contains a random real over L (from the first coordinate, $\left.\mathbb{P}_{0}\right)$, but $\mathrm{L}\left[G \upharpoonright\left(\omega_{1} \backslash\{0\}\right) \times \omega\right]$ does not (as the other coordinates are Cohen forcing, so do not add a random real). Finally, note that the statement "there is a random real over L" is $\Sigma_{3}^{1}$. So, by definition, $\mathbb{P}$ is not 3 -absolute for slices.

Definition 3.3.13. A forcing notion $\mathbb{P}$ is $n$-slicing if there is a sequence of nonatomic forcing notions $\left(\mathbb{P}_{\nu}\right)_{\nu \in \omega_{1}}$ such that:

1. $\mathbb{P}$ is the $\omega$-slice-product of $\left(\mathbb{P}_{\nu}\right)_{\nu \in \omega_{1}}$ with finite support,
2. for every $\nu<\omega_{1}$, every $\mathbb{P}_{\nu}$-generic filter $G$ is uniquely determined by a real in $V[G] \backslash V$,
3. $\mathbb{P}$ is $n$-absolute for slices, and
4. for every $\mathbb{P}$-generic filter $G$, the set $\left\{\left(\ell, x_{G}^{(\ell, k)}\right):(\ell, k) \in \omega^{2}\right\}$ is $\Pi_{n}^{1}$ in $V[G]$, where $x_{G}^{(\ell, k)}$ is the generic real defined by $G \upharpoonright\{(\ell, k)\}$.

Lemma 3.3.14 (Sandwiching Lemma). Let $n \in \omega$, let $\mathbb{P}$ be $n$-slicing, let $G$ be a $\mathbb{P}$-generic filter, and let $\mathcal{S} \subseteq \mathcal{P}\left(\omega_{1} \times \omega\right)$ be an unbounded set of slices. For every $s \in \mathcal{S}$, every $\Sigma_{n}^{1}$-formula with real parameters in $V[G \upharpoonright s]$ is absolute between $V\left[G\lceil s], V[G]\right.$, and $V(G, \mathcal{S})$. So, every $\Sigma_{n}^{1}$-formula with real parameters in $V(G, \mathcal{S})$ is absolute between $V[G]$ and $V(G, \mathcal{S})$.

Proof. The second part follows from the first and Lemma 3.3.9. The first part is proved by induction. For the base case, let $s \in \mathcal{S}$ and $\varphi$ be a $\Sigma_{1}^{1}$ formula with parameters in $V[G\lceil s]$. By definition, there is an arithmetical $\psi$ such that $\varphi=\exists x \psi(x)$. Note that for every real $x \in V[G \upharpoonright s], \psi(x)$ is absolute between $V[G \upharpoonright s]$, $V[G]$, and $V(G, \mathcal{S})$. So, by upwards-absoluteness, if $V(G, \mathcal{S}) \vDash \varphi$, then $V[G] \vDash \varphi$. Likewise, by downwards-absoluteness, $V(G, \mathcal{S}) \vDash \neg \varphi$, then $V[G \mid s] \vDash \neg \varphi$. Since $\mathbb{P}$ is $n$-absolute for slices, $\varphi$ is absolute between $V[G \upharpoonright s]$ and $V[G]$. So, $\varphi$ is absolute between $V[G\lceil s], V[G]$, and $V(G, \mathcal{S})$. The induction step is exactly similar.

The following theorem will be proved in Section 3.3.4.
Theorem 3.3.15 (Slicing Theorem). Let $n \geq 2$. In L, there is an $n$-slicing forcing notion.

### 3.3.2 The Slicing Theorem implies the main theorem

In this section, we prove Theorem 3.2.4 under the assumption that the Slicing Theorem (Theorem 3.3.15) has been established. In particular, we construct our model from L which then, by Slicing Theorem (Theorem 3.3.15) has an $n$-slicing forcing notion for every $n \geq 2$.

We fix a natural number $n \geq 1$ and aim to construct a model of the following:

$$
\mathrm{ZF}+\mathrm{DC}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \boldsymbol{\Pi}_{n}^{1}\right)+\neg \mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \text { unif } \Pi_{n+1}^{1}\right)+\neg \mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \mathbf{C t b l}\right) .
$$

As $n+1 \geq 2$, let $\mathbb{P}$ be $(n+1)$-slicing, let $G$ be a $\mathbb{P}$-generic filter over L , let $Z:=\left\{\left(F \cup\left(\omega_{1} \backslash \omega\right)\right) \times \omega: F \subseteq \mathbb{N}\right.$ is finite $\}$, let $N:=L(G, Z)$, for every $\ell \in \omega$, let $A_{\ell}:=\left\{x_{G}^{(\ell, k)}: k \in \omega\right\}$ and let $A:=\left\{A_{\ell}: \ell \in \omega\right\}$. Then, in $\mathrm{L}[G]$, each $A_{\ell}$ is countable and $A$ is in unif $\Pi_{n+1}^{1}$. We show that, in $N, A$ has no choice function, each $A_{\ell}$ is still countable, and $A$ is still in unif $\Pi_{n+1}^{1}$.

Lemma 3.3.16. In $N, A$ is unif $\Pi_{n+1}^{1}$, and for every $\ell \in \omega, A_{\ell}$ is countable.
Proof. For every $\ell \in \omega$, let $z:=\left(\{\ell\} \cup\left(\omega_{1} \backslash \omega\right)\right) \times \omega$. Then $A_{\ell}$ is countable in $\mathrm{L}[G \upharpoonright z]$ by the enumeration defined by $G \upharpoonright z$, hence $A_{\ell}$ is countable in $N$ by Lemma 3.3.9, Since $\mathbb{P}$ is $(n+1)$-slicing, $\widehat{A}$ is $\Pi_{n+1}^{1}$ in $\mathrm{L}[G]$. Let $\varphi$ be a $\Pi_{n+1}^{1}$ formula defining $\vec{A}$. By Lemmata 3.3.9 and 3.3.14 $N$ contains each $x_{G}^{(\ell, k)}$ and $\varphi$ is absolute between $\mathrm{L}[G]$ and $N$. Therefore, $\varphi$ defines $\widehat{A}$ in $N$ and so $A$ is in unif $\Pi_{n+1}^{1}$.

Proposition 3.3.17. In $N, \mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \operatorname{unif} \Pi_{n+1}^{1}\right)$ and $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \mathbf{C t b l}\right)$ fail.

Proof. By Lemma 3.3.16, it suffices to show that $A$ has no choice function in $N$. Suppose there is a choice function $f: \omega \rightarrow \omega^{\omega}$ for $A$ in $N$. Since $f$ is a countable sequence of reals, we can code $f$ as a real, and so as a subset of $\omega$. By Lemma 3.3.9, there is some $z \in Z$ such that $f \in L[G \upharpoonleft z]$. Hence, there is a $\mathbb{P}\lceil z$-name $f$ for $f$. As $z \in Z$, there is an $\ell \in \omega$ such that $z$ does not meet any $\left\{\ell^{\prime}\right\} \times \omega$ with $\ell^{\prime} \geq \ell$. Let $\ell$ be minimal with that property and let $k \in \omega$ be such that $f(\ell)=\bar{x}_{G}^{(\ell, k)}$. Then there is a $p \in G$ such that $p \Vdash$ " $f$ is a choice function for $A^{\prime \prime} \wedge \dot{f}(\ell)=\dot{x}_{G}^{(\ell, k)}$, where $\dot{x}_{G}^{(\ell, k)}$ is the canonical $\mathbb{P}$-name for $x_{G}^{(\ell, k)}$. Let $k^{\prime} \in \omega \backslash\{k\}$ be such that $\left(\ell, k^{\prime}\right) \in(\{\ell\} \times \omega) \backslash \operatorname{Dom}(p)$ and let $\pi \in \operatorname{Aut}\left(\omega_{1} \times \omega, \omega\right)$ which only swaps $(\ell, k)$ and $\left(\ell, k^{\prime}\right)$. Then $\pi^{*} \in H_{z} \subseteq \operatorname{sym}(\dot{f})$ and $p$ and $\pi^{*}(p)$ are compatible. But $\pi^{*}(p) \Vdash \dot{f}(\ell)=\pi^{*}\left(\dot{x}_{G}^{(\ell, k)}\right)=\dot{x}_{G}^{\left(\ell, k^{\prime}\right)}$, which is impossible as these are distinct.

Proposition 3.3.18. In $N, \operatorname{DC}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \boldsymbol{\Pi}_{n}^{1}\right)$ holds.
Proof. Let $X \subseteq \omega^{\omega}$ be a $\Pi_{n}^{1}$ set of reals in $N$ and let $R \subseteq\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)^{2}$ be a total relation such that $R$ is $\Pi_{n}^{1}$ in $N$. Then there are $\Pi_{n}^{1}$ formulae $\varphi$ and $\psi$ with real parameters $a$ and $b$ in $N$ which define $X$ and $R$ in $N$, respectively. Without loss of generality, we can assume $a=b$. By Lemma 3.3.9, there is a $z \in Z$ such that $a \in L\left[G\lceil z]\right.$. Let $X_{\varphi}$ and $R_{\psi}$ be the sets defined by $\varphi(a)$ and $\psi(a)$ in $\mathrm{L}[G\lceil z]$, and let $\chi(x, a)$ be the formula $\varphi(x, a) \rightarrow \exists x^{\prime} \psi\left(\left(x, x^{\prime}\right), a\right)$. Then $\chi(x, a)$ is $\Sigma_{n+1}^{1}$ and so absolute by Lemma 3.3.14. By downwards-absoluteness, for every $x, \chi(x, a)$ is true in $\mathrm{L}[G \upharpoonright z]$. As usual $\mathrm{L}[G \upharpoonright z] \models \mathrm{ZFC}$, so there is a sequence $\left(x_{k}\right)_{k \in \omega}$ in $\mathrm{L}[G\lceil z]$ such that $x_{k} R_{\psi} x_{k+1}$ for every $k \in \omega$. By Lemma 3.3.9. $\left(x_{k}\right)_{k \in \omega} \in N$, and $\varphi(a)$ and $\psi(a)$ are absolute between $\mathrm{L}\left[G\lceil z]\right.$ and $N$, so $x_{k} R x_{k+1}$ in $N$ for every $k \in \omega$.

By Propositions 3.3.17 \& 3.3.18, the model $N$ witnesses the validity of our Theorem 3.2.4

### 3.3.3 The Kanovei-Lyubetsky Lemma

This is a largely technical section, where we generalise Kanovei and Lyubsetsky's framework in [111, $\S 5 \& \S 6$ ], for constructing forcing notions which are $n$-absolute for slices. In particular, we construct certain $\omega$-slice-products which are $n$-absolute for slices.

Our central result is the Kanovei-Lyubetsky Lemma (Lemma 3.3.43), which generalises [111, Theorem 13]. We follow the general idea of [111, §5]; this framework is an important tool in proving the Slicing Theorem (Theorem 3.3.15) in the next section.

For the rest of Section 3.3.3, we work in L.
Definition 3.3.19. Let $\left(x_{\beta}\right)_{\beta \in \alpha}$ be a sequence of sets. We say that $\left(x_{\beta}\right)_{\beta \in \alpha}$ is continuous at limits if, for every limit $\lambda<\beta$, we have that $x_{\lambda}=\bigcup_{\beta \in \lambda} x_{\beta}$.

Definition 3.3.20. A partial order $(\mathcal{M}, \preccurlyeq) \in \mathrm{L}$ is a storage order if it satisfies the following 5 conditions:

1. Every element $m \in \mathcal{M}$ is of the form $m=(M, P)$, where $M=L_{\gamma}$ for some countable $\gamma>\omega, M \vDash \mathrm{ZFC}^{-}$, and $P$ is an $\omega$-slice forcing notion with finite support of length $<\omega_{1}$ and is in $M$.
2. The pair $(\mathcal{M}, \preccurlyeq)$ is $\Delta_{1}^{\mathrm{HC}}$ in L .
3. If $(M, P) \preccurlyeq(N, Q)$, then $M \subseteq N, P \subseteq Q$, every predense set $D \subseteq P$ in $M$ remains predense in $Q$, and conditions which are incompatible in $P$ are also incompatible in $Q$.

A pair $(M, P) \in \mathcal{M}$ is strictly $\preccurlyeq$-less than another pair $(N, Q) \in \mathcal{M}$ if $M \subsetneq N$, $\operatorname{len}(P)<\operatorname{len}(Q)$, and for every $(\nu, k) \in \operatorname{Dom}(p), P \upharpoonright\{(\nu, k)\} \subsetneq Q \upharpoonright\{(\nu, k)\}$.
4. For every $(M, P) \in \mathcal{M})$, there is an $(N, Q) \in \mathcal{M}$ such that $(M, P)$ is strictly $\preccurlyeq-l e s s$ than $(N, Q)$.

We say that strictly $\preccurlyeq$-increasing sequence, $\left(\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right)\right)_{\xi \in \zeta}$, is a storage sequence if $\left(P_{\xi}\right)_{\xi \in \zeta}$ is continuous at limits.
5. Let $\zeta \leq \omega_{1}$, let $\left(\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right)\right)_{\xi \in \zeta}$ be s a storage sequence, and let $\mathbb{P}:=\bigcup_{\xi \in \zeta} P_{\xi}$.
(a) If $\zeta<\omega_{1}$, then there is an $M$ such that $(M, P) \in \mathcal{M}$ and $\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right) \preccurlyeq$ $(M, \mathbb{P})$ for every $\xi<\zeta{ }^{母}$
(b) If $\zeta=\omega_{1}$, then every predense set $D \subseteq P_{\xi}$ in $M_{\xi}$ remains predense in $\mathbb{P}$ for every $\xi<\omega_{1}, P$ is c.c.c. in $L$, and all conditions which are incompatible in $P_{\xi}$ are incompatible in $\mathbb{P}$.

If $\left(\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right)\right)_{\xi \in \omega_{1}}$ is a storage sequence, then $\bigcup_{\xi \in \omega_{1}} P_{\xi}$ is an $\omega$-slice-product of length $\omega_{1}$. For the rest of this section, fix a storage order, $(\mathcal{M}, \preccurlyeq)$.

The next step is to define a forcing-like relation for a certain language of secondorder arithmetic. Firstly, we define the language itself. The main difference is having constants for names of reals, and bounds on certain quantifiers. Formally, for any forcing notion, $\mathbb{P}$, we say that $\sigma$ is a $\mathbb{P}$-name for a real if $1_{\mathbb{P}} \Vdash$ " $\sigma$ is a real".

Definition 3.3.21. For $(M, P) \in \mathcal{M}$, let $\mathcal{F} \mathcal{L}^{2}(M, P)$ be the language of secondorder arithmetic augmented with a constant symbol, $c_{n}$, for every $n \in \omega$ and a new constant symbol, $c_{\sigma}$, for every $P$-name for a real in $M, \sigma$, and such that second-order quantifiers may be bounded by a countable set $B \subseteq \omega_{1}$ in $M$, which we denote by $\forall^{B}$ and $\exists^{B}$.

Definition 3.3.22. Let $(M, P) \in \mathcal{M}, G$ be a $P$-generic filter over $M$ and $\varphi$ be a formula in $\mathcal{F} \mathcal{L}^{2}(M, P)$. The valuation of $\varphi$ by $G$, denoted $\varphi_{G}$, is the formula produced by replacing every $c_{n}$ in $\phi$ by $n$, every $c_{\sigma}$ in $\varphi$ by $\sigma$, and every $\forall^{B}$ in $\varphi$ by $\forall x \in \omega^{\omega} \cap M[G \upharpoonright B \times \omega]$, so too for $\exists^{B}$.

The language, $\mathcal{F} \mathcal{L}^{2}(M, P)$, is a variant of the standard forcing language in having some quantifiers which are bounded (i.e. $\forall^{B}$ and $\exists^{B}$ ). This bounding helps control the fragment of the product we need. Clearly, every formula in $\mathcal{F} \mathcal{L}^{2}(M, P)$ can be seen as a formula in the standard forcing language. The names and formulae in the order of the forcing languages of a storage order behave in the natural way:

[^8]Remark 3.3.23. If $(M, P),(N, Q) \in \mathcal{M}$, where $(M, P) \preccurlyeq(N, Q)$, and $G$ is a $Q$-generic filter over $N$, then:

1. if $\sigma \in M$ is a $P$-name for a real, then $\sigma$ is also a $Q$-name for a real, and $\sigma_{G}=\sigma_{G \cap P}$, and
2. if $\varphi$ is an $\mathcal{F} \mathcal{L}^{2}(M, P)$ formula, then $\varphi$ is also a $\mathcal{F} \mathcal{L}^{2}(N, Q)$ formula, and $\varphi_{G}=\varphi_{G \cap P}$.

We likewise define a variation of the forcing relation. We define it only for sentences of $\mathcal{F} \mathcal{L}^{2}(M, P)$, and only sentences of a certain form. As usual, we can treat $\vee$ as abbreviations for formulae containing $\neg, \wedge$. Our definition is in the style of the strong forcing relation for $\mathbb{P}$, that is where $p \Vdash_{s} \exists x \varphi(x)$ if there is $\mathbb{P}$-name, $\sigma$, such that $p \Vdash_{s} \sigma$.

Definition 3.3.24 (The forc relation). Let $(M, P) \in \mathcal{M}$, let $p \in P$, let $k>0$, and let $\varphi$ be a $\Sigma_{k}^{1}(M, P)$ or $\Pi_{k}^{1}(M, P)$ sentence. We say that $p \operatorname{forc}_{P}^{M} \varphi$ if one of the following holds:

1. $\varphi$ is $\Sigma_{1}^{1}(M, P)$ and $p \Vdash_{P}^{M} \varphi$,
2. $\varphi=\exists x \psi(x)$ where $\psi$ is $\Pi_{k}^{1}(M, P)$ for $k>1$ and there is a $P$-name $\sigma \in M$ for a real such that $p \operatorname{forc}_{P}^{M} \psi\left(c_{\sigma}\right)$,
3. $\varphi=\exists^{B} x \psi(x)$ where $\psi$ is $\Pi_{k}^{1}(M, P)$ for $k>1$ and there is a $(P \upharpoonright B \times \omega)$-name $\sigma \in M$ for a real such that $p \operatorname{forc}_{P}^{M} \psi\left(c_{\sigma}\right)$, or
4. $\varphi$ is $\Pi_{k}^{1}(M, P)$ and there is no $\left(M^{\prime}, P^{\prime}\right) \in \mathcal{M}$ extending $(M, P)$ and no $q \in P^{\prime}$ such that $q \leq p$ and $q \operatorname{forc}_{P^{\prime}}^{M^{\prime}} \neg \varphi$.

Remark 3.3.25. Strictly speaking, the forc relation is not defined for sentences of the form $\neg \neg \varphi$. However, throughout, for each $\Pi_{n}^{1}(M, P)$ sentence $\varphi$, when we refer to $\neg \varphi$, we mean the $\Sigma_{n}^{1}(M, P)$ formula $\psi$ such that $\neg \psi$ is the formula $\varphi$.

Just as we do for the ordinary forcing language, we need to check that the forc relation obeys all of the properties we expect, such as monotonicity, consistency, and negation completeness. This we now prove.

Lemma 3.3.26 (Monotonicity). Let $(M, P), \varphi$, and $p$ be as in Definition 3.3.24. If $p \operatorname{forc}_{P}^{M} \varphi,(M, P) \preccurlyeq(N, Q) \in \mathcal{M}$, and $q \in Q$ with $q \leq p$, then $q \operatorname{forc}_{Q}^{N} \varphi$.

Proof. By definition, every predense set in $P$ in $M$ remains predense in $Q$ and so every $P$-name in $\varphi$ is also a $Q$-name for a real. The proof is by induction on $\varphi$.

If $\varphi$ is $\Sigma_{1}^{1}(M, P)$, we have to show that $q \Vdash_{Q}^{N} \varphi$. Let $G$ be a $Q$-generic filter over $N$ containing $q$. Then $G \cap P$ is $P$-generic over $M$ containing $p$. By assumption, $p \operatorname{forc}_{P}^{M} \varphi$, so $p \Vdash_{P}^{M} \varphi$ and so $M[G \cap P] \models \varphi[G \cap P]$. By analytic absoluteness, $N[G] \models \varphi[G \cap P]=\varphi[G]$. Hence, $q \Vdash_{Q}^{N} \varphi$.

If $\varphi$ is $\Sigma_{k+1}^{1}(M, P)$, then there is a $\Pi_{k}^{1}(P, M)$ formula $\psi$ such that $\varphi=\exists x \psi(x)$ or $\varphi=\exists^{B} x \psi(x)$. As both cases are similar, we prove the former. Since $p \operatorname{forc}_{P}^{M} \varphi$, there is a $P$-name $\sigma \in M$ for a real such that $p \operatorname{forc}_{P}^{M} \psi\left(c_{\sigma}\right)$. Then $\sigma$ is also $Q$-name for a real in $N$. By the induction hypothesis, $q \operatorname{forc}_{Q}^{N} \psi\left(c_{\sigma}\right)$ and so $q \operatorname{forc}_{Q}^{N} \varphi$.

Finally, if $\varphi$ is $\Pi_{k}^{1}(M, P)$ then $p \operatorname{forc}_{P}^{M} \varphi$. So, there is no $\left(M^{\prime}, P^{\prime}\right) \in \mathcal{M}$ extend$\operatorname{ing}(M, P)$ and no $p^{\prime} \in P^{\prime}$ such that $p^{\prime} \leq p$ and $p^{\prime} \operatorname{forc}_{P^{\prime}}^{M^{\prime}} \neg \varphi$. Hence, there is no $\left(N^{\prime}, Q^{\prime}\right) \in \mathcal{M}$ extending $(N, Q)$ and $q^{\prime} \in Q^{\prime}$ such that $q^{\prime} \leq q$ and $q^{\prime} \operatorname{forc}_{Q^{\prime}}^{N^{\prime}} \neg \varphi$. So, $q \operatorname{forc}_{Q}^{N} \varphi$.

Lemma 3.3.27 (Consistency). Let $(M, P)$ and $p$ be as in Definition 3.3.24 and let $k \geq 1$. Then no $\Pi_{k}^{1}(M, P)$ sentence $\varphi$ is such that $p \operatorname{forc}_{P}^{M} \varphi$ and $p \operatorname{forc}_{P}^{M} \neg \varphi$.

Proof. Suppose that $p \operatorname{forc}_{P}^{M} \varphi$. Then there is no $\left(M^{\prime}, P^{\prime}\right) \in \mathcal{M}$ extending ( $M, P$ ) and no $q \in P^{\prime}$ such that $q \leq p$ and $q \operatorname{forc}_{P^{\prime}}^{M^{\prime}} \neg \varphi$. So, $p \operatorname{forc}_{P}^{M} \neg \varphi$ does not hold.

Note that the proofs of Lemmata 3.3.26 and 3.3.27 are similar to the proofs of the same properties for ordinary syntactic forcing relation, $\Vdash$ [129, IV.2.22]. Negation completeness also holds for forc, but this proof proceeds differently (Lemma 3.3.37).

Next, we extend forc to storage sequences, so that the forcing notion $\mathbb{P}$ it generates is such that forc 'approximates' $\Vdash_{\mathbb{P}}$ for sentences of $\mathcal{F} \mathcal{L}^{2}(L, \mathbb{P})$ with of a certain complexity (Corollary 3.3.39).

Definition 3.3.28. Let $\left(\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right)\right)_{\xi \in \omega_{1}}$ be a storage sequence and let $\mathbb{P}:=\bigcup_{\xi \in \omega_{1}} P_{\xi}$. We define $\mathcal{F} \mathcal{L}^{2}(\mathbb{P}):=\bigcup_{\xi \in \omega_{1}} \mathcal{F} \mathcal{L}^{2}\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right)$.

Definition 3.3.29. Let $k \geq 1,\left(\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right)\right)_{\xi \in \omega_{1}}$ be a storage sequence let $\mathbb{P}:=$ $\bigcup_{\xi \in \omega_{1}} P_{\xi}$. We say a formula $\varphi$ is $\Sigma_{k}^{1}(\mathbb{P})\left(\right.$ or $\left.\Pi_{k}^{1}(\mathbb{P})\right)$ if there is some $\xi<\omega_{1}$ such that $\varphi$ is $\Sigma_{k}^{1}\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right)\left(\right.$ or $\left.\Pi_{k}^{1}\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right)\right)$.

By Lemma 3.3.26, if $\varphi$ is a $\mathcal{F} \mathcal{L}^{2}(\mathbb{P})$ sentence such that there is a $\xi<\omega_{1}$ where $p \operatorname{forc}_{M_{\xi}}^{P_{\xi}} \varphi$, then $p$ forc ${ }_{M_{\xi^{\prime}}}^{P_{\xi^{\prime}}}, \varphi$ for every $\xi^{\prime}>\xi$. So, we can extend forc to $\mathbb{P}$ in a well-defined way:

Definition 3.3.30. Let $\left(\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right)\right)_{\xi \in \omega_{1}}$ be a storage sequence and let $\mathbb{P}:=\bigcup_{\xi \in \omega_{1}} P_{\xi}$. Let $p \in \mathbb{P}$ and let $\varphi$ be a $\Pi_{k}^{1}(\mathbb{P})$ or $\Sigma_{k+1}^{1}(\mathbb{P})$ sentence. We write $p \operatorname{forc}_{\xi} \varphi$ if $p \operatorname{forc}_{P_{\xi}}^{M_{\xi}} \varphi$ and $p \operatorname{forc}_{\infty} \varphi$ if there is a $\xi<\omega_{1}$ such that $p \operatorname{forc}_{\xi} \varphi$.

It is this forc $\boldsymbol{c}_{\infty}$ that we show approximates the standard forcing relation. We begin with some basic properties:

Lemma 3.3.31. Let $\left(\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right)\right)_{\xi \in \omega_{1}}$ be a storage sequence, $\mathbb{P}:=\bigcup_{\xi \in \omega_{1}} P_{\xi}$, and let $k \geq 1$.

1. Let $p \in P_{\xi}$ and let $\varphi$ be a $\Pi_{k}^{1}\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right)$ or $\Sigma_{k+1}^{1}\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right)$ sentence. If $p$ forc $_{\xi} \varphi$, $\xi<\zeta<\omega_{1}$, and $q \in P_{\zeta}$ with $q \leq p$, then $q \operatorname{forc}_{\zeta} \varphi$.
2. Let $p \in \mathbb{P}$. There is no $\Pi_{k}^{1}(\mathbb{P})$ or $\Sigma_{k+1}^{1}(\mathbb{P})$ sentence $\varphi$ such that $p \operatorname{forc}_{\infty} \varphi$ and $p$ forc $_{\infty} \neg \varphi$.

Proof. Parts 1. and 2. follow directly from Lemmata 3.3.26 and 3.3.27, respectively.

Only certain storage sequences suffice for generating suitable forcing notions whose products are $n$-absolute for slices. To this end, we define a kind of sequence which will suffice, in analogy to [111, Definition 15].

Definition 3.3.32. Let $n>2$. A storage sequence $\left(\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right)\right)_{\xi \in \omega_{1}}$ is called $n$ complete if, for every $\Sigma_{n-2}^{\mathrm{HC}}$ set $D \subseteq \mathcal{M}$, there is a $\xi<\omega_{1}$ such that either $\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right) \in$ $D$ or there is no $(N, Q) \in D$ extending $\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right)$.

Lemma 3.3.33. For every $n>2$, there is a $\Delta_{n-1}^{\mathrm{HC}}, n$-complete storage sequence from $\mathcal{M}$ in L .

Proof. Let $n>2$. By Lemma 2.1.20, let $\Gamma \subset \omega_{1} \times \mathbf{H C}$ be a universal $\Sigma_{n-2}^{\mathbf{H C}}$ set. We define the required sequence recursively. Let $\left(M_{0}, P_{0}\right)$ be the $<_{L}$-least pair such that $\left(M_{0}, P_{0}\right) \in \mathcal{M}$. Suppose that $\left(\left(M_{\xi^{\prime}}, P_{\xi^{\prime}}\right)_{\xi^{\prime} \in \xi}\right.$ is already defined. If $\xi$ is a limit, then we set $P_{\xi}:=\bigcup_{\xi^{\prime} \in \xi} P_{\xi^{\prime}}$ and let $M_{\xi}$ be the $<_{L}$-least ctm of ZFC such that $\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right) \in \mathcal{M}$ and $M_{\xi}$ contains $\left(\left(M_{\xi^{\prime}}, P_{\xi^{\prime}}\right)\right)_{\xi^{\prime} \in \xi}$. If $\xi=\xi^{\prime}+1$ is a successor, let $\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right)$ be the $<_{L}$-least pair such that:

1. $\left(M_{\xi^{\prime}}, P_{\xi^{\prime}}\right)$ is strictly- $\preccurlyeq\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right)$, and
2. either $\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right) \in D_{\xi^{\prime}}:=\left\{m \in \mathcal{M}:\left(\xi^{\prime}, m\right) \in \Gamma\right\}$ or there is no $(N, Q) \in D_{\xi^{\prime}}$ extending $\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right)$.

Recall that $<_{L} \backslash \mathbf{H C}^{2}$ is $\Delta_{1}^{\mathbf{H C}}$ (Lemma 2.1.19). By definition, $\mathcal{M}$ and $\preccurlyeq$ are $\Delta_{1}^{\mathbf{H C}}$, and $\Gamma$ is $\Sigma_{n-2}^{\mathrm{HC}}$, so $\left(\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right)\right)_{\xi \in \omega_{1}}$ is $\Delta_{n-1}^{\mathrm{HC}}$. By Property 2. the sequence is $n$ complete.

Notice that $\mathcal{M}$ is an arbitrary storage order here. We return to the issue of the complexity of the storage order itself in Section 3.3.4, where we use the complexity of the sequence to bound the complexity of the set of generics. For now, the exact complexity of the storage sequence is not important.

Our next task is to show that forc $\boldsymbol{c}_{\infty}$ is negation complete for sentences of complexity $\Sigma_{k}^{1}(\mathbb{P})$, for a suitable $k$. For this, we define the class of all forced statements of various complexities, and prove a small lemma, to the effect of negation completeness for $\Pi_{1}^{1}$ sentences:

Lemma 3.3.34. Let $\varphi$ be a $\Pi_{1}^{1}(M, P)$ sentence of the form $\forall x \psi(x)$ or $\forall^{B} x \psi(x)$, for some bounded formula $\psi$. For every $p \in P, p \operatorname{forc}_{P}^{M} \varphi$ if and only if there is no $p^{\prime} \leq p$ such that $p^{\prime} \Vdash{ }_{P}^{M} \exists x \neg \psi(x)$.

Proof. Both cases are similar, so we prove the first case. The right-to-left direction is trivial, so we prove the left-to-right direction. For a contradiction, let $(N, Q) \succcurlyeq$ $(M, P)$ be such that $q \in Q, q \leq p$ and $q \operatorname{forc}_{Q}^{N} \exists x \neg \psi(x)$. Then $q \Vdash_{Q}^{N} \exists x \neg \psi(x)$. We can assume that no $p^{\prime} \leq p$ is such that $p^{\prime} \Vdash_{P}^{M} \exists x \neg \psi(x)$. So, $D:=\left\{p^{\prime} \leq p\right.$ : $\left.p^{\prime} \Vdash_{P}^{M} \psi\right\}$ is dense below $P$. As $(M, P) \preccurlyeq(N, Q), D$ is still predense in $Q$. So, some $r \in D$ is compatible with $q$. Let $G$ be a $Q$-generic filter over $N$ where $r \in G$. Then $G \cap P$ is $P$-generic over $M$. Since $r \Vdash_{P}^{M} \varphi, M[G \cap P] \vDash \varphi_{G \cap P}$. By analytic absoluteness, $N[G] \vDash \varphi_{G}$ and so $r \Vdash_{Q}^{N} \varphi$, which contradicts that $q \Vdash_{G}^{N} \exists x \neg \psi(x)$.

Definition 3.3.35. For all $k>1$, we define the following:
$\boldsymbol{\operatorname { F o r c }}\left(\Sigma_{k}^{1}\right):=\left\{(M, P, p, \varphi):(M, P) \in \mathcal{M} \wedge p \in P \wedge \varphi\right.$ is a $\Sigma_{k}^{1}(M, P)$ sentence $\wedge p$ forc $\left._{P}^{M} \varphi\right\}$.
We define $\operatorname{Forc}\left(\Pi_{k}^{1}\right)$ analogously.
Theorem 3.3.36. For all $k>1$ :

1. $\operatorname{Forc}\left(\Sigma_{1}^{1}\right), \operatorname{Forc}\left(\Pi_{1}^{1}\right)$, and $\operatorname{Forc}\left(\Sigma_{2}^{1}\right)$ are $\Delta_{1}^{\mathrm{HC}}$; and
2. $\operatorname{Forc}\left(\Pi_{k}^{1}\right)$ and $\operatorname{Forc}\left(\Sigma_{k+1}^{1}\right)$ are $\Pi_{k-1}^{\mathrm{HC}}$.

Proof. For each $k \geq 1$, we define the following two classes of sentences:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\Sigma_{k}^{1}(\mathcal{M}) & :=\left\{(M, P, \varphi):(M, P) \in M \wedge \varphi \text { is a } \Sigma_{k}^{1}(M, P) \text { sentence }\right\}, \\
\Pi_{k}^{1}(\mathcal{M}) & :=\left\{(M, P, \varphi):(M, P) \in M \wedge \varphi \text { is a } \Pi_{k}^{1}(M, P) \text { sentence }\right\} .
\end{aligned}
$$

As $\mathcal{M}$ is a storage order, $\mathcal{M}$ is $\Delta_{1}^{\mathrm{HC}}$. Fix some $k \geq 1$. Note that " $\varphi$ is $\Sigma_{k}^{1}(M, P)$ " can be checked in $M$. So, $\Sigma_{k}^{1}(\mathcal{M})$ is $\Delta_{1}^{\mathrm{HC}}$, and exactly similarly for $\Pi_{k}^{1}(\mathcal{M})$. With this, we begin the proof in earnest.

We start with Part 1. As $\Sigma_{1}^{1}(\mathcal{M})$ is $\Delta_{1}^{\mathrm{HC}}$, it suffices to check that " $p \operatorname{forc}_{P}^{M} \varphi^{\prime}$ " is $\Delta_{1}^{\mathrm{HC}}$. Note that $p$ forc $_{P}^{M} \varphi$ if and only if $p \Vdash_{P}^{M} \varphi$, the latter of which can also be checked in $M$. So, " $p \operatorname{forc}_{P}^{M} \varphi^{\prime}$ " is also $\Delta_{1}^{\mathrm{HC}}$.

Next, we check that $\operatorname{Forc}\left(\Pi_{1}^{1}\right)$ is $\Delta_{1}^{\text {HC }}$. Again, it suffices to check that $" p \operatorname{forc}_{P}^{M} \varphi^{\prime \prime}$ is $\Delta_{1}^{\mathrm{HC}}$. By assumption, $\varphi$ is of the form $\forall x \psi(x)$ or $\forall^{B} x \psi(x)$, for some bounded formula $\psi$. By Lemma 3.3.34, for each $p \in P, p \operatorname{forc}_{P}^{M} \varphi$ if and only if there is
 $\operatorname{Forc}\left(\Pi_{1}^{1}\right)$ is $\Delta_{1}^{\mathrm{HC}}$.

Lastly, we show that $\operatorname{Forc}\left(\Sigma_{2}^{1}\right)$ is $\Delta_{1}^{\text {HC }}$. Again, we only have to check that " $p \operatorname{forc}_{P}^{M} \varphi^{\prime}$ " is $\Delta_{1}^{\mathrm{HC}}$. Since $\varphi$ is $\Sigma_{2}^{1}(M, P)$, there is some $\Pi_{1}^{1}(M, P)$ formula $\psi$ such that either $\varphi=\exists x \psi(x)$ or $\varphi=\exists^{B} x \psi(x)$. Both cases are similar, so we can assume the former. By definition, $p \operatorname{forc}_{P}^{M} \varphi$ if and only if there is a $P$-name $\sigma \in M$ for a real such that $p \operatorname{forc}_{P}^{M} \psi\left(c_{\sigma}\right)$. Since $\operatorname{Forc}\left(\Pi_{1}^{1}\right)$ is $\Delta_{1}^{\mathrm{HC}}, " p \operatorname{forc}_{P}^{M} \psi\left(c_{\sigma}\right)$ " is $\Delta_{1}^{\mathrm{HC}}$. The existence quantifier for the $P$-name can be bounded by $M$, which is in HC. Therefore, " $p \operatorname{forc}_{P}^{M} \varphi^{\prime \prime}$ is $\Delta_{1}^{\mathbf{H C}}$.

We prove Part 2. by induction on $k$. We have to show that $\operatorname{Forc}\left(\Pi_{2}^{1}\right)$ and $\operatorname{Forc}\left(\Sigma_{3}^{1}\right)$ are $\Pi_{1}^{\mathrm{HC}}$. We start with the former. By definition, $p \operatorname{forc}_{P}^{M} \varphi$ if and only if for every $\left(M^{\prime}, P^{\prime}\right) \in \mathcal{M}$ extending $(M, P)$ and every $q \in P^{\prime}, q \not \leq p$ or $q \operatorname{forc}_{P^{\prime}}^{M^{\prime}} \neg \varphi$ is false. By the previous part, $\operatorname{Forc}\left(\Sigma_{2}^{1}\right)$ is $\Delta_{1}^{\mathrm{HC}}$, so $q \operatorname{forc}_{P^{\prime}}^{M^{\prime}} \neg \varphi$ is also $\Pi_{1}^{\mathrm{HC}}$. Hence, $p \operatorname{forc}_{P}^{M} \varphi$ is $\Pi_{1}^{\mathrm{HC}}$ too. By a similar argument to that of $\operatorname{Forc}\left(\Sigma_{2}^{1}\right)$, we can show that $\operatorname{Forc}\left(\Sigma_{3}^{1}\right)$ is $\Pi_{1}^{\mathrm{HC}}$. The induction step is similar to the base case.

With this, we can prove negation completeness for $\Pi_{k}^{1}(\mathbb{P})$. Careful complexity tracking in Theorem 3.3.36 shows that an $n$-complete sequence intersects enough extensions to decide whether a negation of a sentence is eventually forced:

Lemma 3.3.37 (Negation Completeness). Let $n>2,\left(\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right)\right)_{\xi \in \omega_{1}}$ be an $n$ complete storage sequence, and $\mathbb{P}:=\bigcup_{\xi \in \omega_{1}} P_{\xi}$. Let $p \in \mathbb{P}, 2 \leq k<n$, and $\varphi$ be a $\Sigma_{k}^{1}(\mathbb{P})$ sentence. Then:

1. there is a $q \leq p$ such that either $q \operatorname{forc}_{\infty} \varphi$ or $q \operatorname{forc}_{\infty} \neg \varphi$, and
2. $p \boldsymbol{f o r c}_{\infty} \varphi$ if and only if there is no $q \leq p$ such that $q \operatorname{forc}_{\infty} \neg \varphi$.

Proof. For Part 1. let $\xi<\omega_{1}$ be such that $\varphi$ is $\Sigma_{k}^{1}\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right)$. Without loss of generality, we assume that $p \in P_{\xi}$. We define the following sets:

$$
D:=\left\{(N, Q) \in \mathcal{M}:\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right) \preccurlyeq(N, Q) \wedge \exists q \in Q\left(q \leq p \wedge q \operatorname{forc}_{Q}^{N} \varphi\right)\right\}
$$

By Theorem 3.3.36, $D$ is $\Sigma_{k-1}^{\mathrm{HC}}$. Since $\left(\left(M_{\zeta}, P_{\zeta}\right)\right)_{\zeta \in \omega_{1}}$ is $n$-complete, there is some $\xi \leq \zeta<\omega_{1}$ such that either $\left(M_{\zeta}, P_{\zeta}\right) \in D$ or there isno pair $(N, Q) \in D$ extending $\left(M_{\zeta}, P_{\zeta}\right)$. Then there are two cases.
a. If $\left(M_{\zeta}, P_{\zeta}\right) \in D$, then there is a condition $q \in P_{\zeta}$ such that $q \leq p$ and $q$ forc $_{\xi} \varphi$. Hence, $q$ forc $_{\infty} \varphi$.
b. Otherwise, there is no pair $(N, Q) \in D$ extending $\left(M_{\zeta}, P_{\zeta}\right)$. Then there is no pair $(N, Q) \succcurlyeq\left(M_{\zeta}, P_{\zeta}\right)$ and condition $q \in Q$ such that $q \leq p$ and $q \operatorname{forc}_{Q}^{N} \varphi$. Hence, $p$ forc $_{\zeta} \neg \varphi$ and so $p$ forc $_{\infty} \neg \varphi$.

For Part 2. suppose there is no $q \leq p$ such that $q \operatorname{forc}_{\infty} \neg \varphi$. By Part 1., $D:=\left\{q \in \mathbb{P}: q \leq p \wedge q \operatorname{forc}_{\infty} \varphi\right\}$ is dense in $\mathbb{P}$ below $p$. Let $\mathcal{A} \subseteq D$ be a maximal antichain below $p$. As $\mathbb{P}$ is c.c.c., $\mathcal{A}$ is countable, so $\mathcal{A} \in \mathbf{H C}$. As $\mathbf{H C}=L_{\omega_{1}}=\bigcup_{\xi \in \omega_{1}} M_{\xi}$, there is some $\xi<\omega_{1}$ such that $p \in \mathbb{P}_{\xi}, \mathcal{A}$ is a maximal antichain in $P_{\xi}$ below $p, \mathcal{A} \in M_{\xi}, \varphi$ is $\Sigma_{k}^{1}\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right)$, and for every $q \in \mathcal{A}, q \operatorname{forc}_{\xi} \varphi$. If $k=1$, then by properties of the ordinary forcing relation, $p \operatorname{forc}_{\xi} \varphi$. So, we can assume that $k \geq 2$. We suppose for a contradiction that $p \operatorname{forc}_{\xi} \varphi$ fails. Then there is a pair $(N, Q) \succcurlyeq\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right)$ and some $q \in Q$ such that $q \leq p$ and $q \operatorname{forc}_{Q}^{N} \neg \varphi$. Since $\mathcal{A}$ remains a maximal antichain below $p$ in $Q$, there is some $r \in \mathcal{A}$ which is compatible with $q$. But this contradicts $r \boldsymbol{f o r c}_{\xi} \varphi$. Therefore, $p \boldsymbol{f o r c}_{\infty} \varphi$. The other direction follows directly from Lemma 3.3.31.

Next, we prove a version of the Truth Lemma for forc $_{\infty}$ (i.e. the analogue of [129, Chapter VII, Theorem 3.5]). For this, we define the valuation in the language $\overline{\mathcal{F}} \mathcal{L}^{2}(\mathbb{P})$. We do this in the natural way: if $\left(\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right)\right)_{\xi \in \omega_{1}}$ is a storage sequence, $\mathbb{P}:=\bigcup_{\xi \in \omega_{1}} P_{\xi}, \varphi$ is a $\mathcal{F} \mathcal{L}^{2}(\mathbb{P})$ sentence, and $G$ is $\mathbb{P}$-generic over L, then there is some $\xi<\omega_{1}$ such that $\varphi$ is in $\mathcal{F} \mathcal{L}^{2}\left(P_{\xi}, M_{\xi}\right)$. By the definition of a storage order, $G_{\xi}:=G \cap P_{\xi}$ is $P_{\xi}$-generic over $M_{\xi}$. So, we let the valuation of $\varphi$ by $G, \varphi_{G}$, be just $\varphi_{G_{\xi}}$. It is simple to check that this is well-defined (see Remark 3.3.23).

Theorem 3.3.38. Let $n>2$, $\left(\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right)\right)_{\xi \in \omega_{1}}$ be an $n$-complete storage sequence, and $\mathbb{P}:=\bigcup_{\xi \in \omega_{1}} P_{\xi}$. Let $1 \leq k<n, 1 \leq \ell \leq n, \varphi$ be a $\mathcal{F} \mathcal{L}^{2}(\mathbb{P})$ sentence, and $G$ be $\mathbb{P}$-generic over L.

1. If $p \in G, \varphi$ is a $\Pi_{k}^{1}(\mathbb{P})$ or $\Sigma_{\ell}^{1}(\mathbb{P})$ sentence for $k<n$, and $p \operatorname{forc}_{\infty} \varphi$, then $\mathrm{L}[G] \models \varphi_{G}$.
2. If $\varphi$ is a $\Pi_{k}^{1}(\mathbb{P})$ or $\Sigma_{k}^{1}(\mathbb{P})$, and $\mathrm{L}[G] \models \varphi_{G}$, then there is some $p \in G$ such that $p \operatorname{forc}_{\infty} \varphi$.

Proof. We prove both items simultaneously by induction on $\varphi$ :
For the base case, assume $\varphi$ is $\Sigma_{1}^{1}(\mathbb{P})$. Suppose that $p \in G$ and $p \operatorname{forc}_{\infty} \varphi$. Then there is a $\xi<\omega_{1}$ such that $p \in P_{\xi}, \varphi$ is $\Sigma_{1}^{1}\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right)$, and $p \operatorname{forc}_{\xi} \varphi$. By definition, we have $p \Vdash_{P_{\xi}}^{M_{\xi}} \varphi$. As $G \cap P_{\xi}$ is $P_{\xi}$-generic over $M_{\xi}, M_{\xi}\left[G \cap P_{\xi}\right] \models \varphi_{G \cap P_{\xi}}$. By analytic absoluteness, $\mathrm{L}[G] \models \varphi_{G \cap P_{\xi}}$. As $\varphi$ is $\Sigma_{1}^{1}\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right), \varphi_{G}=\varphi_{G \cap P_{\xi}}$. Hence $\mathrm{L}[G] \models \varphi_{G}$.

If conversely, $\mathrm{L}[G] \models \varphi_{G}$, then there is a $\xi<\omega_{1}$ such that $\varphi$ is $\Sigma_{1}^{1}\left(P_{\xi}, M_{\xi}\right)$. By analytic absoluteness, $M_{\xi}\left[G \cap P_{\xi}\right]=\varphi_{G \cap P_{\xi}}$. Hence, there is some $p \in G \cap P_{\xi}$ such that $p \Vdash_{P_{\xi}}^{M_{\xi}} \varphi$. Then $p \operatorname{forc}_{\xi} \varphi$ and so $p \operatorname{forc}_{\infty} \varphi$.

For the successor case, first assume $\varphi$ is $\Sigma_{k+1}^{1}(\mathbb{P})$ and $k<n$. Then there is a $\psi \in \Pi_{k}^{1}(\mathbb{P})$ such that either $\varphi=\exists x \psi(x)$ or $\varphi=\exists^{B} x \psi(x)$. Without loss of generality, we can assume the former. If $p \in G$ and $p \operatorname{forc}_{\infty} \varphi$, then there is a $\xi<\omega_{1}$ such that $p \in P_{\xi}, \psi$ is $\Pi_{k}^{1}\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right)$, and $p$ forc $_{\xi} \exists x \psi(x)$. By definition, there is a $P_{\xi}$-name $\sigma \in M_{\xi}$ for a real such that $p \operatorname{forc}_{\xi} \psi\left(c_{\sigma}\right)$. Then, by the induction hypothesis, $\mathrm{L}[G] \models\left(\psi\left(c_{\sigma}\right)\right)_{G}$. Hence, $\mathrm{L}[G] \models\left(\psi\left(c_{\sigma}\right)\right)_{G}$, so $\mathrm{L}[G] \models \varphi_{G}$. (This also works for $k=n$.)

Conversely, if $\mathrm{L}[G] \models \varphi_{G}$ then there is some $x \in L[G]$ such that $\mathrm{L}[G] \models \psi_{G}(x)$. By the definition of a storage order, $\mathbb{P}$ is c.c.c., so there is a countable $\mathbb{P}$-name $\tau \in L$ for a real such that $\tau_{G}=x$. Then $\mathrm{L}[G] \models\left(\psi\left(c_{\tau}\right)\right)_{G}$. As $\tau \in \mathbf{H C}=L_{\omega_{1}}=$ $\bigcup_{\xi \in \omega_{1}} M_{\xi}$, there is some $\xi<\omega_{1}$ such that $\psi\left(c_{\tau}\right)$ is $\Pi_{k}^{1}\left(M_{\zeta}, P_{\zeta}\right)$. So, by the induction hypothesis, there is some $p \in G$ such that $p$ forc $_{\infty} \psi\left(c_{\tau}\right)$. Therefore, $p$ forc $_{\infty} \varphi$.

For the second part of the successor case, assume $\varphi$ is $\Pi_{k}^{1}(\mathbb{P})$ and $1 \leq k<n$. If $p \in G$ and $p$ forc $_{\infty} \varphi$, then by Lemma 3.3.31, there is no $q \leq p$ such that $q$ forc $_{\infty} \neg \varphi$. By induction, $\mathrm{L}[G] \not \vDash(\neg \varphi)_{G}$. Hence, $\mathrm{L}[G] \models \varphi_{G}$. (This also works for $k=n$.)

Conversely, if $\mathrm{L}[G] \models \varphi_{G}$ then $\mathrm{L}[G] \not \models(\neg \varphi)_{G}$. By the induction hypothesis, there is no $p \in G$ such that $p$ forc $_{\infty} \neg \varphi$. Note that the set $D:=\{p \in \mathbb{P}$ : $p \operatorname{forc}_{\infty} \varphi \vee p$ forc $\left._{\infty} \neg \varphi\right\}$ is dense, so there is some $p \in G$ such that $p$ forc $_{\infty} \varphi$.

Putting the pieces together, forc $_{\infty}$ approximates $\mathbb{P}$-forcing along the sequence $\left(\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right)\right)_{\xi \in \omega_{1}}$, i.e. the relations coincide for sentences of bounded complexity:

Corollary 3.3.39. Let $\left(\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right)\right)_{\xi \in \omega_{1}}, \mathbb{P}, k, \ell$, and $\varphi$ be as in Theorem 3.3.38 and let $p \in \mathbb{P}$.

1. If $p \operatorname{forc}_{\infty} \varphi$, then $p \Vdash_{\mathbb{P}} \varphi$.
2. If $\varphi$ is $\Pi_{k}^{1}(\mathbb{P})$, then $p \Vdash_{\mathbb{P}} \varphi$ if and only if there is no $q \leq p$ such that $q \operatorname{forc}_{\infty} \neg \varphi$.
3. If $\Pi_{k}^{1}(\mathbb{P})$ or $\Sigma_{\ell}^{1}(\mathbb{P})$, and $p \Vdash_{\mathbb{P}} \varphi$, then there is some $q \leq p$ such that $q$ forc $\boldsymbol{c}_{\infty} \varphi$.
4. If $k<n$, $\varphi$ is $\Pi_{k}^{1}(\mathbb{P})$, and $p \Vdash_{\mathbb{P}} \varphi$, then $p \operatorname{forc}_{\infty} \varphi$.

Proof. Part 1. follows directly from Theorem 3.3.38. For Part 3., let $G$ be a $\mathbb{P}$ generic filter over L with $p \in G$. Then $\mathrm{L}[G] \models \varphi_{G}$. By Theorem 3.3.38, there is a $q \in G$ such that $q \operatorname{forc}_{\infty} \varphi$. As $G$ is a filter, there is some $r \leq p, q$. Then $r \leq p$ and $r \operatorname{forc}_{\infty} \varphi$.

For Part 4. let $q \leq p$. Then $q \Vdash_{\mathbb{P}} \varphi$. Suppose that $q \operatorname{forc}_{\infty} \neg \varphi$. Then, by Part 1. $q \Vdash_{\mathbb{P}} \neg \varphi$, which contradicts the consistency of $q \Vdash_{\mathbb{P}}$. Hence, there is no $q \leq p$ such that $q$ forc $_{\infty} \neg \varphi$. By Lemma 3.3.37, $p$ forc $_{\infty} \varphi$.

For Part 2., suppose that there is some $q \leq p$ such that $q \operatorname{forc}_{\infty} \neg \varphi$. By Part 1. $q \Vdash_{\mathbb{P}} \neg \varphi$. Hence, $p \Vdash_{\mathbb{P}} \varphi$ cannot hold. If conversely, $p \Vdash_{\mathbb{P}} \varphi$ does not hold, then there is some $q \leq p$ such that $q \Vdash_{\mathbb{P}} \neg \varphi$. By Part 3., there is some $r \leq q$ such that $r$ forc $_{\infty} \neg \varphi$. Hence, $r \leq p$ and $r$ forc $_{\infty} \neg \varphi$.

The coincidence of forc $_{\infty}$ and $\Vdash_{\mathbb{P}}$ for such sentences means that in extensions of L by a countable component of $G$, the exact choice of which component is not so important (in the sense of Lemma 3.3.42, as in [111, page 26]).

Definition 3.3.40. We call a storage order, $(\mathcal{M}, \preccurlyeq)$, repetitive if, for every $(M, P) \in$ $\mathcal{M}, P$ is an $\omega$-slice-product of a single forcing notion

Roughly speaking, repetitiveness is used to 'swap rows' in the matrix of conditions. If $\mathbb{P}$ is an $\omega$-slice-product of one forcing notion, then we can swap around the rows in a matrix of conditions, and we still obtain a condition in $\mathbb{P}$. But this need not be true in general for arbitrary products. We assume repetitiveness to guarantee we can swap rows as required.

More formally, if $(\mathcal{M}, \preccurlyeq)$ is repetitive, and $p \in P$ where $(M, P) \in \mathcal{M}$, len $(p)=$ $\zeta$, and $f: \zeta \rightarrow \zeta$ is a bijection in $M$, then $f(p):=\{((f(\nu), k), q):((\nu, k), q) \in p\}$ is in $P$, so $f$ induces an automorphism on $P$. Likewise, if $\sigma \in M$ is a $P$-name and $\phi$ is a $\mathcal{F} \mathcal{L}^{2}(M, P)$ formula, then we write $f(\sigma)$ for the $P$-name in $M$ produced by replacing each occurrence of a condition, $p$, in $\sigma$ by $f(p)$, and $f(\varphi)$ by replacing each $c_{\sigma}$ in $\varphi$ by $c_{f(\sigma)}$ and each $Q^{B}$ by $Q^{f(B)}$ for each second-order quantifier $Q$ in $\varphi$.

Lemma 3.3.41. Let $(\mathcal{M}, \preccurlyeq)$ be a repetitive storage order, let $(M, P) \in \mathcal{M}$, let $p \in P$, let $\zeta=\operatorname{len}(p)$, let $f: \zeta \rightarrow \zeta$ be a bijection in $M$, let $k \geq 1$, and let $\varphi$ be a $\Sigma_{k}^{1}(M, P)$ or $\Pi_{n}^{1}(M, P)$ sentence. If $p \operatorname{forc}_{P}^{M} \varphi$ then $f(p) \operatorname{forc}_{P}^{M} f(\varphi)$.

Proof. This proof follows from induction, by unpacking the definition. Fix a $P-$ generic filter, $G$, containing $f(p)$. Then $G^{\prime}:=f^{-1}(G)$ is a $P$-generic filter containing $p$ and $f\left(G^{\prime}\right)=G$.

For the base case, let $\varphi$ be $\Sigma_{1}^{1}(M, P)$. In which case, $M[G]=M\left[G^{\prime}\right]$ and so $M[G] \vDash \varphi_{G^{\prime}}$. Moreover, for every $P$-name $\sigma \in M$ for a real, $\sigma_{G}=\sigma_{G^{\prime}}$. Hence, $M[G] \vDash(f(\varphi))_{G}$. So, the implication holds.

Next, suppose $\varphi$ is $\Pi_{k}^{1}(M, P)$. Then there is an $\mathcal{F} \mathcal{L}^{2}(M, P)$ formula, $\psi$, such that either $\varphi=\forall x \psi(x)$ or $\varphi=\forall^{B} x \psi(x)$. Both cases are similar, so we prove the former. For a contradiction, suppose that $f(p) \operatorname{forc}_{P}^{M} f(\varphi)$ fails. Then there is a $(N, Q) \in \mathcal{M}$ and a $q \in Q$ such that $(M, P) \preccurlyeq(N, Q), q \leq f(p)$, and $q \operatorname{forc}_{Q}^{N} f(\exists x \neg \psi(x))$. By induction, $f^{-1}(q) \operatorname{forc}_{Q}^{N} f^{-1}(f(\exists x \neg \psi(x)))$. Hence, we have that $f^{-1}(q) \leq p$ and $f^{-1}(q) \operatorname{forc}_{Q}^{N} \exists x \neg \psi(x)$. But this contradicts $p$ forc $_{P}^{M} \varphi$. So, the implication holds.

[^9]Finally, suppose $\varphi$ is $\Sigma_{k+1}^{1}(M, P)$. Then there is a $\Pi_{k}^{1}(M, P)$ formula $\psi$ such that either $\varphi=\exists x \psi(x)$ or $\varphi=\exists^{B} x \psi(x)$. Again, both are similar, so we assume the latter. As $p \operatorname{forc}_{P}^{M} \varphi$, there is a $(P \upharpoonright(B \times \omega))$-name $\sigma \in M$ such that $p \operatorname{forc}_{P}^{M} \psi\left(c_{\sigma}\right)$. By induction, $f(p) \operatorname{forc}_{P}^{M} f\left(\psi\left(c_{\sigma}\right)\right)$. So, $f(\sigma)$ is a $(P \upharpoonright(f(B) \times \omega))$-name for a real and $f(p) \operatorname{forc}_{P}^{M}(f(\psi))\left(c_{f(\sigma)}\right)$. So, the implication holds.

Lemma 3.3.42. Let $(\mathcal{M}, \preccurlyeq)$ be a repetitive storage order, and fix $n>2$. Suppose that $\left(\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right)\right)_{\xi \in \omega_{1}}$ is an $n$-complete storage sequence, $\mathbb{P}:=\bigcup_{\xi \in \omega_{1}} P_{\xi}, d \subseteq \omega_{1}$ is countable and $d \in \mathrm{~L}, b, c \subseteq \omega_{1} \backslash d$ are countably infinite and $b, c \in \mathrm{~L}, G$ is $\mathbb{P}$ generic over L, and $\psi(y)$ is a $\Pi_{n-1}^{1}$ formula with parameters in $\mathrm{L}[G \upharpoonright(d \times \omega)]$. If there is a real $y \in \mathrm{~L}[\lceil((d \cup b) \times \omega)]$ such that $\mathrm{L}[G] \models \psi(y)$, then there is a real $y^{\prime} \in \mathrm{L}[G \upharpoonright((d \cup c) \times \omega)]$ such that $\mathrm{L}[G] \models \psi\left(y^{\prime}\right)$.

Proof. Suppose not. Let $\mathbb{Q}=\mathbb{P} \upharpoonright(d \times \omega)$. By assumption, there is a $y \in \mathrm{~L}[G \upharpoonright((d \cup$ b) $\times \omega)]$ such that $\mathrm{L}[G] \vDash \phi(y, r)$, but no $y^{\prime} \in \mathrm{L}[G\lceil((d \cup c) \times \omega)]$ is such that $\mathrm{L}[G] \vDash \phi\left(y^{\prime}, r\right)$. Let $\dot{r}$ be a $\mathbb{Q}$-name for $r$. As $\mathbb{P}$ is c.c.c., so is $\mathbb{Q}$, so we assume that $\dot{r}$ is countable. By assumption, $\mathrm{L}[G] \vDash\left(\exists^{d \cup b} x \psi\left(x, c_{\dot{r}}\right)\right)_{G}$. By Theorem 3.3.38, there is a $p \in G$ such that $p$ forc ${ }_{\infty} \exists^{d \cup b} x \psi\left(x, c_{\dot{r}}\right)$. We assumed that there is no $y^{\prime} \in \mathrm{L}[G \upharpoonright((d \cup c) \times \omega)]$ such that $\mathrm{L}[G] \models \psi\left(y^{\prime}, r\right)$, so without loss of generality, $p \vdash_{\mathbb{P}} \neg \exists^{d \cup c} x \psi\left(x, c_{\dot{r}}\right)$.

Note that $b, c, d$ are all countable and in HC. So, by unpacking the definition of $\boldsymbol{f o r c}_{\infty}$ (and increasing $\xi$ if necessary to include $b, c, d$ ), there is some $\xi<\omega_{1}$ such that $b, c, d \in M_{\xi}, p \in P_{\xi}, \psi(x)$ is a $\Pi_{n-1}^{1}\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right)$ formula, and $p \operatorname{forc}_{\xi} \exists^{d \cup b} x \psi\left(x, c_{\dot{r}}\right)$. Let $\zeta=\operatorname{len}(p)$. By increasing $\xi$ if necessary, we can assume $\xi \backslash(d \cup c)$ is the same size as $\xi \backslash(d \cup b)$. Let $f: \zeta \rightarrow \zeta$ be a bijection in $M_{\xi}$ such that $f \upharpoonright d$ is the identity, $f[b]=c$, and $f(\nu)=\nu$ for every $\nu \in b \cap c$. By Lemma 3.3.41, $f(p)$ forc $_{\xi} \exists^{d \cup b} x \psi\left(x, c_{r}\right)$. As $p$ and $f(p)$ agree on their common domains, they are compatible. Then there is a $q \in P_{\xi}$ such that $q \leq p$ and $q \leq f(p)$. Then $q \operatorname{forc}_{\xi} \exists^{d \cup c} x \psi\left(x, c_{\dot{r}}\right)$, hence, $q$ forc $_{\infty} \exists^{d \cup c} x \psi\left(x, c_{\dot{r}}\right)$. By Corollary 3.3.39, $q \Vdash_{\mathbb{P}} \exists^{d \cup c} x \psi\left(x, c_{\dot{r}}\right)$. But this contradicts that $p \Vdash_{\mathbb{P}} \neg \exists^{d \cup c} x \psi\left(x, c_{\dot{r}}\right)$.

In particular, this yields the Kanovei-Lyubetsky Lemma:
Lemma 3.3.43 (Kanovei-Lyubetsky Lemma). Let ( $\mathcal{M}, \preccurlyeq$ ) be a repetitive storage order, $n>2$, let $\left(\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right)\right)_{\xi \in \omega_{1}}$ be an $n$-complete storage sequence, let $\mathbb{P}:=$ $\bigcup_{\xi \in \omega_{1}} P_{\xi}$, and $e \subseteq \omega_{1}$ be unbounded and in L. Then every $\Sigma_{n}^{1}$ formula with parameters in $\mathrm{L}[G \upharpoonright e \times \omega]$ is absolute between $\mathrm{L}[G]$ and $\mathrm{L}[G \upharpoonright e \times \omega]$. So, $\mathbb{P}$ is $n$-absolute for slices.

Proof. Let $1 \leq k \leq n$ and $\varphi \in \Sigma_{k}^{1}$ with parameters in $\mathrm{L}[G \upharpoonright e \times \omega]$. We show that $\varphi$ is absolute by induction on $k$.

The case $k=1$ is just analytic absoluteness.
If $\varphi \in \Sigma_{k+1}^{1}$, then there is a $\psi \in \Pi_{n}^{1}$ such that $\varphi=\exists x \psi(x)$. Furthermore, there is a countable set $d \subseteq e$ in L such that every parameter of $\varphi$ is in $\mathrm{L}[G \upharpoonright d \times \omega]$. Let $b \subseteq e \backslash d$ be countable infinite and in L .

Suppose that $\mathrm{L}[G] \models \varphi$. Then there is some $y \in L[G]$ such that $\mathrm{L}[G] \models \psi(y)$. We can find a countable infinite set $c$ such that $y \in L[G \upharpoonright(d \cup c) \times \omega]$. By Lemma 3.3.42, there is a $y^{\prime} \in L[G \upharpoonright(d \cup b) \times \omega] \subseteq L[G \upharpoonright e \times \omega]$ such that $\mathrm{L}[G] \models \psi\left(y^{\prime}\right)$ and so
$\mathrm{L}\left[G\lceil e \times \omega] \models \psi\left(y^{\prime}\right)\right.$ by induction. Therefore, $\mathrm{L}[G \upharpoonright e \times \omega] \models \varphi$. The other direction follows directly from upwards-absoluteness.

For the last point, recall that $\mathbb{P}$ is $n$-absolute for slices if and only if for every unbounded set of slices $\mathcal{S}$ and every $s \in \mathcal{S}$, every $\Sigma_{n}^{1}$-formula with $\mathrm{L}[G\lceil s]$-real parameters is absolute between $\mathrm{L}[G\lceil s]$ and $\mathrm{L}[G]$. But certainly, for every unbounded set of slices $\mathcal{S}$, every $s \in \mathcal{S}$ is of the form $e \times \omega$ where $e \subseteq \omega_{1}$ is unbounded. So, the relevant absoluteness holds, and hence $\mathbb{P}$ is $n$-absolute for slices.

The Kanovei-Lyubetsky Lemma gives conditions for a forcing notion in this framework to be $n$-absolute for slices. Kanovei \& Lyubetsky focused on almost disjoint forcing; our generalisation applies to other forcing notions; in particular, we apply the Kanovei-Lyubetsky Lemma in Theorem 3.3 .66 to a generalisation of Jensen forcing.

The principal model in Section 3.3 .2 is built from an $\omega$-slice-product of length $\omega_{1}$, but we only use the first $\omega$-many pieces of this product. The remaining $\omega_{1^{-}}$ many pieces are included for the Kanovei-Lyubetsky Lemma, to ensure that $\mathbb{P}$ is $n$-absolute for slices. It is not known whether there is an analogous construction for forcing notions which are $n$-absolute for products of length $\omega$ :

Question 3.3.44. Is there a variant of the storage-order construction for constructing an $\omega$-slice-product of length $\omega$ which is $n$-absolute for slices?

### 3.3.4 Jensen forcing and $n$-Jensen forcing

In this section, we finally prove the Slicing Theorem 3.3 .15 based on a generalisation of Jensen forcing. Our presentation and notation are based on that of 67.

## Jensen forcing

Here, we introduce Jensen's original construction from [105] (for a modern exposition, see [103, §28]). Jensen forcing was originally used to construct a model with the simplest possible non-constructible real: by Shoenfield's absoluteness theorem all $\Sigma_{2}^{1}$ reals are constructible; Jensen forcing gives a non-constructible $\Delta_{3}^{1}$ real.

For us, three key properties of Jensen forcing are the following:
Theorem 3.3.45 (Jensen, [105, Lemmata $6 \& 10, \&$ Corollary 9]). In L, there is a c.c.c. forcing notion, $\mathbb{J}$, adding reals such that there is a unique $\mathbb{J}$-generic real in every generic extension by $\rrbracket$, and in every model the set of $\mathbb{J}$-generic reals is $\Pi_{2}^{1}$.

Our generalisation is based on Jensen's original construction from [105] rather than the modern construction as given in [103, Theorem 28.1]).

Following [67, page 5], we define the meet of two perfect trees, $S$ and $T$, denoted $S \wedge T$, to be the largest perfect tree contained in $S \cap T$, if it exists.

Definition 3.3.46. A forcing notion $\mathbb{P} \subseteq \mathbb{S}$, is called structured if $\mathbb{P}$ is closed under meets, under finite unions, and for all $s \in 2^{\omega},\left(2^{<\omega}\right)_{s} \in \mathbb{P}\left[{ }^{[6]}\right.$

[^10]For any structured forcing notion, $\mathbb{P}$, each generic filter is uniquely determined by a real, in the standard way: $x_{G}:=\bigcup\{\operatorname{stem}(T): T \in G\}$ is a real in $V[G]$. Conversely, $G=\left\{T \in \mathbb{P}: x_{G} \in[T]\right\}$ and so $V[G]=V\left[x_{G}\right]$. We call these the $\mathbb{P}$-generic reals.

If $\mathbb{P}$ is structured, we order $\mathbb{P} \times \omega$ by:

$$
(S, n) \leq(T, m): \Longleftrightarrow S \leq T \wedge m \leq n \wedge 2^{m} \cap S=2^{m} \cap T
$$

We denote the poset $(\mathbb{P} \times \omega, \leq)$ by $\mathbb{Q}(P)$, and call it the fusion order (for details on fusion orders, see e.g. [102, pages 15-17]).

If $\mathbb{P}$ is a forcing notion, let $\mathbb{P}^{<\omega}$ be the $\omega$-product of $\mathbb{P}$ with finite support.
Definition 3.3.47 (Jensen's Operation, $\left.P^{H}\right)$. Let $M$ be a ctm of $\mathrm{ZFC}^{-}+$" $\mathcal{P}(\omega)$ exists", $P \in M$ be structured, $H$ be a $\mathbb{Q}(P)^{<\omega}$-generic filter over $M$, and $\left(T_{k}\right)_{k \in \omega}$ be the generic trees added by $H$. We define:

$$
U:=\left\{T_{k} \wedge S: S \in P, k \in \omega, \text { and } T_{k} \wedge S \neq \emptyset\right\}
$$

Let $P^{H}$ be the closure of $P \cup U$ under finite unions, and order $P^{H}$ by inclusion.
This operation expands $P$ to a new poset $P^{H}$, which has many nice properties. Crucially, predense sets of $P$ are predense in $P^{H}$ :

Lemma 3.3.48. Let $M, P, H$, and $\left(T_{k}\right)_{k \in \omega}$ be as in Definition 3.3.47. Then:

1. $P^{H}$ is structured,
2. $U$ is dense in $P^{H}$ and $\left(T_{k}\right)_{k \in \omega}$ is a maximal antichain in $P^{H}$, and
3. every predense set $D \subseteq P$ in $M$ remains predense in $P^{H}$.
4. every predense set $D \subseteq P^{<\omega}$ in $M$ remains predense in $\left(P^{H}\right)^{<\omega}$.

Proof. Exactly as in [67, Propositions 2.4 \& 2.5].
The forcing notion, $\mathbb{J}$, which we call Jensen forcing, can now be constructed in these terms as follows: in L , we recursively define a sequence $\left(\left(\gamma_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right)\right)_{\xi \in \omega_{1}}$ of pairs of limit ordinals and forcing notion.

1. let $P_{0}$ be the closure of $\mathbb{C}$ under finite unions and let $\gamma_{0}$ be the least limit ordinal such that $P_{0} \in \mathrm{~L}_{\gamma_{0}}$,
2. if $\xi=\xi^{\prime}+1$, then we set $P_{\xi}:=\left(P_{\xi^{\prime}}\right)^{H}$, where $H$ is the $<_{\mathrm{L}}$-least $\mathbb{Q}\left(P_{\xi^{\prime}}\right)^{<\omega_{-}}$ generic filter over $\mathrm{L}_{\gamma_{\xi^{\prime}}}$, and
3. if $\xi$ is a limit, then we set $P_{\xi}:=\bigcup_{\xi^{\prime} \in \xi} P_{\xi^{\prime}}$.

In the last two cases, let $\gamma_{\xi}$ be the least limit ordinal such that $P_{\xi} \in \mathrm{L}_{\gamma_{\xi}}$ and $\omega^{\omega} \cap \mathrm{L}_{\gamma_{\xi+1}} \nsubseteq \mathrm{~L}_{\gamma_{\xi}}$. Finally, we set $\mathbb{J}:=\bigcup_{\xi \in \omega_{1}} P_{\xi}$. If a real $x$ is $\mathbb{J}$-generic, we call it a Jensen real.

## Jensen-like forcing

We now iterate Jensen's operation from Definition 3.3.47 to obtain a Jensensequence in order to define Jensen-like forcing notions.

The key to the generalisation is understanding why the set of Jensen reals has complexity $\Pi_{2}^{1}$. Roughly, a real is Jensen over L if and only if for all $\xi<\omega_{1}$, there is a $k \in \omega$ such that $x \in\left[T_{n}^{\xi}\right]$, where $\left(T_{n}^{\xi}\right)_{n \in \xi}$ is the set of $\mathbb{Q}\left(P_{\xi}\right)$-generic trees used in the construction $\rrbracket$ to define $P_{\xi+1}$. This $\left(T_{n}^{\xi}\right)_{n \in \xi}$ was constructed by always picking the $<_{\text {L }}$-least $\mathbb{Q}\left(P_{\xi}\right)^{<\omega}$-generic filter. So, by Lemma 2.1.19, $\left(T_{n}^{\xi}\right)_{n \in \xi}$ is $\Delta_{1}^{\mathrm{HC}}$, so the set of Jensen reals in L is $\Pi_{1}^{\mathrm{HC}}$. We generalise Jensen's construction by increasing the complexity of the sequence.

Definition 3.3.49. Let $\theta \leq \omega_{1}$. We say $\left(\left(\mathrm{L}_{\gamma_{\xi}}, P_{\xi}\right)\right)_{\xi \in \theta}$ is a Jensen-sequence if, for every $\xi<\theta$ :

1. $P_{0}$ is the closure of $\mathbb{C}$ under finite unions,
2. $\gamma_{\xi}$ is a countable ordinal such that $\mathrm{L}_{\gamma_{\xi}} \models \mathrm{ZFC}^{-}+" \mathscr{P}\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)$ exists" and $\omega^{\omega} \cap L_{\gamma_{\xi}+1} \nsubseteq L_{\gamma_{\xi}}$,
3. $P_{\xi}$ is structured and in $\mathrm{L}_{\gamma_{\xi}}$,
4. if $\xi=\zeta+1$, then there is a $\mathbb{Q}\left(P_{\zeta}\right)^{<\omega}$-generic filter $H_{\zeta} \in \mathrm{L}_{\gamma_{\xi}}$ over $\mathrm{L}_{\gamma_{\zeta}}$ such that $P_{\xi}=\left(P_{\zeta}\right)^{H_{\zeta}}$, and
5. $\left(P_{\xi}\right)_{\xi \in \theta}$ is continuous at limits.

As in the construction of $\rrbracket$ in Section 3.3.4, we can construct Jensen-sequences of length $\omega_{1}$ by recursion. Whilst Jensen uses the $<_{L}$-least generic filter, we consider all possible forcing notions which are defined by Jensen-sequences, using any generic filter.

Definition 3.3.50. We call a forcing notion, $\mathbb{P}$, Jensen-like if there is $\omega_{1}$-length Jensen-sequence, $\left(\left(\mathrm{L}_{\gamma_{\xi}}, P_{\xi}\right)\right)_{\xi \in \omega_{1}}$, such that $\mathbb{P}:=\bigcup_{\xi \in \omega_{1}} P_{\xi}$.

The next major task is to show that Jensen-like forcing notions exhibit generalisations of the properties of $\downarrow$ in Theorem 3.3.45. Obviously, predense sets remain predense at successor steps along a Jensen-sequence as those steps are instances of Jensen's operation; moreover, predense sets remain predense at limit steps and for the union of the sequence, and suitable products along a Jensen-sequence are c.c.c.:

Proposition 3.3.51. Let $\mathbb{P}$ be a Jensen-like forcing notion constructed from the sequence $\left(\left(\mathrm{L}_{\gamma_{\xi}}, P_{\xi}\right)\right)_{\xi \in \omega_{1}}$, then:

1. for every $\xi<\omega_{1}$, every predense set $D \subseteq P_{\xi}$ in $\mathrm{L}_{\gamma_{\xi}}$ is predense in $\mathbb{P}$, and
2. for every $\xi<\omega_{1}$, every predense set $D \subseteq P_{\xi}^{<\omega}$ in $\mathrm{L}_{\gamma_{\xi}}$ is predense in $\mathbb{P}^{<\omega}$.

Proof. Suppose that there is some $p \in \mathbb{P}$ such that $p \perp D$. By definition, there is some $\zeta<\omega_{1}$ such that $p \in P_{\zeta}$. Let $\zeta_{0}$ be minimal such that $\xi<\zeta_{0}$ and $p \in P_{\zeta_{0}}$. Then $D$ is not predense in $P_{\zeta_{0}}$ and $\zeta_{0}$ is a successor. Since $\xi<\zeta_{0}, D \in \mathrm{~L}_{\gamma_{\xi}} \subseteq \mathrm{L}_{\gamma_{5_{0}-1}}$. But this contradicts Lemma 3.3.48. The case where $D \subseteq P_{\xi}^{<\omega}$ is similar.

Proposition 3.3.52. If $\mathbb{P}$ is a Jensen-like forcing notion, then $\mathbb{P}$ and $\mathbb{P}<\omega$, are both c.c.c. in L.

Proof. It suffices to prove the result for $\mathbb{P}^{<\omega}$. By a condensation argument (as in [45, Theorem 5.2]), we can reduce this to Proposition 3.3.51(following the method in [105, Lemma 6]).

Corollary 3.3.53. Let $\mathbb{P}$ be a Jensen-like forcing notion, and $\mathbb{Q}$ be the $\omega$-sliceproduct of $\mathbb{P}$ with finite support of length $\omega_{1}$. Then $\mathbb{Q}$ is c.c.c. in $L$.

Proof. This follows from Proposition 3.3 .52 and a $\Delta$-system argument (as in, e.g. [103, page 188]).

So, we have generalised one of the three key properties of Jensen forcing, c.c.c.; next, we show that the complexity of the set of generics is bounded. For this, we use a preliminary result:

Lemma 3.3.54. Let $\mathbb{P}$ be a Jensen-like forcing notion, let $\left(\left(\mathrm{L}_{\gamma_{\xi}}, P_{\xi}\right)\right)_{\xi \in \omega_{1}}$ be a Jensen-sequence with $\mathbb{P}:=\bigcup_{\xi \in \omega_{1}} P_{\xi}$, and let $\left(T_{k}^{\xi}\right)_{k \in \omega}$ be the $\mathbb{Q}\left(P_{\xi}\right)^{<\omega}$-generic sequence used to construct $P_{\xi+1}$. The following are equivalent:

1. a real $x$ is $\mathbb{P}$-generic over L ,
2. for every $\xi<\omega_{1}, x$ is $P_{\xi}$-generic over $\mathrm{L}_{\gamma_{\xi}}$, and
3. for every $\xi<\omega_{1}$, there is some $k \in \omega$ such that $x \in\left[T_{k}^{\xi}\right]$.

Proof. We start with the argument from Part 1. to Part 3. Let $\xi<\omega_{1}$. By Lemma 3.3.48, $\left\{T_{k}^{\xi}: k \in \omega\right\}$ is a maximal anichain in $P_{\xi+1}$ and by Proposition 3.3.51, it remains predense in $\mathbb{P}$. Hence, there is some $k \in \omega$ such that $x \in\left[T_{k}^{\xi}\right]$.

From Part 3. to Part 2. let $\xi<\omega_{1}$ and let $D \subseteq P_{\xi}$ be dense in $\mathrm{L}_{\gamma_{\xi}}$. By assumption, there is some $k \in \omega$ such that $x \in\left[T_{k}^{\xi}\right]$. We define

$$
E:=\left\{q \in \mathbb{Q}\left(P_{\xi}\right)^{<\omega}: q(k)=(T, n) \wedge \forall s \in 2^{n} \cap T\left(T_{s} \in D\right)\right\} .
$$

First, we prove that $E$ is dense in $\mathbb{Q}\left(P_{\xi}\right)^{<\omega}$ : let $q \in \mathbb{Q}\left(P_{\xi}\right)^{<\omega}$ and let $q(k)=(T, n)$. For every $s \in 2^{n} \cap T, T_{s} \in P_{\xi}$, so there is an $S_{s} \in D$ with $S_{s} \leq T_{s}$. Let $S:=\bigcup_{s \in 2^{n} \cap T} S_{s}$ and $q^{\prime} \in \mathbb{Q}\left(P_{\xi}\right)^{<\omega}$ by $q^{\prime}(k):=(S, n)$ and for $\ell \neq k, q^{\prime}(\ell):=q(\ell)$. Then $(S, n) \leq(T, n)$ and so $q^{\prime} \leq q$ and $q^{\prime} \in E$. Hence, $E$ is dense in $\mathbb{Q}\left(P_{\xi}\right)^{<\omega}$. Let $H_{\xi}$ be the $\mathbb{Q}\left(P_{\xi}\right)^{<\omega}$-generic filter corresponding to $\left(T_{k}^{\xi}\right)_{k \in \omega}$. Then $E$ meets $H_{\xi}$, so there is a pair $(T, n) \in \mathbb{Q}\left(P_{\xi}\right)$ such that for every $s \in 2^{n} \cap T, T_{s} \in D$ and $T_{k}^{\xi} \subseteq T$. Let $s \in 2^{n} \cap T$ such that $s \subseteq x$. Then $x \in\left[T_{s}\right]$ and $T_{s} \in D$. Thus, $x$ is $P_{\xi^{\text {- generic }}}$ over $\mathrm{L}_{\gamma_{\xi}}$.

Finally, from Part 2. to Part 1. let $\mathcal{A} \subseteq \mathbb{P}$ be a maximal antichain. Since $\mathbb{P}$ is c.c.c., $\mathcal{A}$ is countable, so let $\xi<\omega_{1}$ be such that $\mathcal{A} \subseteq P_{\xi}$ and $\mathcal{A} \in \mathrm{L}_{\gamma_{\xi}}$. By assumption, $x$ is $P_{\xi^{-}}$-generic over $\mathrm{L}_{\gamma_{\xi}}$, so there is a $T \in P_{\xi} \subseteq P$ with $x \in[T]$.

So, checking the complexity of the set of generics reduces to checking complexity of the Jensen-sequence itself:

Corollary 3.3.55. Let $\mathbb{P}$ be Jensen-like, and $\left(\left(\mathrm{L}_{\gamma_{\xi}}, P_{\xi}\right)_{\xi \in \omega_{1}}\right.$ be a Jensen-sequence such that $\mathbb{P}=\bigcup_{\xi \in \omega_{1}} P_{\xi}$. For each $n \geq 2$, if $\left(\left(\mathrm{L}_{\gamma_{\xi}}, P_{\xi}\right)\right)_{\xi \in \omega_{1}}$ is $\Delta_{n-1}^{\mathrm{HC}}$, then the set of $\mathbb{P}$-generics is $\Pi_{n}^{1}$ in every transitive model of ZFC.

Proof. Let $M \vDash$ ZFC and contain L. By Lemma 3.3.54, a real is $\mathbb{P}$-generic over L if and only if $x$ is $P_{\xi}$-generic over $\mathrm{L}_{\gamma_{\xi}}$. As $\omega_{1}^{\mathrm{L}}$ and $\mathrm{L}_{\omega_{1}^{L}}$ are in $M,\left(\mathrm{~L}_{\gamma_{\xi}}, P_{\xi}\right)_{\left.\xi \in\left(\omega_{1}\right)^{L}\right)}$ is $\Delta_{n-1}^{\mathrm{HC}}$ in $M$. So, the set of $\mathbb{P}$-generics over $\mathrm{L}, G_{R}$, is $\Delta_{n-1}^{\mathrm{HC}}$ in $M$, and so by Lemma 2.1.18, $G_{R}$ is $\Pi_{n}^{1}$.

The final of the three important properties to generalise is that the generics are suitably unique. Then, we calculate the complexity of the set of generics in analogy to Theorem 3.3.45. This yields the requisite failure of descriptive choice in our final model. We begin by showing the uniqueness of reals in a Jensen-like forcing notion, from which we prove the uniqueness of reals for $\omega$-slice-products of Jensen-like forcing notions.

Lemma 3.3.56. Let $\mathbb{P}$ be a Jensen-like forcing notion. Then for every $\mathbb{P}$-generic filter, $G$, over L , the set of $\mathbb{P}$-generics over L is a singleton in $\mathrm{L}[G]$.

Proof. Let $x$ and $y$ be $\mathbb{P}$-generic reals over L, where $x$ corresponds to $G$ and $y \neq x$. We use a product argument to show that $(x, y)$ is $(\mathbb{P} \times \mathbb{P})$-generic over L , and hence $y \notin \mathrm{~L}[G]$.

Let $\left(\left(\mathrm{L}_{\gamma_{\xi}}, \mathbb{P}_{\xi}\right)\right)_{\xi \in \omega_{1}}$ be a Jensen-sequence such that $\mathbb{P}=\bigcup_{\xi \in \omega_{1}} \mathbb{P}_{\xi}$. As in Lemma 3.3.54 it suffices to show that for every $\xi<\omega_{1},(x, y)$ is $\left(\mathbb{P}_{\xi} \times \mathbb{P}_{\xi}\right)$-generic over $\mathrm{L}_{\gamma_{\xi}}$.

Let $\xi<\omega_{1}, G_{\xi}:=\left\{\left(S, S^{\prime}\right) \in \mathbb{P}_{\xi} \times \mathbb{P}_{\xi}: x \in[S] \wedge y \in\left[S^{\prime}\right]\right\}$, and $D \subseteq \mathbb{P}_{\xi} \times \mathbb{P}_{\xi}$ be open dense in $\mathrm{L}_{\gamma_{\xi}}$. We first show that $G_{\xi} \cap D \neq \emptyset$. Let $m \in \omega$ be such that $x\left\lceil m \neq y\left\lceil m\right.\right.$, and let $E$ be the set of all $q \in \mathbb{Q}\left(\mathbb{P}_{\xi}\right)^{<\omega}$ such that:

1. for every $\ell \in \operatorname{Dom}(q)$, if $q(\ell)=(S, n)$, then $n>m$, and
2. for every $\ell, \ell^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Dom}(q)$, if $q(\ell)=(S, n)$ and $q\left(\ell^{\prime}\right)=\left(S^{\prime}, n^{\prime}\right)$, then for every $s \in 2^{n} \cap S$ and $s^{\prime} \in 2^{n^{\prime}} \cap S^{\prime}$, either $\left(S_{s}, S_{s^{\prime}}^{\prime}\right) \in D$ or both $\ell=\ell^{\prime}$ and $s=s^{\prime}$.

Since $D$ is open dense in $\mathbb{P}_{\xi} \times \mathbb{P}_{\xi}, E$ is dense in $\mathbb{Q}\left(\mathbb{P}_{\xi}\right)^{<\omega}$. Let $H_{\xi}$ be the $\mathbb{Q}\left(\mathbb{P}_{\xi}\right)^{<\omega_{-}}$ generic filter over $L_{\gamma_{\xi}}$ which was used to construct $\mathbb{P}_{\xi+1}$, and let $\left(T_{k}^{\xi}\right)_{k \in \omega}$ be its corresponding $\mathbb{Q}\left(\mathbb{P}_{\xi}\right)^{<\omega}$-generic sequence. So, there is a $q \in H_{\xi} \cap E$. By Lemma 3.3.54, there are $k, k^{\prime} \in \omega$ such that $x \in\left[T_{k}^{\xi}\right]$ and $y \in\left[T_{k^{\prime}}^{\xi}\right]$. Let $(S, n),\left(S^{\prime}, n^{\prime}\right) \in$ $\mathbb{Q}\left(\mathbb{P}_{\xi}\right)$ be such that $q(k)=(S, n)$ and $q\left(k^{\prime}\right)=\left(S^{\prime}, n^{\prime}\right)$. We define $s:=x \upharpoonright n$ and $s^{\prime}:=y \upharpoonright n^{\prime}$. Then $x \in\left[S_{s}\right], y \in\left[S_{s^{\prime}}^{\prime}\right]$, and $\left(S_{s}, S_{s^{\prime}}^{\prime}\right) \in D$. So, $G_{\xi}$ meets $D$, so $(x, y)$ is $(\mathbb{P} \times \mathbb{P})$-generic over L , as required. Hence $y$ is $\mathbb{P}$-generic over $\mathrm{L}[x]$, and $y \notin \mathrm{~L}[x]$. Hence, in particular, $y \notin \mathrm{~L}[G]$.

We use this to prove that the $\omega$-slice-product with finite support of length $\omega_{1}$ for such a Jensen-like forcing notion also has a unique generic real. Our approach follows that of Kanovei and Lyubetsky [110], who show that for every $\rrbracket^{\downarrow}$ - -generic filter $G$ over L, a real $y \in \mathrm{~L}[G]$ is Jensen over L if and only if there is some $k \in \omega$ such that $y=x_{G}^{k}$, where $x_{G}^{k}$ is the Jensen real added by the $k^{\text {th }}$ coordinate of $G$. We use the corresponding result for Jensen-like forcing notions:

Lemma 3.3.57 (Kanovei-Lyubetsky). Let $M$ be a ctm of ZFC $^{-}+$" $\mathcal{P}(\omega)$ exists", and let $P \in M$ be structured. For every $k \in \omega$, let $\dot{x}_{G}^{k}$ be the canonical $P^{<\omega}$-name for the $P$-generic real which is added by the $k^{\text {th }}$-coordinate of the $P^{<\omega}$-generic filter. Let $\dot{y} \in M$ be a $P^{<\omega}$-name for a real such that for every $k \in \omega, 1_{P<\omega} \Vdash \dot{y} \neq \dot{x}_{G}^{k}$. Then for every $\mathbb{Q}(P)^{<\omega}$-filter $H$ over $M$ and every generic tree $T_{k}$ added by $H$, in $M[H]$ the set of conditions forcing that $\dot{y} \notin\left[T_{k}\right]$ is dense in $\left(P^{H}\right)^{<\omega}$.

Proof. Let $p \in\left(P^{H}\right)^{<\omega}$ and let $m \in \omega$. We prove the density by constructing a condition $r_{q} \leq p$ such that $r_{q} \Vdash \dot{y} \notin\left[T_{m}\right]$. By Lemma 3.3.48, $\left(T_{k}\right)_{k \in \omega}$ is dense in $P^{H}$. So, without loss of generality, we assume that for every $k \in \operatorname{Dom}(p)$, there are $\ell_{k} \in \omega$ and $S_{k} \in P$ such that $p(k)=T_{\ell_{k}} \wedge S_{k}$, and that there is some $k_{0} \in \operatorname{Dom}(p)$ such that $\ell_{k_{0}}=m$.

Claim 3.3.58. There is a $q \in H$ such that $\left\{\ell_{k}: k \in \operatorname{Dom}(p)\right\} \subseteq \operatorname{Dom}(q)$ and for every $k \in \operatorname{Dom}(p)$, there is some $s_{k} \in R_{\ell_{k}}$ such that:

A1. $\operatorname{len}\left(s_{k}\right)=n_{\ell_{k}}$,
A2. if $k^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Dom}(p)$ with $k \neq k^{\prime}$, then $s_{k} \neq s_{k}^{\prime}$, and
A3. $\left(R_{\ell_{k}}\right)_{s_{k}} \leq S_{k}$,
where $R_{\ell_{k}} \in P$ and $n_{\ell_{k}} \in \omega$ such that $q\left(\ell_{k}\right)=\left(R_{\ell_{k}}, n_{\ell_{k}}\right)$.
Proof. The proof follows essentially the shape of [67, Theorem 3.1]. Let $\dot{T}_{\ell_{k}}$ be the canonical $\mathbb{Q}(P)^{<\omega}$-name for $T_{\ell_{k}}$. For all $k \in \omega, T_{\ell_{k}} \wedge S_{k} \neq \emptyset$. So, there is a $q^{\prime} \in H$ with $\left\{\ell_{k}: k \in \operatorname{Dom}(p)\right\} \subseteq \operatorname{Dom}\left(q^{\prime}\right)$, such that for every $k \in \operatorname{Dom}(p), q^{\prime} \Vdash$ $\dot{T}_{\ell_{k}} \wedge \check{S}_{k} \neq \emptyset$. It suffices to show that $\left\{s_{k}: s_{k}\right.$ satisfies Properties A1. A2. and A3.\} is dense below $q^{\prime}$.

Let $q^{\prime \prime} \leq q^{\prime}, \ell \in \operatorname{Dom}\left(q^{\prime \prime}\right)$ and $A_{\ell}:=\left\{k \in \operatorname{Dom}(p): \ell_{k}=\ell\right\}$. Then there are $R_{\ell} \in P$ and $n_{\ell} \in \omega$ such that $q^{\prime \prime}(\ell)=\left(R_{\ell}, n_{\ell}\right)$. For every $k \in \operatorname{Dom}(p)$, we have that $q^{\prime \prime} \Vdash \dot{T}_{\ell_{k}} \wedge \check{S}_{k} \neq \emptyset$. So, for every $k \in A_{\ell}$, there is an $s_{k} \in R_{\ell}$ such that $\operatorname{len}\left(s_{k}\right) \geq n_{\ell}$ and $\left(R_{\ell}\right)_{s_{k}} \wedge S_{k} \neq \emptyset$. Without loss of generality, we can assume that for every $k \neq k^{\prime} \in A_{\ell}, \operatorname{len}\left(s_{k}\right)=\operatorname{len}\left(s_{k}^{\prime}\right)$ and $s_{k} \neq s_{k}^{\prime}$. Let $R_{\ell}^{\prime}$ be the tree resulting from replacing $\left(R_{\ell}\right)_{s_{k}}$ with $\left(R_{\ell}\right)_{s_{k}} \wedge S_{k} \in R_{\ell}$ for every $k \in A_{\ell}$. We define $q \leq q^{\prime \prime}$ like so:

$$
q(\ell):= \begin{cases}\left(R_{\ell}^{\prime}, \operatorname{len}\left(s_{k}\right)\right) & \text { if } A_{\ell} \neq \emptyset \\ q^{\prime \prime}(\ell) & \text { otherwise }\end{cases}
$$

Then $q$ satisfies Properties A1. A2., and A3.
Claim 3.3.59. Let $q \in H$ be the condition from Claim 3.3.58. There is a condition $r_{q} \in P^{<\omega}$ such that:

B1. for every $k \in \operatorname{Dom}(p), r_{q}(k) \leq\left(R_{\ell_{k}}\right)_{s_{k}}$,
B2. there is a finite set $A_{q} \subseteq \operatorname{Dom}\left(r_{q}\right)$ such that for every $s \in R_{m} \cap 2^{n_{m}}$, there is some $k \in A_{q}$ such that $r_{q}(k) \leq\left(R_{m}\right)_{s}$, and

B3. for every $k \in \operatorname{Dom}(p) \cup A_{q}, r_{q} \Vdash \dot{y} \notin\left[r_{q}(k)\right]$

Proof. Let $B:=\left(R_{m} \cap 2^{n_{m}}\right) \backslash\left\{s_{k}: \ell_{k}=m\right\}, A \subseteq \omega \backslash \operatorname{Dom}(p)$ be such that $|A|=|B|$, and $\left\{t_{k}: k \in A\right\}$ enumerate $B$. We define $r \in P^{<\omega}$ like so:

$$
r(k):= \begin{cases}\left(R_{\ell_{k}}\right)_{s_{k}} & \text { if } k \in \operatorname{Dom}(p), \\ \left(R_{m}\right)_{t_{k}} & \text { if } k \in A .\end{cases}
$$

For every $k \in \omega$, we have that $1_{P<\omega} \Vdash \dot{y} \neq \dot{x}_{k}^{G}$. So, there is a condition $r_{q} \leq r$ such that for every $k \in \operatorname{Dom}(p) \cup A, r_{q} \Vdash \dot{y} \notin\left[r_{q}(k)\right]$. Then $r_{q}$ satisfies Properties B1. B2. and B3. with $A_{q}:=A \cup\left\{k \in \operatorname{Dom}(p): \ell_{k}=m\right\}$.

We use $r_{q}$ to define a condition $c(q) \leq q$. Let $\ell \in \operatorname{Dom}(q)$ be such that $A_{\ell}:=\left\{k \in \operatorname{Dom}(p): \ell_{k}=l\right\} \neq \emptyset$. Let $R_{\ell}^{\prime}$ be the tree resulting from replacing $\left(R_{\ell}\right)_{s_{k}}$ with $r_{q}(k) \in R_{\ell}$ for every $k \in A_{\ell}$, and if $\ell=m$, also replacing $\left(R_{\ell}\right)_{t_{k}}$ with $r_{q}(k)$ for every $k \in A$. We define $c(q) \leq q$ like so:

$$
c(q)(\ell):= \begin{cases}\left(\left(R_{\ell}^{\prime}, n_{\ell}\right)\right. & \text { if } A_{\ell} \neq \emptyset \\ q(\ell) & \text { otherwise }\end{cases}
$$

Similarly, we can construct such a $c(r)$ for every $r \leq q$. Let $D:=\{c(r): r \leq$ $q\} \subseteq \mathbb{Q}(P)^{<\omega}$. Then $D$ is dense below $q$. Since $H$ is $\mathbb{Q}(P)^{<\omega}$-generic, $G \cap D \neq \emptyset$. Without loss of generality, we can assume that $c(q) \in H$. So, for every $k \in \operatorname{Dom}(p)$, $\left(T_{\ell_{k}}\right)_{s_{k}} \leq r_{q}(k) \wedge S_{n}$. Hence $p$ and $r_{q}$ are compatible.

To complete the proof, it suffices to show that $r_{q} \Vdash \dot{y} \notin\left[T_{m}\right]$. Let $G$ be a $\left(P^{H}\right)^{<\omega}$-generic filter over $M[H]$ containing $r_{q}$. By Lemma 3.3.48, every predense subset of $P^{<\omega}$ in $M$ remains predense in $\left(P^{H}\right)^{<\omega}$. Hence, $G^{\prime}:=G \cap P^{<\omega}$ is a $P^{<\omega}{ }_{-}$ generic filter over $M$ containing $r_{q}$. Then, in $M\left[G^{\prime}\right]$, for every $k \in \operatorname{Dom}(p) \cup A_{q}$, $\dot{y}_{G^{\prime}} \notin\left[r_{q}(k)\right]$. By absoluteness, this is also true in $M[H][G]$. Since $c(q) \in H$, for every $s \in T_{m} \cap 2^{n_{m}}$, there is some $k \in A_{q}$ such that $\left(T_{m}\right)_{s} \leq r_{q}(k)$. Therefore, $\dot{y}_{G} \notin\left[T_{m}\right]$ and so $r_{q} \Vdash \dot{y} \notin\left[T_{m}\right]$.

We generalise this to the products of Jensen-like forcing notions, such that the only generics in the extension are those defined from the coordinates.

Proposition 3.3.60. Let $\mathbb{P}$ be a Jensen-like forcing notion, $G$ be a $\mathbb{P}^{<\omega}$-generic filter over L , and let $\left(x_{G}^{k}\right)_{k \in \omega}$ be the sequence of $\mathbb{P}$-generic reals corresponding to $G$. Then for every $\mathbb{P}$-generic real $y \in \mathrm{~L}[G]$ over L , there is some $k \in \omega$ such that $y=x_{G}^{k}$.

Proof. We use a condensation argument [45, Theorem 5.2], with an appeal to Lemma 3.3.57.

For a contradiction, suppose that there is a $y \in \mathrm{~L}[G]$ such that $y$ is $\mathbb{P}$-generic over L and for every $k \in \omega, y \neq x_{G}^{k}$. By Proposition 3.3.52, $P$ satisfies the c.c.c., so there is a countable $P^{<\omega}$-name, $\dot{y}$, for $y$. Let $\dot{x}_{G}^{k}$ be the canonical $\mathbb{P}^{<\omega}$-name for the $\mathbb{P}$-generic real which is added by the $k^{\text {th }}$ coordinate of $G$. Without loss of generality, we can assume that for every $k \in \omega, 1_{\mathbb{P}<\omega} \Vdash \dot{y} \neq \dot{x}_{G}^{k}$. Let $\left(\left(\mathrm{L}_{\gamma_{\xi}}, P_{\xi}\right)\right)_{\xi \in \omega_{1}}$ be a Jensen-sequence such that $\mathbb{P}=\bigcup_{\xi \in \omega_{1}} P_{\xi}$. Let $X$ be a countable elementary submodel of $\mathrm{L}_{\omega_{2}}$ which contains the following: $\left(P_{\xi}\right)_{\xi \in \omega_{1}}, \mathbb{P}, \mathbb{P}^{<\omega}, \dot{y}$, and $\dot{x}_{G}^{k}$ for every $k \in \omega$. Let $M$ be the transitive collapse of $X$, and $\pi: X \rightarrow M$ be the collapsing isomorphism.

By condensation [45, Theorem 5.2], there is a $\zeta<\omega_{1}$ such that $M=\mathrm{L}_{\zeta}$, and a $\xi<\zeta$ such that $X \cap \mathrm{~L}_{\omega_{1}}=\mathrm{L}_{\xi}$. So, $\pi\left(\omega_{1}\right)=\xi$ and for every $x \in X \cap \mathrm{~L}_{\omega_{1}}$, $\pi(x)=x$. Moreover, if $x \subseteq \mathrm{~L}_{\omega_{2}}$, then $\pi(x)=x \cap \mathrm{~L}_{\xi}$. So, $\pi(\mathbb{P})=P_{\xi}, \pi(\dot{y})=\dot{y}$, and for every $k \in \omega, \pi\left(\dot{x}_{G}^{k}\right)=\dot{x}_{G}^{k} \cap\left(P_{\xi}\right)^{<\omega}$. Hence, for every $k \in \omega, \pi\left(\dot{x}_{G}^{k}\right)$ is the canonical $\left(P_{\xi}\right)^{<\omega}$-name for the $P_{\xi}$-generic real added by the $k^{\text {th }}$ coordinate of $G$. Let $k \in \omega$. By elementarity, $1_{\mathbb{P}<\omega} \Vdash \dot{y} \neq \dot{x}_{G}^{k}$ in $X$ and so $1_{\left(P_{\xi}\right)<\omega} \Vdash \dot{y} \neq \pi\left(\dot{x}_{G}^{k}\right)$ in $\mathrm{L}_{\zeta}$ as well. By definition, $\gamma_{\xi} \geq \xi$, and $\omega^{\omega} \cap \mathrm{L}_{\gamma_{\xi+1}} \subsetneq \mathrm{~L}_{\gamma_{\xi}}$. So, $\gamma_{\xi} \geq \zeta$. Thus, $1_{\left(P_{\xi}\right)<\omega} \Vdash \dot{y} \neq \pi\left(\dot{x}_{G}^{k}\right)$ in $\mathrm{L}_{\gamma_{\xi}}$.

Let $H \in \mathrm{~L}_{\gamma_{\xi}+1}$ be the $\mathbb{Q}\left(P_{\xi}\right)^{<\omega}$-generic filter over $\mathrm{L}_{\gamma_{\xi}}$ such that $\left(P_{\xi}\right)^{H}=P_{\xi+1}$ and let $\left(T_{k}\right)_{k \in \omega}$ be the sequence of $\mathbb{Q}\left(P_{\xi}\right)$-generic trees corresponding to $H$. By Lemma 3.3.54, there is a $k \in \omega$ such that $y \in\left[T_{k}\right]$ in $\mathrm{L}[G]$. So, by Lemma 3.3.57, for every $k \in \omega$, the set $\left\{p \in P_{\xi+1}^{<\omega}: p \Vdash \dot{y} \notin\left[T_{k}\right]\right\}$ is dense in $P_{\xi+1}^{<\omega}$. Hence, there is some $p \in G_{\xi+1}$ such that $p \Vdash \dot{y} \notin\left[T_{k}\right]$ and so $\mathrm{L}_{\gamma_{\xi}+1}\left[G_{\xi+1}\right] \vDash y \notin\left[T_{k}\right]$. By analytic absoluteness, $\mathrm{L}[G] \vDash y \notin\left[T_{k}\right]$. But this contradicts the fact that $y \in\left[T_{k}\right]$ in $L[G]$. So, there is a $k \in \omega$ such that $y=x_{G}^{k}$.

Corollary 3.3.61. Let $\mathbb{P}$ be a Jensen-like forcing notion and let $\mathbb{Q}$ be the $\omega$-sliceproduct of $\mathbb{P}$ with finite support of length $\omega_{1}$, let $I \subseteq \omega_{1} \times \omega$. Let $G$ be a $\mathbb{Q}\lceil I$-generic filter over L. Finally, let $x_{g}^{i}$ be the $\mathbb{P}$-generic real corresponding to $G\lceil\{i\}$. Then for every $\mathbb{P}$-generic real $y \in \mathrm{~L}[G]$ over L , there is some $i \in I$ such that $y=x_{G}^{i}$.

Proof. Let $y \in L[G]$ be $\mathbb{P}$-generic over L and let $\dot{y}$ be a $\mathbb{Q} \upharpoonright I$-name for $y$. By Corollary 3.3.53, Q $\lceil I$ is c.c.c. is and so $\dot{y}$ is countable. Hence, there is a countably infinite $I^{\prime} \subseteq I$ such that $\dot{y}$ is a $\mathbb{Q}\left\lceil I^{\prime}\right.$-name. Since $I^{\prime}$ is countable, $\mathbb{Q} \upharpoonright I^{\prime}$ is order isomorphic to $\mathbb{P}^{<\omega}$. Hence, we can apply Proposition 3.3.60 and so there is an $i \in I^{\prime}$ such that $y=x_{G}^{i}$.

## $n$-Jensen Forcing

In our terminology, Kanovei and Lyubetsky proved that $\omega$-slice-products of almost disjoint forcing are $n$-absolute for slices [111, §4]). We apply this to Jensen-like forcing notions.

Definition 3.3.62. Let $\mathcal{M}_{\mathcal{J}}$ be the set of all $(M, P, \mu)$ with the following 4 properties:

1. there is a countable ordinal $\gamma$ such that $M=L_{\gamma}$ and $M \vDash$ ZFC $^{-}+$" $\mathscr{P}(\omega)$ exists",
2. $\mu>0$ is a countable ordinal in $M$,
3. $P$ is structured, and
4. there is a $\theta<\omega_{1}$ and a Jensen-sequence $J \in M$ such that $J^{\frown}(M, P)$ is a Jensen-sequence.

We order the $(M, P),(N, Q)$ such that $(M, P, \mu),(N, Q, \nu) \in \mathcal{M}_{\mathcal{J}}$ by $(N, Q) \preccurlyeq$ $(M, P)$ if and only if $\nu \leq \mu, N \subseteq M$, and either $Q=P$ or else there is a Jensensequence $J \in M$ such that:
5. there is some $\xi \in \operatorname{Dom}(J)$ such that $J(\xi)=(N, Q)$ and
6. $J^{\frown}(M, P)$ is a Jensen-sequence.

Let $\theta \leq \omega_{1}$. A $\preccurlyeq$-increasing sequence $\left(\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right)\right)_{\xi \in \theta}$ in $\mathcal{M}_{\mathcal{J}}$ is strict if $M_{\xi} \subsetneq$ $M_{\xi+1}$ and $P_{\xi} \subsetneq P_{\xi+1}$ for every $\xi<\theta$.

Lemma 3.3.63. Let $0<\theta \leq \omega_{1}$ and let $\left(\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right)\right)_{\xi \in \theta}$ be a strictly $\preccurlyeq$-increasing sequence which is continuous at limits. Then $\bigcup_{\xi \in \theta} P_{\xi}$ is a Jensen-like forcing notion.

Proof. It is enough to show that there is a Jensen-sequence which contains $\left(\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right)\right)_{\xi \in \theta}$ as an unbounded subsequence. We build a sequence $\left(J_{\zeta}\right)_{\zeta \in \theta}$ of Jensen-sequences such that for every $0<\zeta \leq \theta$, the following hold:

1. $\left(\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right)\right)_{\xi \in \theta}$ is an unbounded subsequence of $J_{\zeta}$,
2. if $\zeta^{\prime}<\zeta<\theta$, then $J_{\zeta}$ extends $J_{\zeta^{\prime}}$, and
3. $\left(J_{\zeta}\right)_{\zeta \in \theta}$ is continuous at limits.

Then $J_{\theta}$ is the desired Jensen-sequence. We define the $J_{\zeta}$ recursively. By definition, there is a Jensen-sequence $J_{0} \in M_{0}$, such that $J_{0}$ ( $\left.M_{0}, P_{0}\right)$ is also a Jensensequence. We set $J_{1}:=J_{0} \frown\left(M_{0}, P_{0}\right)$. Suppose $J_{\zeta^{\prime}}$ is already defined for $\zeta^{\prime}<\zeta$. Then there are three cases.

1. If $\zeta=\zeta^{\prime}+1$ and $\zeta^{\prime}=\zeta^{\prime \prime}+1$, then $\operatorname{Dom}\left(J_{\zeta^{\prime}}\right)$ is a successor ordinal $\eta=\eta^{\prime}+1$ and $J_{\zeta^{\prime}}\left(\eta^{\prime}\right)=\left(M_{\zeta^{\prime \prime}}, P_{\zeta^{\prime \prime}}\right)$. By construction $\left(M_{\zeta^{\prime \prime}}, P_{\zeta^{\prime \prime}}\right) \preccurlyeq\left(M_{\zeta^{\prime}}, P_{\zeta^{\prime}}\right)$ and the sequence is strict, so there is a Jensen-sequence $J_{\zeta_{0}} \in M_{\zeta^{\prime}}$ such that there is some $\xi \in \operatorname{Dom}\left(J_{\zeta_{0}}\right)$ with $J_{\zeta_{0}}(\xi)=\left(M_{\zeta^{\prime \prime}}, P_{\zeta^{\prime \prime}}\right)$ where $J_{\zeta_{0}}{ }^{\complement}\left(M_{\zeta^{\prime}}, P_{\zeta^{\prime}}\right)$ is a Jensen-sequence. Let $J_{\zeta^{\prime \prime}}$ be the restriction of $J_{\zeta_{0}}$ to $\operatorname{Dom}\left(J_{\zeta_{0}}\right) \backslash(\xi+1)$. We set $J_{\zeta}:=J_{\zeta_{0}} \simeq J_{\zeta^{\prime \prime}} \simeq\left(M_{\zeta^{\prime}}, P_{\zeta^{\prime}}\right)$.
2. If $\zeta=\zeta^{\prime}+1$ and $\zeta^{\prime}$ is a limit, then we set $J_{\zeta}:=J_{\zeta^{\prime}} \frown\left(M_{\zeta^{\prime}}, P_{\zeta^{\prime}}\right)$. Since $\left.\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right)\right)_{\xi \in \zeta^{\prime}}$ is an unbounded subsequence of $J_{\zeta^{\prime}}$ and $P_{\zeta^{\prime}}=\bigcup_{\xi \in \zeta^{\prime}} P_{\xi}, J_{\zeta}$ is a Jensen-sequence.
3. Otherwise $\zeta$ is a limit. Then, for every $\zeta^{\prime}<\zeta$, there is a Jensen-sequence $J_{\zeta^{\prime}}$ which contains $\left(\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right)\right)_{\xi \in \zeta^{\prime}}$ as an unbounded subsequence. Let $\alpha<\zeta$ be the largest limit ordinal and for every $\alpha \leq \zeta^{\prime}<\zeta$, and let $\xi_{\zeta^{\prime}}<\operatorname{len}\left(J_{\zeta^{\prime}+1}\right)$ be such that $J_{\zeta^{\prime}+1}\left(\xi_{\zeta^{\prime}}\right)=\left(M_{\zeta^{\prime}}, P_{\zeta^{\prime}}\right)$. Then:

$$
J_{\alpha}^{\frown}\left(J_{\alpha+1} \upharpoonright\left(\operatorname{len}\left(J_{\alpha+1}\right) \backslash \xi_{\alpha}\right)\right) \smile \ldots \frown\left(J_{\alpha+n+1} \upharpoonright\left(\operatorname{len}\left(J_{\alpha+n+1}\right) \backslash \xi_{\alpha+n}\right)\right) \frown \ldots
$$

is a Jensen-sequence which contains $\left(\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right)\right)_{\xi \in \zeta}$ as an unbounded subsequence.

Recall that if $(M, P)$ is in a repetitive storage order, $P$ is an $\omega$-slice-product of a unique $Q_{P}$. Hence for every such $P$, there is a unique pair $\left(Q_{P}, \mu_{P}\right)$ such that $P$ is the $\omega$-slice-product of $Q_{P}$ with finite support. We now identify each pair $(M, P)$ in a repetitive storage order with a triple $\left(M, Q_{P}, \mu_{P}\right)$. This makes $\mathcal{M}_{\mathcal{J}}$ repetitive:

Lemma 3.3.64. The set $\left(\mathcal{M}_{\mathcal{J}}, \preccurlyeq\right)$ is a repetitive storage order.
Proof. We first check that $\left(\mathcal{M}_{\mathcal{J}}, \preccurlyeq\right)$ is a partial order, then check that it is a repetitive storage order. Reflexivity is clear. For antisymmetry, suppose $(M, P, \mu) \preccurlyeq$ $(N, Q, \nu) \preccurlyeq(M, P, \mu)$. Automatically, $M=N$ and $\nu=\mu$. Then note that for each Jensen-sequence, $\left(\left(\mathrm{L}_{\gamma_{\xi}}, P_{\xi}\right)\right)_{\xi \in \zeta}$, and for each $\xi^{\prime}<\xi<\zeta$, we have that $\mathrm{L}_{\gamma_{\xi^{\prime}}} \subsetneq \mathrm{L}_{\gamma_{\xi}}$, so the only possibility is $P=Q$. Finally we check transitivity. Let $(M, P, \mu) \preccurlyeq\left(M^{\prime}, P^{\prime}, \mu^{\prime}\right) \preccurlyeq\left(M^{\prime \prime}, P^{\prime \prime}, \mu^{\prime \prime}\right)$. By definition, $M \subseteq M^{\prime} \subseteq M^{\prime \prime}$ and $\mu \leq \mu^{\prime} \leq \mu^{\prime \prime}$. Suppose without loss of generality that $P, P^{\prime}$, and $P^{\prime \prime}$ are pairwise distinct. There is Jensen-sequence, $J$, with $\operatorname{len}(J)<\omega_{1}$ and an $\xi<\operatorname{len}(J)$ where $J(\xi)=(M, P)$ and $J^{-}\left(M^{\prime}, P^{\prime}\right)$ is a Jensen-sequence. Likewise, there is a $J^{\prime}$ such that $J\left(\xi^{\prime}\right)=\left(M^{\prime}, P^{\prime}\right)$ and $J^{\prime} \frown\left(M^{\prime \prime}, P^{\prime \prime}\right)$ is a Jensen-sequence. So, let $J^{\prime \prime}:=J^{\wedge}\left(J^{\prime} \upharpoonright\left(\operatorname{len}\left(J^{\prime}\right) \backslash \xi^{\prime}\right)\right)$. Then $J^{\prime \prime}$ is a Jensen-sequence in $M^{\prime \prime}$ and $J^{\prime \prime} \subset\left(M^{\prime \prime}, P^{\prime \prime}\right)$ is a Jensen-sequence, so $(M, P, \mu) \preccurlyeq\left(M^{\prime \prime}, P^{\prime \prime}, \mu^{\prime \prime}\right)$.

We need to check each condition of the definition of a storage order. Definition 3.3.20 Parts 1, 2, and 4 are clear. Definition 3.3.20 Part 3 follows from Proposition 3.3.51. So, we prove Definition 3.3.20 Part 5. Let $\zeta \leq \omega_{1}$ be a limit ordinal, and let $S=\left(\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}, \mu_{\xi}\right)\right)_{\xi \in \zeta}$ be a $\preccurlyeq$-strictly increasing sequence which is continuous at limits. By Lemma 3.3.63, there is a Jensen-sequence, $J$, which contains $S$ as an unbounded subsequence. Then there are two cases:

1. If $\zeta<\omega_{1}$, we can find a Jensen-sequence, $J^{\prime}$ which properly extends $J$. We define $\left(M_{\zeta}, P_{\zeta}\right):=J^{\prime}(\operatorname{len}(J))$. As $\zeta$ is a limit, $\operatorname{len}(J)$ is also a limit. So, $P_{\zeta}=\bigcup_{\xi \in \zeta} P_{\xi}$. Let $\mu_{\zeta}$ be such that for all $\xi<\zeta, \mu_{\xi}<\mu_{\zeta}$. Without loss of generality, we assume that $\mu_{\zeta} \in M_{\zeta}$. So, $\left(M_{\zeta}, P_{\zeta}, \mu_{\zeta}\right) \in \mathcal{M}_{\mathcal{J}}$, and $\left(M_{\zeta}, P_{\zeta}, \mu_{\zeta}\right) \succcurlyeq\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}, \mu_{\xi}\right)$ for each $\xi<\zeta$.
2. If $\zeta=\omega_{1}$, then $\mathbb{P}=\bigcup_{\xi \in \omega_{1}} P_{\xi}$ is a Jensen-like forcing notion, so it suffices to check the predense sets remain predense. Let $\mathbb{Q}$ be the $\omega$-slice-product of $\mathbb{P}$ with finite support of length $\omega_{1}$, and for each $\xi<\omega_{1}$, let $Q_{\xi}$ be the $\omega$-slice-product of $P_{\xi}$ with finite support of length $\mu_{\xi}$. Let $D \subseteq Q_{\xi}$ be dense in $M_{\xi}$. Then, arguing as before, $D$ is predense in $\mathbb{Q} \upharpoonright\left(\omega \times \mu_{\xi}\right)$, so is predense in $\mathbb{Q}$.

So, $\mathcal{M}_{\mathcal{J}}$ is a storage order. But repetitiveness is clear, which completes the proof.

Definition 3.3.65. Let $n \geq 2$. We say that $\mathbb{P}$ is $n$-Jensen if:

1. $\mathbb{P}$ is Jensen-like,
2. the set of $\mathbb{P}$-generic reals over $L$ is $\Sigma_{n}^{1}$ for every transitive model of $Z F C$, and
3. the $\omega$-slice-product of $\mathbb{P}$ with finite support of length $\omega_{1}$ is $n$-absolute for slices.

So, the Jensen forcing notion is 2-Jensen. Note that not all $(n+1)$-Jensen forcing notions are $n$-Jensen, for example an $(n+1)$-Jensen forcing notion based on an $n$-complete sequence has a set of generics of exactly complexity $\Pi_{n+1}^{1}$ (the exactness holds as, e.g. $N$ satisfies $\left.\mathrm{DC}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \Pi_{n}^{1}\right)\right)$. An example of such a forcing notion is in the proof of the Slicing Theorem (Theorem 3.3.15). It is not known whether, up to forcing equivalence, there is exactly one $n$-Jensen forcing notion. We expect not.

From the Kanovei-Lyubetsky Lemma, we can prove that $\omega$-slice-products defined from $n$-complete sequences are $n$-absolute for slices. We provide a forcingequivalence argument to show exactly this, i.e. that Lemma 3.3 .43 can be used to prove $n$-absoluteness for slices of an $\omega$-slice-product.
Theorem 3.3.66. For all $n \geq 2$, there is an $n$-Jensen forcing notion.
Proof. The Jensen forcing notion is 2-Jensen, so we prove the case where $n>2$. By Lemma 3.3.33, there is a storage sequence, $\left(\left(M_{\xi}, P_{\xi}\right)\right)_{\xi \in \omega_{1}}$, in $\mathcal{M}_{\mathcal{J}}$ which is $\Delta_{n-1}^{\mathrm{HC}}$ and $n$-complete. By Lemma 3.3.63, $\mathbb{P}=\bigcup_{\xi \in \omega_{1}} P_{\xi}$ is Jensen-like, so by Corollary 3.3.63, the set of $\mathbb{P}$-generic reals over L is $\Pi_{n}^{1}$ in every transitive model of ZFC. By the Kanovei-Lyubetsky Lemma (Lemma 3.3.43), the $\omega$-slice-product of $\mathbb{P}$ with finite support of length $\omega_{1}$ is $n$-absolute for slices. So, this slice product is an $n$-Jensen forcing notion.

Our final flourish is to prove the Slicing Theorem (Theorem 3.3.15). Recall that we use $n$-absolute for slices to ensure some choice, and a $\Pi_{n}^{1}$ countable set of countable sets of generics, $A$, to witness the required failure of choice. If $\mathbb{P}$ is $n$-Jensen, then we only know that the set of $\mathbb{P}$-generic reals over L is $\Pi_{n}^{1}$ in $\mathrm{L}[G]$. However, we show that every $\omega$-slice-product of an $n$-Jensen forcing notion with finite support of length $\omega_{1}$ includes some $n$-slicing forcing notion. We first show that an $n$-Jensen forcing notion is suitably equivalent to a forcing notion whose generics use their first bit to 'track' which slice they are from. We then build the $\omega$-slice-product, and show that it is $n$-slicing.
Theorem 3.3.15 (Slicing Theorem). Let $n \geq 2$. In L , there is an $n$-slicing forcing notion.

Proof. Fix an $n \geq 2$. By Theorem 3.3.66, there is an $n$-Jensen forcing notion, $\mathbb{P}$. For each $\nu<\omega_{1}$, we define:

$$
\mathbb{P}_{\nu}:= \begin{cases}\left\{T \in \mathbb{P}: \operatorname{stem}\left(T_{0}\right)=\nu+1\right\} & \text { if } \nu \in \omega \\ \left\{T \in \mathbb{P}: \operatorname{stem}\left(T_{0}\right)=0\right\} & \text { otherwise }\end{cases}
$$

Let $k \in \omega$ and $x \in 2^{\omega}$ with $x(0)=k+1$.
Claim 3.3.67. The real $x$ is $\mathbb{P}$-generic over L if and only if $x$ is $\mathbb{P}_{k}$-generic.
Proof. Let $G_{x}:=\left\{T \in \mathbb{P}_{k}: x \in[T]\right\}$, and $H_{x}=\{T \in \mathbb{P}: x \in[T]\}$. It suffices to show that $G_{x}$ is $\mathbb{P}_{k}$-generic over L if and only if $H_{x}$ is $\mathbb{P}$-generic over L . For the reverse direction, suppose $D \subseteq \mathbb{P}_{k}$ is dense. Let $D^{\prime}:=D \cup\{T \in \mathbb{P}$ : len $(\operatorname{stem}(T)) \geq$ 1 and $\left.T \notin \mathbb{P}_{k}\right\}$. Then $D^{\prime}$ is dense in $\mathbb{P}$, so there is some $T \in H_{x} \cap D^{\prime}$. As $x \in T$ and $x(0)=k+1, T \in \mathbb{P}_{k}$. So, $T \in G_{x} \cap D^{\prime}$, so $G_{x}$ is $\mathbb{P}_{k}$-generic over L. The converse is similar.

Now let $\mathbb{Q}$ be the product of $\mathbb{P}$ with finite support of length $\omega_{1}$, and let $\mathbb{Q}^{\prime}$ $\omega$-slice-product of $\left(P_{\nu}\right)_{\nu \in \omega_{1}}$ with finite support of length $\omega_{1}$. We show that $\mathbb{Q}^{\prime}$ is $n$-slicing.

Let $G$ be a $\mathbb{Q}^{\prime}$-generic filter over $L$. If $D$ is dense in $\mathbb{Q}$, then $D \cap \mathbb{Q}^{\prime}$ is dense in $\mathbb{Q}^{\prime}$. So, $H:=\{p \in \mathbb{Q}: \exists q \in H(q \leq p)\}$ is $\mathbb{Q}$-generic over L . As $H$ can be constructed in $\mathrm{L}[G]$ and vice versa, $\mathrm{L}[H]=\mathrm{L}[G]$. Exactly similarly, for every $I \subseteq \omega_{1} \times \omega$, $\mathrm{L}[G \upharpoonright I]=\mathrm{L}[H \upharpoonright I] . \mathrm{So}, \mathbb{Q}^{\prime}$ is $n$-absolute for slices.

It remains to show that $A:=\left\{\left(\ell, x_{G}^{(\ell, k)}\right):(\ell, k) \in \omega^{2}\right\}$ is $\Pi_{n}^{1}$ in $\mathrm{L}[G]$. In $\mathrm{L}[G]$, let $B$ be the set of all pairs $(x, \ell)$ where $x$ is $\mathbb{P}$-generic and $x(0)=\ell+1$. Then $B$ is $\Pi_{n}^{1}$. So, it suffices to show that $A=B$. Let $(\ell, x) \in A$. So, $x$ is $\mathbb{P}_{\ell}$-generic over L and $x(0)=\ell+1$. By Claim 3.3.67, $x$ is $\mathbb{P}$-generic over L, hence $(\ell, x) \in B$. Conversely, if $(\ell, x) \in B$, then $x$ is $\mathbb{P}$-generic over L and $x(0)=\ell+1$, so by Corollary 3.3.61, there is some $k \in \omega$ such that $x=x_{H}^{(\nu, k)}$, where $x_{H}^{(\nu, k)}$ is the $\mathbb{P}$-generic added by $H \upharpoonright\{(\ell, k)\}$. So, for every $T \in G \upharpoonright\{(\ell, k)\}, x \in[T]$. Hence $x=x_{G}^{(\nu, k)}$, so $(\ell, x) \in A$. So, $A=B$.

In particular, a subset of the Jensen forcing notion is 2 -slicing.
Returning to the original problem, we could use Kanovei and Lyubetsky's variant of almost disjoint forcing from [111] to prove Corollary 3.2.5, by adapting the proof of Theorem 3.2 .4 to almost disjoint rather than Jensen forcing. This yields a model of $\mathrm{ZF}+\neg \mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \mathbf{C t b l}\right)$. As the product of this variant is $n$-absolute for slices (essentially by [111, Theorem 9]), $\mathrm{DC}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \Pi_{n}^{1}\right)$ also holds in this model. A compactness argument then yields Corollary 3.2.5. However, our proof of Theorem 3.2.4 does not work for almost disjoint forcing, as the generics are not unique: we can swap finitely many bits in a generic to generate another generic (as in [111, Lemma 9vi)]). In which case, we do not know the complexity of the set corresponding to $A$.

### 3.4 Non-uniform descriptive choice principles

We have so far only considered the hierarchy of uniform choice principles for ' $\boldsymbol{\Pi}$ ' projective point classes, thanks to Theorem 3.1.2. By contrast, for the nonuniform choice principles, we know only that $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \boldsymbol{\Pi}_{n+1}^{1}\right)$ implies $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \boldsymbol{\Pi}_{n}^{1}\right)$ and $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{n}^{1}\right)$. Hence we ask:

Question 3.4.1. Is $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \Pi_{n}^{1}\right) \mathrm{ZF}$-equivalent to $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \Sigma_{n+1}^{1}\right)$ ?
Question 3.4.2. Is $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \boldsymbol{\Pi}_{n}^{1}\right)$ ZF-equivalent to $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{n+1}^{1}\right)$ ?
As well as the equivalences of non-uniform descriptive choice principles, we can ask about separating non-uniform descriptive choice principles. By Corollary 3.2.7, we can separate uniform choice for all projective pointclasses from the minimal non-uniform descriptive choice principle beyond ZF (namely $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{2}^{0}\right)$ ). It is not known whether the non-uniform projective choice principles can be separated from one another:

Question 3.4.3. Is there a model of $\mathrm{ZF}+\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \boldsymbol{\Pi}_{n}^{1}\right)+\neg \mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \Pi_{n+1}^{1}\right)$ ?

Finally, our principles are defined for arbitrary pointclasses, so we can ask about Borel choice principles.

Question 3.4.4. Is there a model if $\mathrm{ZF}+\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{\alpha}^{0}\right)+\neg \mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{\alpha+1}^{0}\right)$ ?
Question 3.4.5. Is there a model of $\mathrm{ZF}+\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ;\right.$ unif $\left.\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{\alpha}^{0}\right)+\neg \mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ;\right.$ unif $\left.\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{\alpha+1}^{0}\right)$ ?

## Chapter 4

## Elements of Generalised Real Analysis

This chapter is based on joint work with Lorenzo Galeotti
In this chapter, we investigate generalisations of real analysis to fields with large cardinality, focusing on the generalisation of the analysis of real functions.

In Section 4.1, we describe the generalisations and strengthenings of continuity and their relationships; Sections 4.2.1 and 4.3 contain the main development of the generalised real analysis of functions. In Section 4.2.1, we consider results that can be proved independently of the choice of the uncountable $\kappa$; in Section 4.3, we consider a result that can only be proved under the assumption that $\kappa$ has the tree property. We end with an open question about the $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$-analogy of the Suslin Hypothesis (Section 4.4).

Throughout this chapter, we assume $\kappa$ is a regular uncountable cardinal and that $\mathbb{K}$ is an ordered field, and work with the $\mathbb{K}$-interval bn $(\mathbb{K})$-topology on $\mathbb{K}$.

### 4.1 Generalising continuity

Up to isomorphism, the real line is the only Dedekind complete ordered field, so in general, our ordered fields will not be Dedekind complete. In fact, Dedekind completeness is equivalent to many theorems of real analysis.

The failure to be Dedekind complete means that continuity does not necessarily imply all of its classical consequences; e.g., continuous functions need not satisfy the Intermediate Value Theorem (Example 4.2.2). In this section, we discuss strengthenings of the notion of continuity that are a better fit for non-Dedekind complete fields. The notions of $\kappa$-continuity and $\kappa$-supercontinuity come from the (pre)history of generalised real analysis [2, 74]; in this section, we introduce another notion, called sharpness, of intermediate strength between continuity and $\kappa$-supercontinuity. This notion is central to Section 4.3.
Definition 4.1.1. A $\kappa$-continuous function $f: \mathbb{K} \rightarrow \mathbb{K}$ is called $\kappa$-supercontinuous if for any $a, b \in \mathbb{K}, \operatorname{cof}(f([a, b]))<\kappa$ and $\operatorname{coi}(f([a, b]))<\kappa$.

For the next generalised notion of continuity, we use a technical auxiliary property from [25, Definition 4.1.6]: a sequence, $\left(a_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \kappa}$, is called interval witnessed if for every bounded convex $C \subseteq \mathbb{K}$ with $\left|C \cap\left\{a_{\alpha}: \alpha \in \kappa\right\}\right|=\kappa$, and every $\varepsilon \in \mathbb{K}^{>0}$, there is a $\mu<\kappa$ and some pairwise disjoint intervals $\left(I_{\beta}\right)_{\beta \in \mu}$ where:

1. for all $\beta<\kappa$, $\operatorname{len}\left(I_{\beta}\right)<\varepsilon$, and
2. $\left|\left(\left\{a_{\alpha}: \alpha \in \kappa\right\} \cap C\right) \backslash \bigcup_{\beta \in \mu} I_{\beta}\right|<\kappa$.

Definition 4.1.2. A continuous function $f: \mathbb{K} \rightarrow \mathbb{K}$ is called $\kappa$-sharp if for every $a, b \in \mathbb{K}$, if $f$ has no maximum on $[a, b]$ then there is an interval witnessed sequence $\left(a_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \kappa}$, where each $a_{\alpha} \in[a, b]$, such that $\left(f\left(a_{\alpha}\right)\right)_{\alpha \in \kappa}$ is increasing and cofinal in $f([a, b])$, and so too for $-f$.

We say that $f$ is sharp if it is $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})$-sharp.


Figure 4.1: Implications between strengthenings of continuity. (a) Continuity does not imply bn $(\mathbb{K})$-continuity on $\mathbb{R}$ (Proposition 4.1.3) and $\eta_{\kappa}$-fields (Example 4.1.4). (b) On $\eta_{\kappa}$ fields, bn $(\mathbb{K})$-supercontinuity implies sharpness (Corollary 4.2.20). (c) Under the conditions of Proposition 4.1.14, bn $(\mathbb{K})$-continuity does not imply bn $(\mathbb{K})$ supercontinuity.

By definition, every $\kappa$-supercontinuous function is $\kappa$-continuous and every sharp function is continuous; furthermore, every $\kappa$-continuous function is continuous (Corollary 2.2.1). Later, we see that on $\eta_{\kappa}$ orders, every $\kappa$-supercontinuous function is sharp (Corollary 4.2.20). So, in this case, sharpness forms an intermediate generalised notion of continuity.

In the classical case, the notions of continuity and $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{R})$-continuity do not coincide: since $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{R})=\omega$, we are considering $\omega$-open sets, i.e. finite unions of open intervals. Clearly, $\sin : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is continuous, but $\sin ^{-1}\left(\left(0, \frac{1}{2}\right)\right)$ is not a finite union of open intervals, so it is not $\omega$-continuous (and thus, by definition, not $\omega$-supercontinuous). However, some of the distinctions disappear in the classical case; a summary of the implications and non-implications can be found in Figure 4.1.

Proposition 4.1.3. Let $f: \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, then:

1. $f$ is $\omega$-continuous if and only if $f$ is $\omega$-supercontinuous and
2. $f$ is sharp if and only if $f$ is continuous.

Proof. For Part 1., all $\omega$-continuous functions are continuous, hence, by the classical Extreme Value Theorem, they reach their maxima and minima, so are $\omega$ supercontinuous. For Part 2. all continuous functions are bounded on any $[a, b]$, so are trivially sharp.


Figure 4.2: The $\neg \omega$-jump function, $J_{\neg \omega}(x)$

We see later (Proposition 4.1.14, Figure 4.1) that under certain conditions, the generalisation of Proposition 4.1.3, Part 1. fails. The following example shows that on non-Archimedean fields, continuity is blind to a change in output at a gap; furthermore, a function that jumps at a gap is an example of a continuous function that is not $\kappa$-continuous for $\eta_{\kappa}$ fields.

Example 4.1.4. Let $\mathbb{K}$ be non-Archimedean. As discussed in Section 2.2.3, bot(INF) is an ( $\omega, \lambda$ )-gap for some $\lambda$ denoted by $\neg \omega$. Let

$$
J_{\neg \omega}:= \begin{cases}0 & \text { if there is an } n \in \mathbb{N} \text { such that } x<n \\ 1 & \text { otherwise } .\end{cases}
$$

be the $\neg \omega$-jump function (Figure 4.2). Then $J_{\neg \omega}$ is continuous on $\mathbb{K}$. If $\mathbb{K}$ is $\eta_{\kappa}$, then $J_{\neg \omega}$ is sharp but not $\kappa$-continuous.

This is because the set INF is not $\kappa$-open: if it were, then there would be a sequence of fewer than $\kappa$ nested intervals whose union is INF; by the $\eta_{\kappa}$ property, we could find an element between $\mathbb{N}$ and the set of lower bounds of these intervals, contradicting that $\neg \omega$ is a gap. In order to check that $J_{\neg \omega}$ is sharp, just observe that the image of any nonempty set is either $\{0\},\{1\}$, or $\{0,1\}$.

## Homogeneity

Now, we show the failure of Proposition 4.1.3, Part 1. under certain conditions. To show this, we introduce a homogeneity property for orders, based on modeltheoretic homogeneity (as in [144, Definition 4.2.12]).

Definition 4.1.5. An order, $\mathbb{O}$, is called $\kappa$-homogeneous if for all convex $I, J \subseteq \mathbb{O}$ such that $\operatorname{cof}(I)=\operatorname{cof}(J) \leq \kappa$ and $\operatorname{coi}(I)=\operatorname{coi}(J) \leq \kappa$, there is an order-preserving bijection $b: I \rightarrow J$.

If $\mathbb{G}$ is an ordered group, the map $x \mapsto-x$ is a order-reversing bijection with $\operatorname{coi}(I)=\operatorname{cof}(-I)$ and $\operatorname{cof}(I)=\operatorname{coi}(-I)$ for any set $I$. Thus, if $\mathbb{G}$ is $\kappa$-homogeneous
and $\operatorname{cof}(I)=\operatorname{coi}(J) \leq \kappa$ and $\operatorname{coi}(I)=\operatorname{cof}(J) \leq \kappa$, then there is an order-reversing bijection $r: I \rightarrow J$.

We show that the ordered field $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$ is $\kappa$-homogeneous, but do not give any further general conditions which ensure $\kappa$-homogeneity. Any ordered field is $\omega$ homogeneous, by a gluing argument:
Remark 4.1.6. If $\mathbb{K}$ is an ordered field, 1 -homogeneity follows immediately from scaling and shifting (i.e. double transitivity, see [178, page 126]): let $I, J \subseteq \mathbb{K}$ be such that $\operatorname{cof}(I)=\operatorname{cof}(J)=\operatorname{coi}(I)=\operatorname{coi}(I)=1$. Then $I=[a, b]$ and $J=[c, d]$ for some $a, b, c, d \in \mathbb{K}$. So the map $f(x)=c+\frac{c-d}{b-a}(x-a)$ is an order isomorphism from $I$ to $J$. Then, $\omega$-homogeneity amounts to gluing these partial order isomorphisms along an $\omega$-length coinitial (or cofinal) sequence.

Lemma 4.1.7. Suppose $\left|\kappa^{<\kappa}\right|=\kappa$. If $I, J \subseteq \mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$ are such that $\operatorname{cof}(I)=\operatorname{cof}(J)=1$ and $\operatorname{coi}(I)=\operatorname{coi}(J)=\kappa$, then there is an order-preserving isomorphism $b: I \rightarrow J$.

Proof. Without loss of generality, we can assume that $\operatorname{top}(I)$ and top $(J)$ are gaps (note that if $\operatorname{top}(I), \operatorname{top}(J) \in \mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$, then we can use the technique in Remark 4.1.6). Let $I=[a, A]$ and $J=[b, B]$ for some $a, b \in \mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$, and gaps $A, B$. Then $(a, A]$ and $(b, B]$ are $\eta_{\kappa}$ orders of size $\kappa$, which are dense in $I$ and $J$ respectively. By Theorem 2.2.2, there is an order isomorphism $f: \mathbb{Q}_{\kappa} \rightarrow(a, A]$ and an order isomorphism $g: \mathbb{Q}_{\kappa} \rightarrow(b, B]$. Hence, the map $(g \circ f) \cup\{(a, b)\}$ is an order isomorphism from $[a, A]$ to $[b, B]$.
Proposition 4.1.8. If $\left|\kappa^{<\kappa}\right|=\kappa$, then $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$ is $\kappa$-homogeneous.
Proof. By splitting $I$ at some $a \in I$, it suffices to assume that $\operatorname{cof} I=\operatorname{cof} J=1$. As in Lemma 4.1.7, we may assume that $I=(A, a)$ and $J=(B, b)$ for some almost gaps $A, B$ and some $a, b \in \mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$.

Then there are two cases. Firstly, suppose $\operatorname{coi}(A)=\operatorname{coi}(B)=\kappa$, then use Lemma 4.1.7. Otherwise, $\operatorname{coi}(A)=\operatorname{coi}(B)=\lambda<\kappa$. In which case, let $\left(a_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \lambda}$ be strictly decreasing and coinitial in $A$, and likewise $\left(b_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \lambda}$ in $B$. By Remark 4.1.6, there is a (linear) order isomorphism $f_{\alpha}:\left(a_{\alpha+1}, a_{\alpha}\right) \rightarrow\left(b_{\alpha+1}, b_{\alpha}\right)$. We inductively define a sequence of order isomorphisms $F_{\alpha}:\left(a_{\alpha}, a\right) \rightarrow\left(b_{\alpha}, b\right)$, for each $\alpha<\lambda$, such that if $\alpha<\beta$, then $F_{\alpha} \subsetneq F_{\beta}$.

Firstly, let $F_{0}=f_{0}$. Suppose that $F_{\alpha}$ has been defined. Then let $F_{\alpha+1}$ : $F_{\alpha} \cup f_{\alpha+1} \cup\left\{\left(a_{\alpha+1}, b_{\alpha+1}\right)\right\}$ (i.e. $\left.F_{\alpha+1}\left(a_{\alpha+1}\right)=b_{\alpha+1}\right)$. Clearly, $F_{\alpha+1}$ is an order isomorphism and extends $F_{\alpha}$.

Next, suppose $\mu<\lambda$ is a limit and that $F_{\alpha}$ has been defined for all $\alpha<\mu$. As $\mu<\kappa,\left(a_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \mu}$ is a short sequence, so this sequence has no $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$-limit (as in [75, Corollary 1.11(ii)]). Hence $\left(a_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \mu}$ defines a $(\mu, \kappa)$-gap $G$ in $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$ ग likewise $\left(b_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \mu}$ defines a $(\mu, \kappa)$-gap $G^{\prime}$. So, it suffices to define an $F_{\mu}$ on $\left[a_{\mu}, G\right]=$ $\left[a_{\mu}, a\right] \backslash \bigcup_{\alpha \in \mu}\left[a_{0}, a_{\alpha}\right]$. We assumed that $\left(a_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \lambda}$ is strictly increasing, so $a_{\mu}<G$. Similarly, $b_{\mu}<G^{\prime}$. Hence, let $F_{\mu}:\left[a_{\mu}, G\right] \rightarrow\left[b_{\mu}, G^{\prime}\right]$ be the order isomorphism from Lemma 4.1.7

Finally, let $F:=\bigcup_{\alpha \in \lambda} F_{\alpha}$. By construction, $\operatorname{Dom}(F)=(A, a)$, and $\operatorname{Im}(F)=$ $(B, b)$. Moreover, $F:(A, a) \rightarrow(B, b)$ is an order isomorphism, as required.

[^11]This actually allows us to fix cofinally-many points of the order isomorphism: if $I, J \subseteq \mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$ such that $\operatorname{cof}(I)=\operatorname{cof}(J)=\lambda$, then for any cofinal sequence $\left(a_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \lambda}$ in $I$, and cofinal $\left(b_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \lambda}$ in $J$, there is an order isomorphism $f: I \rightarrow J$ such that $f\left(a_{\alpha}\right)=b_{\alpha}$. The analogous result holds if $\operatorname{coi}(I)=\operatorname{coi}(J)$, and for the orderreversing case.

This also shows that $\operatorname{Ded}\left(\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}\right)\left(=\operatorname{Ded}\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}\right)\right)$ is $\kappa$-homogeneous: if $I, J \subseteq \operatorname{Ded}\left(\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}\right)$ have the same cofinality and coinitiality, let $f: I \cap \mathbb{Q}_{\kappa} \rightarrow J \cap \mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$ be the order isomorphism. Then the natural extension, $\hat{f}: I \rightarrow J$, where if $G$ is a gap is $I \cap \mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$, it is sent to the corresponding gap in $J \cap \mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$, is an order isomorphism.

So, $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa} \subsetneq \mathbb{R}_{\kappa} \subsetneq \operatorname{Ded}\left(\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}\right)$, where $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$ and $\operatorname{Ded}\left(\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}\right)$ are $\kappa$-homogeneous. However, this natural restriction of this method does not show that $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ is $\kappa$-homogeneous: the $f$ from Lemma 4.1.7 and Proposition 4.1.8 need not be Cauchy continuous (i.e. the image of a Cauchy sequence need not be a Cauchy sequence). Hence, the completion of $f$ need not map Cauchy gaps to Cauchy gaps, so need not be an order isomorphism from $I$ to $J$ (even though it is an order isomorphism from $I \cap \mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$ to $\left.J \cap \mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}\right)$, as we see in the following example.

Example 4.1.9. Let $G$ be a $(\kappa, \kappa)$-gap in $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ (hence also a $(\kappa, \kappa)$-gap in $\left.\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}\right)$ such that $0<G<1$, and let $r \in(0,1) \backslash \mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$. By the $\kappa$-homogeneity of $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$, there is an order isomorphism $i:[0, r) \cap \mathbb{Q}_{\kappa} \rightarrow[0, G] \cap \mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$ and an order isomorphism $j:(r, 0] \cap \mathbb{Q}_{\kappa} \rightarrow[G, 0] \cap \mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$. Then, $(i \cup j):[0,1] \cap \mathbb{Q}_{\kappa} \rightarrow[0,1] \cap \mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$ is an order isomorphism, but is not Cauchy continuous: by definition, there is a strictly increasing cofinal sequence in $[0, r)$ which is Cauchy, but the image of this sequence is not Cauchy. So $(i \cup j)$ does not extend to an order isomorphism from $[0,1] \subseteq \mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ into itself.

The problem of finding a Cauchy continuous order isomorphism from $I \cap \mathbb{Q}_{\kappa} \rightarrow$ $J \cap \mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$ seems fairly rigid ${ }^{2}$ Hence, we ask the following question:

Question 4.1.10. Let $\left|\kappa^{<\kappa}\right|=\kappa$. Is $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa} \kappa$-homogeneous?

## Separating $\kappa$-continuity and $\kappa$-supercontinuity

A key fact which we use in separating $\kappa$-continuity from $\kappa$-supercontinuity is that order isomorphisms are $\kappa$-supercontinuous.

Lemma 4.1.11. Let $\mathbb{K}$ be an ordered field, $C, D \subseteq \mathbb{K}$ be convex sets, and $f: C \rightarrow$ $D$ be strictly monotone. If $f$ is surjective on $D$, then $f$ is $\kappa$-supercontinuous. If $\mathbb{K}$ is also $\eta_{\kappa}$, then the converse holds.

Proof. First, suppose $f$ is a surjection. As $f$ is strictly monotone, $f(a, b)=$ $(f(a), f(b))$ for all $a, b \in C$, so $f$ is $\kappa$-continuous (exactly as in [74, Lemma 3.2.5]). Similarly, $f([a, b])=[f(a), f(b)]$. But $\operatorname{cof}(f([a, b]))=\operatorname{coi}(f([a, b]))=1<\kappa$. So, $f$ is $\kappa$-supercontinuous.

[^12]

Figure 4.3: The volcano function at $G$, volcano $(x)$

For the converse, note that $\kappa$-supercontinuity implies $\kappa$-continuity. Then the result follows from [74, Theorem 3.3.1] (i.e. Theorem 4.2.3).
Corollary 4.1.12. Let $\mathbb{K}$ be an ordered field, and let $I, J \subseteq \mathbb{K}$. An orderpreserving or reversing bijection from $I$ to $J$ is $\kappa$-supercontinuous.

The union of two suitably chosen functions of this type is $\kappa$-continuous and unbounded on a bounded interval, hence not $\kappa$-supercontinuous (see Lemma 4.2.4).
Example 4.1.13 (Volcano function). Let $\mathbb{K}$ be a $\kappa$-homogeneous ordered field such that $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})=\kappa$ and let $(L, R)$ be a $(\kappa, \kappa)$-gap in $\mathbb{K}$. Fix any $\ell \in L$ and $r \in R$.

Since $\operatorname{cof}(\mathbb{K})=\kappa$, we have that $\{x \in L: x \geq \ell\}$ and $[0, \infty)$ have the same cofinality and coinitiality and therefore, using $\kappa$-homogeneity, are order isomorphic by an isomorphism $i$; similarly, $\{x \in R: x \leq r\}$ and $[0, \infty)$ have an order-reversing bijection, $b$. We define the volcano function (see Figure 4.3) by:

$$
\text { volcano }(x):=\left\{\begin{array}{cl}
0 & \text { if } x<\ell \\
i(x) & \text { if } x \in L \text { and } x \geq \ell, \\
b(x) & \text { if } x \in R \text { and } x \leq r, \text { and } \\
0 & \text { if } x>r
\end{array}\right.
$$

Similarly, if, for any $(\kappa, \kappa)$-almost gap $A>0$ (so for any $a \in \mathbb{K}^{>0}$ ), we can define an $A$-bounded volcano function, instead using an order-isomorphism $i_{A}:\{x \in L$ : $x \geq \ell\} \rightarrow\left\{x \in \mathbb{K}^{\geq 0}: x<A\right\}$, and an order-reversing bijection $b_{A}:\{x \in R: x \leq$ $r\} \rightarrow\left\{x \in \mathbb{K}^{\geq 0}: x<A\right\}$. This function is bounded, but has no maximum.

Proposition 4.1.14. If $\mathbb{K}$ is a $\kappa$-homogeneous ordered field with $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})=\kappa$ which has a $(\kappa, \kappa)$-gap, then there are functions which are $\kappa$-continuous but not $\kappa$-supercontinuous.
Proof. Example 4.1.13 suffices: wei $(\mathbb{K})=\operatorname{cof}\left(\operatorname{volcano}\left(\left[a_{0}, b_{0}\right]\right)\right)=\kappa$, so volcano is not $\kappa$-supercontinuous. For $\kappa$-continuity, it suffices to show that volcano ${ }^{-1}(a, b) \in$ $\tau_{\kappa}$ for any $a, b \in \mathbb{K} \cup\{ \pm \infty\}$. First, suppose $a \in \mathbb{K}$ and $b \in \mathbb{K} \cup\{-\infty\}$, then by construction volcano ${ }^{-1}((a, b))$ is the union of two open intervals, one for each side of $G$. Otherwise $(a, b)=(a, \infty)$, where volcano ${ }^{-1}(a, \infty)$ is an open interval.

By Propositions 4.1.14 and 4.1.8, we know that $\kappa$-continuity does not imply $\kappa$-supercontinuity on $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$. We do not know whether all assumptions of Proposition 4.1.14 are necessary.

## Localising $\kappa$-Continuity

The properties of $\kappa$-supercontinuity and $\kappa$-continuity are 'global' properties and the naïve attempt to localise them fails badly as the following result shows.

Theorem 4.1.15 (Folklore, e.g. [74, Theorem 3.3.6]). If $x \in \mathbb{K}$, we say that $f: \mathbb{K} \rightarrow \mathbb{K}$ is $\kappa$-continuous at a point $x$ if for all $V \in \tau_{\kappa}$ with $f(x) \in V$, there is a $U \in \tau_{\kappa}$ where $x \in U$ and $f(U) \subseteq V$. If $\left|\kappa^{<\kappa}\right|=\kappa$, then $J_{\neg \omega}: \mathbb{R}_{\kappa} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ is $\kappa$-continuous at every point $x \in \mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ but not $\kappa$-continuous.

One can define a local notion of $\kappa$-continuity by requiring several technical properties to hold at each almost gap. This has the advantage that, on $\mathbb{R}$, a function is continuous if and only if it is locally $\omega$-continuous. We do not give the full details here since there are no immediate applications of this notion (however, we briefly mention it on pages 79 and 83, and in Footnote 53. The core idea is to generalise convergence to gaps:
Definition 4.1.16. Let $f:[a, b] \rightarrow \mathbb{K}, A$ be an almost gap in $[a, b]$, and $B$ be an (almost) gap in $\mathbb{K}$. We call $B$ the image almost gap of $f$ at $A$ if, for any sequence, $\left(x_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \lambda}$, from $[a, b]$, which is cofinal or coinitial with $A$, we have that $\left(f\left(x_{\alpha}\right)\right)_{\alpha \in \lambda}$ is cofinal or coinitial with $B]^{3}$ If $B$ is a gap, we call it the image gap of $f$ at $A$.

We call $f$ locally $\kappa$-continuous if, at every almost gap, $A$, either: (1) $f$ has an image almost gap; or (2) $A$ is a $(\kappa, \kappa)$-gap and $f$ approaches $\infty$ (or $-\infty$ ) on both sides of $A$ (as in Example 4.1.13). In other words, $f$ has a well-defined continuous extension $f: \operatorname{Ded}(\mathbb{K}) \rightarrow \operatorname{Ded}(\mathbb{K}) \cup\{ \pm \infty\}$. (To ensure that $f$ is IVT, as on page 79, we also require that if $f$ is not constant on either side of $A$, and $f$ takes suitable values above and below $B$ on opposites sides of $A$, then $A$ is not a gap.) On $\eta_{\kappa}$ ordered fields with wei $(\mathbb{K})=\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})=\kappa, \kappa$-continuity implies local $\kappa$-continuity $\mathbb{Z}^{4}$

### 4.2 Generalising properties of functions

In this section, we discuss theorems that hold in classical analysis for all continuous functions. In each of the cases, we observe that the theorem does not directly generalise to non-Archimedean fields and discuss whether there is a generalised version and if so, for which class of functions it holds. In this section, we focus on results that hold for arbitrary uncountable $\kappa$, and reserve the discussion of results that need some large cardinal property of $\kappa$ for Section 4.3.

[^13]
### 4.2.1 Properties of functions

On the real line $\mathbb{R}$, continuous functions satisfy a plethora of theorems: the intermediate value theorem, IVT, the open mapping theorem, OMT, Brouwer's fixed point theorem, BFPT, the extreme value theorem, EVT, and the bounded value theorem, BVT. Furthermore, differentiable functions satisfy Rolle's Theorem, the mean value theorem, MVT, the positive derivative theorem, PDT, and the constant value theorem, CVT.

Definition 4.2.1. Let $\mathbb{K}$ be an ordered field and $f: \operatorname{Dom}(f) \rightarrow \operatorname{Ran}(f)$ where $\operatorname{Dom}(f), \operatorname{Ran}(f) \subseteq \mathbb{K}$. A function $f$ is called differentiable at $x_{0}$ if there is an $\ell \in \mathbb{K}$ such that $\frac{f(x)-f\left(x_{0}\right)}{x-x_{0}} \rightarrow \ell$ as $x \rightarrow x_{0}$ from above and below; we write $f^{\prime}\left(x_{0}\right):=\ell$. We call $f$ differentiable if it is differentiable at every $x_{0} \in \mathbb{K}$. As usual, if $f, g$ are differentiable, then $f+g, f . g$, and $f \circ g$ are differentiable.

We say that $f$ is:

1. $\operatorname{IVT}(\mathbb{K})$ (for "intermediate value theorem") if for any $a, b, c \in \mathbb{K}$, where $f(a)<$ $c<f(b)$, there is $x \in(a, b)$ such that $f(x)=c$;
2. $\operatorname{OMT}(\mathbb{K})$ (for "open mapping theorem") if $I:=\operatorname{Dom}(f) \subseteq \mathbb{K}$ is a convex bounded set, $f$ is injective, and for every $\kappa$-open set, $O$, the image of $O$ under $f, f(O \cap I)$, is $\kappa$-open;
3. $\operatorname{BFPT}(\mathbb{K})$ (for "Brouwer's fixed point theorem") if $\operatorname{Dom}(f)=\operatorname{Ran}(f)=[a, b]$ and there is some $x \in[a, b]$ such that $f(x)=x$;
4. $\operatorname{EVT}(\mathbb{K})$ (for "extreme value theorem") if for all $a, b \in \mathbb{K}, f$ has a maximum and minimum on $[a, b]$;
5. $\operatorname{BVT}(\mathbb{K})$ (for "bounded value theorem") if for any $a, b \in \mathbb{K}$, there are bounds $m, M \in \mathbb{K}$ such that $m \leq f(x) \leq M$ for all $x \in[a, b]$;
6. Rolle( $\mathbb{K}$ ) (for "Rolle's theorem") if $f$ is differentiable, $\operatorname{Dom}(f)$ is convex, and for all $a, b \in \operatorname{Dom}(f)$ with $f(a)=f(b)$, there is some $c \in(a, b)$ such that $f^{\prime}(c)=0 ;$
7. $\operatorname{MVT}(\mathbb{K})$ (for "mean value theorem") if $f$ is differentiable, $\operatorname{Dom}(f)$ is convex, and for all $a, b \in \operatorname{Dom}(f)$, there is a $c \in(a, b)$ such that $f^{\prime}(c)=\frac{f(b)-f(a)}{b-a}$;
8. $\operatorname{PDT}(\mathbb{K})$ (for "positive derivative theorem") if $f$ is differentiable, $\operatorname{Dom}(f)$ is convex, and if $f^{\prime}(x)$ is non-negative for every $x \in \operatorname{Dom}(f)$, then $f$ is nondecreasing on $\operatorname{Dom}(f)$; and
9. $\operatorname{CVT}(\mathbb{K})$ (for "constant value theorem") if $f$ is differentiable, $\operatorname{Dom}(f)$ is convex, and if $f^{\prime}(x)=0$ for every $x \in \operatorname{Dom}(f)$, then $f$ is constant on $\operatorname{Dom}(f)$.
Let P be any of the above properties and $\mathcal{C} \subseteq \mathbb{K}^{\mathbb{K}}$. We say that $\mathbb{K}$ is $\mathrm{P}(\mathbb{K}, \mathcal{C})$ if all $f \in \mathcal{C}$ are $\mathrm{P}(\mathbb{K})$. For each of the properties P , the statement $\mathrm{P}(\mathbb{R}$, continuous) is a classical theorem. Furthermore, it turns out that $\mathrm{P}(\mathbb{K}$, continuous) is equivalent to " $\mathbb{K}$ is Dedekind complete", i.e. $\mathbb{K}=\mathbb{R}$, as is systematically laid out by Deveau and Teismann in their [44, as listed in the following table.

| Property | Reference |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| IVT | $\boxed{44}$ | CA19] |
| OMT | 44 | CA28] |
| BFPT | 44 | CA45] |
| EVT | 44 | CA24] |
| BVT | 44 | CA26] |
| Rolle | 44, | CA21] |
| MVT | 44, | CA22] |
| PDT | 44, | CA38] |
| CVT | 44 | CA39] |

In some cases, the classical theorem generalises to some class of functions generalising the continuous functions, in others, it does not. This process of generalisation is later analysed from a philosophical perspective (cf. Section 7.2.2).

We summarise the results of the following sections for the special field $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ (under the assumption of $\left|\kappa^{<\kappa}\right|=\kappa$ ) as follows:

1. If $f$ is $\kappa$-continuous, then $f$ is $\operatorname{IVT}\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}\right)$ and $\operatorname{OMT}\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}\right)$ (Theorem 4.2.3 \& Proposition 4.2.13).
2. If $f$ is $\kappa$-continuous, then $f$ is $\operatorname{EVT}\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}\right)$ if and only if $f$ is $\kappa$-supercontinuous (Corollary 4.2.21).
3. If both $f$ and $x \mapsto f(x)-x$ are $\kappa$-continuous, then $f$ is $\operatorname{BFPT}\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}\right)$; however, there are $\kappa$-supercontinuous functions that are not $\operatorname{BFPT}\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}\right)$ (Propositions $4.2 .14 \& 4.2 .16$.
4. If $f$ is $\kappa$-supercontinuous, then $f$ is $\operatorname{BVT}\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}\right)$ and $\operatorname{Rolle}\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}\right)$ (Propositions $4.2 .25 \& 4.2 .19$.
5. If both $f$ and $x \mapsto f(x)+a . x+b$ are $\kappa$-supercontinuous, then $f$ is $\operatorname{MVT}(\mathbb{K})$, $\operatorname{CVT}\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}\right)$, and $\operatorname{PDT}\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}\right)$ (Proposition 4.2.26).

### 4.2.2 The Intermediate Value Theorem and the Open Mapping Theorem

We build on Galeotti's study of the Intermediate Value Theorem on $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ from 74 , Theorem 3.3.1].

Example 4.2.2. Let $\mathbb{K}$ be an $\eta_{\kappa}$ ordered field with wei $(\mathbb{K})=\kappa$. Then $J_{\neg \omega}: \mathbb{K} \rightarrow \mathbb{K}$ from Example 4.1.4 is continuous, but not $\operatorname{IVT}(\mathbb{K})$, so IVT( $\mathbb{K}$, continuous) fails.

Theorem 4.2.3 (Galeotti, [74, Theorem 3.3.1]). If $\mathbb{K}$ is an $\eta_{\kappa}$ ordered field, then IVT(K, $\kappa$-continuous) holds.

Proof. The proof in [74, Theorem 3.3.1] works for all $\eta_{\kappa}$ ordered fields.

## Some examples

Given a function, $f$, the assumption that $f$ is $\mathrm{IVT}(\mathbb{K})$ can give back some continuity properties of $f$; this can be called a partial converse of IVT. The following examples are motivated by this phenomenon.

Lemma 4.2.4 (Glueing Lemma). Let $\mathbb{K}$ be an ordered field. For any function $f: \mathbb{K} \rightarrow \mathbb{K}$, the following hold.

1. If $f$ is piecewise $\kappa$-continuous, then $f$ is $\kappa$-continuous; and
2. if $f$ is piecewise $\kappa$-supercontinuous, then $f$ is $\kappa$-supercontinuous.

Proof. Part 1. is exactly as in [74, Theorem 3.4.24]; for Part 2. observe that $\operatorname{cof}(f([a, b]))=\operatorname{cof}\left(f([a, b]) \cap I_{k}\right)$ and $\operatorname{coi}(f([a, b]))=\operatorname{coi}\left(f([a, b]) \cap I_{\ell}\right)$ for some $k$ and $\ell$.

Proposition 4.2.5. Let $\mathbb{K}$ be an ordered field, and $f:[a, b] \rightarrow \mathbb{K}$ be continuous.

1. If $f$ is $\operatorname{IVT}(\mathbb{K})$ and injective, then $f$ is $\kappa$-supercontinuous.
2. If $f$ is $\mathrm{IVT}(\mathbb{K})$ and piecewise strictly monotone, then $f$ is $\kappa$-supercontinuous. So too if $f$ is $\operatorname{IVT}(\mathbb{K})$ and is either strictly monotone or constant on each piece.

Proof. First, suppose $C \subseteq \mathbb{K}$ is convex, and $f: C \rightarrow \mathbb{K}$ is a strictly monotone, $\operatorname{IVT}(\mathbb{K})$ function. Let $D:=\{x \in \mathbb{K}: \exists z, y \in C(f(z) \leq x \leq f(y))\}$. We show that $f$ is a bijection from $C$ to $D$, and hence $\kappa$-supercontinuous. Without loss of generality, assume $f$ is strictly increasing. By strict monotonicity, $f(C) \subseteq D$. By $\operatorname{IVT}(\mathbb{K}), f(C)=D$. So, it suffices to show that $f$ is injective. But this follows immediately from monotonicity. So, $f$ is a bijection from $C$ to $D$. Hence, such an $f$ is $\kappa$-supercontinuous as in Lemma 4.1.11.

For Part 1., if $f$ is injective and $\operatorname{IVT}(\mathbb{K})$. We show that $f$ is strictly monotone. Suppose $f$ is not strictly increasing. So, there are $a, b, c \in \operatorname{Dom}(f)$ such that $a<b<c$ and $f(b)=\max \{f(a), f(b), f(c)\}$, or $f(b)=\min \{f(a), f(b), f(c)\}$. Without loss of generality, we assume the former. By injectivity, $f(a)<f(b)$, $f(c)<f(b)$, and $f(a) \neq f(b)$. So, without loss of generality, assume $f(a)=$ $\min \{f(a), f(b), f(c)\}$. Then $f(c) \in(f(a), f(b))$. So, by $\operatorname{IVT}(\mathbb{K})$, there is an $x \in$ $(a, b)$ such that $f(x)=f(c)$. But this contradicts injectivity. So, $f$ is strictly monotone. Then, argue as in the first paragraph.

As constant functions are obviously $\kappa$-supercontinuous, Part 2. follows from Lemmata 4.1.11 and 4.2.4, and Part 1.

With this, we can provide a strengthening of one direction of the classical theorem that an ordered field, $\mathbb{K}$, is an rcf if and only if $\operatorname{IVT}(\mathbb{K}, \mathbb{K}[X])$ holds [144, Theorem 3.3.9]:

Corollary 4.2.6. Let $\mathbb{K}$ be an $r c f$. If $p \in \mathbb{K}[X]$, then $p$ is $\kappa$-supercontinuous.

Proof. If $p$ is a polynomial, then $p$ is either constant (hence $\kappa$-supercontinuous), or is not constant on any interval $I \subseteq \mathbb{K}$. Without loss of generality, assume $p$ is non-constant. By differentiating as usual, $p^{\prime}$ is a polynomial. As $\mathbb{K}$ is an rcf, $p^{\prime}$ has finitely many roots, $a_{0}, \ldots, a_{n}$. Hence, $p$ has finitely many local extrema. A simple check shows that on each of $\left(-\infty, a_{0}\right],\left[a_{m}, a_{m+1}\right]$, and $\left(a_{n}, \infty\right), p$ is a monotone function. As $p$ is non-constant, it is not constant on any subintervals of these intervals. So, in fact, $p$ is piecewise strictly monotone.

It is clear that $p$ is surjective on each of these intervals, hence by Lemma 4.1.11, $p$ is $\kappa$-supercontinuous on each of these intervals. So, $p$ is piecewise $\kappa$ supercontinuous. Hence, by Proposition 4.2.4 Part 2., $p$ is $\kappa$-supercontinuous.

The assumptions in Proposition 4.2.5, Part 1. is not necessary, as we can define a $\kappa$-supercontinuous function that is not piecewise strictly monotone shows (Example 4.2.8). For this, we prove a gap-analogue of the Glueing Lemma (Lemma 4.2.4 at image gaps:

Lemma 4.2.7. Let $\mathbb{K}$ be an ordered field, let $[a, b] \subseteq \mathbb{K}$, let $f:[a, b] \rightarrow \mathbb{K}$, let $G$ be a gap in $[a, b]$, and let $f$ have an image gap, $H$, at $G$. If $f \upharpoonright[a, G]$ and $f \upharpoonright[G, b]$ are $\kappa$-continuous, then $f$ is $\kappa$-continuous.

Proof. Let $O \subseteq \mathbb{K}$ be $\kappa$-open. If $H$ is not a gap in $O$, then $f^{-1}(O)$ is obviously $\kappa$ open. So suppose $H$ is a gap in $O$. As $f \upharpoonright[a, G]$ is $\kappa$-continuous, $(f \upharpoonright[a, G])^{-1}(O)=$ $\left(\bigcup_{\alpha \in \lambda} O_{\alpha}\right) \cap[a, G]$ for some $\lambda<\kappa$, and some open intervals, $O_{\alpha} \subseteq \mathbb{K}$. Without loss of generality, we can assume that there is a unique $\alpha_{0}$ such that $G$ is a gap in $O_{\alpha_{0}}$. Likewise, $(f \upharpoonright[G, b])^{-1}(O)=\left(\bigcup_{\beta \in \mu} O_{\beta}^{\prime}\right) \cap[G, b]$, where $O_{\beta}^{\prime}$ are open intervals, $\mu<\kappa$, and there is a unique $\beta_{0}$ such that $G$ is a gap in $O_{\beta_{0}}^{\prime}$. Then,

$$
f^{-1}(O)=\bigcup_{\alpha \in \mu \backslash\left\{\alpha_{0}\right\}} O_{\alpha} \cup \bigcup_{\beta \in \lambda \backslash\left\{\beta_{0}\right\}} O_{\beta}^{\prime} \cup\left(O_{\alpha_{0}} \cap O_{\beta_{0}}^{\prime}\right)
$$

But this is a $<\kappa$-sized union of open intervals. So $f^{-1}(O)$ is $\kappa$-open. Hence, $f$ is $\kappa$-continuous.

The same is true if $f(x) \rightarrow \infty$ (or $-\infty$ ) as $x$ tends to $G$ from above $G$, and from below $G$ (this generalises the fact that volcano and bounded volcano function are $\kappa$-continuous, see Example 4.1.13) '5

Example 4.2.8. Let $\mathbb{K}$ be an ordered field, where $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})>\omega$. We define the following function (see Figure 4.4):
upwardsstumble $(x):= \begin{cases}2 n+1-(x-2 n) & \text { if } x \in[2 n, 2 n+1] \text { with } n \in \mathbb{Z}, \\ 2 n+2(x-(2 n+1)) & \text { if } x \in(2 n+1,2 n+2) \text { with } n \in \mathbb{Z}, \\ x & \text { otherwise } .\end{cases}$
The image gap of upwardsstumble at $\neg \omega$ is $\neg \omega$, likewise for $-(\neg \omega)$. So, by Lemma 4.2.7, $f$ is $\kappa$-continuous. Indeed, upwardsstumble is $\kappa$-supercontinuous, but not piecewise strictly monotone.


Figure 4.4: Example 4.2.8, a $\kappa$-continuous function with $\omega$-many turning points

Let $Z$ be a set of integer parts for $\mathbb{K}$ (from Section 2.3.3). The $Z$-analogue of Example 4.2.8, using a small zigzag at each $z \in Z$, has exactly ip $(\mathbb{K})$-many turning points $\sqrt[6]{6}$ and is $\kappa$-supercontinuous (the preimage of an image of an interval is at most a union of three intervals). As usual, a function $f: \mathbb{K} \rightarrow \mathbb{K}$ is called periodic if there is a $P \in \mathbb{K}$ such that $f(x)=f(x+P)$ for all $x \in \mathbb{K}, P$ is called the period of $f$. For the next example, we need a result by Galeotti and Nobrega.

Proposition 4.2.9 (Galeotti \& Nobrega; [77, Lemma 13]). Let $\mathbb{K}$ be an ordered field with $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})=\kappa, C \subseteq \mathbb{K}$ be convex, and $f: C \rightarrow \mathbb{K}$. Let $a \in \mathbb{K}$ and $\left(x_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \kappa}$ be a strictly monotone sequence in $C$ such that $f\left(x_{2 \alpha}\right)=a$ and $f\left(x_{2 \alpha+1}\right) \neq a$. Then $f$ is not $\kappa$-continuous.

Example 4.2.10. Let $Z$ be a set of integer parts in a field, $\mathbb{K}$, where $\mathrm{ip}(\mathbb{K})=\kappa$. We define the following function:

$$
\text { sawtooth }(x)= \begin{cases}4(x-z) & \text { if } x \in\left[z, z+\frac{1}{4}\right] \text { for some } z \in Z \\ 2-4(x-z) & \text { if } x \in\left(z+\frac{1}{4}, z+\frac{3}{4}\right] \text { for some } z \in Z \\ -4+4(x-z) & \text { if } x \in\left(z+\frac{3}{4}, z\right) \text { for some } z \in Z\end{cases}
$$

This function is periodic with period 1 , and is $\kappa$-supercontinuous on any period. However, Proposition 4.2 .9 shows that it is not $\kappa$-continuous.

## A classical converse to IVT

Another classical converse to IVT is the following. If $f$ is $\operatorname{IVT}(\mathbb{R})$ and $f^{-1}(\{x\})$ is closed for all $x \in \mathbb{R}$ then $f$ is continuous [180, §4, Ex 19]. This fails in $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$.

Proposition 4.2.11. Let $\left|\kappa^{<\kappa}\right|=\kappa$. Then there is a continuous function $f: \mathbb{R}_{\kappa} \rightarrow$ $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ such that $\operatorname{IVT}\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}\right)$ holds, $f^{-1}(\{x\})$ is closed for all $x \in \mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$, and $f$ is not $\kappa$ continuous.

[^14]Proof. Define the following function:

$$
f(x):= \begin{cases}x \cdot \operatorname{sawtooth}\left(\frac{1}{x}\right) & \text { if } x \in(0,1) \\ 0 & \text { otherwise }\end{cases}
$$

By Proposition 4.2.9, $f(x)$ is not $\kappa$-continuous. If $x \in[-1,1] \backslash\{0\}$, then we have that $\left|f^{-1}(\{x\})\right|<\kappa$, hence $f^{-1}(\{x\})$ is $\left(\kappa\right.$ - closed. Next, $f^{-1}(\{0\})$ has one limit point, 0 . As $f^{-1}(\{0\}) \ni 0, f^{-1}(\{0\})$ is closed, but $f^{-1}(\{0\})$ is not $\kappa$-closed. Finally if $|x|>1$, then $f^{-1}(\{x\})=\emptyset$ is $(\kappa$-)closed.
Question 4.2.12. Does Proposition 4.2.11 hold if we replace "closed" by " $\kappa$ closed"?

We close this section by remarking that OMT remains a consequence of IVT.
Proposition 4.2.13. Let $\mathbb{K}$ be an ordered field such that $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})=\kappa$. Then, $\operatorname{OMT}(\mathbb{K}, \operatorname{IVT}(\mathbb{K}))$ holds. So, if $\mathbb{K}$ is $\eta_{\kappa}$, then $\operatorname{OMT}(\mathbb{K}, \kappa$-continuous) holds.

Proof. Let $f$ be injective and $\operatorname{IVT}(\mathbb{K})$. Then $f$ is not constant on any subinterval, so $f$ is strictly monotone bijective and hence $f((a, b))=(f(a), f(b))$ for any $a, b \in I$ (as in 74, Lemma 3.2.5]). If $I=[c, d]$ then, $f([c, d])=[f(c), f(d)]$ which is $\kappa$-open in the subspace $\kappa$-topology on $f(I)$, and the other cases are similar. So, $f$ maps sets of the form $(a, b)$ to ( $\kappa$-open) intervals, and hence $\kappa$-open sets to $\kappa$-open sets. The final part follows from Theorem 4.2.3.

We remark that a tedious check shows that IVT(K, locally $\kappa$-continuous) holds for the property of local $\kappa$-continuity mentioned, but not precisely defined on page 73.

### 4.2.3 Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem

Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem (BFPT) says that for any continuous real function $f:[a, b] \rightarrow[a, b]$, there is an $x \in[a, b]$ such that $f(x)=x$. On $\mathbb{R}$, BFPT is typically proved from IVT as follows: if $f$ is continuous, then so is $x \mapsto f(x)-x$, so the latter function satisfies IVT and thus has to have a zero between $a$ and $b$ which is a fixed point of $f$. We show that the generalisations of these arguments fail. $\square$ Remember from Example 4.1.4 that for any $r \in$ INF, the function

$$
J_{\neg \omega} \upharpoonright[0, r]:[0, r] \rightarrow[0, r]
$$

is continuous, not $\kappa$-continuous, and does not satisfy $\operatorname{IVT}(\mathbb{K})$. However, it clearly satisfies $\operatorname{BFPT}(\mathbb{K})$ since $J_{\neg \omega}(0)=0$.

The classical proof of BFPT from IVT mentioned above yields the following generalisation.
Proposition 4.2.14. Let $\mathbb{K}$ be an ordered field. Let $p \subseteq\left\{f \in \mathbb{K}^{X}: X \subseteq \mathbb{K}\right\}$ be such that if $f \in p$, then $f(x)-x \in p$. If $\operatorname{IVT}(\mathbb{K}, p)$, then $\operatorname{BFPT}(\mathbb{K}, p)$. If, in addition, $\mathbb{K}$ is $\eta_{\kappa}$ and $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})=\kappa$, then if $\mathcal{F}:=\left\{f \in \mathbb{K}^{\mathbb{K}}\right.$ : both $f$ and $f(x)-x$ are $\kappa$-continuous $\}$, then $\operatorname{BFPT}(\mathbb{K}, \mathcal{F})$.

[^15]Proof. Let $f:[a, b] \rightarrow[a, b]$ be such that $f \in p$. There are $c, d \in[a, b]$ such that $f(c)-c \leq 0 \leq f(d)-d$. If $f(c)-c=0$ or $f(d)-d=0$ we are done. Otherwise $0 \in \operatorname{Ran}(f(x)-x)$. If $f \in p$ then $f(x)-x \in p$, so $f$ is $\operatorname{IVT}(\mathbb{K})$. Hence there is an $e \in[c, d]$ such that $f(e)-e=0$.

Examples of classes of functions which satisfy the condition in Proposition 4.2 .14 include the polynomials, decreasing bijections, and increasing bijections which are 'fast increasing', i.e. such that for all $a \in\left[0, f\left(x_{k+1}\right)-f\left(x_{k}\right)\right]$, and all $m \in$ $\mathbb{N}$, we have that $f\left(x_{k}+a\right)>f\left(x_{k}\right)+m . a$ (and likewise $\left.f\left(x_{0}-a\right)<f\left(x_{0}\right)-m . a\right)$ ). Indeed, any piecewise combination of these three cases (with finitely many pieces) also suffices.

However, the $\kappa$-continuity of $f$ does not in general imply the $\kappa$-continuity of $x \mapsto f(x)-x$.

Proposition 4.2.15. Let $\mathbb{K}$ be a $\eta_{\kappa}$ ordered field. Let $\mathcal{C}$ be either the $\kappa$-continuous or the $\kappa$-supercontinuous functions. Then the following hold.

1. If $a \in \mathbb{K} \backslash\{0\}$, there is an $f \in \mathcal{C}$ such that $f(x)+a x \notin \mathcal{C}$. Hence $\mathcal{C}$ is not closed under addition of linear polynomials.
2. If $a \in \mathbb{K} \backslash\{0\}$, there are $f, g \in \mathcal{C}$ such that $f(x) / a x, g(x) . a x \notin \mathcal{C}$. Hence $\mathcal{C}$ is not closed under multiplication or division by linear polynomials.

Proof. In each case, it suffices to construct a $\kappa$-supercontinuous $f$ such that the resulting function $(f(x)+x$, etc.) is not $\kappa$-continuous.

For Part 1. let $a \neq 0$, and

$$
f_{a}(x):= \begin{cases}-a(x-1) & \text { if } x<\neg \omega \\ -a(x+1) & \text { if } x>\neg \omega .\end{cases}
$$

Clearly, $f_{a}$ is monotone. For surjectivity, note that $(-a(n-1))_{n \in \omega}$ is cofinal with $(-a(n+1))_{n \in \omega}$. Hence, by Lemma 4.1.11, $f_{a}$ is $\kappa$-supercontinuous. As $f_{a}(x)+a x \neq$ $0, f_{a}(x)+a x$ violates $\operatorname{IVT}(\mathbb{K})$, so by Theorem 4.2.3, $f_{a}(x)+a x$ is not $\kappa$-continuous (see also Figure 4.5).

For Part 2. we define functions $g, h$ which are $\kappa$-supercontinuous such that $g(x) / x$ and $h(x) . x$ are not $\kappa$-continuous. For $g$, we can use $f_{-1}$ from Part 1. $f_{-1}(x) / x$ is not $\operatorname{IVT}(\mathbb{K})$ as it omits 1 . The function $h$ is similar:

$$
h(x):= \begin{cases}1 & \text { if } x<2 \\ \frac{1}{x-1} & \text { if } 2<x<\neg \omega \\ \frac{1}{x+1} & \text { if } x>\neg \omega .\end{cases}
$$

So $h: \mathbb{K} \rightarrow \mathbb{K}$, is $\kappa$-supercontinuous (above 2 , $f$ is a monotone surjection, below $2 f$ is constant, so use Proposition 4.2.4). So, $x . h(x)$ omits 1 on $[3, \infty)$, so is not $\kappa$-continuous. Elaborations with $a \neq 1$ are similar. As $g(x)=x$ is a polynomial, the 'hence' parts follows.


Figure 4.5: The $\kappa$-supercontinuous functions are not closed under addition

By Corollary 4.2.6, polynomials are $\kappa$-supercontinuous on rcfs. Hence, if $\mathbb{K}$ is also an rcf, Proposition 4.2.15 shows that neither the $\kappa$-continuous functions nor the $\kappa$-supercontinuous functions are closed under algebraic operations. Not only does the classical proof of BFPT break down, but we can give a concrete counterexample.

Proposition 4.2.16. Let $\mathbb{K}$ be a $\kappa$-homogeneous ordered field with $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})=\kappa$ and a ( $\kappa, \kappa)$-gap. Then $\operatorname{BFPT}(\mathbb{K}, \kappa$-supercontinuous) fails.

Proof. Let $G$ be a $(\kappa, \kappa)$-gap. Without loss of generality, let $0<G<1$. We construct a strictly decreasing $f:[0,1] \rightarrow[0,1]$ such that $f:[0, G] \rightarrow[G, 1]$ and $f:[G, 1] \rightarrow[0, G]$. By $\kappa$-homogeneity and $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})=\kappa$, there is a $\kappa$-continuous reverse order-isomorphism $g:[0, G] \rightarrow[G, 1]$. As $[1, G] \cap[G, 1]=\emptyset, g$ has no fixed points. Similarly, let $h:[G, 1] \rightarrow[0, G]$ be a reverse order-isomorphism. Then let $f=g \cup h:[0,1] \rightarrow[0,1]$. Clearly, $f$ has no fixed points. By Lemma 4.1.11, $f$ is $\kappa$-supercontinuous. The result follows.

We close this section with a remark about crossing and intersecting of functions. If $f, g: \mathbb{K} \rightarrow \mathbb{K}$ are functions, we say (as usual) that they intersect if there is some $x$ such that $f(x)=g(x)$. We say that they cross if there is an interval $[a, b]$, partitioned into two non-empty convex sets $L \cup R=[a, b]$ such that $L<R$ and $f<g$ on $L$ and $f>g$ on $R$ (see Figure 4.6). Clearly, on $\mathbb{R}$, intersecting and crossing are equivalent since there are no gaps. However, if $(L, R)$ is an almost gap, it is possible to cross without intersecting 8

Proposition 4.2.17. Let $\mathbb{K}$ be an ordered field with $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})>\omega$. There are functions $f, g: \mathbb{K} \rightarrow \mathbb{K}$ which are strictly monotone, bn $(\mathbb{K})$-supercontinuous which cross but do not intersect.

[^16]

Figure 4.6: Functions which cross at a gap $(L, R)$ but do not intersect

Proof. We define two functions:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& f(x):= \begin{cases}x & \text { if } x<\neg \omega \\
2 x & \text { if } x>\neg \omega ;\end{cases} \\
& g(x):= \begin{cases}2 x & \text { if } x<\neg \omega \\
x & \text { if } x>\neg \omega .\end{cases}
\end{aligned}
$$

By Lemma 4.1.11, both $f$ and $g$ are $\kappa$-supercontinuous (surjectivity amounts to checking that $(n)_{n \in \omega}$ and $(2 n)_{n \in \omega}$ are both cofinal with $\left.\neg \omega\right)$. Clearly, $f$ and $g$ do not intersect. However, they do cross at $\neg \omega$ (again as $(2 n)_{n \in \omega}$ is cofinal with $\neg \omega)$.

### 4.2.4 The Extreme Value Theorem and the Bounded Value Theorem

In this section, we extend Galeotti's analysis of the Extreme Value Theorem from (74) and get a characterisation of the $\kappa$-supercontinuous functions in terms of EVT.

Remark 4.2.18. For any ordered field $\mathbb{K}$, if $f: \mathbb{K} \rightarrow \mathbb{K}$ is $\operatorname{EVT}(\mathbb{K})$ then $f$ is BVT(K).

We can construct explicit continuous, EVT functions which are not $\kappa$-continuous using the gaps in non-Archimedean fields (Corollary 4.1.4). Galeotti initially proved $\operatorname{EVT}\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}, \kappa\right.$-supercontinuity) [74, Theorem 3.3.3]. In fact, this is an exact characterisation for $\eta_{\kappa}$ ordered fields:

Theorem 4.2.19 (Galeotti). Let $\mathbb{K}$ be an $\eta_{\kappa}$ ordered field with $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})=\kappa$. Then both $\operatorname{EVT}(\mathbb{K}, \kappa$-supercontinuous) and $\operatorname{BVT}(\mathbb{K}, \kappa$-supercontinuous) hold.

Proof. Galeotti proved EVT( $\mathbb{K}, \kappa$-supercontinuous) in [74, Theorem 3.3.3]. The second claim follows from Remark 4.2.18.

As EVT functions always have maxima and minima, we obtain our missing implication from Section 4.1.

Corollary 4.2.20. Let $\mathbb{K}$ be an $\eta_{\kappa}$ ordered field with $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})=\kappa$. If $f: \mathbb{K} \rightarrow \mathbb{K}$ is $\kappa$-supercontinuous, then $f$ is sharp.

Corollary 4.2.21. Let $\mathbb{K}$ be an $\eta_{\kappa}$ ordered field with $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})=\kappa$. Suppose $f: \mathbb{K} \rightarrow$ $\mathbb{K}$ is $\kappa$-continuous. Then the following are equivalent:

1. $f$ is $\kappa$-supercontinuous,
2. $f$ is $\operatorname{EVT}(\mathbb{K})$, i.e. for all $a, b \in \mathbb{K}, \operatorname{cof}(f([a, b]))=\operatorname{coi}(f([a, b]))=1$.

Proof. From Part 1. to Part 2. is Theorem 4.2.19, For Part 2. to Part 1., if $f$ is $\operatorname{EVT}(\mathbb{K})$, then for every interval $[a, b] \in \mathbb{K}, \operatorname{cof}(f([a, b]))=\operatorname{coi}(f([a, b]))=1$, as if $f(y)=M$ is maximal on $[a, b]$ then $f(y)$ is cofinal in $f([a, b])$. So, too for coinitiality.

So, by e.g. Example 4.1.13, we have the following:
Corollary 4.2.22. Let $\mathbb{K}$ be $\kappa$-homogeneous, such that $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})=\kappa$ and $\mathbb{K}$ has a ( $\kappa, \kappa$ )-gap. Then EVT $(\mathbb{K}, \kappa$-continuous) and $\operatorname{BVT}(\mathbb{K}, \kappa$-continuous) fail.

On non-Archimedean fields, not every continuous $\operatorname{BVT}(\mathbb{K})$ function is $\operatorname{EVT}(\mathbb{K})$ as the following example shows.

Example 4.2.23. Let $\mathbb{K}$ be non-Archimedean, let $a \in \operatorname{INF}$, and define

$$
f(x):= \begin{cases}x-a & \text { if } x<\neg \omega \\ 0 & \text { otherwise }\end{cases}
$$

Then $f$ is continuous and $\operatorname{BVT}(\mathbb{K})$, but not $\operatorname{EVT}(\mathbb{K})$.
If we weaken $\kappa$-continuity to continuity, then Corollary 4.2 .21 fails as the following example shows.

Example 4.2.24. Let $\left|\kappa^{<\kappa}\right|=\kappa$. We define a continuous function, $J^{\omega}$, such that for all $a, b \in \mathbb{R}_{\kappa}, \operatorname{coi}\left(J^{\omega}([a, b])\right)<\kappa$ and $\operatorname{cof}\left(J^{\omega}([a, b])\right)<\kappa$, which is not $\operatorname{EVT}\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}\right)$. Let $I(n):=\left\{x \in \mathbb{R}_{\kappa}:\left(\forall k \in \omega\left(|x-n|<\frac{1}{k}\right)\right.\right.$ or $\left.\left.x>n\right)\right\}$ (i.e. $x$ which are greater than or infinitely close to $n$ ). Let $\neg n$ be the $(\omega, \kappa)$-gap defined by $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa} \backslash I(n)$ and $I(n)$. The following function will do (i.e. Figure 4.7):

$$
J^{\omega}(x):= \begin{cases}0 & \text { if } x \in(-\infty, \neg 1] \cup(\neg \omega, \infty), \\ n & \text { if } x \in[\neg n, \neg(n+1)] .\end{cases}
$$

Local $\kappa$-continuity (page 73) suffices for IVT(K). We do not know whether $\operatorname{EVT}(\mathbb{K})$ holds for every local $\kappa$-continuous function, $f$, such that for all $a, b \in \mathbb{K}$, $\operatorname{cof}(f([a, b]))<\kappa$ and $\operatorname{coi}(f([a, b]))<\kappa$.


Figure 4.7: The $\omega$-jumping function, $J^{\omega}$

### 4.2.5 Rudiments of calculus: Differentiable functions

In this section, we deal with the properties Rolle, MVT, PDT, and CVT which concern differentiable functions, building on [8] and [179]. Like continuity, differentiability is a local property and therefore is blind to jumps at gaps. As mentioned, all of the properties for the class of continuous functions only hold if $\mathbb{K}=\mathbb{R}$. Assuming $\left|\kappa^{<\kappa}\right|=\kappa$, we can construct specific counterexamples to each of the four properties on $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ : the function $J_{\neg \omega}$ clearly fails $\mathrm{CVT}\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}\right)$, but also fails $\operatorname{MVT}\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}\right): J_{\neg \omega}^{\prime}(x)=0$ for all $x$, but $\frac{f(\omega)-f(1)}{\omega-0}=\frac{1}{\omega}>0$, contradicting $\operatorname{MVT}\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}\right)$. For $\operatorname{Rolle}\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}\right)$ and $\operatorname{PDT}\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}\right)$, we define:

$$
\operatorname{drop}(x):= \begin{cases}x & \text { if } x>\neg \omega \\ x-\omega & \text { if } x<\neg \omega\end{cases}
$$

Then $\operatorname{drop}(0)=\operatorname{drop}(\omega)$, but $\operatorname{drop}^{\prime}(x)=1$ on $[0, \omega]$, so fails $\operatorname{Rolle}\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}\right)$. As drop has a positive derivative at every point, but is not increasing on $[0, \omega]$ (e.g. $\operatorname{drop}(1)>$ $\left.\operatorname{drop}\left(\frac{\omega}{2}\right)\right)$, it fails $\operatorname{PDT}\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}\right)$.

Note that classically, the proof of Rolle and MVT uses EVT and MVT implies both PDT and CVT. This results in the following observations.

Proposition 4.2.25. Let $\mathbb{K}$ be any ordered field. Then the following hold.

1. $\operatorname{Rolle}(\mathbb{K}, \operatorname{EVT}(\mathbb{K}))$ and
2. if $f$ is $\operatorname{MVT}(\mathbb{K})$, then $f$ is both $\operatorname{PDT}(\mathbb{K})$ and $\operatorname{CVT}(\mathbb{K})$.

Proof. The classical proof of Rolle from EVT gives Part 1. (see, e.g. [50, Theorem 32]). The classical proofs of PDT and CVT from MVT give Part 2. (see, e.g. 50, page 105] and [180, Theorem 5.11]).

Note that Propositions 4.2.21 and 4.2.25 Part 1. yield $\operatorname{Rolle}(\mathbb{K}, \kappa$-supercontinuous) if $\mathbb{K}$ is an $\eta_{\kappa}$ ordered field with $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})=\kappa$.

As with BFPT, the classical proofs of our current target properties require some closure under algebraic operations that is not in general true for the class
of $\kappa$-supercontinuous functions. A class of functions, $\mathcal{C}$, is closed under reflection if, for every $f \in \mathcal{C}$, the function $-f$ is also in $\mathcal{C}$; it is closed under the addition of linear functions if for every $f \in \mathcal{C}$, and for every $a, b \in \mathbb{K}$, we have that $x \mapsto$ $f(x)+a \cdot x+b \in \mathcal{C}$.

Proposition 4.2.26. Let $\mathbb{K}$ be an ordered field and $\mathcal{C}$ be a class of functions.

1. If $\mathcal{C}$ is closed under reflection and $\operatorname{PDT}(\mathbb{K}, \mathcal{C})$ holds, then $\operatorname{CVT}(\mathbb{K}, \mathcal{C})$ holds.
2. If $\mathcal{C}$ is closed under the addition of linear functions and $\operatorname{Rolle}(\mathbb{K}, \mathcal{C})$ holds, then $\operatorname{MVT}(\mathbb{K}, \mathcal{C})$ holds.

Proof. For Part 1. let $f: C \rightarrow \mathbb{K}$ with $f \in \mathcal{C}$ such that $f^{\prime}(C)=\{0\}$. By the algebra of limits, $(-f)^{\prime}=-f^{\prime}$. So, $(-f)^{\prime}(C)=\{0\}$. So, $-f$ and $f$ are both non-decreasing on $C$. Hence $f$ is constant on $C$. Part 2. is essentially the classical proof (e.g. 50, Theorem 33]).

Obviously, the class of $\kappa$-supercontinuous function is closed under reflection. Therefore, if $\mathbb{K}$ is an $\eta_{\kappa}$ ordered field, and $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})=\kappa$, then every function, $f$, such that $f$ and $x \mapsto f(x)+a \cdot x+b$ are $\kappa$-supercontinuous is $\operatorname{Rolle}(\mathbb{K}), \operatorname{MVT}(\mathbb{K}), \operatorname{PDT}(\mathbb{K})$, and $\operatorname{CVT}(\mathbb{K})$ (use Propositions 4.2.19 \& 4.2.25 and the proof of Proposition 4.2.26). One example is $\mathbb{K}[X]$, the polynomials. If $\mathbb{K}$ is also an rcf, then the rational functions satisfy these conditions too.

Note that by Proposition 4.2.15, the set of all $\kappa$-supercontinuous functions does not have these closure properties. At the moment, we do not know whether any of MVT $\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}, \kappa\right.$-supercontinuous), $\operatorname{PDT}\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}, \kappa\right.$-supercontinuous $)$, or $\operatorname{CVT}\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}, \kappa\right.$-supercontinuous) hold (or, more strongly, whether $\operatorname{PDT}\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}, \kappa\right.$-continuous), and hence $\operatorname{CVT}\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}, \kappa\right.$-continuous), holds). A differentiable version of the volcano function (Example 4.1.13) could provide a concrete counterexample. It would also provide a counterexample to Darboux's property (cf. [44, CA27]), the remaining pillar of calculus [200, §3].

### 4.2.6 The Uniform Limit Theorem

We close this section with a property that differs from the previous ones, as it is not a property of individual functions, but a closure property of a class of functions. The classical Uniform Limit Theorem (ULT) says that the uniform limit of an $\omega$-sequence of continuous real functions is continuous.

Definition 4.2.27. Let $\mathbb{K}$ be an ordered field with $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})=\kappa$, and $\left(a_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \kappa}$ be coinitial in $\mathbb{K}^{>0}$. The sequence of functions $\left(f_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \kappa} \in\left(\mathbb{K}^{\mathbb{K}}\right)^{\kappa}$ converges uniformly to $f: \mathbb{K} \rightarrow \mathbb{K}$ if for each $a_{\alpha}$ there is an $\alpha<\kappa$ such that for every $\beta>\alpha$ and $x \in \mathbb{K}$, $\left|f_{\beta}(x)-f(x)\right|<a_{\alpha}$. Let $p \subseteq \mathbb{K}^{\mathbb{K}}$ and $q \subseteq\left(\mathbb{K}^{\mathbb{K}}\right)^{\kappa}$. We say that a class of functions, $\mathcal{C}$, satisfies $\operatorname{ULT}(\mathbb{K})$ if, for any uniformly convergent sequence $\left(f_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \kappa} \subseteq \mathcal{C}$, the uniform limit is in $\mathcal{C}$.

It is easy to check that the classical proof of ULT (e.g. 180, Theorem 7.12]) immediately generalises to show that the class of continuous functions satisfies $\operatorname{ULT}(\mathbb{K})$ for every ordered field $\mathbb{K}$.

Proposition 4.2.28. Let $\mathbb{K}$ be a $\kappa$-homogeneous $\eta_{\kappa}$ ordered field with a $(\kappa, \kappa)$-gap such that $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})=\kappa$. Then neither the class of $\kappa$-continuous functions nor the class of $\kappa$-supercontinuous functions satisfies ULT $(\mathbb{K})$.

Proof. We construct a $\kappa$-sequence of $\kappa$-supercontinuous functions which uniformly approximate a function, $f$, which is not $\operatorname{IVT}(\mathbb{K})$, so $f$ is not $\kappa$-continuous. Let $G$ be a $(\kappa, \kappa)$-gap. By $\kappa$-homogeneity, let $f \upharpoonright(-\infty, G]$ be a $\kappa$-continuous strictly increasing surjection from $(-\infty, G]$ to $(-\infty, 0)$ and $f \upharpoonright[G, \infty)$ be a $\kappa$-continuous strictly increasing surjection from $[G, \infty)$ to $(0, \infty)$. Obviously, for some $x, y \in \mathbb{K}$, $f(x)<0<f(y)$, but $0 \notin f(\mathbb{K})$, so $f$ is not $\operatorname{IVT}(\mathbb{K})$.

Next, we construct a sequence of $\kappa$-continuous functions which converge uniformly to $f$. Let $\left(a_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \kappa}$ be a strictly decreasing coinitial sequence in $\mathbb{K}^{>0}$. We define the following sequence of functions:

$$
f_{\alpha}(x):= \begin{cases}f(x) & \text { if } x \notin\left[-a_{\alpha}, a_{\alpha}\right], \\ f\left(-a_{\alpha}\right)+\frac{\left(f\left(a_{\alpha}\right)-f\left(-a_{\alpha}\right)\right)\left(x+a_{\alpha}\right)}{2 a_{\alpha}} & \text { if } x \in\left[-a_{\alpha}, a_{\alpha}\right] .\end{cases}
$$

As $f_{\alpha}$ is linear between $-a_{\alpha}$ and $a_{\alpha}, f_{\alpha}$ is $\kappa$-continuous by Lemma 4.2.4. Moreover $\left(f_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \kappa}$ tends uniformly to $f$ : fix an $\varepsilon \in \mathbb{K}^{>0}$, then pick an $\alpha$ such that $a_{\alpha}<\varepsilon$. By construction, for all $\beta \geq \alpha$, for all $x,\left|f_{\beta}(x)-f(x)\right|<a_{\alpha}$.

### 4.3 Generalisations and large cardinals

As opposed to the results of Section 4.2.1, which do not depend on the choice of $\kappa$, the results in this section require $\kappa$ to have some property associated with large cardinals: they are either weakly compact or have the tree property.

In [25] \& [76], Carl, Galeotti, Hanafi, and Löwe, showed that generalisations of the Bolzano-Weierstraß and Heine-Borel theorems are each equivalent to $\kappa$ having the tree property ${ }^{\text {? }}$

Theorem 4.3.1 (Carl, Galeotti, Hanafi, \& Löwe [76, Theorem 7.1]). Let $\mathbb{K}$ be a $\kappa$-spherically complete ordered field, with $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})=\kappa$. Then the following are equivalent:

1. $\kappa$ has the tree property, and
2. ${ }_{\mathrm{w}} \mathrm{BWT}_{\mathfrak{k}}$ : every bounded interval witnessed $\kappa$-sequence has a convergent $\kappa$ subsequence, i.e. no gap in $\mathbb{K}$ has a cofinal or cointial interval witnessed $\kappa$-sequence.

In this section, we obtain a further connection: we prove that sharp functions are $\operatorname{EVT}(\mathbb{K})$ if and only if $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})$ has the tree property (Theorem 4.3.11). We return to this from a philosophical perspective in Section 7.2.2.

[^17]Lemma 4.3.2. If $\mathbb{K}$ is a $\kappa$-spherically complete ordered field with $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})=\kappa$, and $\kappa$ satisfies the tree property, then EVT $(\mathbb{K}$, sharp) holds.

Proof. By Theorem 4.3.1, we argue from wBWT( $\mathbb{K}$ ) that all sharp functions are $\operatorname{EVT}(\mathbb{K})$. Suppose $f:[a, b] \rightarrow \mathbb{K}$ is sharp. Maxima and minima are exactly dual, so we only consider maxima. Either $f$ has a maximum on $[a, b]$, in which case we are done, or $f$ has no maximum on $[a, b]$. So, suppose $f$ has no maximum.

As $f$ is sharp, let $\left(a_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \kappa}$ be an interval witnessed sequence in $[a, b]$ such that $\left(f\left(a_{\alpha}\right)\right)_{\alpha \in \kappa}$ is increasing and cofinal in $f([a, b])$. By wBWT $(\mathbb{K}),\left(a_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \kappa}$ has a convergent subsequence with length $\lambda,\left(a_{\alpha_{\beta}}\right)_{\beta \in \lambda}$, such that the limit of $\left(a_{\alpha_{\beta}}\right)_{\beta \in \lambda}$ is $x \in \mathbb{K}$. As $[a, b]$ is closed, $x \in[a, b]$. As $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})=\kappa, \lambda=\kappa[75$, Corollary 1.11(ii)]. As $\left(f\left(a_{\alpha_{\beta}}\right)\right)_{\beta \in \kappa}$ is increasing, $\left(f\left(a_{\alpha_{\beta}}\right)\right)_{\beta \in \kappa}$ is also cofinal in $\overline{f([a, b]) \text {. As } f \text { is sharp, }}$ it is continuous, so $f(x)=\lim _{\beta \rightarrow \kappa} f\left(a_{\alpha_{\beta}}\right)$. As $\left(f\left(a_{\alpha_{\beta}}\right)\right)_{\beta \in \kappa}$ is cofinal, $f(x)$ must be a maximum, which contradicts that $f$ has no maximum on $[a, b]$.

Theorem 4.3.3. Let $\mathbb{K}$ be a $\kappa$-spherically complete ordered field such that $\mathrm{bn}(\mathbb{K})=$ $\kappa$. If $\operatorname{EVT}(\mathbb{K}$, sharp) then $\kappa$ has the tree property.

Proof. We prove the contrapositive. Suppose $\kappa$ does not have the tree property. By Lemma 2.1.5, let $T$ be a well-pruned $\kappa$-Aronszajn tree. We define a sharp function, $f:[0,1] \rightarrow \mathbb{K}$, which violates $\operatorname{EVT}(\mathbb{K})$. We do this by labelling the tree, $T$, with certain convex subsets of $[0,1]$, and using this labelling to define $f(x)$ according to the least limit level, $\operatorname{Lev}_{\lambda}(T)$, such that $x$ does not appear in a $\operatorname{Lev}_{\lambda}(T)$ label. We prove that $f$ is sharp and violates $\mathrm{EVT}(\mathbb{K})$ using a series of claims. We first define the labelling and the function $f$, then we show that $f$ is continuous, unbounded, and sharp.

Fix a sequence, $\left(\varepsilon_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \kappa}$, which is coinitial in $\mathbb{K}^{>0}$. We modify the labelling construction in [25, Theorem 4.17], by labelling each node $t \in T$ with a convex set $L(x) \subseteq[0,1]$, so that:

1. if $t$ is the root, i.e. $t \in \operatorname{Lev}_{0}(T)$, then $L(t)=[0,1]$,
2. if $\alpha<\kappa$ is a successor, if $t \in \operatorname{Lev}_{\alpha}(T)$, then $L(t)$ is an open interval in $[0,1]$, and $\operatorname{len}(L(t))<\varepsilon_{\alpha}$,
3. for every limit $\lambda<\kappa$, then $L(t)=\bigcap_{s \subseteq t} L(s)$, and
4. for all $\alpha<\kappa$, there is a $\gamma_{\alpha}<\kappa$ such that for all $s, t \in \operatorname{Lev}_{\alpha}(t)$, for all $a \in L(t)$ and $b \in L(s),|a-b|>\varepsilon_{\gamma_{\alpha}}$, i.e. the "distance" $\square$ between $L(s)$ and $L(t)$ is at least $\varepsilon_{\gamma_{\alpha}}$.

By $\kappa$-spherical completeness, these labels can be chosen to be non-empty (for a detailed argument, see [25, Lemma 2.9]). The only modification of the labelling in [25, §4.4] is that in the limit case, we take $L(t):=\bigcap_{s \subseteq t} L(s)$, rather than a subset of this intersection.

Claim 4.3.4. For each $t \in T, L(t)$ is open in $[0,1]$.

[^18]Proof. The proof is by induction. At successor levels, this holds by definition. For a limit $\gamma$, suppose that, for all $t \in \bigcup_{\beta \in \gamma} \operatorname{Lev}_{\beta}(T), L(t)$ is open in $[0,1]$. Let $O:=\bigcap_{\beta \in \gamma} L\left(t_{\beta}\right)$, for some strictly decreasing nested sequence of labels, $\left(L\left(t_{\beta}\right)\right)_{\beta \in \gamma}$ (note for any $t \in \operatorname{Lev}_{\gamma}(t)$, we even have that $L(t)=\bigcap_{\beta \in \gamma} L(t \upharpoonright \beta)$ ). As bn $(\mathbb{K})=\kappa$, the order topology on $\mathbb{K}$ is $\kappa$-additive, i.e. the intersection of $<\kappa$-many open sets is open (this follows from [190, Theorem viii] or [75, Lemma 2.19], noting that $\mathbb{K}$ $\kappa$-metrises itself, see Chapter 6 for more on additivity). By induction, each $L\left(t_{\beta}\right)$ is open. So, by $\kappa$-additivity, $O$ is also open.

Note that for all $a \in[0,1]$, there is a smallest $\beta(a)<\kappa$ such that $a \notin$ $\bigcup_{t \in \operatorname{Lev}_{\beta(a)}(T)} L(t)$, otherwise $\{t \in T: a \in L(t)\}$ would be a branch of length $\kappa$. Hence, there is a smallest limit ordinal, $\alpha(a)$, such that $a \notin \bigcup_{t \in \operatorname{Lev}_{\alpha(a)}(T)} L(t)$.

Let $\left(m_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \kappa}$ be strictly increasing and cofinal in $\mathbb{\mathbb { D }}$ Then we define the function $f$ as follows:

$$
f(a):=m_{\alpha(a)} .
$$

At limit levels, $L(t)$ is a convex set with "endgaps" (rather than endpoints); so $f$ only changes value at gaps, and is hence continuous. Formally:

Claim 4.3.5. The function $f:[0,1] \rightarrow \mathbb{K}$ is continuous.
Proof. Note that $\{\alpha(a): a \in[0,1]\}$ is a collection of limit ordinals, so its induced topology is discrete. As $\left(m_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \kappa}$ is strictly increasing, the induced topology on $\left\{m_{\alpha(a)}: a \in[0,1]\right\}=\operatorname{Im}(f)$ is also discrete. Therefore, it suffices to show that, if $m \in \operatorname{Im}(f)$, then $f^{-1}(m)$ is open.

Let $m \in \operatorname{Im}(f)$ and $a \in[0,1]$ be such that $f(a)=m_{\alpha(a)}=m$. We will prove that there is $\varepsilon_{a} \in \mathbb{K}^{>0}$ such that for all $b \in B\left(a, \varepsilon_{a}\right)$ we have $f(b)=m$.

Note that by definition, for all $t \in \operatorname{Lev}_{\alpha(a)}(T)$, we have that $a \notin L(t)$. Since $T$ is a $\kappa$-tree and $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})=\kappa$, we can show that there is $\varepsilon \in \mathbb{K}^{>0}$ such that for all $b \in B(a, \varepsilon)$ and all $t \in \operatorname{Lev}_{\alpha(a)}(T)$ we have $b \notin L(t)$. Indeed, let $t \in \operatorname{Lev}_{\alpha(a)}(T)$. By construction, $L(t)$ is a convex set with no supremum and infimum such that $\operatorname{coi}(\operatorname{top}(L(t)))=\operatorname{cof}(\operatorname{bot}(L(t)))<\kappa$. By Lemma 2.3.2 Part 3., there is $\varepsilon_{t} \in \mathbb{K}^{>0}$ such that for all $b \in L(t)$, we have that $b \notin B\left(a, \varepsilon_{t}\right)$. As $T$ is a $\kappa$-tree, $\left|\operatorname{Lev}_{\alpha(a)}(T)\right|<$ $\kappa$. Therefore, there is a $\varepsilon \in \mathbb{K}^{>0}$ such that for all $t \in \operatorname{Lev}_{\alpha(a)}(T), \varepsilon<\varepsilon_{t}$. So, in particular, for all $t \in \operatorname{Lev}_{\alpha(a)}(T)$ and $b \in L(t), a \notin L(t) \supseteq B(b, \varepsilon)$.

We now distinguish two cases. First, suppose that $\beta(a)$ is a limit ordinal. Then, by definition, $\beta(a)=\alpha(a)$ and there is a strictly increasing sequence, $\left(t_{\beta}\right)_{\beta \in \alpha(a)}$, in $T$ such that, for all $\beta<\alpha(a), a \in L\left(t_{\beta}\right)$. Then, again by Lemma 2.3.2 Part 3. for each $\beta<\alpha(a)$, there is an $\varepsilon_{\beta}^{\prime} \in \mathbb{K}^{>0}$ such that $B\left(a, \varepsilon_{\beta}^{\prime}\right) \subseteq L\left(t_{\beta}\right)$. So, as $\alpha(a)<\kappa=\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})$, there is an $\varepsilon^{\prime} \in \mathbb{K}^{>0}$ such that for all $\beta<\alpha(a), \varepsilon^{\prime}<\varepsilon_{\beta}^{\prime}$. In particular, for all $\beta<\alpha(a)$, we have $B\left(a, \varepsilon^{\prime}\right) \subseteq L\left(t_{\beta}\right)$. Let $\varepsilon_{a}=\min \left\{\varepsilon^{\prime}, \varepsilon\right\}$. Then, by construction, for all $b \in B\left(a, \varepsilon_{a}\right)$ and for every $\beta<\alpha(a)$, there is a $t \in \operatorname{Lev}_{\beta}(T)$ such that $b \in L(t)$, and for every $s \in \operatorname{Lev}_{\alpha(a)}(T)$ we have that $b \notin L(s)$. Therefore, for all $b \in B\left(a, \varepsilon_{a}\right)$ we have $\alpha(b)=\alpha(a)$ and $f(b)=m_{\alpha(b)}=m_{\alpha(a)}=m$ as desired.

Otherwise, suppose that $\beta(a)$ is a successor. Then $\beta(a)=\gamma+n$, where $\gamma$ is a limit ordinal, and $n$ is a natural number greater than 0 . So, by definition, $\gamma<\beta(a)$

[^19]and there is a $t \in \operatorname{Lev}_{\gamma+(n-1)}(T)$ such that $a \in L(t)$. By Claim 4.3.4, $L(t)$ is open in $[0,1]$. Therefore, there is an $\varepsilon^{\prime} \in \mathbb{K}^{>0}$ such that $B\left(a, \varepsilon^{\prime}\right) \subseteq L(t)$. As before, let $\varepsilon_{a}=\min \left\{\varepsilon^{\prime}, \varepsilon\right\}$ and, as in the limit case, note that for all $b \in B\left(a, \varepsilon_{a}\right)$, we have that $\alpha(b)=\alpha(a)$ and $f(b)=m_{\alpha(b)}=m_{\alpha(a)}=m$ as desired.

Claim 4.3.6. For every $t \in T$, the set $f(L(t))$ is unbounded in $\mathbb{K}$, hence $f$ is not EVT(K).

Proof. As $T$ is a well-pruned $\kappa$-Aronszajn tree, for any $t \in T, T_{t}$ is a $\kappa$-Aronszajn tree. In particular, $T_{t}$ has $\kappa$-many levels, and every branch of $T_{t}$ is of length $<\kappa$. So, there are cofinally many $\alpha \in \kappa$ such that $m_{\alpha} \in f(L(t))$, i.e. $f(L(t))$ is unbounded in $\mathbb{K}$.

Claim 4.3.7. The function $f$ is sharp.
Proof. We prove this with two claims, one of which shows that $f$ has a maximum or is unbounded on any interval $[c, d]$, the other of which ensures that, in the case where $f$ is unbounded on $[c, d]$, there is a suitable sequence which is interval witnessing.

Let $[c, d] \subseteq[0,1]$. Clearly, $f$ achieves a minimum, as $\operatorname{Im}(f) \subseteq\left\{m_{\gamma}: \gamma \in \kappa\right\}$, where $\left(m_{\gamma}\right)_{\gamma \in \kappa}$ is strictly increasing. To prove the upper bound, we need a further claim:

Claim 4.3.8. Either $f$ has a maximum on $[c, d]$, or the set $f([c, d])$ is unbounded in $\mathbb{K}$.

Proof. Suppose that $f$ has no maximum on $[c, d]$. As $[c, d]$ is convex, and $L(t)$ is convex for all $t \in T, L(t) \cap[c, d] \neq \emptyset$ implies one of four possible cases:

1. $L(t) \subseteq[c, d]$,
2. $[c, d] \subseteq L(t)$,
3. $L(t) \cap[c, d]=[c, A)$ where $A$ is an almost gap, or
4. $L(t) \cap[c, d]=(B, d]$ where $B$ is an almost gap.

In Case 2, we show that either $f$ has a maximum on $[c, d]$, or we are in one Cases 1. 3, and 4. Suppose we are not in one of Cases 1. 3, and 4. Then there is a $\delta \leq \kappa$ such that for all $\eta<\delta$, there is a $t_{\eta} \in \operatorname{Lev}_{\eta}(T)$ such that $[c, d] \subseteq L\left(t_{\eta}\right)$, but no $t_{\delta} \in \operatorname{Lev}_{\delta}(T)$ such that either $L\left(t_{\delta}\right) \subseteq[c, d],[c, d] \cap L\left(t_{\delta}\right)=[c, A)$, or $[c, d] \cap L\left(t_{\delta}\right)=(B, d]$, where $A, B$ are almost gaps. As $T$ is a $\kappa$-tree, $\delta<\kappa$. Hence, for all $x \in[c, d]$, the first level at which $x$ is not included by in a label is level $\delta$. So, by definition, $f(x)=m_{\delta}$. Hence, $f$ is constant on $[c, d]$, and so trivially has a maximum.

If Case 1 holds for some $t$, unboundedness follows directly from Claim 4.3.6.
So, we consider Cases 3 and 4. Note that it is possible that both happen simultaneously, i.e. there are $t, t^{\prime}$ such that $L(t) \cap[c, d]$ is a non-empty convex set with minimum value $c$, and $L\left(t^{\prime}\right) \cap[c, d]$ is a non-empty convex set with maximum value $d$. By labelling Condition 4, we know that these two sets must be separated.

So, we can assume without loss of generality that we are in Cases 3 and 4 (simultaneously), as being in at most one of Cases 3 or 4 is simpler. That is, there is no $t \in T$ such that $L(t) \subseteq[c, d]$, and there is a $t \in T$ such that $L(t) \cap[c, d] \neq \emptyset$. Note that there is some $\gamma$ such that there are at most two distinct $s, t \in \operatorname{Lev}_{\gamma}(T)$ with $L(s)=\left(\ell_{s}, r_{s}\right)$ and $L(t)=\left(\ell_{t}, r_{t}\right)$ such that $\ell_{s}<c<r_{s}$ and $\ell_{t}<d<r_{t}$ (at most two follows from convexity: otherwise we are in Case 1). In which case $r_{s}<\ell_{t}$. Let $\gamma_{0}$ be the minimal such $\gamma$, then $\gamma_{0}$ is a successor, and there is an $r \in \operatorname{Lev}_{\gamma_{0}-1}(T)$ such that $[c, d] \subseteq L(r)$.

We prove that $f(c) \geq f\left(\left(c, r_{s}\right)\right)$. An analogous proof shows that $f(d) \geq$ $f\left(\left(\ell_{t}, d\right)\right)$. Suppose, for a contradiction, that there is an $e \in\left(c, r_{s}\right)$ such that $f(e)>f(c)$. Suppose $f(c)=m_{\alpha_{c}}$. Then, by the definition of $f$, there is a $t^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Lev}_{\alpha_{c}}(T)$ such that $L\left(t^{\prime}\right) \subseteq\left(\ell_{s}, r_{s}\right)$ where $e \in L\left(t^{\prime}\right)$, such that $c<L\left(t^{\prime}\right)$. But this contradicts our assumption that there is no $t^{\prime \prime} \in T$ such that $L\left(t^{\prime \prime}\right) \subseteq[c, d]$. So, $f(c) \geq f\left(\left(c, r_{s}\right)\right)$, and likewise $f(d) \geq f\left(\left(\ell_{t}, d\right)\right)$.

Finally note that $f$ is bounded by $\max \{f(c), f(d)\}$ on $\left[r_{s}, \ell_{t}\right]$, since for all $t \in \operatorname{Lev}_{\gamma_{0}}(T)$, the interval $\left[r_{s}, \ell_{t}\right]$ has empty intersection with $L(t)$, and there is a $t^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Lev}_{\gamma_{0}-1}(T)$ such that $\left[r_{s}, t_{\ell}\right] \subseteq L\left(t^{\prime}\right)$. So, on $[c, d], f$ has a maximum, namely $\max \{f(c), f(d)\}$.

By Claim 4.3.8, let $\left(b_{\delta}\right)_{\delta \in \kappa}$ be any sequence in $[c, d]$ such that $\left(f\left(b_{\delta}\right)\right)_{\delta \in \kappa}$ is strictly increasing and unbounded in $\mathbb{K}$. The proof that $\left(b_{\delta}\right)_{\delta \in \kappa}$ is interval witnessed in $\mathbb{K}$ has two steps. First, we show that $\left(b_{\delta}\right)_{\delta \in \kappa}$ is interval witnessed in the Cauchy closure of $\mathbb{K}, \operatorname{VC}(\mathbb{K})$. We use this to prove that $\left(b_{\delta}\right)_{\delta \in \kappa}$ is interval witnessed in $\mathbb{K}$.

The proof that $\left(b_{\delta}\right)_{\delta \in \kappa}$ is interval witnessed in the Cauchy closure of $\mathbb{K}$ follows exactly as in 75, Claim 3.19], noting that this claim shows that any sequence which is cofinal in the tree of labels is interval witnessing.

Claim 4.3.9. The sequence $\left(b_{\delta}\right)_{\delta \in \kappa}$ is interval witnessed in the Cauchy completion of $\mathbb{K}, \mathrm{VC}(\mathbb{K})$.

Proof. Throughout the proof of this claim, we work in $\mathrm{VC}(\mathbb{K})$. For any $t \in T$, let $L_{\mathrm{Vc}}(t):=\{x \in \mathrm{VC}(\mathbb{K}): \exists a, b \in L(t)(a \leq x \leq b\}$, the convex subset of $\mathrm{VC}(\mathbb{K})$ defined by $L(t)$. Note that $\operatorname{len}(L(t))=\operatorname{len}\left(L_{\mathrm{VC}}(t)\right)$.

Let $B:=\left\{b_{\delta}: \delta \in \kappa\right\}$ and $C \subseteq(0,1)$ be a bounded convex subset of $\operatorname{VC}(\mathbb{K})$ such that $|C \cap B|=\kappa$. Fix an $\hat{\varepsilon}_{0} \in \mathbb{K}^{>0}$. Without loss of generality, assume that $C$ has neither a supremum nor an infimum. By [25, Lemma 2.12(3)], there is an $\hat{\varepsilon}_{1} \in \mathbb{K}^{>0}$ such that for all $x \in C,\left(x-\hat{\varepsilon}_{1}, x+\hat{\varepsilon}_{1}\right) \subseteq C$. Let $\hat{\varepsilon}:=\min \left\{\hat{\varepsilon}_{0}, \hat{\varepsilon}_{1}\right\}$. Recall that $\left(\varepsilon_{\delta}\right)_{\delta \in \kappa}$ is coinitial in $\mathbb{K}^{>0}$ (and hence in $\left.\operatorname{VC}(\mathbb{K})^{>0}\right)$. So, there is a limit ordinal $\lambda<\kappa$ such that $\varepsilon_{\lambda}<\hat{\varepsilon}$. By Condition 2 of the labelling, if $t \in \bigcup_{\lambda \leq \eta<\kappa} \operatorname{Lev}_{\eta}(T)$ has successor length, then the interval $L_{\mathrm{VC}}(t)$ has diameter $<\varepsilon_{\lambda}<\hat{\varepsilon}$.

Let $t \in \operatorname{Lev}_{\lambda+1}(T)$, and $c \in L_{\mathrm{Vc}}(t)$. We claim that the following are equivalent:

1. $L_{\mathrm{Vc}}(t) \subseteq C$,
2. $c \in C$, and
3. $L_{\mathrm{Vc}}(t) \cap C \neq \emptyset$.

The implications from Condition 1 to Condition 2 to Condition 3 are obvious. As $L_{\mathrm{Vc}}(t)$ has diameter $<\hat{\varepsilon}$, and $(c-\hat{\varepsilon}, c+\hat{\varepsilon}) \subseteq C$, and we have that Condition 3 implies Condition 1 .

Let $T \upharpoonright C:=\left\{t \in \operatorname{Lev}_{\lambda+1}(T): \exists \delta \in \kappa\left(b_{\delta} \in C \cap L_{\mathrm{Vc}}(t)\right)\right\}$. Since $T$ is a $\kappa$-tree, we have that $\left|\operatorname{Lev}_{\lambda+1}(T)\right|<\kappa$. So, we can write $T \upharpoonright C=\left\{t_{\gamma}: \gamma<\mu\right\}$ for some $\mu<\kappa$. By construction, for each $\gamma, L_{\mathrm{VC}}\left(t_{\gamma}\right) \subseteq C$ and the diameter of $L_{\mathrm{VC}}\left(t_{\gamma}\right)$ is less than $\hat{\varepsilon}$.

It remains to prove Condition 2 in the definition of interval witnessing (page 68). By the previous equivalence, if $t^{\prime} \in \bigcup_{\lambda \leq \eta<\kappa} \operatorname{Lev}_{\eta}(T)$ and $t \subseteq t^{\prime}$ where $t \in$ $\operatorname{Lev}_{\lambda+1}(T)$, then $L_{\mathrm{VC}}\left(t^{\prime}\right) \subseteq C$ if and only if there is a $\gamma$ such that $t=t_{\gamma}$. So, $L_{\mathrm{Vc}}\left(t^{\prime}\right) \subseteq L_{\mathrm{Vc}}\left(t_{\gamma}\right)$. Hence:
$I:=(B \cap C) \backslash \bigcup_{\gamma \in \mu} L_{\mathrm{VC}}\left(t_{\gamma}\right) \subseteq\left\{t_{\gamma}: \exists \eta<\lambda\left(t_{\gamma} \in \operatorname{Lev}_{\eta}(T)\right)\right\}=\bigcup_{\eta \in \lambda+1}\left\{t_{\gamma}: t_{\gamma} \in \operatorname{Lev}_{\eta}(T)\right\}$.
As $T$ is a $\kappa$-tree and $\kappa$ is regular, this shows $|I|<\kappa$. Hence, $\left(b_{\delta}\right)_{\delta \in \kappa}$ is interval witnessed in $\operatorname{VC}(\mathbb{K})$.

Claim 4.3.10. The sequence $\left(b_{\delta}\right)_{\delta \in \kappa}$ is interval witnessed in $\mathbb{K}$.
Proof. By Claim 4.3.9 and 76, Lemma 4.7], either $\left(b_{\delta}\right)_{\delta \in \kappa}$ has a convergent subsequence in $\mathrm{VC}(\mathbb{K})$, or $\left(b_{\delta}\right)_{\delta \in \kappa}$ is interval witnessed in $\mathbb{K}$.

Suppose, for a contraction, that $\left(b_{\delta}\right)_{\delta \in \kappa}$ has a convergent subsequence, $\left(b_{\delta_{\alpha}}\right)_{\alpha \in \kappa}$ (as $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})=\kappa$, we know that this subsequence must have length $\kappa$ ). Let $\ell \in \operatorname{VC}(\mathbb{K})$ be its limit. Note that $\left(b_{\delta_{\alpha}}\right)_{\alpha \in \kappa}$ is cofinal with $\left(b_{\delta}\right)_{\delta \in \kappa}$. So, in particular, $\left(f\left(b_{\delta}\right)\right)_{\delta \in \kappa}$ is cofinal with $f([0,1])$, so is unbounded.

We prove that, in this case, $f$ has a continuous extension $\hat{f}: \mathrm{VC}([0,1]) \rightarrow$ $\mathrm{VC}([0,1])$ (note that, in general, a continuous $f$ on $\mathbb{K}$ need not have a continuous extension on $\mathrm{VC}(\mathbb{K})$, see page 71$)$. Recall the definition of $L_{\mathrm{Vc}}(t)$ from the proof of Claim 4.3.9. Exactly as with $f$, for any $c \in \operatorname{VC}([0,1])$, let $\beta(c)$ be the least ordinal such that $c \notin \bigcup_{t \in \operatorname{Lev}_{\beta(c)}(T)} L_{\mathrm{Vc}}(t)$, let $\alpha(c)$ be the least limit ordinal greater than or equal to $\beta(c)$, and let $\hat{f}(c)=m_{\alpha(c)}$. Clearly, $\hat{f}$ extends $f$. So, it suffices to prove that $\hat{f}$ is $(\mathrm{VC}([0,1])$-)continuous. But, the proof of Claim 4.3.5 also works for $\hat{f}$ on $\mathrm{VC}([0,1])$, so $\hat{f}$ is $\mathrm{VC}([0,1])$-continuous.

Finally, note that by construction, $\hat{f} \rightarrow \infty$ as $x \rightarrow \ell$. So, $\hat{f}$ is not continuous at $\ell$, contradicting our initial assumption that $\left(b_{\delta}\right)_{\delta \in \kappa}$ had a convergent subsequence in $\operatorname{VC}(\mathbb{K})$.

Hence, every strictly increasing sequence, $\left(f\left(b_{\delta}\right)\right)_{\delta \in \gamma}$, which is unbounded in $\mathbb{K}$, is such that $\left(b_{\delta}\right)_{\delta \in \gamma}$ is interval witnessed in $\operatorname{VC}(\mathbb{K})$, and so is interval witnessed in $\mathfrak{K}$.

So, by Claims 4.3.6 and 4.3.7, $f$ is sharp but not $\operatorname{EVT}(\mathbb{K})$.
This yields the main theorem.
Theorem 4.3.11. Let $\mathbb{K}$ be a $\kappa$-spherically complete ordered field $\mathbb{K}$ where $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})=$ $\kappa$. Then the following are equivalent:

1. $\kappa$ has the tree property,
2. $\operatorname{EVT}(\mathbb{K}$, sharp $)$, and
3. $\operatorname{BVT}(\mathbb{K}$, sharp $){ }^{[/ 2}$

Proof. By Lemma 4.3.2 and Theorem 4.3.3, it suffices to prove the equivalence of Part 2. and Part 3. If EVT( $\mathbb{K}$, sharp) then clearly $\operatorname{BVT}(\mathbb{K}$, sharp). Conversely, it suffices to prove that if $\kappa$ does not have the tree property, then there is an unbounded sharp function. The $f$ from Theorem 4.3.3 will do.

Theorem 4.3.11 reveals some independence in generalised real analysis, unlike the above absolute generalisations. This and Proposition 4.2.19 immediately imply:

Corollary 4.3.12. Let $\mathbb{K}$ be a $\kappa$-spherically complete, $\eta_{\kappa}$ ordered field with $\mathrm{bn}(\mathbb{K})=$ $\kappa$, where $\kappa$ does not have the tree property. Then some sharp functions on $\mathbb{K}$ are not $\kappa$-supercontinuous.

Corollary 4.3.13. Let $\mathbb{K}$ be a $\kappa$-homogeneous $\eta_{\kappa}$ ordered field $\mathbb{K}$ where $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})=$ wei $(\mathbb{K})=\kappa$, which has a $(\kappa, \kappa)$-gap, and suppose $\kappa$ has the tree property. Then:

1. $f: \mathbb{K} \rightarrow \mathbb{K}$ is $\kappa$-supercontinuous if and only if $f$ is sharp and $\kappa$-continuous,
2. not all sharp functions are $\kappa$-continuous, and
3. not all $\kappa$-continuous functions are sharp.

Proof. Part 1. is by Proposition 4.2.20, Corollary 4.2.21, and Theorem 4.3.11. Part 2. is by Part 1. and Proposition 4.1.14. Part 3. is by Corollary 4.1.4. $\square$

Question 4.3.14. If $\kappa$ does not have the tree property, does $\kappa$-continuity imply sharpness?

## Remark on weak compactness and symmetrical completeness

An order is called symmetrically complete if none of its gaps is symmetric (i.e. a $(\lambda, \lambda)$-gap for some $\lambda$, following [128, page 263]). In 1908, Hausdorff showed how to construct orders with prescribed types of gaps 88. Later, Kuhlmann, Kuhlmann, \& Shelah proved that any field can be extended to a symmetrically complete field 128, 188. We do not know whether one can construct symmetrically complete fields with additional properties (a possible first step would be to generalise [128, Theorem 7]). However, if they exist, they would provide another connection between weak compactness and EVT.

If there is a symmetrically complete $\eta_{\kappa}$ ordered field, $\mathbb{K}$, with $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})=$ wei $(\mathbb{K})=$ $\kappa$ where $\kappa$ is weakly compact, then $\kappa$-continuity and $\kappa$-supercontinuity over $\mathbb{K}$ coincide. One can prove this using local $\kappa$-continuity (page 73 ): on $\mathbb{K}$, a (local) $\kappa$-continuous function has an image almost gap at every gap (i.e. the case where

[^20]$f$ approaches $\pm \infty$ is excluded). Weak compactness implies that every bounded $\kappa$-sequence of $\mathbb{K}$ has a strictly monotone $\kappa$-subsequence (by [108, Theorem 7.8]; see [40, page 134], [76, Theorem 3.4], and [185, page 148] for more on this property). The coincidence of $\kappa$-continuity and $\kappa$-supercontinuity then follows easily. Hence, by Theorem 4.2.19, we have that EVT $(\mathbb{K}, \kappa$-continuous) holds.

### 4.4 The $\kappa$-Suslin Hypothesis for ordered fields

Finally, we pose an $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$-analogue of Suslin's Question. In 1920, Suslin asked whether any Dedekind complete dense linear order where every collection of pairwise disjoint open intervals is countable was isomorphic to $\mathbb{R}$ [195]. This turns out to be independent of ZFC 194. On a space, $X$, we defind ${ }^{[13}$ the Suslin number to be the smallest cardinal such that any family of open sets of $X$ of $\operatorname{size} \mathfrak{s n}(X)$ is not pairwise disjoint (34) We can generalise this to $\kappa$-topologies:

Definition 4.4.1. For a $\kappa$-topological space, $\left(X, \tau_{\kappa}\right)$, the $\kappa$-Suslin number, $\mathfrak{s n}_{\kappa}(X)$, is the least cardinal such that any family $\mathcal{F} \subseteq \tau_{\kappa}$ of size $\mathfrak{s n}_{\kappa}(X)$ is not pairwise disjoint.

Proposition 4.4.2. If $\mathbb{O}$ is an order, $\mathfrak{s n}_{\kappa}(\mathbb{O}) \leq \mathfrak{s n}(\mathbb{O}) \leq \operatorname{owei}(\mathbb{O})^{+}$. If $\mathbb{K}$ is an ordered field with a set of integer parts, then $\mathfrak{s n}_{\kappa}(\mathbb{O})=\mathfrak{s n}(\mathbb{O})=$ owei $(\mathbb{O})^{+}$

Proof. For the first part, suppose $Q$ is order dense in an order, $\mathbb{O},|Q|=$ owei( $\mathbb{O}$ ), and $\mathcal{P}$ partitions $\mathbb{O}$. Then, if $P \in \mathcal{P}$, then $P \cap Q$ is nonempty. So, the maximum size of a family of disjoint non-empty open intervals in $\mathbb{O}$ is bounded by $|Q|=$ owei( $\mathbb{O}$ ) (as if $\mathcal{Q}$ partitions $Q$, then $|\mathcal{Q}| \leq|Q|$ ). Also, every family of $\kappa$-open sets is a family of open sets. So the result holds.

For the second part, we show that $\operatorname{ip}(\mathbb{K})^{+} \leq \mathfrak{s n}_{\kappa}(\mathbb{K})$. Let $Z$ be a set of integer parts for $\mathbb{K}$. If $z \neq z^{\prime}$ are elements of $Z$, then $\left(z-\frac{1}{3}, z+\frac{1}{3}\right) \cap\left(z^{\prime}-\frac{1}{3}, z^{\prime}+\frac{1}{3}\right)=\emptyset$. So the lower bound holds. The equality follows from Proposition 2.3.6.

Hence, in particular, $\mathfrak{s n}\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}\right)=\mathfrak{s n}_{\kappa}\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}\right)=\kappa^{+}$.
Much ink has been spilled on the generalised tree-version of Suslin's problem (e.g. [131, 176]), i.e. the consistency of the existence of $\kappa$-Suslin trees ( $\kappa$-Aronszajn trees where every antichain is of size $<\kappa$ ). A $\kappa$-Suslin tree exists if and only if a $\kappa$-Suslin order exists, that is a Dedekind complete order, $\mathbb{O}$, such that $\mathfrak{s n}(\mathbb{O}) \leq \kappa^{+}$ and $\kappa<\operatorname{wei}(\mathbb{O})$ 106, page 292]. Suslin's Question is also generalised like so ${ }^{15}$
$\left(\mathrm{SH}_{\kappa}\right)$ If $\mathbb{O}$ is a symmetrically complete, Dedekind complete dense linear order with $\operatorname{cof}(\mathbb{O})=\operatorname{coi}(\mathbb{O})=\kappa, \mathfrak{s n}(\mathbb{O})=\kappa^{+}$, then $\mathbb{O}$ is order isomorphic to $\operatorname{Ded}\left(\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}\right)$.

[^21]Eda proved that $\left(\mathrm{SH}_{\kappa}\right)$ holds if and only if there is no $\kappa$-Suslin tree, and that $\left(\mathrm{SH}_{\kappa}\right)$ fails in L for all regular $\kappa$ [49, Theorems 3 and 4].

However, both $\left(\mathrm{SH}_{\kappa}\right)$ and being a $\kappa$-Suslin order are too strong for fields for generalised real analysis: no large cardinality rcf is Dedekind complete (and wei $\left.\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}\right)=\kappa\right)$. But, we can state a question for Cauchy completeness:

Question 4.4.3. Let $\kappa$ be an uncountable regular cardinal such that $\left|\kappa^{<\kappa}\right|=\kappa$. Is (it consistent with ZFC that) any Cauchy complete $\eta_{\kappa}$-ordered field, $\mathbb{K}$, such that $\mathfrak{s n}(\mathbb{K})=\kappa^{+}$, ordered-field isomorphic to $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ ? What about with $\mathfrak{s n}_{\kappa}(\mathbb{K})=\kappa^{+}$?

By Theorem 2.3.13 and Proposition 4.4.2, if $\mathbb{K}$ is a Cauchy complete $\eta_{\kappa}$-ordered $\operatorname{rcf}$ with $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})=\kappa, \mathfrak{s n}=\kappa^{+}\left(\right.$or $\left.\mathfrak{s n}_{\kappa}(\kappa)=\kappa^{+}\right)$, then $\mathbb{K}$ is ordered-field isomorphic to $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$.

## Chapter 5

## Transfinite Sums and Polynomials

This chapter focuses on the question of whether the theory of infinite sums and series can be extended to large cardinality fields．Overall，the answer is mostly negative．

In Section 5．1，we state the basic desiderata on possible sums；in Section 5．2， we prove that these properties are incompatible（Theorem 5．2．3）；in Section 5.3 we analyse some candidate notions of sum from the literature and novel ones（these results are summarised in Table 1．1）；finally，Section 5.4 concerns the implica－ tion of this difficulty in defining infinite sums on generalised polynomials and the Weierstraß＇Approximation Theorem．

Throughout this chapter，we assume that $\kappa$ is an uncountable regular cardinal． We reserve $\sum$ for finite sums on arbitrary fields，or for the standard countable summation on $\mathbb{R}$（i．e．either finite sums on $\mathbb{R}$ or convergence of $\mathbb{R}$－valued series）．

## 5．1 Desiderata for sums

In this section，we stipulate some desiderata that should be satisfied by a notion of sum on an ordered field $\mathbb{K}$ ．The section includes a list of the desiderata．

A sum on $\mathbb{K}$ is a function $S: \operatorname{Dom}(S) \rightarrow \mathbb{K}$ where $\operatorname{Dom}(S) \subseteq \bigcup_{\mu \in \mathrm{On}_{n}} \mathbb{K}^{\mu}$ ．The elements of $\operatorname{Dom}(S)$ are called $S$－summable．If $\mu \in$ On，we also write $S_{\mu}\left(x_{\alpha}\right)$ for $S\left(\left(x_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \mu}\right)$ ．

We remind the reader of our notation for sequences from Section 2．1．1．Recall that if $x$ and $y$ are sequences of the same length，then $x+y$ is the sequence define by their pontwise sum（i．e．$\left.\left(x_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \mu}+\left(y_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \mu}=\left(x_{\alpha}+y_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \mu}\right)$ ．If $火 \in \mathbb{K}^{\mu}$ ，we call $\operatorname{supp}(\mathrm{x}):=\left\{\alpha \in \mu: x_{\alpha} \neq 0\right\}$ ．Clearly， $\operatorname{supp}(x)$ is a well－ordered set of order type $\xi \leq \mu$ ．If $i: \xi \rightarrow \operatorname{supp}(\mathbb{x})$ is the order isomorphism，then we define the contraction of $x$ ，denoted by contract $(\mathbb{x}) \in \mathbb{K}^{\xi}$ ，as $\alpha \mapsto x_{i(\alpha)}$ ．A sequence $火$ is called positive if all elements of the sequence are positive．A sum $S$ is called positive if，for all positive $x \in \operatorname{Dom}(S)$ ，we have that $S(x)>0$ ．

If $S$ is a sum，we say that $\operatorname{spect}(S):=\left\{\mu \in \operatorname{On}\right.$ ：there is some $火 \in \operatorname{Dom}\left(S_{\mu}\right)$ with $\operatorname{supp}(\mathbb{x})=\mu\}$ is the spectrum of $S$ ，i．e．，the class of ordinals $\mu$ for which there is a non－trivial $S$－summable sequence of length $\mu$ ．

There are a number of sequences for which classical analysis gives us a clear indication that they should be summable and what their sum should be．E．g．for
all $\mathfrak{x} \in \mathbb{K}^{<\omega}$ ，the algebraic operation + on $\mathbb{K}$ provides a natural candidate for $S(\mathbb{x})$ ， viz．$x_{0}+\ldots+x_{n}$ where len $(\mathbb{x})=n+1$（this corresponds to Ext，stated formally in the list below）．

Since $\mathbb{Q} \subseteq \mathbb{K}$（Section 2．3．6），and some infinite $\mathbb{Q}$－sequences are $\sum$－summable， e．g．$\sum_{\omega}\left(\frac{1}{2^{n}}\right)=1$ ，we might similarly expect that if $\mathfrak{c} \in \mathbb{Q}^{\omega}$ is a convergent series with value $X:=\sum_{i=0}^{\infty} x_{i}$ ，then $火$ is $S$－summable and $S(火)=X$ ．In which case，say that $S$ satisfies $\operatorname{Ext}_{\mathbb{Q}}$（this strengthens Ext）．

We may also expect $S$ to depend on $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})$ ．The most elementary connection generalises the sum of the geometric series，i．e．$\left.S\left(\frac{1}{2^{\alpha}}\right)_{\alpha \in \operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})}\right)=1$ ．This connection is captured by Or in the list below．Similarly，we might expect the summation of constants to be multiplication，i．e．（for a set of ordinal ordinals， $\mathrm{bn}(\mathbb{K})$ ，and a $\lambda<\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})$ ）we might expect $S\left(\overline{1}_{\lambda}\right)=\lambda$ ．This corresponds to Cons $_{e}$ in the list below．

More cautiously，there are some properties of（countable）sums which are equiv－ alent to the Dedekind completeness of $\mathbb{K}$（i．e．they only hold if $\mathbb{K}=\mathbb{R}$ ），e．g．if for ev－ ery sequence $\left(x_{n}\right)_{n \in \omega}$ from $\mathbb{K}$ ，such that $\lim _{n \rightarrow \omega}\left|\frac{x_{n+1}}{x_{n}}\right|<1$ ，the series $\left(\sum_{n=1}^{n=N} x_{n}\right)_{N \in \omega}$ converges（see also［44，CA47－CA50］）．

For our purposes，we focus on the following properties of sums：

1．Ext（for＂extending finite sums＂）．If supp $(x)=\left\{x_{\alpha_{0}}, \ldots, x_{\alpha_{n}}\right\}$ is finite，then $S(\mathrm{x})=x_{\alpha_{0}}+\ldots+x_{\alpha_{n}}$ ．

2．Lin（for＂linearity＂）．If $x, y \in \operatorname{Dom}(S) \cap \mathbb{K}^{\mu}$ and $a \in \mathbb{K}$ ，then the sequence $\mathbb{z}:=\alpha \mapsto x_{\alpha}+a \cdot y_{\alpha}$ is $S$－summable and $S(\mathbb{x})+a \cdot S(\mathrm{y})=S(\mathbb{z})$ ．

3．Conc（for＂concatenation＂）．If $火$ and $y$ are $S$－summable，then so is $x^{\sim}$ y and $S(\mathrm{x})+S(\mathrm{y})=S\left(\mathrm{x}^{\sim} \mathrm{y}\right)$ ．

4．Comp（for＂comparison test＂）．If $\varkappa^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Dom}\left(S_{\mu}\right)$ and $y$ is any sequence of length $\mu$ such that for all $\alpha \in \mu$ ，we have that $0 \leq y_{\alpha} \leq x_{\alpha}$ ，then y is $S$－summable and $S_{\mu}(\mathrm{y}) \leq S_{\mu}(\mathrm{x})$ ．

5． Cons $_{e}$（for＂constant＂）．The map $e: \operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K}) \rightarrow \mathbb{K}$ is an ordinal embedding （see Section 2．3．3）and for all $\lambda<\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})$ ，we have that $S\left(\overline{1}_{\lambda}\right)=e(\lambda)$ ．

6．Ind（for＂independence of order＂）．Let $f: \mu \rightarrow \mu$ be a bijection．Let $x^{\prime} \in \operatorname{Dom}\left(S_{\mu}\right)$ be non－negative and let $x_{\alpha}^{f}:=x_{f(\alpha)}$ ．Then $\chi^{f}$ is $S$－summable and $S(x)=S\left(x^{f}\right)$ ．

7．El（for＂elimination of zeroes＂）．A sequence $x$ is $S$－summable if and only if contract $(\mathbb{x})$ is $S$－summable；furthermore，$S(x)=S$（contract $(x))$ ．

8． $\boldsymbol{E x t}_{\mathbb{Q}}$（for＂extending series on $\mathbb{Q}$＂）．If $\mathfrak{x} \in \mathbb{Q}^{\omega}$ is a series converging（in $\mathbb{Q}$ ） to some $\ell \in \mathbb{K}$ ，then $S(\mathbb{x})=\ell$ 円

[^22]9. Or (after Nicole Oresme, 18, page 241]). For all $x \in \mathbb{K}$ such that $0<|x|<1$, the $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})$-sequence $\mathbb{g}^{x}$ defined by $\mathfrak{g}_{\alpha}^{x}:=\frac{1}{x^{\alpha}}$ is $S$-summable and $S\left(\mathfrak{g}^{x}\right)=\frac{1}{1-x}$; a sum satisfying Or will be called Oresmic.
10. Geo (for "geometric"). If $I$ with len $(I)=x$ is an interval, partitioned into a $\lambda$-sequence of disjoint interval $I_{\alpha}$ with $\operatorname{len}\left(I_{\alpha}\right)=x_{\alpha}$, then $\left(x_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \lambda}$ is $S$-summable and $S\left(\left(x_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \lambda}\right)=x$; a sum satisfying Geo will be called geometric.
11. $\operatorname{Tr}$ (for "truncation"). If $\nless<\operatorname{Dom}(S)$, then for all $\mu, \mathfrak{x} \upharpoonright \mu \in \operatorname{Dom}(S)$.

Fact 5.1.1. Let $S$ be a sum; we observe a number of immediate consequences of the properties listed:

1. If $S$ satisfies Ext, then $\mathbb{K}=\operatorname{Ran}(S)$ and $\mathbb{K}^{<\omega} \subseteq \operatorname{Dom}(S)$.
2. If $S$ satisfies Lin, and $\mu \in \operatorname{spect}(S)$, then $\overline{0}_{\mu}$ is $S$-summable and $S_{\mu}\left(\overline{0}_{\mu}\right)=0$.
3. If $S$ satisfies Ext and Conc, then $\operatorname{spect}(S)$ is closed under successors: if $x$ is positive and $S$-summable, then $x^{\sim} 1$ is too.
4. If $S$ satisfies Lin and Conc, $\mathfrak{x} \in \operatorname{Dom}\left(S_{\mu}\right)$, and $\lambda \in \operatorname{spect}(S)$, then $\mathfrak{火}^{\sim} \overline{0}_{\lambda} \in$ $\operatorname{Dom}(S)$ and $S(x)=S\left(x^{\sim} \overline{0}_{\lambda}\right)$.
5. If $S$ satisfies Ext and Comp, then $S$ is positive: given any positive $\mathfrak{x}$, let y be the sequence with $y_{0}:=x_{0}$ and $y_{\alpha}:=0$ (for $\alpha>0$ ); then $0<x_{0}=S(\mathrm{y}) \leq$ $S(x)$.
6. If $S$ satisfies Comp and $\mathbf{E l}$, then $S$ satisfies $\mathbf{T r}$.

Example 5.1.2. Let $S^{\text {finite }}$ be defined by $\operatorname{Dom}\left(S^{\text {finite }}\right):=\{x: \operatorname{supp}(x)$ is finite $\}$ and $S^{\text {finite }}(\mathrm{k}):=\sum_{\alpha \in \operatorname{supp}(\mathrm{x})} x_{\alpha}$. Clearly, $S^{\text {finite }}$ satisfies Ext, Lin, Conc, Comp, Ind, $\mathbf{E l}, \operatorname{Tr}$ (all inherited from finite sums), but not $\mathbf{E x t}_{\mathbb{Q}}$.

Example 5.1.3. For any $c \in \mathbb{K}$, let $S^{c}$ be the following sum:

$$
S^{c}(\mathbb{x})= \begin{cases}x_{\alpha_{0}}+\ldots+x_{\alpha_{n}} & \text { if } \operatorname{supp}(\mathbb{x})=\left\{x_{\alpha_{0}}, \ldots, x_{\alpha_{n}}\right\}, \\ c & \text { otherwise } .\end{cases}
$$

Then for all $c \in \mathbb{K}, S^{c}$ satisfies Ext, but not Lin as $S^{c}\left(\overline{1}_{1}+\overline{1}_{\omega}\right)=c \neq 1+c$.
Fairly weak conditions are enough to ensure that infinite sequences can have unbounded sums:

Remark 5.1.4. If $S$ satisfies Ext and Conc, and there is a $\mu \geq \omega$ and an $火 \in$ $\left(\mathbb{K}^{>0}\right)^{\mu}$ which is $S$-summable, then we have that for any $c \in \mathbb{K}$, there is an $S$ summable $y \in\left(\mathbb{K}^{>0}\right)^{\mu}$ such that $S(y)>c$ : if $S\left(x_{x}\right)<0$, let $m=c-S\left(x^{x}\right)$, otherwise let $m=c$. By Ext and Conc, $(m+1)^{\wedge}$ « is $S$-summable and $S\left((m+1)^{\wedge}\right.$ « $)=$ $m+1+S(x)$, so $m+1+S(x)>c$.

Combinations of the desiderata mean that certain sequences are not summable． For example，if $S$ satisfies Lin，Conc，Comp，and Cons ${ }_{e}$ ，then $\overline{1}_{\mathrm{bn}(\mathbb{K})}$ is not $S$－ summable．We can prove this by comparing $\overline{1}_{\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})}$ against each $\overline{1}_{\mu}$ for all $\mu<\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})$ ， which are $S$－summable and are such that $S_{\mu}\left(\overline{1}_{\mu}\right)=e(\mu)$ ，by Cons ${ }_{e}$ ．We can strengthen this by extending an argument for transfinite sums on ordinals from ［133，page 523］：

Lemma 5．1．5．If $S$ satisfies Ext，Lin，and Conc，then $\overline{1}_{\alpha}$ is not $S$－summable， for any $\alpha \geq \omega$ ．

Proof．The $\omega$ case is representative，so we assume $\alpha=\omega$ ．Assume towards a contradiction that $\overline{1}_{\omega} \in \operatorname{Dom}(S)$ ．By Ext and Fact 5．1．1 Part 2，$S\left(\overline{0}_{1}\right)=0$ and $S\left(\overline{1}_{1} \frown \overline{0}_{\omega}\right)=1$ ；by Conc，$S\left(\overline{0}_{1} \frown \overline{1}_{\omega}\right)=S\left(\overline{1}_{\omega}\right)$ ．By Lin，

$$
\begin{aligned}
S\left(\overline{1}_{\omega}\right) & \left.=S\left(\overline{0}_{\wedge}\right\urcorner \overline{1}_{\omega}+\overline{1}_{1} \smile \overline{0}_{\omega}\right) \quad\left(\text { i.e. } S \text { of the pointwise sum of } \overline{0}_{1} \frown \overline{1}_{\omega} \text { and } \overline{1}_{1} \frown \overline{0}_{\omega}\right) \\
& \left.\left.=S\left(\overline{0}_{\perp}\right\urcorner \overline{1}_{\omega}\right)+S\left(\overline{1}_{1}\right\urcorner \overline{0}_{\omega}\right) \\
& =S\left(\overline{1}_{\omega}\right)+1,
\end{aligned}
$$

a contradiction．
Proposition 5．1．6．If $S$ satisfies $\mathbf{E l}$ and Lin，then $S$ satisfies Conc．
Proof．Using Fact 5．1．1 Part 2，by Lin，$S\left(\overline{0}_{\lambda}\right)=0$ for all $\lambda \in \operatorname{spect}(S)$ ．Let $x \in \mathbb{K}^{\lambda}$ and $y \in \mathbb{K}^{\mu}$ be $S$－summable．By El，$\overline{0}_{\lambda} \frown$ y and $x^{\frown} \overline{0}_{\mu}$ are $S$－summable，and
 pointwise sum）is $S$－summable and $S\left(x^{\wedge}\right.$ y $)=S(x)+S(y)$ ．

Hence，the combination of $\mathbf{E x t}, \mathbf{L i n}$ ，and $\mathbf{E l}$ also shows that $\overline{1}_{\alpha}$ is not summable for any infinite $\alpha$ ．

Proposition 5．1．7．If $S$ satisfies Ext，Lin，Comp，and El，and $\mathfrak{x}$ is infinite， positive，and $S$－summable，then $x$ tends to 0 ．

Proof．By Proposition 5．1．6，$S$ satisfies Conc．Suppose that $火$ does not tend to 0. Then，there is some $\varepsilon>0$ and some subset $X \subseteq \operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})$ of cardinality $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})$ such that $x_{\xi}>\varepsilon$ for all $\xi \in X$ ．Define y by

$$
y_{\gamma}:= \begin{cases}x_{\gamma} & \text { if } \gamma \in X, \\ 0 & \text { otherwise } .\end{cases}
$$

By Comp，we have that y is $S$－summable and therefore，by $\mathbf{E l}$ ，contract $(\mathrm{y})=\bar{\varepsilon}_{\mathrm{bn}(\mathrm{K})}$ is $S$－summable．Hence，by Lin，$\overline{1}_{\alpha}$ is $S$－summable，in contradiction to Lemma 5．1．5

By the comments on page 98，if $S$ satisfies Lin，Comp，El，and Cons ${ }_{e}$ and 火 is a positive，and $S$－summable，bn $(\mathbb{K})$－sequence，then $火$ tends to 0 ．

## 5．2 Incompatibility of desiderata

Here，we show that combinations of desiderata are incompatible．In particular，a combination of the other desiderata will imply that $\mathbf{E x t}_{\mathbb{Q}}$ cannot hold．Any sum operation on non－Archimedean fields therefore cannot both extend the sums on $\mathbb{Q}$ and satisfy all of the desiderata．Approaches from the literature either turn on the problems in summing a geometric series（i．e．being Oresmic），or in summing a divided interval（i．e．Geo）．We state versions of these arguments in Remark 5．2．1 and Proposition 5．2．2．In fact，an underlying argument strengthens both of these approaches，namely Theorem 5．2．3．

Remark 5．2．1．A standard method of showing the failure of desiderata on non－ Archimedean fields is to consider geometric series，e．g．$\left(\frac{1}{2^{n}}\right)_{n \in \omega}$（see，for exam－ ple，［44，AP38］）．The key move is to show that $S\left(\left(\frac{1}{2^{\alpha}}\right)_{\alpha \in \omega}\right)=S\left(\left(\frac{1}{2^{\alpha}}\right)_{\alpha \in \kappa}\right)-$ $S\left(\overline{0}_{\omega}\left(\frac{1}{2^{\alpha}}\right)_{\alpha \in \kappa}\right)=1-\varepsilon<1$ ，for some $\varepsilon>0$ ，by showing that all of the neces－ sary sequences are summable．Using our terminology，we can state the result like so：if $\mathbb{K}$ is an exponential rcf，where $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})=\kappa$ ，with a sum $S$ satisfying Ext，Lin， Comp，El，and Or，and $火$ is defined by $x_{n}:=\frac{1}{2^{n}}$ ，then $S(火)<1$（so $S$ does not satisfy $\operatorname{Ext}_{\mathbb{Q}}$ ）．

Proposition 5．2．2（Folklore）．Let $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})>\omega$ and $S\left(\left(\frac{1}{2^{n}}\right)_{n \in \omega}\right)=1$ ．Then $S$ is not geometric．So，any sum satisfying Geo cannot satisfy Ext $_{\mathbb{Q}}$ ．

Proof．For all $n<\omega$ ，let $I_{n}:=\left[1-\frac{1}{2^{n}}, 1-\frac{1}{2^{n+1}}\right)$ ．Then $\left(\operatorname{len}\left(I_{n}\right)\right)_{n \in \omega}=\left(\frac{1}{2^{n}}\right)_{n \in \omega}$ ．So， $S\left(\operatorname{len}\left(\left[1-\frac{1}{2^{n}}, 1-\frac{1}{2^{n+1}}\right)\right)=1\right.$ ．However $\bigcup_{n \in \omega}\left[1-\frac{1}{2^{n}}, 1-\frac{1}{2^{n+1}}\right) \neq[0,1]$ ，because e．g． $\bigcup_{n \in \omega}\left[1-\frac{1}{2^{n}}, 1-\frac{1}{2^{n+1}}\right) \subsetneq\left[0,1-\frac{1}{\omega}\right)$ ．So， $\operatorname{len}\left(\bigcup_{n \in \omega}\left[1-\frac{1}{2^{n}}, 1-\frac{1}{2^{n+1}}\right) \leq 1-\frac{1}{\omega}\right.$ ．

Our principal incompatibility result strengthens Lemma 5．1．5 to all infinite positive sequences，assuming Comp：

Theorem 5．2．3（Folklore）．Suppose that $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})>\omega$ and that $S$ satisfies Ext， Lin，Conc，and Comp．Then no positive 火火 of infinite length is $S$－summable．

Proof．Suppose towards a contradiction that $x$ is positive，has length $\mu \geq \omega$ ，and is $S$－summable．

By Comp， $\mathfrak{x}\left\lceil\omega \frown \overline{0}_{\mu}\right.$ is $S$－summable．As $\omega<\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})$ ，and $\mathfrak{x} \upharpoonright \omega$ is positive， $\mathfrak{x} \upharpoonright \omega$ has a lower bound $b>0$ ．By Comp again， $\bar{b}_{\omega} \neg^{0} \overline{0}_{\mu}$ is $S$－summable，and hence，by Lin，$\overline{1}_{\omega} \overline{0}_{\mu}$ is $S$－summable．The rest is a variation of the proof of Lemma 5．1．5 without loss of generality，we can assume that $\mu \geq \omega^{2}$ ，so sequences of length $\omega+\mu$ or $1+\omega+\mu$ can be considered sequences of length $\mu$ ．

By Ext，$S\left(\overline{0}_{1}\right)=0$ and $\left.S\left(\overline{1}_{1}\right\urcorner \overline{0}_{\mu}\right)=1$ ；by Conc，$\left.\left.S\left(\overline{0}_{1} \frown \overline{1}_{\omega}\right\urcorner \overline{0}_{\mu}\right)=S\left(\overline{1}_{\omega}\right\urcorner \overline{0}_{\mu}\right)$ ． By Lin，noting that the following sequences have the same length，we have that：

$$
\begin{aligned}
S\left(\overline{1}_{\omega} \frown \overline{0}_{\mu}\right) & \left.\left.=S\left(\overline{0}_{1} \frown \overline{1}_{\omega}\right\urcorner \overline{0}_{\mu}+\overline{1}_{1}\right\urcorner \overline{0}_{\mu}\right) \\
& \left.\left.\left.=S\left(\overline{0}_{1}\right\urcorner \overline{1}_{\omega}\right\urcorner \overline{0}_{\mu}\right)+S\left(\overline{1}_{1}\right\urcorner \overline{0}_{\mu}\right) \\
& \left.=S\left(\overline{1}_{\omega}\right\urcorner \overline{0}_{\mu}\right)+1,
\end{aligned}
$$

a contradiction．

Corollary 5.2.4. Suppose that $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})>\omega$ and that $S$ satisfies Ext, Lin, Conc, and Comp. Then $S$ fails Ext $_{\mathbb{Q}}$.

The reasoning in Theorem 5.2 .3 is fairly flexible, e.g. if $S$ satisfies Ext, Lin, Concat, and Tr , then no positive infinite sequence is $S$-summable. Note that, unlike in Remark 5.2.1 and Proposition 5.2.2, the value of $S\left(\overline{1}_{\omega}\right)$ in Lemma 5.1.5 is not important, summability alone suffices.

### 5.3 Candidate notions of sum

In this section, we define and analyse several notions of sum from the literature, and some further natural definitions. As we have seen in the previous section, notably in Theorem 5.2.3, each notion of sum must violate some desiderata and for each candidate, we identify which desiderata are satisfied or violated. The results are summarised in Table 1.1.

### 5.3.1 Model-theoretic sums

## Finite Model-theoretic Sum

Let $\mathbb{K}$ be an rcf. By Proposition 2.3.7, we can fix an ordinal embedding $e: \operatorname{bn}(\kappa) \rightarrow$ $\kappa$. For the remainder of this section, we write $\lambda$ for $e(\lambda)$ for any ordinal $\lambda<\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})$ where the ordinal embedding $e$ is fixed. The following definition generalises one of Rubinstein-Salzedo and Swaminathan's [179, Definition 39]:2

Definition 5.3.1. Let $\operatorname{len}(\mathbb{x})=\lambda<\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})$. If there is a unique rational function $f \in \mathbb{K}(X)$ such that $f(n)=x_{0}+\ldots+x_{n}$ (note that $\mathbb{N} \subseteq \mathbb{K}$ ), then we say that $f$ sums 火. In that case, define $S^{\text {finmod }}(\mathbb{x}):=f(\lambda)$.

Proposition 5.3.2. Let $\mathbb{K}$ be an rcf. Then $S^{\text {finmod }}$ satisfies Lin and Cons ${ }_{e}$.
Proof. For Lin, let $\mathfrak{x}=\left(x_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \mu}$ and $y=\left(y_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \mu}$ be $S^{\text {finmod }}$-summable and $a \in \mathbb{K}$. Then there are unique $f, g \in \mathbb{K}(X)$ which sum $\boldsymbol{x}$, y respectively. So, $a . f+g \in \mathbb{K}(X)$ and $a . f+g(n)=\sum_{\alpha \leq n}\left(\left(a \times x_{\alpha}\right)+y_{\alpha}\right)$. If a distinct $h$ also sums $a$. 火 $+y$ then $h-a . f$ sums $y$, contradicting that $y$ is $S^{\text {finmod }}$ summable. So, $a . f+g$ uniquely sums $a . \mathfrak{x}+y$. For Cons, use the identity function.

Remark 5.3.3. On rcfs, $S^{\text {finmod }}$ satisfies a weakening of Ind, namely constancy under any bijection $f: \alpha \rightarrow \alpha$ such that $f(n)=n$ for all $n \in \omega$ (as if $f$ sums $\left(x_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \lambda}$ then $f$ sums $\left.\left(x_{f(\alpha)}\right)_{\alpha \in \lambda}\right)$.

To prove the desiderata of $S^{\text {finmod }}$, we use a standard fact about polynomials:
Remark 5.3.4. Let $\mathfrak{x} \in \mathbb{K}^{\omega}$. Suppose $f, g \in \mathbb{K}(X)$ sum $\mathfrak{x}$, where $g=\frac{p^{g}}{q^{g}}$ for some unique coprime $p^{g}, q^{g} \in \mathbb{K}[X]$, likewise for $f$. Let $P_{n}$ be the sum of the first $n$ terms of «. Suppose $p^{g}=\sum_{i=1}^{N_{g}} p_{i}^{g} x^{i}$ and $q^{g}=\sum_{j=1}^{M_{g}} q_{j}^{g} x^{j}$ for $p_{i}^{g}, q_{j}^{g} \neq 0$. For every $n \in \omega$, $g(n)=P_{n}$, so $p^{g}(n)=P_{n} \cdot q^{g}(n)$, i.e. $\sum_{i=1}^{N_{g}} p_{i}^{g} n^{i}=P_{n} \cdot \sum_{j=1}^{M_{g}} q_{j}^{g} n^{j}$, likewise for $f$. By

[^23]a simple algebraic argument, we can solve $\max \left\{M_{g}, M_{f}\right\}+\max \left\{N_{g}, N_{f}\right\}+1$-many of these simultaneous equations, which then shows that $M_{g}=M_{f}, N_{g}=N_{f}$, $p_{i}^{g}=p_{i}^{f}$, and $q_{j}^{g}=q_{j}^{f}$. So, $f=g$.

Proposition 5.3.5. If $\mathbb{K}$ is an rcf, then $S^{\text {finmod }}$ violates Ext, Conc, El, Comp, and Ind.

Proof. For Ext, let $\alpha \geq \omega$ and $\boldsymbol{火}=\overline{0}_{\alpha} \frown 1$. Let $c_{0}: \mathbb{K} \rightarrow\{0\}$ be the constant 0 function. Then $c_{0}$ sums $x$. By Remark 5.3.4, $c_{0}$ uniquely sums $x$. Hence $S^{\text {finmod }}(\mathbb{x})=0$. But assuming Ext, $S^{\text {finmod }}(\mathbb{x})=1$, a contradiction. The same example shows that $S^{\text {finmod }}$ fails El.

The identity $f \in \mathbb{K}(X)$ sums the sequence $\overline{1}_{\omega}$ and thus for any sequence $火$ with $\mathfrak{x}\left\lceil\omega=\overline{1}_{\omega}\right.$, we get $S^{\text {finmod }}(\mathbb{x})=\operatorname{id}(\omega)=\omega$. Similarly, the constant zero function sums the sequence $\overline{0}_{\omega}$, and thus any sequence $x$ starting with $\omega$ many zeros, $S^{\text {finmod }}(\mathbb{x})=0$. Let $y$ be any sequence such that $S^{\text {finmod }}(y)>0$. This gives immediate refutations of Conc and Ind: if Conc holds, then $\omega=S^{\text {finmod }}\left(\overline{1}_{\omega} \curvearrowright y\right)=$ $\omega+S^{\text {finmod }}(y)>\omega$. If Ind holds, then $0=\overline{0}_{\omega} \frown \overline{1}_{\omega}=\overline{1}_{\omega} \overline{0}_{\omega}=\omega$.

For Comp, let $\lambda \geq \omega$. The sequence $\overline{1}_{\lambda}$ is $S^{\text {finmod }}$-summable, and summed by the identify, $f(x)=x$. We define the 'zero-one' sequence like so:

$$
x_{\alpha}:= \begin{cases}0 & \text { if } \alpha=2 \beta \\ 1 & \text { if } \alpha=2 \beta+1 .\end{cases}
$$

Suppose, for a contradiction, that $S^{\text {finmod }}$ satisfies Comp. Then, $\overline{1}_{\lambda}$ point-wise bounds $\left(x_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \lambda}$, so $\left(x_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \lambda}$ is $S^{\text {finmod }}$-summable, as summed by some $\frac{p}{q} \in \mathbb{K}(X)$. As $x_{0}=0, p(0)=0$, so $p=x \cdot p^{\prime}$ for some $p \in \mathbb{K}[X]$. For all $n<\omega \leq \lambda$, $\left(x \cdot \frac{p^{\prime}}{q}\right)(2 n)=n$, i.e. $2 n \cdot \frac{p^{\prime}(2 n)}{q(2 n)}=n$. So, $2 \cdot p^{\prime}(2 n)=q(2 n)$. By Remark 5.3.4. we know that $2 p^{\prime}=q$. Hence $\frac{p}{q}=\frac{1}{2} x$. So $\frac{p}{q}$ does not sum $\left(x_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \lambda}$ : it is incorrect at all odd $m<\omega$.

The underlying reason is that $S^{\text {finmod }}$ ignores all infinite entries in a summable sequence. Any sum which depends on only a $<\kappa$-length subsequence of an $S$ summable $x$ has the same fate: by a variation of the proof of Proposition 5.3.5, it will fail Ext, Conc, Ind, and El.

## Infinite model-theoretic sum

The natural modification of $S^{\text {finmod }}$ to avoid Proposition 5.3.5 is to require that the sum takes into account infinite coordinates of a sequence. As before, we assume that $\mathbb{K}$ is an rcf with an ordinal embedding $e: \operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K}) \rightarrow \mathbb{K}$ and we identify $\operatorname{bn}(\kappa)$ with the $\operatorname{Ran}(e)$.

Definition 5.3.6. Let len $(\mathbb{x})=\lambda<\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})$. If there is a unique rational function $f \in \mathbb{K}(X)$ such that $f(0)=x_{0}$ and for all $\alpha<\lambda, f(\alpha+1)=f(\alpha)+x_{\alpha+1}$, then we say that $f$ well-sums $x$. In that case, define $S^{\text {infmod }}(\mathbb{x}):=f(\lambda)$.

Proposition 5.3.7. The sum $S^{\text {infmod }}$ satisfies Lin, but not Ext, El, Ind, Conc, and Comp.

Proof．The proof of Lin is exactly as in Proposition 5．3．2．
Next we prove that $S^{\text {infmod }}$ violates Ext．Suppose for a contradiction that it satisfies $S^{\text {infmod }}$ ．Let $\lambda<\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})$ and $火:=\overline{0}_{\omega} \frown 1 \frown \overline{0}_{\lambda}$ ．If $S^{\text {infmod }}$ satisfies Ext，then
 unique $p, q \in \mathbb{K}[X]$ such that $\frac{p}{q}$ well－sums $x$ ．Hence $\frac{p(n)}{q(n)}=0$ for all $n \in \omega$ ，and $\frac{p(\alpha)}{q(\alpha)}=1$ for all $\alpha \in \lambda \backslash \omega$ ．So，$p(n)=0$ for all $n \in \omega$ ．As $p$ is a polynomial，$p$ has only finitely many turning points（as in Corollary 4．2．6，since we assume $\mathbb{K}$ is an $\mathrm{rcf})$ ．So，if $p(n)=0$ for all $n \in \omega, p$ is the constant 0 function．Hence $\frac{p(\alpha)}{q(\alpha)}=0$ for all $\alpha \in \lambda \backslash \omega$ ，a contradiction．

Moreover，the constant 1 function clearly uniquely represents the sequence $\overline{1}_{1}$ and the sequence $1^{\wedge} \overline{0}_{\lambda}$ ．So，by comparing with $火, ~ S^{\text {infmod }}$ fails $\mathbf{E l}$ and Ind respectively．

Meanwhile，the constant 0 function uniquely sums $\overline{0}_{\omega}$ and $\overline{0}_{\lambda}$ ，so $\overline{0}_{\omega}$ and $\overline{0}_{\lambda}$ are $S^{\text {infmod }}$－summable，and so is $\overline{1}_{1}$ ，but $火$ is not，hence $S^{\text {infmod }}$ violates Conc．

Lastly，note that $\overline{1}_{\lambda}$ pointwise－bounds $x$ ，and is $S^{\text {infmod }}$－summable，as it is uniquely summed by the identity function．So，$S^{\text {infmod }}$ fails Comp．

Finally，we can expand the permissible representations of sums，beyond $\mathbb{K}(X)$ ． Rubinstein－Salzedo and Swaminathan＇s sum on No includes exp，log，and arctan． For an arbitrary exponential field， $\mathbb{K}$ ，there are two natural expansions of $\mathbb{K}(X)$ ：

1．Let $G(\mathbb{K}) \subseteq \mathbb{K}^{\mathbb{K}}$ be the closure of $\mathbb{K}(X) \cup\{\exp , \log \}$ under addition，sub－ traction，multiplication，and composition of functions，and by division by non－zero functions．

2．Let $H(\mathbb{K}):=\{f: \mathbb{K} \geq 0 \rightarrow \mathbb{K}: f$ is defined using a formula in the language of exponential rcfs with a single free variable $\}$ ．

Then $\mathbb{K}(X) \subsetneq G(\mathbb{K}) \subsetneq H(\mathbb{K})$, e．g．$h=\left\{\begin{array}{ll}0 & \text { if } x>0, \\ 1 & \text { otherwise }\end{array}\right.$ is in $H(\mathbb{K}) \backslash G(\mathbb{K})$ ．
If $S^{G}$ and $S^{H}$ are the sums defined as in Definition 5．3．6．but with $\mathbb{K}(X)$ replaced by $G(\mathbb{K})$ and $H(\mathbb{K})$ ，respectively，then Proposition 5．3．7 still holds for $S^{G}$ ，using the same argument．A similar result holds for $S^{H}$ with a more careful argument that there is no unique $h \in H(\mathbb{K})$ which represents the sum of $火$ ．The key observation is that $\omega$ is not definable in the language of exponential rcfs（as the theory is o－minimal，which follows in much the same way as 144，Corollary 3．3．23］），so we cannot define $J_{\neg \omega}$（from Example 4．1．4），as is required to well－sum $\overline{0}_{\omega} \frown 1 \frown \overline{0}_{\lambda}$ ．

## 5．3．2 Suprema of finite sums

In this section，we analyse the definition of sums as the supremum of the collection of finite subsums（Theorem 5．3．12 and a version of its proof were communicated by Galeotti）．As usual，if $X$ is a set and $\mu$ is a cardinal，let $[X]^{<\mu}=\{A \subseteq X$ ： $|X|<\mu\}$ ．

The basic idea of this definition is to consider a sequence $火$ of length $\alpha$, its finite partial sums, $\sum_{\gamma \in I} x_{\gamma}$, for $I \in[\alpha]^{<\omega}$ and the sets

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \mathrm{FS}(\mathbb{x}):=\left\{\sum_{\gamma \in I} x_{\gamma}: I \in[\alpha]^{<\omega}\right\} \text { and } \\
& \mathrm{FB}(\mathrm{x}):=\{b \in \mathbb{K}: \forall x \in \operatorname{FS}(\mathbb{x})(x \leq b)\} .
\end{aligned}
$$

Note that the definition of $\mathrm{FS}(x)$ ignores all negative values of the sequence $x$, so we need to handle these separately. For a sequence $\mathcal{x}$, let $x_{\gamma}^{+}:=\min \left(0, x_{\gamma}\right)$ and $x_{\gamma}^{-}:=-\max \left(0, x_{\gamma}\right)$. Clearly, $\mathfrak{k}=\mathfrak{k}^{+}-\mathfrak{k}^{-}$.

Definition 5.3.8. We define

$$
\operatorname{Dom}\left(S^{\text {supfin }}\right):=\left\{x^{x}: \text { both } \operatorname{FS}\left(\mathfrak{x}^{+}\right) \text {and } \operatorname{FS}\left(\mathfrak{x}^{-}\right) \text {have a supremum }\right\}
$$

and $S^{\text {supfin }}(\mathbb{x}):=\sup \left(\mathrm{FS}\left(\mathfrak{x}^{+}\right)\right)-\sup \left(\mathrm{FS}\left(\mathfrak{x}^{-}\right)\right)$if this exists.
Furthermore, observe that $\mathrm{FS}(\mathrm{x})$ can only have a supremum if $\operatorname{cof}(\mathrm{FS}(\mathrm{x}))=$ $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})$ or if $\mathrm{FS}(x)$ has a maximal element (Proposition 2.3.5). Therefore, if $x$ is a sequence of length $\lambda<\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})$, then $\mathrm{FS}(\mathrm{x})$ can only have a supremum if $\mathrm{FS}(\mathrm{x})$ has a maximal element which implies that $\operatorname{supp}(x)$ is finite. The main result of this section, Theorem 5.3.12, proves that this is true in general, i.e. all summable sequences have finite support.

In particular, if $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})>\omega$, then $\overline{1}_{\omega}$ is not $S^{\text {supfin }}$-summable, and therefore, $S^{\text {supfin }}$ does not satisfy Cons $_{e}$.

Lemma 5.3.9. For any $\mathbb{K}, S^{\text {supfin }}$ satisfies Ext, Ind, El, and is positive.
Proof. Positivity and Ext are trivial. For Ind, let $\mathfrak{x} \in \mathbb{K}^{\kappa}$, and $f: \kappa \rightarrow \kappa$ be a bijection, then note that $\mathrm{FB}(\mathrm{x})=\mathrm{FB}\left(\left(x_{f(\alpha)}\right)_{\alpha \in \kappa}\right)$. For El, note that $\mathrm{FB}(\operatorname{contract}(\mathrm{x}))=$ FB(x).

Proposition 5.3.10. If $x$ and $y$ are non-negative $S^{\text {supfin }_{\text {-summable }} \text { sequences of }}$ length $\kappa$ and $a \in \mathbb{K}$ with $a \geq 0$, then so are $x+a . y$ and $x^{\sim} \mathcal{y}$ and

$$
\begin{aligned}
S^{\text {supfin }}(\mathfrak{x}+a . y) & =S^{\text {supfin }}(\mathfrak{x})+a . S^{\text {supfin }}(y) \text { and } \\
S^{\text {supfin }}(\mathfrak{x}-y) & =S^{\text {supfin }}(x)+S^{\text {supfin }}(y)
\end{aligned}
$$

In other words, $S^{\text {supfin }}$ satisfies Lin and Conc for non-negative sequences of length $\kappa$.

Proof. Since the sequences are non-negative, we do not need to split them into their positive and negative part. Let $x:=\sup (\mathrm{FS}(x))$ and $y:=\sup (\mathrm{FS}(y))$. We show that $\mathrm{FS}(火+a . y)$ has supremum $x+a . y$. First of all, $x+a . y$ is an upper bound of $\mathrm{FS}(\rightsquigarrow+a . y)$ : if $I \in[\kappa]^{<\omega}$, then $\sum_{\gamma \in I}\left(x_{\gamma}+a . y_{\gamma}\right)=\sum_{\gamma \in I} x_{\gamma}+a . \sum_{\gamma \in I} y_{\gamma}$, so each element of $\mathrm{FS}(x+a \cdot y)$ is below $x+a . y$.

Let $\varepsilon>0$ ．Find $b \in \mathrm{FS}(\mathrm{x})$ and $c \in \mathrm{FS}(y)$ such that $b+a . c \geq x+a y-\varepsilon$ ．Let $I$ and $J$ be finite sets such that $b=\sum_{\gamma \in I} x_{\gamma}$ and $c=\sum_{\delta \in J} y_{\delta}$ ．Then

$$
\sum_{\gamma \in I \cup J} x_{\gamma}+a . y_{\gamma} \geq b+a . c \geq x+a . y-\varepsilon .
$$

Thus $x+a . y$ is the least upper bound of $\mathrm{FS}(x+a . y)$ ．
Using El，we get that $S^{\text {supfin }}\left(\overline{0}_{\mu} \frown \mathfrak{x}\right)=S^{\text {supfin }}\left(x^{\sim} \frown \overline{0}_{\mu}\right)=S^{\text {supfin }}(\mathbb{x})$ ，so as in the proof of Proposition 5．1．6，we write $\mathfrak{c}^{\wedge}$ y as $\left(\overline{0}_{\kappa} \frown\right.$ у）$+\left(\mathfrak{c} \frown \overline{0}_{\kappa}\right)$（i．e．the pointwise sum of sequences $\left(\overline{0}_{\kappa} \frown y\right)$ and（ $\left.\mathfrak{c}^{\frown} \overline{0}_{\kappa}\right)$ ）and obtain Conc from the linearity claim．

By noting that Lemma 5．1．5 also holds when restricted to non－negative se－ quences，we immediately have that $\overline{1}_{\alpha}$ is not $S^{\text {supfin }}$－summable for any infinite $\alpha$ ． To prove the general result，that no infinite positive sequence is $S^{\text {supfin }}$－summable， we use the following lemma：

Lemma 5．3．11．Let $火$ be a sequence such that there is some $\alpha$ with $x_{\alpha}>0$ and there are infinitely many $\beta$ such that $x_{\beta} \geq x_{\alpha}$ ．Then $火$ is not $S^{\text {supfin }}$－summable．

Proof．It is enough to show that $\mathrm{x}^{+}$is not summable，so without loss of generality， we can assume that $火$ is positive．By Ind，the order of elements does not matter， so again without loss of generality，assume that $\alpha=0$ ，i．e．$x_{0}>0$ and there are infinitely other values at least as big．

Let $x_{\gamma}^{\prime}:=x_{1+\gamma}$ ，i．e．$x^{\prime}$ is the sequence $火$ with the $0^{\text {th }}$ entry removed．Towards a contradiction，we assume that $火$ is summable；by Ext and Conc for non－negative sequences（Lemma 5．3．9 \＆Proposition 5．3．10），we have that $S^{\text {supfin }}(\mathbb{x})=x_{0}+$ $S^{\text {supfin }}\left(x^{\prime}\right)>S^{\text {supfin }}\left(\mathfrak{x}^{\prime}\right)$ ．However，for each $\sum_{\gamma \in I} x_{\gamma} \in \mathrm{FS}\left(x^{x}\right)$ ，if $0 \in I$ ，we can find $J$ with $J=\{\beta\} \cup I \backslash\{0\}$ and $\beta \notin I$ such that $\sum_{\gamma \in I} x_{\gamma} \leq \sum_{\gamma \in J} x_{\gamma} \in \mathrm{FS}\left(x^{\prime}\right)$ ． Thus $\sup \left(\mathrm{FS}\left(x^{\prime}\right)\right) \leq \sup \left(\mathrm{FS}\left(x^{\prime}\right)\right)$ and thus $S^{\text {supfin }}\left(x^{\prime}\right)<S^{\text {supfin }}\left(x^{\prime}\right)$ ．But this is a contradiction．

Theorem 5．3．12．Let $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})>\omega$ and $\mathfrak{x}$ be $S^{\text {supfin }}{ }_{- \text {summable．Then }} \operatorname{supp}(\mathbb{x})$ is finite．

Proof．Suppose $x$ is summable，so both $x^{+}$and $x^{-}$are summable．We show that $\mathfrak{x}^{+}$has finite support；the same proof shows that $-\mathfrak{x}^{-}$has finite support whence $\mathfrak{z}^{-}$has finite support，so the whole sequence $火$ has finite support．

We create a sequence $y$ that is a re－ordering of $x^{+}$with the property that for $\alpha<\beta, y_{\alpha} \geq y_{\beta}$ ．By Ind，$y$ is summable if and only of $x^{+}$is summable．Also $|\operatorname{supp}(y)|=\left|\operatorname{supp}\left(x^{+}\right)\right|$．Note that $y_{\omega}=0$ ，because otherwise，$y$ has infinitely many values at least as big as $y_{\omega}$ ，and therefore contradicts Lemma 5．3．11．Thus $\operatorname{supp}(y)$ is an ordinal $\alpha \leq \omega$ ．

If $\operatorname{supp}(y)=\omega$ ，then no finite sum of elements of $y$ can be an upper bound of $\mathrm{FS}(\mathrm{y})$ ，so $\operatorname{cof}(\mathrm{FS}(\mathrm{y}))=\omega$ ．But that means that $\mathrm{FS}(y)$ has no supremum（since $\omega<\mathrm{bn}(\kappa)$ ），so y is not summable．Therefore $\operatorname{supp}(\mathrm{y})$ is a natural number whence $\operatorname{supp}\left(\mathrm{x}^{+}\right)$is finite．

This means that $S^{\text {supfin }}$ trivialises by being equal to $S^{\text {finite }}$ from Example 5．1．2， As a Pyrrhic victory，this，of course，implies that $S^{\text {supfin }}$ satisfies all of the desiderata
that finite sums satisfy, i.e. Lin and Conc for arbitrary sequences, Comp, and Tr. It does not satisfy $\operatorname{Ext}_{\mathbb{Q}} \mathbf{H}^{3}$

## Simplest upper bounds

The reason for the fact that $S^{\text {supfin }}$ trivialised was that in most cases, the supremum $\mathrm{FS}(\mathbb{x})$ does not exist. One idea is to replace the supremum operation with some other operation that is guaranteed to find an upper bound.

Let $\mathbb{K}$ be an initial subfield of No. Recall that if $\mathrm{FB}(\mathbb{x})$ is non-empty, Conway's simplicity theorem (Theorem 2.3.9) guarantees the existence of a simplest element. So we let $\operatorname{Dom}\left(S^{\text {simple }}\right)=\{\mathrm{x}: \mathrm{FB}(\mathrm{x})$ is non-empty $\}$ and let $S^{\text {simple }}(\mathrm{x})$ the unique element of minimal length in $\mathrm{FB}(\mathrm{x})$ which exists by Theorem 2.3.9.

Clearly, $S^{\text {simple }}$ satisfies Ind and $\mathbf{E l}$, by definition. Now, if $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})>\omega, \overline{1}_{\omega}$ becomes summable, since the ordinal $\omega$ is the simplest surreal bigger than all finite partial sums, so $S^{\text {simple }}\left(\overline{1}_{\omega}\right)=\omega$. But the same is true for any infinite sequence of 1s, so if $\lambda \geq \omega, S^{\text {simple }}\left(\overline{1}_{\lambda}\right)=\omega$. Consequently, $S^{\text {simple }}$ cannot satisfy Conc, Cons $e$ (for any ordinal embedding $e$ ), and Lin.

Proposition 5.3.13. The sum $S^{\text {simple }}$ satisfies Comp.
Proof. Consider $火$ and $y$ such that $x_{\alpha} \leq y_{\alpha}$; then for each finite $I, \sum_{\alpha \in I} x_{\alpha} \leq$ $\sum_{\alpha \in I} y_{\alpha}$, and so $\mathrm{FB}(x) \supseteq \mathrm{FB}(y)$. Thus, if $\mathrm{FB}(\mathrm{y})$ is non-empty, then so is $\mathrm{FB}(\mathrm{x})$. Furthermore, if $m_{x}$ and $m_{y}$ are the unique elements of minimal length of $\mathrm{FB}(x)$ and $\mathrm{FB}(\mathrm{y})$, respectively, then either $m_{\mathrm{z}}=m_{y}$, in which case $S^{\text {simple }}(\mathrm{x})=S^{\text {simple }}(\mathrm{y})$; or they are different and $m_{\nless}$ is strictly shorter than $m_{y}$. In that case, it is not possible that $m_{y} \leq m_{\nless}$ (since otherwise $m_{\nless} \in \mathrm{FB}(y)$, contradicting the minimality of $m_{y}$ ), so $S^{\text {simple }}(\mathbb{x})=m_{x}<m_{y}=S^{\text {simple }}(y)$.

Even Ext fails badly if $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})>\omega$ : if $x, y$ are surreal numbers such that $x<y$, and the length of $y$ is smaller than the length of $x$, then the length one sequence of value $x$ will not get $x$ assigned as the sum. E.g. the simplest surreal in the class $\{x: x \geq \omega-1\}$ is the ordinal $\omega$. Therefore the length one sequence with single value $\omega-1$ would be assigned the sum $\omega>\omega-1$.

### 5.3.3 Hahn field sums

Recall the definition of a Hahn field, $H(\mathbb{R}, \mathbb{G})$, where $\mathbb{G}$ is a divisible ordered group (Definition 2.3.16). If $f \in \mathbb{H}(\mathbb{R}, \mathbb{G})$, we think of $f$ as a formal power series $\mathrm{S}_{i \in \operatorname{supp}(f)} f(i) X^{i}$. The natural transfinite sum on a Hahn field is pointwise (see [36, page 40], 92, §3.1], 93, and 184).

Definition 5.3.14. Let $\mathbb{H}=\mathbb{H}(\mathbb{R}, \mathbb{G})$ be a Hahn field and $\mathbb{K} \subseteq \mathbb{H}$ and $\mathbb{h}$ a sequence in $\mathbb{K}$ of length $\mu$. We say that $\mathbb{h}=\left(\mathrm{S}_{i \in \operatorname{supp}\left(f_{\alpha}\right)} f_{\alpha}(i) X^{i}\right)_{\alpha \in \mu}$ is $S^{\text {point }}$-summable (for "pointwise") if the following hold:

[^24]1. the set $I:=\bigcup_{\alpha \in \mu} \operatorname{supp}\left(f_{\alpha}\right)$ is well-ordered;
2. for each $i \in I, g(i):=\sum_{\alpha \in \mu} f_{\alpha}(i)$ converges in $\mathbb{R}$ (if $i \notin I$, let $\left.g(i):=0\right)$;
3. the function $g \in \mathbb{K}$.

Then $S^{\text {point }}(\mathfrak{h}):=g$.
Intuitively, we arrange a sequence into an array of coefficients, and sum the $\mathbb{R}$-coefficients in each column $i \in \mathbb{G}$
Proposition 5.3.15. Suppose that $\mathbb{G}$ is an ordered group with a strictly increasing sequence $\left(i_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha<\kappa}$. Then $\kappa \subseteq \operatorname{spect}\left(S^{\text {point }}\right)$ on $\mathbb{H}_{\kappa}(\mathbb{R}, \mathbb{G})$ and $\kappa+1 \subseteq \operatorname{spect}\left(S^{\text {point }}\right)$ on $\mathbb{H}(\mathbb{R}, \mathbb{G})$.

Proof. Consider $x_{\alpha}$ with $\operatorname{supp}\left(x_{\alpha}\right)=\left\{i_{\alpha}\right\}$ and $x_{\alpha}\left(i_{\alpha}\right)=1$. Then $x$ is $S^{\text {point }}$ _ summable in $\mathbb{H}(\mathbb{R}, \mathbb{G})$ and all proper initial segments of $x$ are $S^{\text {point }}$-summable in both $\mathbb{H}_{\kappa}(\mathbb{R}, \mathbb{G})$ and $\mathbb{H}(\mathbb{R}, \mathbb{G})$.

If $\left|\kappa^{<\kappa}\right|=\kappa$, each of $\mathrm{No}_{<\kappa}$, and $\mathrm{No}_{\leq \kappa}$ are Hahn fields, and No is a "Hahn Field" (the class-sized analogue of a Hahn field) [36, Theorem 21]. Thus, $S^{\text {point }}$ is defined on $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa} \varsubsetneqq \mathrm{No}_{\leq \kappa}$. This sum satisfies most desiderata.
Proposition 5.3.16 (Folklore). Let $\mathbb{K}$ be a subfield of the Hahn field, $\mathbb{H}(\mathbb{R}, \mathbb{G})$, such that for all $r \in \mathbb{R}, r \cdot X^{0} \in \mathbb{K}$. Then $S^{\text {point }}$ satisfies Ext, Lin, Conc, El, and $\operatorname{Ext}_{\mathbb{Q}}$ on $\mathbb{K}$.

Proof. All properties are directly inherited from the corresponding properties of the $\mathbb{R}$-sum used in the definition.

Remark 5.3.17. If $\mathbb{K}$ is a subfield of a Hahn field, we have a small amount of Ind, using that ordinary $\mathbb{R}$-sum satisfies Ind for absolutely convergent sequences: let $\left(x_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \lambda}$ be $S_{\text {point }}$-summable. Suppose $x_{\alpha}=\mathrm{S}_{I_{\alpha}}^{\mathbb{K}} r_{i}^{\alpha} X^{i}$ is such that for all $i \in \bigcup_{\alpha \in \lambda} I_{\alpha}$, $\left(\sum_{\alpha \leq \beta} r_{i}^{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \beta}$ is absolutely convergent in $\mathbb{R}$. Then $S_{\text {point }}$ satisfies Ind for this sequence.

Proposition 5.3.18. On $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$, $S^{\text {point }}$ does not satisfy Ind, Comp, Cons ${ }_{e}$, or Geom.

Proof. Let $火=\left(x_{n}\right)_{n \in \omega}$ be a sequence such that the series $\sum_{n \in \omega} x_{n}$ converges, but does not converge absolutely. So, by the Riemann sum theorem [180, Theorem 3.54], there is a permutation $\pi$ such that $\sum_{n \in \omega} x_{\pi(n)}$ does not converge. Then define $f_{n}(0):=x_{n}$ and $f_{n}^{\pi}(0):=x_{\pi(n)}$. Clearly, $\mathbb{C}^{\pi}$ is a re-ordering of $\mathbb{G}$, so Ind implies that if one of these is summable, then so is the other. But $\mathbb{f}$ is summable and $\mathbb{Q}^{\pi}$ is not.

By Theorem 5.2.3 and Proposition 5.3.16. Cost $_{e}$ fails. As $\left(\frac{1}{n}\right)_{n \in \omega}$ is $S^{\text {point }}$ summable, so is $\left(\frac{\omega}{n}\right)_{n \in \omega}$. But then $\left(\frac{\omega}{n}\right)_{n \in \omega}$ pointwise bounds $\overline{1}_{\omega}$, which, by Theorem 5.2.3, is not $S^{\text {point }}$-summable. Hence, Comp fails. Observing that $r . X^{0} \in \mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ for all $r \in \mathbb{R}$, Propositions 5.2.2 and 5.3.16 imply that Geom fails.

[^25]This reveals the main issue with $S_{\text {point }}$ ，that coefficients for different $g, h \in$ $\mathfrak{G}$ don＇t interact：there is no sequence，$\left(x_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \mu}$ ，where $x_{\alpha}=r_{\alpha} \cdot X^{g}$ such that $S_{\text {point }}\left(\left(x_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \mu}\right)=\mathrm{S}_{h \in J}^{K} r_{h} \cdot X^{h}$ for $g \notin J$ ．

## 5．3．4 Point－wise sequential limits

The following definition of a sum on the surreal numbers was suggested in 134 ， ［150］．Surreal numbers are sequences，so the sequence of partial sums can be considered as a sequence of sequences；at limits，we can ask whether the digits of this sequence stabilise pointwise．E．g．，for each $n \in \mathbb{N}, \sum_{n}\left(\frac{1}{2^{m}}\right)=1-\frac{1}{2^{n+1}}=$ $1^{\sim} 0^{\sim} \overline{1}_{n}$ ．This sequence stabilises every digit，so a natural limit is $1^{\wedge} 0^{\sim} \overline{1}_{\omega}$ ．

Let $\mathbb{K}$ be an initial subfield of No．If $火$ is any sequence of surreals of limit length $\lambda$ ，we say that x stabilises pointwise if，for each $\alpha$ ，there is some $\beta$ such that for all $\gamma, \gamma^{\prime}>\beta, x_{\gamma}(\alpha)=x_{\gamma^{\prime}}(\alpha)$（including the case＂$x_{\gamma}(\alpha)$ is undefined＂）．In this case， we call the unique surreal，$x$ ，defined by $x(\alpha)=0$ if $火$ stabilises on 0 at digit $\alpha$ and $x(\alpha)=1$ if $火$ stabilises on 1 at digit $\alpha$ the pointwise limit of $火$ and denote it by pwlim（x）．

Let $\propto$ be any sequence of elements of $\mathbb{K}$ of length $\mu$ ．We inductively define the sequence $s=\left(s_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha<\mu}$ of partial sums of $火$ by

$$
\begin{aligned}
s_{0} & :=0, \\
s_{\alpha+1} & :=s_{\alpha}+x_{\alpha}, \text { and } \\
s_{\lambda} & :=\operatorname{pwlim}(s \upharpoonright \lambda) \text { if } \lambda \text { is a limit ordinal and } s \upharpoonright \lambda \text { stabilises pointwise. }
\end{aligned}
$$

We say that $火 \in \operatorname{Dom}\left(S^{\text {seq }}\right)$ if，for all limit ordinals $\lambda \leq \mu, s_{\lambda}$ is defined．Then $S^{\mathrm{seq}}(x)=s_{\mu}$ ．

It is easy to see that $S^{\text {seq }}$ satisfies Ext and El，but problems occur already at sequences of length $\omega$ ，as observed by Mező 150，page 3］：if $火$ is any divergent positive sequence of reals，then each element of $x$ is a surreal of length $\leq \omega$ and the sequence of partial sums $s$ eventually grows bigger than every $n$ ，i．e．，for each $n<\omega$ ，the first $n$ digits eventually stabilise on 1 ．Therefore，$s_{\omega}=\overline{1}_{\omega}$ ．Since this is independent of the choice of $火$, Lin and Conc must fail：$S^{\text {seq }}\left(\overline{1}_{\omega}+\overline{1}_{\omega}\right)=S^{\text {seq }}\left(\overline{2}_{\omega}\right)=$ $\omega \neq \omega+\omega=S^{\text {seq }}\left(\overline{1}_{\omega}\right)+S^{\text {seq }}\left(\overline{1}_{\omega}\right)$ and $S^{\text {seq }}\left(\overline{1}_{1}-\overline{1}_{\omega}\right)=\omega \neq \omega+1=S^{\text {seq }}\left(\overline{1}_{1}\right)+S^{\text {seq }}\left(\overline{1}_{\omega}\right)$ ．

Proposition 5．3．19．In general，the sum $S_{\text {seq }}$ violates Comp．
Proof．Let $\mathfrak{\kappa}:=\left(x_{n}\right)_{n \in \omega}$ be defined like so：

$$
x_{n}:= \begin{cases}\overline{1}_{n+1} \frown \overline{0}_{\omega} \frown 0 & \text { if } n \text { is even and } \\ \overline{1}_{n+1} \frown \overline{0}_{\omega} \frown 1 & \text { if } n \text { is odd }\end{cases}
$$

$y_{0}:=x_{0}$ ，and $y_{n+1}:=x_{n+1}-x_{n}$ ．Note that $0 \leq y_{n} \leq 2$ ．Since $\overline{2}_{\omega}$ is summable（by the above，its sum is $\omega$ ），if Comp holds，then y should be summable．However，if $s$ is the sequence of partial sums of $y$ ，then by induction $s_{n}=x_{n}$ ．But the sequence $\mathcal{火}$ does not stabilise in digit $\omega$ ，so $s_{\omega}$ is not defined，and thus $y$ is not summable．

Lipparini and Mező have also observed that Ind fails for $S_{\text {seq }}$ 134，page 7］．

### 5.3.5 Sums as integrals of step function

Let $\mathbb{K}$ be an $r \subset f$ and $\mathcal{K}_{\mathcal{K}} \in \mathbb{K}^{\lambda}$ for some limit ordinal, $\lambda$. By Proposition 2.3.7, we can assume that $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K}) \subseteq \mathbb{K}$ via an ordinal embedding. We define the step function:

$$
\operatorname{step}_{«<}(y)= \begin{cases}x_{\alpha} & \text { if } y \in(\alpha, \alpha+1) \\ 0 & \text { otherwise }\end{cases}
$$

If we could integrate this step function step $_{\star}$ to a function $F_{\star}:[0, \lambda] \rightarrow \mathbb{K}$ with $F(0)=0$, we could define the sum of $火$ to be $F_{\star}(\lambda)$.

We show that the easy option, using $\kappa$-continuous ${ }^{[6]}$ functions whose derivatives are step functions, is trivial (Theorem 5.3.21, see Section 4.2.5 for more on differentiability). We then comment on an alternative (Remark 5.3.5).
Definition 5.3.20. We say that $火$ is $S_{\rho}$-summable if there is a $\kappa$-continuous $F$ : $\mathbb{K} \rightarrow \mathbb{K}$ which is differentiable at every $x \in \mathbb{K} \backslash$ bn $(\mathbb{K})$, such that $F^{\prime}=$ step $_{x}$, where $F(0)=0$. In which case, we define $S_{\int}(x):=F(\lambda+1)$.

If $\mathbb{K}$ is an $\eta_{\kappa} \mathbb{r c f}$, and $\varkappa_{\kappa} \in \mathbb{K}^{\leq \kappa}$ has finite support, we can specify a piecewise linear function, $F$, on (finitely many) intervals with $\mathrm{bn}(\mathbb{K})$-endpoints, as required for $\prec$. This $F$ is differentiable except at the finitely many endpoints of the intervals, and by Lemmata 4.1.11 and 4.2.4, $F$ is $\kappa$-continuous. Hence, $S_{\int}$ satisfies Ext. But $S_{S}$ is ultimately trivial, like $S^{\text {suptin }}$ :
 then $\operatorname{supp}(x)$ is finite.
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose $\mathfrak{x} \in\left(\mathbb{K}^{>0}\right)^{\omega}$. By construction, $F$ is constant on $C=[\neg \omega, \omega)$, suppose with value $c$. By construction, $\left(\sum_{m=1}^{n} x_{m}\right)_{n \in \omega}$ is cofinal in $F((-\infty, \neg \omega])$. By definition, $F$ is increasing, so $\operatorname{cof}(F((-\infty, \neg \omega]))=\omega$. But by 75, Corollary 1.11(ii)], $\left(\sum_{m=1}^{n} x_{m}\right)_{n \in \omega}$ does not converge to $c$. So, there is some $a<c$ such that $a>\sum_{m=1}^{n} x_{m}$ for all $n \in \omega$. Hence $F$ violates IVT( $\left.\mathbb{K}\right)$, so is not $\kappa$-continuous, a contradiction.

Hence, like $S^{\text {supfin }}, S_{\int}$ satisfies Lin, Conc, Comp, El, and Ind.
Remark 5.3.22. Several notions of No-integration have been developed (e.g. [62]). A notably inclusive notion is due to Costin, Ehrlich, and Friedman [38, 39]. They define an integral operator on a large class of functions with many desirable properties. Alas, the class of functions on which their operator is defined does not include step functions.

Costin conjectures that this can be partially overcome yet, Costin and Ehrlich conjecture that their operator cannot be extended to include all functions step ${ }_{\kappa}$, even for $x \in \mathbb{R}^{\omega}$ for the following reason: such an operator would allow for an explicit construction of Banach limits (see [39, page $7 \&$ proof of Theorem 12]); however, the existence of Banach limits is independent of ZF [39, Theorem 13(3)]. $]^{8}$

[^26]
### 5.4 Sums, generalised polynomials, and Weierstraß' Approximation Theorem

We close this chapter by connecting the discussion of transfinite sums to real analysis as discussed in Chapter 4

The Weierstraß' Approximation Theorem says that if $a, b \in \mathbb{R}$ and $f:[a, b] \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is continuous, then there is a sequence of polynomials $\left(p_{n}\right)_{n \in \omega} \in(\mathbb{Q}[X])^{\omega}$ which converge uniformly to $f$ [207]. The straightforward generalisations fail for nonArchimedean fields (by [44, CA51]), for a concrete example, recall $J_{\neg \omega}:[0, \omega] \rightarrow$ $[0,1]$ from Example 4.1.4. This $J_{\neg \omega}$ is continuous, but is not uniformly approximated by any $\left(p_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \kappa} \in(\mathbb{K}[X]([a, b]))^{\kappa}$. In fact, this fails even for the most restrictive class ${ }^{9}$

Proposition 5.4.1. If $\mathbb{K}$ is an rcf with $\mathrm{bn}(\mathbb{K})=\kappa$, then there is a $\kappa$-supercontinuous function that is not uniformly approximated by polynomials.

Proof. Recall Example 4.2.8, upwardsstumble( $x$ ). Fix $a, b \in \mathbb{K}$. There are $c, d, e, f \in$ $\mathbb{K}$ so that upwardsstumble ${ }^{-1}(a, b)=(c, d)$ or $(c, d) \cup(e, f)$, so upwardsstumble is $\kappa$ continuous. Moreover, there are $g, h \in \mathbb{K}$ so that upwardsstumble $([a, b])=[g, h]$, so upwardsstumble is $\kappa$-supercontinuous. It also clearly has $\omega$-many turning points. Suppose for a contradiction that there is a $p \in \mathbb{K}[X]([a, b])$ such that for all $x \in[0, \omega]$, |upwardsstumble $(x)-p(x) \left\lvert\,<\frac{1}{3}\right.$. By the standard argument, as $p$ is a polynomial, it is differentiable and piecewise-monotone between turning points. Clearly, $p$ is not constant. As a polynomial has only finitely many turning points, let $t_{0}$ be the largest finite turning point of $p$, and let $t_{1}$ be the smallest infinite turning point, if it exists, otherwise let $t_{1}=\omega$. Let $2 n \in\left(t_{0}, t_{1}\right)$, so also $2 n+\frac{3}{2} \in\left(t_{0}, t_{1}\right)$. Note that

$$
\text { upwardsstumble }(2 n)=\text { upwardsstumble }\left(2 n+\frac{3}{2}\right)=2 n+1
$$

Moreover, $2 n+1 \in\left(t_{0}, t_{1}\right)$, and upwardsstumble $(2 n+1)=2 n$. By assumption $\mid p(x)$ - upwardsstumble $(x) \left\lvert\, \leq \frac{1}{3}\right.$. As $p$ is piecewise monotone, it must have a turning point in $\left(2 n, 2 n+\frac{3}{2}\right)$, contradicting that $t_{0}$ is the largest finite turning point.

The inability of classical (finite exponent) polynomials to approximate functions results in a desire to define generalisations of polynomials using transfinite sums.

Let $\mathbb{K}$ be an ordered exponential field, $\mathbb{N} \subseteq A=\left\{a_{\alpha}: \alpha<\mu\right\} \subseteq \mathbb{K}$ a well-ordered set of exponents, and $S$ a sum on $\mathbb{K}$. We say that $f: \mathbb{K} \rightarrow \mathbb{K}$ is an $(A, S)$-polynomial if there is an $I \subseteq \mu$ and a map $c: I \rightarrow \mathbb{K}$ such that for each $x \in \mathbb{K}$, the sequence $z_{\alpha}^{x}:=c(\alpha) \cdot x^{a_{\alpha}}$ is $S$-summable and $S\left(\mathbb{Z}^{x}\right)=f(x)$.

We write $\operatorname{Poly}(A, S)$ for the class of $(A, S)$-polynomials. Note that if $A=\mathbb{N}$ and $S=S^{\text {finite }}$, then Poly $(A, S)=\mathbb{K}[X]$. Assuming Lin and Comp, any $(\mathbb{K} \geq 0, S)$ polynomial is continuous, using a simultaneous $\varepsilon \delta$-argument:

[^27]Proposition 5.4.2. Let $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})=\kappa$ and $S$ satisfy Lin and Comp. Suppose $\beta<\kappa$ and $\left(c_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \beta},\left(i_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \beta} \in\left(\mathbb{K}^{\geq 0}\right)^{\beta}$ are such that $p(X):=S_{\alpha \in \beta}\left(c_{\alpha} X^{i_{\alpha}}\right) \in \operatorname{Poly}(\mathbb{K} \geq 0, S)$. Then $p(x)$ is continuous.

Proof. As $\mathbb{K}$ is exponential, for all $b \in \mathbb{K}^{\geq 0}$, $X^{b}$ maps intervals to intervals, hence is continuous. Fix some $a$ and some $\varepsilon>0$. We show that there is a $D>0$ such that for all $x \in \mathbb{K}$ with $|x-a|<D,|p(a)-p(x)| \leq \varepsilon$.

As $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})>\beta$, there is a lower bound $0<C<c_{\alpha}$ for all $\alpha<\beta$. As $p(X) \in$ $\operatorname{Poly}\left(\mathbb{K}^{\geq 0}, S\right)$, we know that $p\left(\frac{1}{C}\right)$ is defined, i.e. $\left(c_{\alpha} \times \frac{1}{C^{i \alpha}}\right)_{\alpha \in \beta}$ is $S$-summable. As $\left(c_{\alpha} \times \frac{1}{C^{i \alpha} \alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \beta}$ pointwise bounds $\overline{1}_{\beta}$, Comp implies $\overline{1}_{\beta}$ is $S$-summable. Suppose $S\left(\overline{1}_{\beta}\right)=M$.

Fix an $\alpha<\beta$. As $c_{\alpha} X^{i_{\alpha}}$ is a continuous function, there is $\delta_{\alpha}>0$ such that for all $x$ with $|x-a|<\delta_{\alpha}$, we have that $\left|c_{\alpha} \times x^{i_{\alpha}}\right|<\frac{\varepsilon}{M}$. These $\delta_{\alpha}$ form a positive $\beta$ sequence, $\left(\delta_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \beta}$. As $\beta<\kappa=\operatorname{coi}\left(\mathbb{K}^{>0}\right)$, there is a lower bound $D>0$ such that for all $\alpha<\beta, D<\delta_{\alpha}$. Let $|x-a|<D$. Without loss of generality assume $x<a$. So, by Lin and Comp with $\overline{0}_{\beta}, 0=S\left(\overline{0}_{\beta}\right) \leq p(a)-p(x)=S_{\beta}\left(c_{\alpha} \times a^{i_{\alpha}}\right)-S_{\beta}\left(c_{\alpha} \times x^{i_{\alpha}}\right)$. Then, by Comp with $\left(c_{\alpha} \times a^{i_{\alpha}}\right)_{\alpha \in \beta},\left(c_{\alpha} \times\left(a^{i_{\alpha}}-x^{i_{\alpha}}\right)\right)_{\alpha \in \beta}$ is $S$-summable, and by Lin, $S_{\beta}\left(c_{\alpha} \times a^{i_{\alpha}}\right)-S_{\beta}\left(c_{\alpha} \times x^{i_{\alpha}}\right)=S_{\beta}\left(c_{\alpha} \times\left(a^{i_{\alpha}}-x^{i_{\alpha}}\right)\right)$. By Comp again, and using the assumption that $|a-x|<D, p(a)-p(x)=S_{\beta}\left(c_{\alpha}\left(a^{i_{\alpha}}-x^{i_{\alpha}}\right)\right) \leq S_{\beta}\left(\frac{\bar{\varepsilon}}{M_{\beta}}\right)$ which equals $\frac{\varepsilon}{M} \times S\left(\overline{1}_{\beta}\right)$ by Lin. Putting the pieces together, $|p(a)-p(x)| \leq \frac{\varepsilon}{M} \times M=\varepsilon$.

Definition 5.4.3. Let $\mathbb{K}$ be an ordered exponential field, $\mathbb{N} \subseteq A=\left\{a_{\alpha}: \alpha<\right.$ $\mu\} \subseteq \mathbb{K}$ a well-ordered set of exponents, and $S$ a sum on $\mathbb{K}$. Let $\mathcal{C}$ be any class of functions. We say that $\mathbb{K}$ satisfies the $(A, S)$-Weierstraß' Approximation theorem for $\mathcal{C}$, in symbols $\operatorname{WAT}(A, S, \mathcal{C})$, if, for any $f \in \mathcal{C}$, there is a sequence of $(A, S)$ polynomials which uniformly approximates $f$ IT

It is natural to ask whether an appropriate choice of $A$ and $S$ would allow us to recover $\operatorname{WAT}(A, S, \mathcal{C})$ for some natural class $\mathcal{C}$, e.g. the $\kappa$-continuous or $\kappa$ supercontinuous functions.

## Remark on alternative approximations

Other classes of functions can be uniformly approximated on $\mathbb{K}$. An example is that the uniformly continuous functions [180, Definition 4.18] can be uniformly approximated by $\lambda$-step functions, i.e. functions which are constant on each interval, $I_{\alpha}$, where $\left(I_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \lambda}$ partitions $\mathbb{K}$. The Heine-Cantor theorem 180 , Theorem 4.19] can be generalised straightforwardly to $\eta_{\kappa}$ ordered fields where wei $(\mathbb{K})=\kappa$. Using this, we can show that if $f:[a, b] \rightarrow \mathbb{K}$ is uniformly continuous, and $Q$ is order-dense in $\mathbb{K}$, then there is a sequence $\left(f_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})}$ of $Q$-valued ip $(\mathbb{K})$-step functions which converges uniformly to $f$. However, the class of $Q$-valued ip( $\mathbb{K})$-step functions has size at least wei $(\mathbb{K})^{\mathrm{ip}(\mathbb{K})}$, e.g. on $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$, wei $\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}\right)^{\mathrm{ip}\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}\right)}=\kappa^{\kappa}$. To strengthen the analogy with the classical case, we might also ask whether there is a class, $\mathcal{C}$, where WAT $(A, S, \mathcal{C})$ holds and $|\operatorname{Poly}(A, S)|<|\mathcal{C}|$.

[^28]
## Chapter 6

## Capping the Topology: Descriptive Set Theory on $\kappa$-Topologies

This chapter is based on joint work with Luca Motto Ros (Università degli Studi di Torino) and Claudio Agostini (Technische Universität Wien); all contributors contributed equally to this work.

In this chapter, we study generalised descriptive set theory on $\kappa$-topologies. The chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.1 concerns 'general $\kappa$-topology' for arbitrary spaces. In Section 6.2, we define and study the Borel ${ }_{\kappa}$ sets, focusing on our main spaces: $\kappa^{\kappa}, 2^{\kappa}$, and certain ordered spaces. We show that if $\kappa$ is inaccessible, then the Borel $_{\kappa}$ hierarchy has length at most 3 (Lemma 6.2.6). In Section 6.2.2, we show that the standard classical proofs of the non-collapse of the Borel $_{\kappa}$ sets of $\kappa^{\kappa}$ fail, as there are no suitable complete or universal Borel ${ }_{\kappa}$ sets. Instead, we characterise the Borel $_{\kappa}$ sets into an appropriate infinite difference hierarchy (Proposition 6.2.28). Section 6.2.3 gives corresponding results for linearly ordered spaces.

Section 6.3 studies $\kappa$-topological analyticity. The classically equivalent notions of analyticity form a strictly increasing hierarchy on $\kappa^{\kappa}$, from projections which add no complexity (Proposition 6.3.3) to the Borel $_{\kappa}$ images of $\kappa^{\kappa}$. We describe the bianalytic and strictly analytic sets for these notions, and compare them to the ordinary topology (summarised in Tables 6.2 and 6.3). Significantly, the generalised Suslin's theorem fails (Theorem 6.3.18). We prove analogous results for interval $\kappa$-topologies, and place the notions of analyticity on ordered spaces into a hierarchy which may differ from that of $\kappa^{\kappa}$ (Proposition 6.3.49 and Corollary 6.3.51).

Section 6.4 describes how to construct many non- $\kappa$-homeomorphic $\kappa$-topologies for the same full topology (Proposition 6.4.3).

For this chapter, we again assume that $\kappa$ is a regular uncountable cardinal. Recall that if $\kappa$ is inaccessible, then $\kappa^{<\kappa}=\kappa$, and if $\kappa^{<\kappa}=\kappa$ then $\kappa$ is regular (page 10). For this chapter, we call topologies full topologies to distinguish them from $\kappa$-topologies.

## $6.1 \kappa$-Topological spaces

We define some basic $\kappa$-topological properties of $\kappa$-topologies on our main spaces, building on Section 2.2.1. Much of this generalises straightforwardly from full topologies. Other properties generalise the full topology case, but not straightforwardly (e.g. Proposition 6.1.5). Yet others are disanalogous to the full topology case (e.g. Remark 6.1.11 and Proposition 6.1.14).

We first need a little extra notation, which is used throughout this chapter. If $Q$ is order dense in $X$, and we wish to distinguish between elements of $Q$ and elements of $X \backslash Q$, we use $q$ for elements of $Q$ (and $a, b, \ldots, x, y, \ldots$ for elements of $X \backslash Q$ as usual). We write $B \sqcup C$ for $(\{0\} \times B) \cup(\{1\} \times C)$, which we treat as a disjoint union of (copies of) $B$ and $C$ (as $(\{0\} \times B) \cap(\{1\} \times C)$ is empty). If $B \subseteq X$, we call $f: X \rightarrow B$ a retract of $B$ if $f(b)=b$ for all $b \in B$. If $A, A^{\prime} \subseteq X^{Y}$ (or $A, A^{\prime} \subseteq X^{<\kappa}$ ), we say that $A^{\prime}$ refines $A$ if for every $s^{\prime} \in A^{\prime}$ there is a $s \in A$ such that $s^{\prime} \subseteq s$. If $A \subseteq X^{<\alpha}$, let $\uparrow A:=\bigcup_{s \in A} N_{s}$. We denote bounded $\kappa$-topology (on $X^{\alpha}$ ) by $\tau_{\kappa}^{\mathrm{b}}$.

We say that $\mathcal{B} \subseteq \mathscr{P}(X)$ is $\kappa$-additive if for any $B_{\alpha} \in \mathcal{A}$ and any $\mu<\kappa$, $\bigcap_{\alpha \in \mu} B_{\alpha} \in \mathcal{B}$. Throughout, unless otherwise specified, we call a $\kappa$-topological space $\kappa$-additive if $\tau_{\kappa}$ is $\kappa$-additive (rather than if the full topology is $\kappa$-additive). Any subspace, $X$, of an $\alpha$-additive $\kappa$-topological space $Y$ is again $\alpha$-additive, as if $\left\{O_{\beta} \cap X: \beta \in \mu\right\}$ is any family of $\kappa$-open subsets of $X$ of size $\mu<\alpha$, then $\bigcap_{\beta \in \mu}\left(O_{\beta} \cap X\right)=\left(\bigcap_{\beta \in \mu} O_{\beta}\right) \cap X$ is $\kappa$-open in $X$ by $\alpha$-additivity of $Y$.

Our principal examples are $\kappa$-additive full topologies, for example any $\kappa$-Polish spaces. Even so, the $\kappa$-topology generated by a basis for a full topology need not be $\kappa$-additive. For example, the interval $\kappa$-topology on $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ is not $\kappa$-additive (Proposition 6.1.13), but the full interval topology on $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ is $\kappa$-additive.

We say that a $\kappa$-topology on $X$ is $\kappa$-zero-dimensional if it has a basis, $\mathcal{B}$, such that every element of $\mathcal{B}$ is both $\kappa$-open and $\kappa$-closed.

Each set $\mathcal{B} \subseteq \mathscr{P}(X)$ naturally gives us a notion of $\mathcal{B}$-connectedness: $B \subseteq X$ is called $\mathcal{B}$-connected if there is no partition of $B$ into sets $C, D \in \mathcal{B}$. We say that a $\kappa$-topological space is $\kappa$-connected if it is $\tau_{\kappa}$-connected.

Theorem 6.1.1 ( 74 , Theorem 3.2.14]). If $B$ is $\mathcal{B}$-connected, and $f: X \rightarrow X$ is $\mathcal{B}, \mathcal{B}$-continuous, then $f(B)$ is $\mathcal{B}$-connected.

Definition 6.1.2. Let $(X, \tau)$ be a topological space. A set $B \subseteq X$ is $\mathrm{G}_{\delta}^{\kappa}$ if $X=\bigcap_{\alpha \in \kappa} O_{\alpha}$ for $O_{\alpha} \in \tau$. Likewise, $B$ is $\mathrm{F}_{\sigma}^{\kappa}$ if $X \backslash B$ is $\mathrm{G}_{\delta}^{\kappa}$.

We define $\kappa$-homeomorphisms and product $\kappa$-topologies in the natural way: if $\mathcal{B}_{X}$ is a basis for $X$ and $\mathcal{B}_{Y}$ is a basis for $Y$, a function $f: X \rightarrow Y$ is a $\mathcal{B}_{X}, \mathcal{B}_{Y}$ homeomorphism if $f$ is a bijection, $f$ is $\mathcal{B}_{X}, \mathcal{B}_{Y}$-continuous and $f^{-1}$ is $\mathcal{B}_{Y}, \mathcal{B}_{X^{-}}$ continuous. If $\mathcal{B}_{X}, \mathcal{B}_{Y}$ are $\kappa$-topologies, we say that $f$ is a $\kappa$-homeomorphism. Moreover, if $\left(X, \tau_{\kappa}^{X}\right),\left(Y, \tau_{\kappa}^{X}\right)$ are $\kappa$-topological spaces generated by $\mathcal{B}_{X}, \mathcal{B}_{Y}$ respectively, the product basis is the set $\mathcal{B}_{X \times Y}:=\left\{B \times C: B \in \mathcal{B}_{X} \wedge C \in \mathcal{B}_{Y}\right\}$, and the product $\kappa$-topology on $X \times Y$ is the set $\left\langle\mathcal{B}_{X \times Y}\right\rangle_{\kappa}$.
Proposition 6.1.3. If $\left(X, \tau_{\kappa}^{X}\right),\left(Y, \tau_{\kappa}^{Y}\right)$ are $\kappa$-topological spaces then the product $\kappa$-topology on $X \times Y$ can be characterised like so: $\pi_{\kappa}=\left\{\bigcup_{\alpha \in \lambda}\left(U_{\alpha} \times V_{\alpha}\right): \lambda \in\right.$ $\left.\kappa, U_{\alpha} \in \tau_{\kappa}^{X}, V_{\alpha} \in \tau_{\kappa}^{Y}\right\}$.

Proof. Clearly $\pi_{\kappa} \subseteq\left\{\bigcup_{\alpha \in \lambda} U_{\alpha} \times V_{\alpha}: \lambda<\kappa, U_{\alpha} \in \tau_{\kappa}^{X}, V_{\alpha} \in \tau_{\kappa}^{Y}\right\}$, as every basis element is $\kappa$-open. Conversely, suppose $P \in \pi_{\kappa}$. Then $P=\bigcup_{\alpha \in \lambda}\left(U_{\alpha} \times V_{\alpha}\right)=$ $\bigcup_{\alpha \in \lambda}\left(\left(\bigcup_{\gamma \in \lambda_{\alpha}} B_{\gamma}\right) \times\left(\bigcup_{\delta \in \mu_{\alpha}} B_{\delta}\right)\right)$ where $\lambda_{\alpha}, \mu_{\alpha}<\kappa, B_{\gamma}$ is basic open in $X$, and $B_{\delta}$ is basic open in $Y$. As $\kappa$ is regular, $\max \left(\lim _{\alpha \in \lambda}, \lambda_{\alpha} \lim _{\alpha \in \lambda} \mu_{\alpha}\right)=: \nu<\kappa$. So, $P=\bigcup_{\gamma, \delta \in \nu}\left(B_{\gamma} \times B_{\delta}\right)$, as required.

### 6.1.1 $\kappa$-Baire space and $\kappa$-Cantor space

In this section, we state and prove the basic $\kappa$-topological properties of $\kappa$-Baire space and $\kappa$-Cantor space. We show that, up to $\kappa$-homeomorphism, there are just two spaces of the form $\lambda^{\kappa}: \kappa^{\kappa}$ and $2^{\kappa}$.

Definition 6.1.4. Let $f: \kappa \rightarrow \kappa$. We define the following set:

$$
D(f):=\left\{x \in \kappa^{\kappa}: x(\alpha)<f(\alpha) \text { for every } \alpha \in \kappa\right\}
$$

We equip $D(f)$ with the subspace $\kappa$-topology inherited from $\kappa^{\kappa}$.
It is well-known that the full topology of the diagonal space on $\kappa, D(\mathrm{id})$, is homeomorphic to $2^{\kappa}$. This can be strengthened to a $\kappa$-homeomorphism:

Proposition 6.1.5. Let $\kappa$ be inaccessible, and $f: \kappa \rightarrow \kappa$ be such that for all $\alpha<\kappa, f(\alpha)>2$. Then $D(f)$ is $\kappa$-homeomorphic to $2^{\kappa}$.

Proof. Let $T(f)=\left\{s \in \kappa^{<\kappa}: s(\alpha)<f(\alpha)\right.$ for every $\left.\left.\alpha<\operatorname{len}(s)\right\}\right\}$, so $\mathcal{B}_{T}=$ $\left\{N_{s} \cap D(f): s \in T(f)\right\}$ is a basis for the topology of $D(f)$. The structure of the proof is as follows: we inductively prove a claim that there are club-many levels of $T(f)$ and $2^{<\kappa}$ which have the same cardinality. We use this to inductively construct an order and sequence-length preserving map, $g$, between a basis $\mathcal{A}$ for $D(f)$ and $\mathcal{B}$ for $2^{\kappa}$. We then use $g$ to define a function $\phi: D(f) \rightarrow 2^{\kappa}$. Finally, we prove $\phi$ is a $\kappa$-homeomorphism.

First, we prove that there is some bijection between levels of $T(f)$ and levels of $2^{<\kappa}$ :

Claim 6.1.6. For every $s \in T(f)$ and $s^{\prime} \in 2^{<\kappa}$, there is a club $C\left(s, s^{\prime}\right) \subseteq\{\alpha \in \kappa$ : $\left.\left|\operatorname{Lev}_{\alpha}\left(T(f)_{s}\right)\right|=\left|\operatorname{Lev}_{\alpha}\left(\left(2^{<\kappa}\right)_{s^{\prime}}\right)\right|\right\}$.

Proof. We prove this by induction (following [1, Claim 3.14.1], [37, Proposition 6.5]). Fix an ordinal $\alpha<\kappa$. We will find an $\alpha^{\prime}>0$ such that $\left|\operatorname{Lev}_{\alpha+\alpha^{\prime}}\left(T(f)_{s}\right)\right|=$ $\left|\operatorname{Lev}_{\alpha+\alpha^{\prime}}\left(\left(2^{<\kappa}\right)_{s^{\prime}}\right)\right|$. We define a sequence $\left(\lambda_{n}\right)_{n \in \omega}$ such that $\lambda_{n}<\kappa$ so that $\sup _{n \in \omega} \lambda=$ $\alpha^{\prime}$.

Firstly, let $\lambda_{0}=0$. Suppose that for all $k \leq n, \lambda_{n}$ has been defined. Then let $\lambda_{\leq n}:=\sum_{k \leq n} \lambda_{k}$. Clearly $\lambda_{\leq n}<\kappa$. Let $\gamma<\kappa$ be such that:

1. $\max \left\{2^{\left|\alpha+\lambda_{\leq n}\right|},\left|\operatorname{Lev}_{\alpha+\lambda_{\leq n}}\left(T(f)_{s}\right)\right|\right\} \leq \gamma$, and
2. for all $t \in \operatorname{Lev}_{\alpha+\lambda \leq n}\left(T(f)_{s}\right), \lambda_{n} \leq\left|\operatorname{Lev}_{\alpha+\lambda_{\leq n}+\gamma}\left(T(f)_{t}\right)\right|$.

The following shows that such a $\gamma$ exists: for Property 1. note that $2^{|\alpha+\lambda \leq n|}<\kappa$ (as $\kappa$ is inaccessible), then note that there is a $n^{\prime}>\lambda_{\leq n}$ such that $\left|\operatorname{Lev}_{\alpha+\lambda_{\leq n}}\left(T(f)_{s}\right)\right| \leq$ $\left|\operatorname{Lev}_{\alpha+n^{\prime}}\left(T(f)_{s}\right)\right|$, whilst Property 2. is trivial.

Let $\lambda_{n+1}$ be the least such $\gamma$, and $\alpha^{\prime}=\sup \left\{\lambda_{n}: n \in \omega\right\}$. By construction, $\left|\operatorname{Lev}_{\alpha+\alpha^{\prime}}\left(\left(2^{<\kappa}\right)_{s^{\prime}}\right)\right|=\left|2^{\alpha+\alpha^{\prime}}\right|=\prod_{n \in \omega} 2^{\left|\alpha+\lambda_{n}\right|}=\prod_{n \in \omega}\left|\alpha+\lambda_{n}\right|$. Moreover, for every $t \in \operatorname{Lev}_{\alpha}\left(T(f)_{s}\right)$, we have that:

$$
\prod_{n \in \omega}\left|\alpha+\lambda_{n}\right| \leq\left|\operatorname{Lev}_{\alpha+\alpha^{\prime}}\left(T(f)_{t}\right)\right| \leq\left|\operatorname{Lev}_{\alpha+\alpha^{\prime}}\left(T(f)_{s}\right)\right| \leq \prod_{n \in \omega}\left|\alpha+\lambda_{n}\right| .
$$

The first inequality follows from Property 2., while the last one follows from Property 1. Thus, $C=\left\{\alpha<\kappa:\left|\operatorname{Lev}_{\alpha}\left(T(f)_{s}\right)\right|=\left|\operatorname{Lev}_{\alpha}\left(\left(2^{<\kappa}\right)_{s^{\prime}}\right)\right|\right\}$ is unbounded in $\kappa$. We now prove that $C$ contains a club. Let $C\left(s, s^{\prime}\right):=\left\{\alpha \in \kappa:\left|\operatorname{Lev}_{\alpha}\left(T(f)_{s}\right)\right|=\right.$ $\left|\operatorname{Lev}_{\alpha}\left(\left(2^{<\kappa}\right)_{s^{\prime}}\right)\right|$ and $\left.\left|-\operatorname{len}\left(s^{\prime}\right)+\alpha\right|=|\alpha|\right\}$, and let $\beta$ be a limit ordinal such that $J=C\left(s, s^{\prime}\right) \cap \beta$ is a cofinal in $\beta$. Let $\left(\alpha_{\delta}\right)_{\delta \in \gamma}$ be a cofinal sequence in $J$. Notice that $\left|\operatorname{Lev}_{\alpha_{\delta}}\left(T(f)_{s}\right)\right|=\left|\operatorname{Lev}_{\alpha_{\delta}}\left(\left(2^{<\kappa}\right)_{s^{\prime}}\right)\right|=2^{\left|-\operatorname{len}\left(s^{\prime}\right)+\alpha_{\delta}\right|}=2^{\left|\alpha_{\delta}\right|}$. As $J$ is cofinal, the following holds:

$$
\left|\operatorname{Lev}_{\beta}\left(T(f)_{s}\right)\right| \leq \prod_{\delta \in \gamma}\left|\operatorname{Lev}_{\alpha_{\delta}}(T(f))\right| \leq\left(\sup \left\{\left|\operatorname{Lev}_{\alpha_{\delta}}(T(f))\right|: \delta<\gamma\right\}\right)^{\gamma}
$$

But we can easily bound this, as $\alpha_{\delta}, \gamma<\beta$ :

$$
\left|\operatorname{Lev}_{\beta}\left(T(f)_{s}\right)\right| \leq\left(2^{|\beta|}\right)^{|\gamma|} \leq 2^{|\beta|}=\left|\operatorname{Lev}_{\beta}\left(\left(2^{<\kappa}\right)_{s^{\prime}}\right)\right| .
$$

Then, we have

$$
2^{|\beta|}=\prod_{\alpha \in \beta} 2 \leq\left|\operatorname{Lev}_{\beta}\left(T(f)_{s}\right)\right| \leq 2^{|\beta|}=\left|\operatorname{Lev}_{\beta}\left(\left(2^{<\kappa}\right)_{s^{\prime}}\right)\right| .
$$

Hence $\beta \in C\left(s, s^{\prime}\right)$, and so $C\left(s, s^{\prime}\right)$ is a club.
Next, proceeding recursively, we find a cofinal family of $I \subseteq \kappa$ and, for each $\alpha \in I$, we find families $\mathcal{A}_{\alpha} \subseteq T(f)$ and $\mathcal{B}_{\alpha} \subseteq 2^{<\kappa}$, and an order-preserving bijection $g_{\alpha}: \mathcal{A}_{\alpha} \rightarrow \mathcal{B}_{\alpha}$ such that $\operatorname{len}(s)=\operatorname{len}\left(g_{\alpha}(s)\right)$ for all $s \in \mathcal{A}_{\alpha}$ with the following properties for $\alpha<\beta \in I$ :

1. $\mathcal{A}_{\alpha} \subseteq \mathcal{A}_{\beta} \subseteq T(f)$ and $\mathcal{B}_{\alpha} \subseteq \mathcal{B}_{\beta} \subseteq 2^{<\kappa}$,
2. $g_{\alpha} \subseteq g_{\beta}$,
from this, we define $\mathcal{A}_{<\gamma}:=\bigcup_{\alpha \in \gamma} \mathcal{A}_{\alpha}, \mathcal{B}_{<\gamma}:=\bigcup_{\alpha \in \gamma} \mathcal{B}_{\alpha}$, and $g_{<\gamma}:=\bigcup_{\alpha \in \gamma} g_{\alpha} ;$ obviously $g_{<\gamma}: \mathcal{A}_{<\alpha} \rightarrow \mathcal{B}_{<\alpha}$; lastly
3. there is a $\gamma_{0}>\beta$ such that $\mathcal{A}_{\beta}=\mathcal{A}_{<\beta} \cup \operatorname{Lev}_{\gamma_{0}}(T(f))$ and $\mathcal{B}_{\beta}=\mathcal{B}_{<\beta} \cup$ $\operatorname{Lev}_{\gamma_{0}}\left(2^{<\kappa}\right)$.

For the base case, let $g_{0}:\{0\} \rightarrow\{0\}$ with $g(0)=0$, i.e. send the root of $T(f)$ to the root of $2^{<\kappa}$. So, $\mathcal{A}_{0}=\{0\}$ and $\mathcal{B}_{0}=\{0\}$.

Suppose $0<\beta<\kappa$ is such that $g_{<\beta}: \mathcal{A}_{<\beta} \rightarrow \mathcal{B}_{<\beta}$ has already been defined.

For every $s \in \delta\left(\mathcal{A}_{<\beta}\right)$, the frontier of $\mathcal{A}_{<\beta}$, we can define $g(s)=\bigcup\{g(t)$ : $t \in \mathcal{A}_{<\beta}$ with $\left.t \subseteq s\right\}$. For each $s \in \delta\left(\mathcal{A}_{<\beta}\right)$, we can use Claim 6.1.6 to find a club $C(s, g(s))$. As a $<\kappa$-intersection of clubs is a club, $\bigcap_{s \in A_{<\beta}} C(s, g(s))$ is also a club. Hence we can find a $\gamma_{0}$ such that for all $s \in \delta\left(\mathcal{A}_{<\beta}\right),\left|\operatorname{Lev}_{\gamma_{0}}\left(T(f)_{s}\right)\right|=$ $\left|\operatorname{Lev}_{\gamma_{0}}\left(\left(2^{<\kappa}\right)_{g(s)}\right)\right|$. Here we use that $\kappa$ being inaccessible implies $\left|\delta\left(\mathcal{A}_{<\beta}\right)\right| \leq 2^{\mu}<\kappa$ for some $\mu<\kappa$. Choose a bijection $h_{s}: \operatorname{Lev}_{\gamma_{0}}\left(T(f)_{s}\right) \rightarrow \operatorname{Lev}_{\gamma_{0}}\left(\left(2^{<\kappa}\right)_{g(s)}\right)$.

For every tree, $T$, for every $A \subseteq T$, and for every $t \in T$, there is $s \in \delta(A)$ such that $t \in T_{s}$. Hence $\bigcup_{s \in \delta(A)} \operatorname{Lev}_{\alpha}\left(T_{s}\right)=\operatorname{Lev}_{\alpha}(T)$. Then let $\mathcal{A}_{\beta}:=\mathcal{A}_{<\beta} \cup \operatorname{Lev}_{\gamma_{0}}(T(f))$ and $\mathcal{B}_{\beta}:=\mathcal{B}_{<\beta} \cup \operatorname{Lev}_{\gamma_{0}}\left(2^{<\kappa}\right)$.

Finally, let $g_{\beta}:=g_{<\beta} \cup \bigcup_{s \in \mathcal{A}_{<\beta}} h_{s}$. Clearly, Conditions 1. 2. and 3. are satisfied for $\beta$. By construction, $g_{\beta}$ is an order and sequence-length preserving bijection, as required.

We let $g:=g_{<\kappa}, \mathcal{A}:=\mathcal{A}_{<\kappa}$, and $\mathcal{B}:=\mathcal{B}_{<\kappa}$. By construction, $g: \mathcal{A} \rightarrow \mathcal{B}$ is an order and sequence-length preserving bijection, as required.

Proceeding as in 97, Lemma 2.1], we use this $g$ to define a $\kappa$-homeomorphism, $\phi: D(f) \rightarrow 2^{\kappa}$. Let $\phi(x)=\bigcup\{g(x\lceil\alpha): \alpha<\kappa$ and $x \upharpoonright \alpha \in \mathcal{A}\}$ (i.e., $\phi(x)$ is the unique element of $\bigcap\left\{N_{g(x\lceil\alpha)}: \alpha<\kappa\right.$ and $\left.\left.x \upharpoonright \alpha \in \mathcal{A}\right\}\right)$. First, $\phi$ is well-defined, since Condition 3. ensures that for every $x \in D(f)$, there are cofinally many $\alpha<\kappa$ such that $x \upharpoonright \alpha \in \mathcal{A}$, and the fact that $g$ is length-preserving ensures that $\bigcup\left\{g(x \upharpoonright \alpha): \alpha<\kappa\right.$ and $x\lceil\alpha \in \mathcal{A}\} \in 2^{\kappa}$. It remains to show that $\phi$ is a $\kappa$ homeomorphism.

Note that if $s \in \mathcal{A}$, then $\phi\left(N_{s} \cap D(f)\right)=N_{g(s)}$ is $\kappa$-open in $2^{\kappa}$. Exactly similarly, if $t \in \mathcal{B}$, then $\phi^{-1}\left(N_{t}\right)=N_{g^{-1}(s)} \cap D(f)$ is $\kappa$-open.

So, let $s \in T(f) \backslash \mathcal{A}$ : we want to show that $\phi\left(N_{s} \cap D(f)\right)$ is $\kappa$-open in $2^{\kappa}$. Given $s \in T(f)$, we can find an $\alpha>\operatorname{len}(s)$ such that $\operatorname{Lev}_{\alpha}(T(f)) \subseteq \mathcal{A}$. Then $N_{s} \cap D(f)$ is a union of some elements from $\operatorname{Lev}_{\alpha}(T(f))$, each of which is sent to an element of $\mathcal{B}$ of length $\alpha$. However, $\left|\operatorname{Lev}_{\alpha}(T(f))\right| \leq 2^{|\alpha|}<\kappa$ since $\kappa$ is inaccessible. Thus, $\phi\left(N_{s} \cap D(f)\right)$ is the union of $<\kappa$-many elements of $\mathcal{B} \subseteq 2^{<\kappa}$ and so it is $\kappa$-open.

A similar argument works for all $t \in 2^{<\kappa} \backslash \mathcal{B}$.
Remark 6.1.7. Note that in Proposition 6.1.5, it suffices for $f(\alpha)>2$ cofinally often.

Corollary 6.1.8. If $\kappa$ is inaccessible, and $\lambda<\kappa$, the $\kappa$-topological space $\lambda^{\kappa}$ is $\kappa$-homeomorphic to $2^{\kappa}$.

We now describe some of the key $\kappa$-topological properties of $2^{\kappa}$ and $\kappa^{\kappa}$. Significantly, $2^{\kappa}$ is $\kappa$-zero-dimensional, whilst $\kappa^{\kappa}$ is not, though both are zero-dimensional with the full topology [112, page 35]. First, note that the $\kappa$-Cantor space $2^{\kappa}$ with the bounded topology is not $\kappa$-connected, as $2^{\kappa}=N_{1} \sqcup N_{0}$.

Proposition 6.1.9. Let $\kappa$ be inaccessible. Then for $2^{\kappa}$ and $\kappa^{\kappa}$, the corresponding $\tau_{\kappa}^{\mathrm{b}}$ are $\kappa$-additive.
Proof. Let $\left\{A_{\alpha}: \alpha \in \lambda\right\}$ be a family of $\kappa$-open sets for some $\lambda<\kappa$, then for each $\alpha<\lambda$, there is a family of cones, $\left\{N_{s_{\beta}}^{\alpha}: \beta \in \mu_{\alpha}\right\}$, such that $A_{\alpha}=\bigcup_{\beta \in \mu_{\alpha}} N_{s_{\beta}}^{\alpha}$ and $\mu_{\alpha}<\kappa$. Then, for some map, $\phi$ :

$$
O:=\bigcap_{\alpha \in \lambda} \bigcup_{\beta \in \mu_{\alpha}} N_{s_{\beta}}^{\alpha}=\bigcup_{\phi \in \prod_{\alpha \in \lambda} \mu_{\alpha}}\left(\bigcap_{\beta \in \lambda} N_{s_{\phi(\alpha)}}^{\alpha}\right) .
$$

Since $\kappa$ is inaccessible, we have that $\left|\prod_{\alpha \in \lambda} \mu_{\alpha}\right| \leq \mu^{\lambda}<\kappa$ for $\mu=\sup \left\{\mu_{\alpha}: \alpha<\lambda\right\}$.
Since every non-empty intersection of cones is still a cone, $O$ is $\kappa$-open, as required. As $2^{\kappa}$ is a subspace of $\kappa^{\kappa}, 2^{\kappa}$ is $\kappa$-additive.

Proposition 6.1.10. The $\kappa$-Cantor space, $2^{\kappa}$, is $\kappa$-zero-dimensional.
Proof. If $s \in 2^{<\kappa}$, then $2^{\kappa} \backslash N_{s}=\bigcup_{\alpha \in \operatorname{len}(s)} N_{s\left\lceil\alpha \subset\left(1-s_{\alpha}\right)\right.}$, i.e. the union of all cones immediately off the stem of $N_{s}$. As len $(s)<\kappa, 2^{\kappa} \backslash N_{s}$ is $\kappa$-open, so $N_{s}$ is $\kappa$ clopen.

This argument does not work for $\kappa^{\kappa}$, as every $t \subseteq s$ has $\kappa$-many neighbours, so the smallest antichain $A$ such that $\bigcup_{s \in A} N_{s}=\kappa^{\kappa} \backslash N_{t}$ has size $\kappa$. In fact:

Remark 6.1.11. The $\kappa$-Baire space, $\kappa^{\kappa}$, is not $\kappa$-zero-dimensional: suppose, for a contradiction, that $\{B, C\}$ is a partition of $\kappa^{\kappa}$ into two $\kappa$-open sets. Then, there are antichains $A_{B}, A_{C} \subseteq \kappa^{<\kappa}$ such that $\uparrow A_{B}=B$ and $\uparrow A_{C}=C$. As $B$ and $C$ are disjoint, $A_{B} \cup A_{C}$ is an antichain in $\kappa^{<\kappa}$. But, for any antichain $A \subseteq \kappa^{<\kappa}$, if $\uparrow A=\kappa^{\kappa}$, then $|A|=\kappa$. So, $\left|A_{B} \cup A_{C}\right|=\kappa$. Hence, at least one of $A_{B}$ and $A_{C}$ is size $\kappa$, without loss of generality we can suppose $\left|A_{B}\right|=\kappa$. But then $\uparrow A_{B}$ is not $\kappa$-open, a contradiction.

### 6.1.2 Linearly ordered spaces

Our other main class of example spaces are linearly ordered sets with their order $\kappa$-topologies, principally the interval $\kappa$-topologies on $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$. For most of this chapter, we only use the order properties of $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$. In Section 6.3.4, we use that $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$ and $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ are fields. Both $\tau_{\kappa}^{Q_{\kappa}}$ and $\tau_{\kappa}^{\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}}$ generate the same full topology, namely the interval topology, but are distinct (Corollary 6.2.50). Equipped with the $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$-interval $\kappa$ topology, $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ is $\kappa$-connected [74, Corollary 3.2.11]. Unlike the bounded $\kappa$-topology (Corollary 6.2.30), for all $q \in Q,\{q\}$ is $\kappa$-closed in the $Q$-interval $\kappa$-topology, and so Borel $_{\kappa}$, as $\{q\}=X \backslash((-\infty, q) \cup(q, \infty))$.

Other natural examples of $\kappa$-interval topologies include:

1. $\lambda^{\kappa}$ with the $\lambda^{\kappa}$-interval $\kappa$-topology, where we order $\lambda^{\kappa}$ lexicographically, i.e. $s^{\frown} \alpha^{\frown} x<s^{\frown} \beta^{\frown} y$ for any $\alpha<\beta$; and
2. the set $\left(\lambda^{*} \sqcup \kappa\right)^{\kappa}$ with the basis of lexicographic $\left(\lambda^{*} \sqcup \kappa\right)^{\kappa}$-intervals, $-\alpha<\beta$ for all $-\alpha \in \lambda^{*}, \beta \in \kappa$, where $\lambda^{*}$ is $\kappa$ with the reverse ordering.

The interval $\kappa$-topologies on $\omega^{\omega}$ and $\kappa^{\kappa}$ are not compatible with any field structure, as each has a minimal element, $\overline{0}_{\omega}$ and $\overline{0}_{\kappa}$ respectively (so there is no $\left.\overline{0}_{\omega}-\overline{0}_{\omega}<\overline{0}_{\omega}\right)$. So too for $\left(\lambda^{*} \sqcup \kappa\right)^{\kappa}$ :

Example 6.1.12. Let $\lambda$ be a regular infinite cardinal, and let $X=\left(\lambda^{*} \sqcup \kappa\right)^{\kappa}$. If $G$ is a gap in $X$, then there is a $\mu<\kappa$, 火 $\in\left(\lambda^{*} \sqcup \kappa\right)^{\mu}, \alpha \in \kappa, \beta \in \lambda$, and $\gamma, \delta \in \lambda^{*} \sqcup \kappa$

$G$ Hence, any gap in $X$ is a $(\lambda, \kappa)$-gap. Moreover, $X$ has $(\lambda, \kappa)$-gaps, e.g. the one defined by $\left(0 \smile \bar{\alpha}_{\kappa}\right)_{\alpha \in \kappa}$ and $\left(1-\overline{-\beta}_{\kappa}\right)_{\beta \in \lambda}$.

So, by Proposition 2.3.3, no ordered group (or field) structure is compatible with the interval $\kappa$-topology on $X$.

Proposition 6.1.13. 1 . If $\kappa^{<\kappa}=\kappa$, then $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ with the $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa^{-}}$or $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa^{-}}$-interval $\kappa$ topology is neither $\kappa$-zero-dimensional, nor $\omega_{1}$-additive, and so not $\kappa$-additive.
2. The $2^{\kappa}$-interval $\kappa$-topology on $2^{\kappa}$ is not $\omega_{1}$-additive, and so not $\kappa$-additive.
3. The $\left(\kappa^{*} \sqcup \kappa\right)^{\kappa}$-interval $\kappa$-topology on $\left(\kappa^{*} \sqcup \kappa\right)^{\kappa}$ is not $\kappa$-additive.

Proof. 1. For non- $\kappa$-zero-dimensionality, note that the complement of a basic open $(-\infty, x)$ is $[x, \infty)$, as $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})=\kappa$, no sequence of length $<\kappa$ approaches $x$, so $[x, \infty)$ is not $\kappa$-open. For non- $\omega_{1}$-additivity, note that $\bigcap_{n \in \omega}\left(0, \frac{1}{n}\right)=\left(0, \frac{1}{\imath \omega}\right)$ which is not $\kappa$-open (see Example 4.1.4).
2. Let $A:=\bigcap_{n \in \omega}\left(\overline{0}_{\kappa}, \overline{0}_{n} \frown 1 \frown \overline{0}_{\kappa}\right)=\left(\overline{0}_{\kappa}, \overline{0}_{\omega} \frown \overline{1}_{\kappa}\right]$. Suppose that $A=\bigcup_{\alpha \in \lambda}\left(a_{\alpha}, b_{\alpha}\right)$ for some $a_{\alpha}, b_{\alpha} \in 2^{\kappa}$ and $\lambda<\kappa$. There is some $\alpha<\kappa$ such that $\overline{0}_{\omega} \neg \overline{1}_{\kappa} \in$ $\left(a_{\alpha}, b_{\alpha}\right)$, thus $b_{\alpha}>\overline{0}_{\omega} \neg \overline{1}_{\kappa}$, which means that $b_{\alpha}>\overline{0}_{n} \neg \overline{1}_{\kappa}$ for some $n$, a contradiction.
3. As in Part 2.

$$
N_{\overline{0}_{\omega}}=\bigcap_{n \in \omega}\left(\overline{0}_{n} \frown(-1) \frown \overline{0}_{\kappa}, \overline{0}_{n} \frown 1 \frown 0^{\kappa}\right)=\bigcup_{\alpha \in \kappa}\left(\overline{0}_{\omega} \frown(-\alpha) \frown \overline{0}_{\kappa}, \overline{0}_{\omega} \frown \alpha \frown 0^{\kappa}\right) .
$$

Suppose that $N_{\overline{0}_{\omega}}=\bigcup_{\alpha \in \lambda}\left(a_{\alpha}, b_{\alpha}\right)$ for some $\lambda<\kappa$ and $a_{\alpha}, b_{\alpha} \in\left(\kappa^{*} \sqcup \kappa\right)^{\kappa}$, again assuming $b_{\alpha}$ are increasing. Then $N_{\overline{0}_{\omega}}$ has coinitiality $<\lambda$, as witnessed by $\left(b_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \lambda}$. As $\left(\overline{0}_{\omega}-\bar{\beta}_{\kappa}\right)_{\beta \in \kappa}$ is cofinal, we can assume that $\left(b_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \lambda}$ is a subsequence of $\left(\overline{0}_{\omega}-\bar{\beta}_{\kappa}\right)_{\beta \in \kappa}$. If $b_{\alpha}=\overline{0}_{\omega} \frown \bar{\beta}_{\kappa}$, let $b_{\alpha}^{\prime}:=\beta$. Then $\left(b_{\alpha}^{\prime}\right)_{\alpha \in \lambda}$ is cofinal in $\kappa$. But this contradicts the regularity of $\kappa$.

The witnesses to the failure of $\kappa$-additivity in Proposition 6.1.13 Part 1. is in fact $\kappa$-closed in $(0, \infty):(0, \infty) \backslash\left(0, \frac{1}{-\omega}\right)=\bigcup_{n \in \omega}\left(\frac{1}{n}, \infty\right)$. Indeed, if $X$ is a linear order, $Q \subseteq X$, and $A=\bigcap_{\alpha \in \lambda}\left(a_{\alpha}, b_{\alpha}\right)$ where $a_{\alpha}, b_{\alpha} \in Q \cup\{ \pm \infty\},\left(a_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \lambda}$ is strictly increasing, $\left(b_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \lambda}$ is strictly decreasing, and $\lambda<\kappa$, then $A$ is $\kappa$-closed in the $Q$-interval $\kappa$-topology.

We can use $\kappa$-topologies to make finer distinctions of properties of ( $\kappa$-)topological spaces, as full topologies may be generated from distinct $\kappa$-topologies. We first show the difference between the interval $\kappa$-topology and the bounded $\kappa$-topology on $\left(\kappa^{*} \sqcup \kappa\right)^{\kappa}$, and hence prove that the witness in Proposition 6.1.13 Part 3. is not $\kappa$-closed:

[^29]Proposition 6.1.14. Let $s \in\left(\kappa^{*} \sqcup \kappa\right)^{<\kappa}$ have successor length. Then $N_{s}=\left\{s^{\frown} x\right.$ : $\left.x \in\left(\kappa^{*} \sqcup \kappa\right)^{\kappa}\right\}$ is neither $\kappa$-open nor $\kappa$-closed in the $\left(\kappa^{*} \sqcup \kappa\right)^{\kappa}$-interval $\kappa$-topology on $\left(\kappa^{*} \sqcup \kappa\right)^{\kappa}$.

Proof. That $N_{s}$ is not $\kappa$-open is by cofinality, exactly as in Proposition 6.1.13 Part 3. (with $\left.N_{s}=\bigcup_{\alpha \in \kappa}\left(s^{\frown} \overline{-\alpha}_{\kappa}, s \frown \bar{\alpha}_{\kappa}\right)\right)$. So, we prove that $N_{s}$ is not $\kappa$ closed: by assumption $s=t^{〔} \alpha$ for some $\alpha \in \kappa^{*} \sqcup \kappa$. Note that $\left(\kappa^{*} \sqcup \kappa\right)^{\kappa} \backslash N_{s}=$ $\left(\bigcup_{\beta \in \kappa}\left(-\infty, t\left\ulcorner\bar{\beta}_{\kappa}\right)\right) \cup\left(\bigcup_{\beta \in \kappa}\left(t^{\frown-\beta_{\kappa}}\right), \infty\right)\right)$. Both of the sets $\bigcup_{\beta \in \kappa}\left(-\infty, t \frown \bar{\beta}_{\kappa}\right)$ and $\bigcup_{\beta \in \kappa}\left(\left(t \smile \overline{-\beta}_{\kappa}\right), \infty\right)$ are not $\kappa$-open, by a cofinality argument.

Suppose for a contradiction that $\left(\kappa^{*} \sqcup \kappa\right)^{\kappa} \backslash N_{s}$ is $\kappa$-open. As the intersection of two $\kappa$-open sets is $\kappa$-open, $\left(\left(\kappa^{*} \sqcup \kappa\right)^{\kappa} \backslash N_{s}\right) \cap\left(\infty, s \overline{0}_{\kappa}\right)=\bigcup_{\beta \in \kappa}\left(-\infty, t^{\sim} \bar{\beta}_{\kappa}\right)$ is $\kappa$-open, a contradiction. Hence $\left(\kappa^{*} \sqcup \kappa\right)^{\kappa} \backslash N_{s}$ is not $\kappa$-open. So, $N_{s}$ is not $\kappa$-closed.

### 6.2 The Borel $_{\kappa}$ hierarchy

In this section, we define the $\kappa$-topology analogue of the Borel hierarchy. We show that if $\kappa$ is inaccessible, then this hierarchy collapses after only a few levels. We give a characterisation of the Borel $_{\kappa}$ sets of $\kappa^{\kappa}$ and certain linearly ordered spaces. We also develop the descriptive set theory of these Borel $_{\kappa}$ sets, including a noncollapsing difference hierarchy, and show that these pointclasses have no universal or Lipschitz, $\kappa$-complete sets.
 the following pointclasses ${ }^{2}$

1. $\kappa \Sigma_{1}^{0}(\mathcal{A}):=\mathcal{A}$,
2. $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Pi}_{\alpha}^{0}(\mathcal{A}):=\neg \kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{\alpha}^{0}(\mathcal{A})=\left\{X \backslash O: O \in \kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{\alpha}^{0}(\mathcal{A})\right\}$,
3. $\kappa \Sigma_{2}^{0}(\mathcal{A}):=\left\{\bigcup_{\beta \in \lambda} A_{\beta}: A_{\beta} \in \kappa \Pi_{1}^{0}(\mathcal{A}) \cup \kappa \Sigma_{1}^{0}(\mathcal{A}) \wedge \lambda<\kappa\right\}$,
4. if $\alpha>2, \kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{\alpha}^{0}(\mathcal{A})=\left\{\bigcup_{\gamma \in \lambda} A_{\gamma}: A_{\gamma} \in \bigcup_{\beta \in \alpha} \kappa \Pi_{\beta}^{0}(\mathcal{A}) \wedge \lambda<\kappa\right\}$,
5. $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Delta}_{\alpha}^{0}(\mathcal{A}):=\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{\alpha}^{0}(\mathcal{A}) \cap \kappa \Pi_{\alpha}^{0}(\mathcal{A})$, and
6. $\operatorname{Bor}_{\kappa}(\mathcal{A}):=\bigcup_{\alpha \in \kappa} \kappa \Sigma_{\alpha}^{0}(\mathcal{A})$. A set $S \in \operatorname{Bor}_{\kappa}(\mathcal{A})$ is called $\operatorname{Borel}_{\kappa}$ in $(X, \mathcal{A})$.

In the definition of $\operatorname{Bor}_{\kappa}(\mathcal{A})$, we stop after $\kappa$-many steps, because, if $\kappa$ is regular, then $\operatorname{Bor}_{\kappa}(\mathcal{A})$ forms a $\kappa$-algebra. Indeed, if $\kappa$ is regular, then for any family $\mathcal{A}$, $\operatorname{Bor}_{\kappa}(\mathcal{A})$ is the smallest $\kappa$-algebra containing $\mathcal{A}$. Hence, if $\left(X, \tau_{\kappa}\right)$ is a $\kappa$-topological space with a basis, $\mathcal{B}$, then $\kappa \Sigma_{2}^{0}\left(\tau_{\kappa}\right)=\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{2}^{0}(\mathcal{B})$ (and thus $\operatorname{Bor}_{\kappa}\left(\tau_{\kappa}\right)=\operatorname{Bor}_{\kappa}(\mathcal{B})$ ).

[^30]When the family $\tau_{\kappa}$ is clear from the context, we write $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{1}^{0}$ for $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{1}^{0}\left(\tau_{\kappa}\right)$, etc. Unlike the usual Borel hierarchy, in Borel ${ }_{\kappa}$ hierarchy, $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{2}^{0}$ set are $<\kappa$-unions of $\kappa$ opens and $\kappa$-closed (a mixed source). This ensures that the hierarchy is increasing: otherwise, we do not in general know whether $\left.\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{1}^{0} \subseteq \kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{2}^{0}\right]^{3}$

Proposition 6.2.2. For every family of sets $\mathcal{A} \subseteq \mathscr{P}(X)$ and for every $\alpha<\beta<\kappa$, we have $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{\alpha}^{0}(\mathcal{A}) \cup \kappa \boldsymbol{\Pi}_{\alpha}^{0}(\mathcal{A}) \subseteq \kappa \boldsymbol{\Delta}_{\beta}^{0}(\mathcal{A})$.

Proof. If $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{\alpha}^{0}(\mathcal{A}) \cup \kappa \boldsymbol{\Pi}_{\alpha}^{0}(\mathcal{A}) \subseteq \kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{\beta}^{0}(\mathcal{A})$, then $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{\alpha}^{0}(\mathcal{A}) \cup \kappa \boldsymbol{\Pi}_{\alpha}^{0}(\mathcal{A}) \subseteq \kappa \boldsymbol{\Pi}_{\beta}^{0}(\mathcal{A})$, so it suffices to prove that $\kappa \Sigma_{\alpha}^{0}(\mathcal{A}) \cup \kappa \Pi_{\alpha}^{0}(\mathcal{A}) \subseteq \kappa \Sigma_{\beta}^{0}(\mathcal{A})$.

We proceed by induction on $\beta$. The case $\beta=2$ holds by definition. Suppose $\beta>2$ and assume the statement holds for every $\beta^{\prime}<\beta$. Let $A_{\gamma} \subseteq X$ for some $\gamma<\lambda<\kappa$, and $\beta^{\prime}<\beta$. If $A_{\gamma} \in \kappa \Pi_{\beta^{\prime}}^{0}(\mathcal{A})$, then by definition, $\bigcup_{\gamma \in \kappa} A_{\gamma} \in \kappa \Pi_{\beta}^{0}(\mathcal{A})$. So, for each $\gamma<\lambda$, suppose $A_{\gamma} \in \kappa \Pi_{\beta_{\gamma}}^{0}(\mathcal{A})$ for some $\beta_{\gamma}<\beta$.

If $\beta$ is a limit, then for each $\beta^{\prime}<\beta, \beta^{\prime}+1<\beta$, so by induction $A_{\gamma} \in \kappa \Sigma_{\beta_{\gamma}}^{0}(\mathcal{A}) \subseteq$ $\kappa \Pi_{\beta_{\gamma}+1}^{0}(\mathcal{A})$. So, the result holds by the first case.

If $\beta=\beta^{\prime}+1$, then we can assume without loss of generality that $\beta_{\gamma}=\beta^{\prime}$ for all $\gamma<\lambda$. So, $A_{\gamma}=\bigcup_{\delta \in \mu_{\gamma}} P_{\delta}^{\gamma}$ for some $P_{\delta}^{\gamma} \in \bigcup_{\alpha \in \beta^{\prime}} \kappa \Pi_{\alpha}^{0}(\mathcal{A})$. So, $\bigcup_{\gamma \in \lambda} A_{\gamma}=$ $\bigcup_{\gamma \in \lambda} \bigcup_{\delta \in \mu_{\gamma}} P_{\delta}^{\gamma}$. As $\kappa$ is regular, we can reindex the right-hand side as $\bigcup_{\gamma \in \mu} P_{\gamma}$ for some $\mu<\kappa$. So, $\bigcup_{\gamma \in \lambda} A_{\gamma} \in \kappa \Sigma_{\beta}^{0}(\mathcal{A})$ as required.

By the standard arguments, we note that for any basis, $\mathcal{B}, \kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{\xi}^{0}(\mathcal{B})$ and $\operatorname{Bor}_{\kappa}(\mathcal{B})$ is closed under the preimages of $\kappa$-continuous functions.

### 6.2.1 Collapse of the Borel $_{k}$ hierarchy

The Borel $_{\kappa}$ hierarchy collapses assuming that either $\tau_{\kappa}$ has certain strongly topological properties, or $\kappa$ is inaccessible. For the former, notice that in a $\kappa$-additive space, unions and intersections of $<\kappa$-many $\kappa$-clopen sets is $\kappa$-clopen. Thus, in particular, every set of a $\kappa$-additive $\kappa$-zero-dimensional $\kappa$-topology is $\kappa$-clopen. So, if $\tau_{\kappa}$ is a $\kappa$-additive $\kappa$-zero-dimensional $\kappa$-topology, then $\operatorname{Bor}_{\kappa}\left(\tau_{\kappa}\right)=\tau_{\kappa}$. This observation, and Propositions 6.1.9 and 6.1.10, yield the following:

Remark 6.2.3. If $\kappa$ is inaccessible, then, on $2^{\kappa}, \operatorname{Bor}_{\kappa}\left(\tau_{\kappa}^{\mathrm{b}}\right)$ is exactly the $\kappa$-clopen sets of $2^{\kappa}$.

Hence, we mainly focus on $\kappa^{\kappa}$. For any $\kappa$-topology, when $\kappa$ is inaccessible, Bor $_{\kappa}=\kappa \Delta_{3}^{0}$. We prove this next. First, we need an algebraic lemma. Let $\Gamma$ be a family of sets. We define $\mathrm{U}_{\kappa}(\Gamma):=\left\{\bigcup_{\alpha \in \lambda} G_{\alpha}: G_{\alpha} \in \Gamma, \lambda<\kappa\right\}$, and $\mathrm{I}_{\kappa}(\Gamma):=\left\{\bigcap_{\alpha \in \lambda} G_{\alpha}: G_{\alpha} \in \Gamma, \lambda<\kappa\right\}$. When $\kappa$ is inaccessible, we can 'swap' the order of $<\kappa$-unions and $<\kappa$-intersections:

Lemma 6.2.4. Suppose $\kappa$ is inaccessible and $\Gamma \subseteq \mathscr{P}(X)$. Then:

[^31]1. $\mathrm{I}_{\kappa}\left(\mathrm{U}_{\kappa}(\Gamma)\right)=\mathrm{U}_{\kappa}\left(\mathrm{I}_{\kappa}(\Gamma)\right)$.
2. If $\Gamma$ is closed under relative complements with $X$, then $\mathrm{I}_{\kappa}\left(\mathrm{U}_{\kappa}(\Gamma)\right)$ is a $\kappa$ algebra.

Proof. In general:

$$
A:=\bigcap_{\beta \in \lambda} \bigcup_{\alpha \in \mu} A_{\beta, \alpha}=\bigcup_{s \in \mu^{\lambda}}\left(\bigcap_{\beta \in \lambda} A_{\beta, s(\beta)}\right) .
$$

If $\kappa$ is inaccessible and $\lambda, \mu<\kappa$, then $\mu^{\lambda}<\kappa$, and thus previous equation implies that $A \in \mathrm{U}_{\kappa}\left(\mathrm{I}_{\kappa}(\Gamma)\right)$ for every $A \in \mathrm{I}_{\kappa}\left(\mathrm{U}_{\kappa}(\Gamma)\right)$. The other direction follows similarly.

If $\Gamma$ is closed under complements, then $\mathrm{I}_{\kappa}\left(\mathrm{U}_{\kappa}(\Gamma)\right)$ is also closed under complements, thus is a $\kappa$-algebra, since given $\bigcap_{\beta \in \lambda} \bigcup_{\alpha \in \mu} A_{\beta, \alpha} \in \mathrm{I}_{\kappa}\left(\mathrm{U}_{\kappa}(\Gamma)\right)$ we have:

$$
X \backslash \bigcap_{\beta \in \lambda} \bigcup_{\alpha \in \mu} A_{\beta, \alpha}=\bigcup_{\beta \in \lambda} \bigcap_{\alpha \in \mu}\left(X \backslash A_{\beta, \alpha}\right) \in \mathrm{U}_{\kappa}\left(\mathrm{I}_{\kappa}(\Gamma)\right)
$$

and $\mathrm{U}_{\kappa}\left(\mathrm{I}_{\kappa}(\Gamma)\right)=\mathrm{I}_{\kappa}\left(\mathrm{U}_{\kappa}(\Gamma)\right)$ by the previous point.
Corollary 6.2.5. If $\kappa$ is inaccessible and $\mathcal{B}$ is $\kappa$-additive, then $\langle\mathcal{B}\rangle_{\kappa}$ is $\kappa$-additive.
The converse is false, e.g. $\left\{\bigcup_{\alpha \leq \omega} N_{s_{\alpha}}: s_{\alpha} \in \kappa^{<\kappa}\right\}$, the basis of at most countable unions of cones generates the $\kappa$-additive bounded $\kappa$-topology, but is not itself $\kappa$ additive.

Hence, inaccessibility alone entails a short Borel $_{\kappa}$ hierarchy:
Lemma 6.2.6. For any $\mathcal{B} \subseteq \mathscr{P}(X)$, if $\kappa$ is inaccessible, then $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{3}^{0}(\mathcal{B})=\kappa \Delta_{3}^{0}(\mathcal{B})=$ $\operatorname{Bor}_{\kappa}(\mathcal{B})$.

Proof. Clearly, $\Gamma=\kappa \Sigma_{1}^{0} \cup \kappa \Pi_{1}^{0}$ is closed under complements. So, by Lemma 6.2.4 Part 2. $\mathrm{U}_{\kappa}\left(\mathbf{I}_{\kappa}\left(\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{1}^{0} \cup \kappa \boldsymbol{\Pi}_{1}^{0}\right)\right)$ is a $\kappa$-algebra. Moreover, $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Pi}_{3}^{0}=\mathrm{U}_{\kappa}\left(\mathrm{I}_{\kappa}\left(\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{1}^{0} \cup \kappa \overline{\boldsymbol{\Pi}_{1}^{0}}\right)\right)$, so $\kappa \Sigma_{3}^{0}=\kappa \Pi_{3}^{0}=$ Bor $_{\kappa}$.

### 6.2.2 $\kappa$-Baire space

We can characterise the Borel $_{\kappa}$ sets of $\kappa^{\kappa}$ in ways that are more informative than their height in the Borel $_{\kappa}$ hierarchy. We first characterise Borel $_{\kappa}$ by their conelike partitions. This yields two further characterisations: one syntactic and one in terms of $\kappa$-connected components. We then stratify the Borel ${ }_{\kappa}$ sets into a noncollapsing difference hierarchy. The non-collapse of the ordinary Borel hierarchy can be proved using complete and universal sets, which must fail to generalise to the Borel $_{\kappa}$ sets; we show that this fails due to the lack of suitable universal and complete sets.

## Representations of Borel $_{\kappa}$ sets

Here, we prove that Borel $_{\kappa}$ sets of $\kappa^{\kappa}$ can be represented by a certain partition into conelike sets in a unique way. We also prove that if $\kappa$ is weakly compact, then the intersections of these families are non-empty (Lemma 6.2.16), which in fact characterises weak compactness for inaccessible cardinals (Remark 6.2.18). Later,
we use this to show that certain $\kappa$-analytic sets are close to their full topological closure (Proposition 6.3.32).

We say that an antichain $A \subseteq \kappa^{<\kappa}$ (ordered with the subset relation) is optimal for a set $B \subseteq \kappa^{\kappa}$ if, for every antichain $A^{\prime} \subseteq \kappa^{<\kappa}$ such that $\uparrow A^{\prime}=B$, and every $a^{\prime} \in A^{\prime}$, there is an $a \in A$ where $a \subseteq a^{\prime}$. We say that a set $C \subseteq \kappa^{\kappa}$ is conelike in $N_{s}$, for some $s \in \kappa^{<\kappa}$, if $C=N_{s} \backslash \bigcup_{\beta \in I} N_{s \sim \beta}$ for some $I \subseteq \kappa$ where $|I|<\kappa$.
Remark 6.2.7. If $s \in \kappa^{<\kappa}$, then $\left\{X \subseteq \kappa^{\kappa}: X\right.$ is conelike in $\left.N_{s}\right\}$ is closed under arbitrary unions: if $\left(C_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \lambda}$ are conelike for $N_{s}$, then for each $\alpha, C_{\alpha}=$ $N_{s} \backslash \bigcup_{\beta \in I_{\alpha}} N_{s \sim \beta}$. So, $\bigcup_{\alpha \in \lambda} C_{\alpha}=N_{s} \backslash \bigcup_{\beta \in \bigcap_{\alpha \in \lambda} I_{\alpha}} N_{s-\beta}$. But $\left|\bigcap_{\alpha \in \lambda} I_{\alpha}\right| \leq\left|I_{0}\right|<\kappa$. So, $\bigcup_{\alpha \in \lambda} C_{\alpha}$ is conelike. A similar argument shows that $\left\{X \subseteq \kappa^{\kappa}: X\right.$ is conelike in $\left.N_{s}\right\}$ is closed under $<\kappa$-sized intersections

Conelikeness engenders a kind of two-valued measure on Borel ${ }_{\kappa}$ sets:
Remark 6.2.8. For any $s \in \kappa^{<\kappa}$, let $\mu_{s}:$ Bor $_{\kappa} \rightarrow\{0,1\}$, where $\mu_{s}(B)=0$ if $B \subseteq \bigcup_{\alpha \in I} N_{s \sim \alpha}$ where $I \subseteq \kappa$ is such that $|I|<\kappa$, and $\mu_{s}(B)=1$ if $\mu_{s}\left(N_{s} \backslash B\right)=0$. We can directly prove that if $B \in \kappa \Sigma_{3}^{0}$ then $\mu_{s}(B)$ is well-defined, and hence if $\kappa$ is inaccessible, $\mu_{s}$ is well-defined on all of $\mathrm{Bor}_{\kappa}$.

Sets that are conelike in distinct cones are either disjoint or comparable. Obviously, for every $P_{s}$ and $P_{t}$ conelike in $N_{s}$ and $N_{t}$, respectively, $P_{s} \subseteq P_{t}$ implies $s \subseteq t$. Hence:

Remark 6.2.9. Let $s, t \in \kappa^{<\kappa}$ be distinct. Suppose that $P_{s}$ and $P_{t}$ are conelike in $N_{s}$ and $N_{t}$, respectively, and that $P_{s} \cap P_{t} \neq \emptyset$. Then, $P_{s} \subseteq P_{t}$ implies that $t \subseteq s$ (and not $s \subseteq t$ ).
Lemma 6.2.10. Let $\left(P_{s_{\alpha}}\right)_{\alpha \in \gamma}$ be decreasing with respect to inclusion, and let each $P_{s_{\alpha}}$ be conelike in $N_{s_{\alpha}}$. If $\bigcap_{\alpha \in \gamma} P_{s_{\alpha}}=\emptyset$, then $\gamma=\kappa$, and there is an $\alpha<\gamma$ and an $s \in \kappa^{<\kappa}$ such that $s_{\beta}=s$ for every $\beta>\alpha$.
Proof. By Remark 6.2.9, if $\left(P_{s_{\alpha}}\right)_{\alpha \in \gamma}$ is decreasing with respect to inclusion, then $\left(s_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \gamma}$ is increasing with respect to inclusion. So, suppose there is a cofinal $J \subseteq \gamma$ such that $\left(s_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in J}$ is strictly increasing. Let $x^{\prime}=\bigcup_{\alpha \in J} s_{\alpha}$, and let $x=x^{\prime}$ if $\gamma=\kappa$, or $x=x^{\prime} \overline{0}_{\kappa}$ otherwise. Then, we have $x \in \bigcap_{\alpha \in J} N_{s_{\alpha}}=\bigcap_{\alpha \in J} P_{s_{\alpha}}$, by Remark 6.2.9, so $\bigcap_{\alpha \in J} P_{s_{\alpha}} \neq \emptyset$.

Otherwise, there is no such cofinal sequence. So, there is a $\beta<\gamma$ and an $s \in \kappa^{<\kappa}$ such that $s_{\beta}=s$ for every $\beta>\alpha$, but $\gamma<\kappa$, then $\bigcap_{\alpha \in \gamma} P_{s_{\alpha}}$ is conelike (and thus non-empty) by Remark 6.2.7.
Definition 6.2.11. Let $\mathcal{F} \subseteq \kappa^{<\kappa}$ be a family of sequences and let $\mathcal{P}=\left\{P_{s}: s \in\right.$ $\mathcal{F}\}$ be a family of Borel $_{\kappa}$ sets. We say that $\mathcal{P}$ is a conelike partition of $B$ if $\mathcal{P}$ is a partition of $B$ and each $P_{s}$ is conelike in $N_{s}$.

We say that $\mathcal{F}$ and $\mathcal{P}$ are optimal for $B$ if, in addition, $|\mathcal{F}|<\kappa$ and every conelike partition $\mathcal{P}^{\prime}=\left\{P_{s}: s \in \mathcal{F}^{\prime}\right\}$ of $B$ refines $\mathcal{P}$ (i.e. for every $s^{\prime} \in \mathcal{F}^{\prime}$ there is $s \in \mathcal{F}$ such that $\left.P_{s^{\prime}} \subseteq P_{s}\right)$.
Lemma 6.2.12. Let $\kappa$ be inaccessible. For every Borel $_{\kappa}$ set $B \subseteq \kappa^{\kappa}$, there is a unique family $\mathcal{F}(B) \subseteq \kappa^{<\kappa}$, and a unique conelike partition, $\mathcal{P}(B)=\left\{P_{s}: s \in\right.$ $\mathcal{F}(B)\}$, such that $\mathcal{F}(B)$ and $\mathcal{P}(B)$ are optimal for $B$.

Proof. We prove that the family, $\mathcal{S}$, of Borel $_{\kappa}$ sets with an optimal conelike partition is a $\kappa$-algebra containing the $\kappa$-open sets.

First, we show that all $\kappa$-open sets are in $\mathcal{S}$. Let $B \in \kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{1}^{0}\left(\tau_{\kappa}\right)$. Let $A$ be an optimal antichain in $\kappa^{<\kappa}$ such that $B=\uparrow A$, i.e. $A$ is the set of minimal elements of $\left\{s \in \kappa^{<\kappa}: N_{s} \subseteq B\right\}$. Then, setting $\mathcal{F}(B)=A$ and $P_{s}=N_{s}$ suffices.

Next, we show that $\mathcal{S}$ is closed under complements. Suppose $C \in \mathcal{S}$, let $\mathcal{F}(C) \subseteq \kappa^{<\kappa}$ be an optimal family with a conelike partition, $\mathcal{P}(C)$. Without loss of generality, let $C \neq \emptyset$. We want to define $\mathcal{F}(B)$ and $\mathcal{P}(B)$ for $B=\kappa^{\kappa} \backslash C$.
Claim 6.2.13. For every $s \in \kappa^{<\kappa}$ there is a set, $P_{s}$, which is conelike in $N_{s}$ such that either $P_{s} \subseteq C$ or $P_{s} \cap C=\emptyset$.

Proof. Let $s \in \kappa^{\kappa}$, and let $J=\left\{\beta<\kappa: N_{s \sim \beta} \cap C \neq \emptyset\right\}$. If $|J|<\kappa$, then $\left(N_{s} \backslash \bigcup_{\beta \in J} N_{s-\beta}\right) \cap C=\emptyset$, as required. So, assume $|J|=\kappa$.

For every $\beta \in J$, let $t(\beta) \in \mathcal{F}(C)$ be such that $N_{s \sim \beta} \cap P_{t(\beta)} \neq \emptyset$. Notice that $t(\beta) \subseteq s \frown \beta$, as $P_{t(\beta)} \subseteq N_{t(\beta)}$. As $|\mathcal{F}(A)|<\kappa$, there is a $t \in \mathcal{F}(C)$ and $J^{\prime} \subseteq J$ of size $\kappa$ such that $t(\beta)=t$ for all $\beta \in J^{\prime}$. This implies $t \subseteq s$, as $t \subseteq s^{\sim} \beta$ for all $\beta \in J$. If $t=s$, then $s \in F(C)$ and, by definition, there is a conelike $P_{s} \subseteq C$, as required. Otherwise, $t \subsetneq s$, and there is an $I_{t}$ such that $P_{t}=N_{t} \backslash \bigcup_{\beta \in I_{t}} N_{t-\beta}$, thus either $N_{s} \subseteq N_{s \backslash(\operatorname{len}(t)+1)} \subseteq P_{t}$ or $N_{s} \cap N_{s \mid(\operatorname{len}(t)+1)} \subseteq P_{t}=\emptyset$. Since $N_{s} \cap P_{t} \neq \emptyset$, we must have $N_{s} \subseteq N_{s\lceil(\operatorname{len}(t)+1)} \subseteq P_{t}$, and thus $P_{s}=N_{s} \subseteq C$.

Using Remark 6.2.7, for each $s \in \kappa^{<\kappa}$, there is a unique maximal set

$$
P_{s}=\bigcup\left\{P_{s}^{\prime}: P_{s}^{\prime} \text { is conelike in } N_{s} \text { and either } P_{s}^{\prime} \subseteq C \text { or } P_{s}^{\prime} \cap C=\emptyset\right\},
$$

with the property that $P_{s}$ is conelike in $N_{s}$ and either $P_{s} \subseteq C$ or $P_{s} \cap A=\emptyset$. Since $\mathcal{P}(C)$ is optimal, and these $P_{s}$ are maximal, we have that $\mathcal{P}(C)=\left\{P_{s}: s \in \mathcal{F}(C)\right\}$.

Then, define:

$$
\mathcal{F}(B)=\left\{s \in \kappa^{<\kappa}: P_{s} \subseteq B \text { and } P_{s} \nsubseteq P_{s \mid \beta} \text { for every } \beta<\operatorname{len}(s)\right\} .
$$

We claim that $\mathcal{F}(B)$ and $\mathcal{P}(B)=\left\{P_{s}: s \in \mathcal{F}(B)\right\}$ are optimal as desired. By construction, every other conelike partition $P^{\prime}$ of $B$ refines $\mathcal{P}(B)$ : indeed, if $P$ is conelike in some $N_{s}$ and $P \subseteq B$, then $P \subseteq P_{s}$ by construction, and by the definition of $\mathcal{F}(B)$, there is a $t \subseteq s$ such that $P_{s} \subseteq P_{t}$ with $t \in \mathcal{F}(B)$. So, we just need to check that $|\mathcal{F}(B)|<\kappa$.
Claim 6.2.14. We can partition $\mathcal{F}(B)$ into three sets, $F_{1}, F_{2}$, and $F_{3}$, such that for each $i \in 3,\left|F_{i}\right|<\kappa$.

Proof. Let $F_{1}=\left\{s \in \mathcal{F}(B): P_{s}=N_{s}\right.$ and $s$ has successor length $\}$. For every $s^{\curvearrowright} \beta \in F_{1}, s \in \mathcal{F}(C)$ : if not, then $P_{s} \cup N_{s \sim \beta}$ is conelike in $N_{s}$ containing $P_{s}$, contradicting the definition of $\mathcal{F}(B)$ or of $P_{s}$. For every $s \in \mathcal{F}(C)$, let $I_{s} \subseteq \kappa$ be of size $<\kappa$, and such that $P_{s}=N_{s} \backslash \bigcup_{\alpha \in I_{s}} N_{s\urcorner \alpha}$. Then, we must have $\left|F_{1}\right| \leq$ $\left|\bigcup_{s \in \mathcal{F}(C)} I_{s}\right|<\kappa$, since $\kappa$ is regular and $|\mathcal{F}(C)|<\kappa$.

Now let $F_{2}=\left\{s \in \mathcal{F}(B): P_{s}=N_{s}\right.$ and $s$ has limit length $\}$. Let $\gamma=$ $\sup \{\operatorname{len}(s): s \in \mathcal{F}(C)\}$ and let $T=\left\{s \in \kappa^{<\kappa}: s \subseteq t\right.$ for some $\left.t \in \mathcal{F}(A)\right\}$. Then $|T| \leq|\mathcal{F}(C) \times \gamma|<\kappa$. We claim that for every $\alpha<\operatorname{len}(s)$ we have $s\lceil\alpha \in T$.

This way, each element $s \in F_{2}$ is uniquely assigned a subset of $T$, and thus, as $\kappa$ is inaccessible, $\left|F_{2}\right| \leq|\mathscr{P}(T)|<\kappa$. By the definitions of $\mathcal{F}(B)$ and $P_{s \mid \alpha}$, for every $\alpha<\operatorname{len}(s)$, we have $N_{s \upharpoonright \alpha} \cap C \neq \emptyset$ and we can find $t \in \mathcal{F}(C)$ such that $N_{s \mid \alpha} \cap P_{t} \neq \emptyset$. Using the same argument as above, $t$ must be comparable with $s \upharpoonright \alpha$, and furthermore we cannot have $t \subseteq s \upharpoonright \alpha$, as otherwise $P_{s \mid \alpha} \subseteq N_{s \mid \alpha} \subseteq P_{t}$. Thus $s \upharpoonright \alpha \subseteq t$, and so $s \upharpoonright \alpha \in T$ by the definition of $t$.

Let $F_{3}=\left\{s \in \mathcal{F}(B): P_{s} \neq N_{s}\right\}$. Let $T=\left\{s \in \kappa^{<\kappa}: s \subseteq t\right.$ for some $\left.t \in \mathcal{F}(C)\right\}$ be defined as above: we claim $F_{3} \subseteq T$. Let $s \in F_{3}$ and let $\beta$ be such that $N_{s \sim \beta} \cap P_{s}=\emptyset$, then there is $t \in \mathcal{F}(A)$ such that $P_{t} \cap N_{s} \sim \beta \neq \emptyset$. Arguing as before, we must have $s \subseteq t$, and so $s \in T$. Therefore, we have $\left|F_{3}\right| \leq|T|<\kappa$.

In order to prove that $\mathcal{S}$ is closed $<\kappa$-sized unions, let $\mu<\kappa$. For all $\gamma<\mu$, let $B_{\gamma} \in \mathcal{S}$ where we write $P_{s}^{\gamma}$ for the $P_{s} \in \mathcal{P}\left(B_{\gamma}\right)$. Let $B=\bigcup_{\gamma \in \mu} B_{\gamma}$. We show that $B \in \mathcal{S}$. For any $s \in \bigcup_{\gamma \in \mu} \mathcal{F}\left(B_{\gamma}\right)$, let $P_{s}:=\bigcup\left\{P_{s}^{\gamma}: \gamma \in \mu, s \in \mathcal{F}\left(B_{\gamma}\right)\right\}$. By construction, for all such $s, P_{s}$ is $\mathrm{Borel}_{\kappa}$, and either $P_{s}=N_{s}$, or $P_{s}$ is conelike in $N_{s}$. We need to remove any $P_{s}$ which is covered by a lower $P_{t}$. For every $x \in B$, let $s(x)$ be the minimal $s \in \bigcup_{\gamma \in \mu} \mathcal{F}\left(B_{\mu}\right)$ such that $x \in P_{s}$. Let $\mathcal{F}(B):=$ $\{s(x): x \in B\}$. By construction, $\mathcal{P}(B)=\left\{P_{s}: s \in \mathcal{F}(B)\right\}$ is a partition. As $\kappa$ is regular, $|\mathcal{F}(B)| \leq \sum_{\gamma \in \mu}\left|\mathcal{F}\left(B_{\gamma}\right)\right|<\kappa$. So, proving that $\mathcal{P}(B)$ is optimal amounts to checking that every conelike partition of $B$ refines $\mathcal{P}(B)$. Indeed, suppose $\mathcal{P}^{\prime}$ is a conelike partition of $B$. Fix $P_{s}^{\prime}$ which is conelike in $N_{s}$ and $P_{s}^{\prime} \subseteq B$. Then, we must have that $P_{s}^{\prime} \subseteq \bigcup\left\{P_{t}: t \in \mathcal{F}(B), P_{t} \cap P_{s}^{\prime} \neq \emptyset\right\}$. By Remark 6.2.9, there are two cases:

1. there is an $r \subsetneq s$ with $r \in \mathcal{F}(B)$ such that $P_{s}^{\prime} \subseteq P_{r}$, or
2. $P_{s}^{\prime} \subseteq \bigcup\left\{P_{t}: s \subseteq t, t \in \mathcal{F}(B)\right\}$. Suppose for a contradiction that $s \subsetneq t$ for all $t \in \mathcal{F}(B)$ such that $s \subseteq t$. Then, since $|\mathcal{F}(B)|<\kappa$, we have that $P_{t} \subseteq \bigcup\left\{P_{t}: s \subseteq t\right\} \subseteq \bigcup\left\{N_{t}: s \subseteq t\right\}$ is a union of $<\kappa$-many cones, thus is not conelike in $N_{s}$, a contradiction. So, $s \in \mathcal{F}(B)$ and $P_{s}^{\prime} \subseteq P_{s}$ by the definition of $P_{s}$.

So, $P_{s}^{\prime}$ is refined by some $P_{t} \in \mathcal{P}(B)$, as required. Hence, $\mathcal{S}$ contains the $\kappa$ open, and is closed under $<\kappa$-unions and complements. To conclude, recall that $\mathrm{Bor}_{\kappa}$ is the smallest $\kappa$-algebra containing the $\kappa$-open sets.

Remark 6.2.15. If $B, B^{\prime}$ are Borel $_{\kappa}$ and $B \subseteq B^{\prime}$ then $\mathcal{F}(B)$ refines $\mathcal{F}\left(B^{\prime}\right)$.
Lemma 6.2.16. Assume $\kappa$ is weakly compact. Let $\left(B_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \kappa}$ be decreasing with respect to inclusion, where each $B_{\alpha}$ is non-empty and $\mathrm{Borel}_{\kappa}$. If $\bigcap_{\alpha \in \kappa} B_{\alpha}=\emptyset$, then there is a $\gamma<\kappa$ such that $\bigcap_{\gamma<\alpha<\kappa} \mathcal{F}\left(B_{\alpha}\right) \neq \emptyset$.

Proof. For every $B_{\alpha}$, let $\mathcal{P}\left(B_{\alpha}\right)$ be the unique conelike partition from Lemma 6.2.12, Note that if there are $\alpha<\beta, r \in \mathcal{F}\left(B_{\alpha}\right)$, and $t \in \mathcal{F}\left(B_{\beta}\right)$ such that $s \subseteq t$, then, for every $\gamma$ satisfying $\alpha \leq \gamma \leq \beta$, there is a $s \in \mathcal{F}\left(B_{\gamma}\right)$ such that $r \subseteq s \subseteq t$. Indeed, since $\mathcal{P}\left(B_{\beta}\right)$ refines $\mathcal{P}\left(B_{\gamma}\right)$, and $\mathcal{P}\left(B_{\gamma}\right)$ refines $\mathcal{P}\left(B_{\alpha}\right)$, there is an $s \in \mathcal{F}\left(B_{\gamma}\right)$ such that $P_{t}^{\beta} \subseteq P_{s}^{\gamma} \subseteq P_{r}^{\alpha}$, and so we must have $r \subseteq s \subseteq t$ by Remark 6.2.9. This implies that if $s \in \mathcal{F}\left(B_{\alpha}\right)$ for cofinally many $\alpha<\kappa$, then $s \in \bigcap_{\alpha \in \kappa} \mathcal{F}\left(\overline{B_{\alpha}}\right)$.

Now assume towards contradiction that for all $\gamma<\kappa, \bigcap_{\gamma<\alpha<\kappa} \mathcal{F}\left(B_{\alpha}\right)=\emptyset$. We show that there is a $\kappa$-Aronszajn tree, and thus $\kappa$ is not weakly compact.

Let $T^{\prime}=\bigcup_{\alpha \in \kappa} \mathcal{F}\left(B_{\alpha}\right)$. Then, for every $s \in T^{\prime}$ there is $\alpha<\kappa$ such that $s \notin \mathcal{F}\left(B_{\alpha}\right)$, by the previous argument. So, by the pigeonhole principle, $\left|T^{\prime}\right|=\kappa$. Let

$$
F_{\alpha}=\left\{s \in \mathcal{F}\left(B_{\alpha}\right):\left|\left\{t \in T^{\prime}: s \subseteq t\right\}\right|=\kappa\right\} .
$$

Claim 6.2.17. $F_{\alpha} \neq \emptyset$ for every $\alpha<\kappa$.
Proof. Indeed, $T^{\prime \prime}=T^{\prime} \backslash \bigcup_{\epsilon \in \alpha} \mathcal{F}\left(B_{\epsilon}\right)$ has size $\kappa$, and for every $t \in T^{\prime \prime}$, there is $s \in \mathcal{F}\left(B_{\alpha}\right)$ such that $s \subseteq t$, since $\mathcal{F}\left(B_{\alpha}\right)$ refines all $\mathcal{F}\left(B_{\beta}\right)$ for $\beta \geq \alpha$. Thus, by the pigeonhole principle, we can find $s \in \mathcal{F}\left(B_{\beta}\right)$ such that $s \subseteq t$ for $\kappa$-many $t \in T^{\prime \prime}$.

Proceeding recursively, we define trees $T_{\alpha} \subseteq \bigcup_{\alpha \in \kappa} F_{\alpha}$ of height $\alpha+1$ such that all levels of $T_{\alpha}$ have size $<\kappa$. Let $T_{0}=\{\emptyset\}$, and given $\alpha$ limit, let $T_{\alpha}^{\prime}=\bigcup_{\gamma \in \alpha} T_{\gamma}$ and let $T_{\alpha}=T_{\alpha}^{\prime} \cup \delta\left(T_{\alpha}^{\prime}\right)$. It is clear that they satisfy all the required properties (since $\left|\delta\left(T_{\alpha}^{\prime}\right)\right|<\kappa$ if $\kappa$ is inaccessible).

Suppose that $T_{\beta}$ is as required, and that $\alpha=\beta+1$. Then, $L_{\beta}=\operatorname{Lev}_{\beta}\left(T_{\beta}\right)$ has size $<\kappa$. By the definition of $T^{\prime}$, the set $\left\{t \in T^{\prime}: s \subseteq t\right\}$ has size $\kappa$ for any $s \in L_{\beta}$. Also, for every $s \in L_{\beta}$, there is an $\alpha_{s}<\kappa$ such that $s \notin F_{\alpha^{\prime}} \subseteq \mathcal{F}\left(B_{\alpha^{\prime}}\right)$ for every $\alpha^{\prime} \geq \alpha_{s}$ (otherwise $s \in \bigcap_{\alpha_{s}<\alpha<\kappa} \mathcal{F}\left(B_{\alpha}\right)$ by the previous argument). Let $\gamma_{\alpha}=\sup \left\{\alpha_{s}: s \in L_{\beta}\right\}$, then $\gamma_{\alpha}<\kappa$ since $\left|L_{\beta}\right|<\kappa$. Let $L_{\alpha}$ be the set of minimal elements of $\bigcup_{s \in L_{\beta}}\left\{t \in F_{\gamma_{\alpha}}: s \subseteq t\right\}$, and let $T_{\alpha}=T_{\beta} \cup L_{\alpha}$. Then, $L_{\alpha} \cap T_{\alpha}=\emptyset$, thus $T_{\alpha}$ has height $\alpha+1$, and $\operatorname{Lev}_{\alpha}\left(T_{\alpha}\right)=L_{\alpha}$ has size $<\kappa$ since $\left|F_{\gamma_{\alpha}}\right| \leq\left|\mathcal{F}\left(B_{\gamma_{\alpha}}\right)\right|<\kappa$, as required.

We claim that $T=\bigcup_{\alpha \in \kappa} T_{\alpha}$ is a $\kappa$-Aronszajn tree. We just need to check that $T$ has no branch of size $\kappa$, since all other properties are guaranteed by the construction. Assume for a contradiction that $b \subseteq T$ is a branch of size $\kappa$, and let $x=\bigcup b$. Then, $x \in \bigcap_{s \in b} N_{s} \subseteq \bigcap_{s \in b} P_{s}$, contradicting $\bigcap_{\alpha \in \kappa} B_{\alpha}=\emptyset$.

Remark 6.2.18. The converse holds in the following sense. Suppose $\kappa$ is inaccessible, and any decreasing sequence of Borel $_{\kappa}$ sets, $B_{\alpha}$, such that $\bigcap_{\alpha \in \kappa} B_{\alpha}=\emptyset$, is such that $\bigcap_{\alpha \in \kappa} \mathcal{F}\left(B_{\alpha}\right) \neq \emptyset$. Then $\kappa$ is weakly compact.

Thus, this property characterises the weakly compact cardinals amongst the inaccessible ones.

This gives us a very informative representation of the Borel $_{\kappa}$ sets. One particular use of this is in Theorem 6.3.32.

If $\kappa$ is not inaccessible, then the Borel $_{\kappa}$ hierarchy may be strictly longer:
Proposition 6.2.19. If $\kappa$ is not inaccessible, there is a $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{3}^{0}$ set with no optimal conelike partition.

Proof. As $\kappa$ is not inaccessible, let $\lambda<\kappa$ be such that $2^{\lambda}=\kappa$. Let $A=[T]$ be a closed set in the full topology of $2^{\lambda}$ such that $\left|2^{\lambda} \backslash A\right|=|A|=\kappa$. For any $\gamma<\lambda$, and $N_{s} \subseteq \kappa^{\kappa}$, let $B_{\gamma}:=\bigcup_{s \in \operatorname{Lev}_{\gamma}(T)} N_{s}$. As $T$ is a $\lambda$-tree, $B_{\gamma}$ is $\kappa$-open in $\kappa^{\kappa}$. Then $\uparrow A:=\bigcap_{\gamma \in \lambda} B_{\gamma}=\bigcup_{s \in A} N_{s}$ is $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{3}^{0}$. But $|A|=\kappa$, and it is clear that no conelike partition for $\uparrow A$ can have cardinality $<\kappa$. So, $\uparrow A$ has no optimal conelike partition. The same argument works for $\uparrow\left(2^{\lambda} \backslash A\right)$.

Based on Lemma 6.2.12, we can characterise the Borel $_{\kappa}$-sets syntactically, as a union of certain 'V-like' sets (i.e. cones with $\kappa$-open sets removed). In fact, a Borel $_{\kappa}$ set $B=\bigcup_{\beta \in \mu} N_{s_{\beta}} \backslash O_{\beta}$ where $N_{s_{\beta}}$ are cones, $O_{\beta}$ are $\kappa$-open sets, and $\mu<\kappa$ (see Figures 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3).

Corollary 6.2.20. If $\kappa$ is inaccessible, then $X \subseteq \kappa^{\kappa}$ is Borel $_{\kappa}$ if and only if it has one of the following forms:

1. $X=\bigcup_{s \in A} N_{s}$ where $A \subseteq \kappa^{<\kappa}$ is an antichain and $|A|<\kappa$, when $X$ is $\kappa$-open;
2. $X=\kappa^{\kappa} \backslash \bigcup_{s \in A} N_{s}$ where $A \subseteq \kappa^{<\kappa}$ is an antichain and $|A|<\kappa$, when $X$ is $\kappa$-closed;
3. $X=\left(\kappa^{\kappa} \backslash \bigcup_{s \in A} N_{s}\right) \cup \bigcup_{t \in A^{\prime}} N_{t}$ where $A, A^{\prime} \subseteq \kappa^{<\kappa}$ are antichains where $\left|A \cup A^{\prime}\right|<\kappa$, and such that for every $t \in A^{\prime}$, there is a $s \in A$ with $s \subsetneq t$, when $X$ is $\kappa \Sigma_{2}^{0}$;
4. $X=\bigcup_{i \in I}\left(N_{s_{i}} \backslash \bigcup_{t \in A_{i}} N_{s-t}\right)$ where $I, A_{i} \subseteq \kappa^{<\kappa}$ are antichains, $|I|<\kappa$, $\left|\bigcup_{i \in I} A_{i}\right|<\kappa$, and for all $i, j \in I, i \neq j, s_{i} \perp s_{j}$, when $X$ is $\kappa \Pi_{2}^{0}$; and
5. $X=\bigcup_{i \in I}\left(N_{s_{i}} \backslash \bigcup_{t \in A_{i}} N_{s-t}\right)$ where $I, A_{i} \subseteq \kappa^{<\kappa}$ are antichains and $\left|\bigcup_{i \in I} A_{i}\right|<$ $\kappa$, when $X$ is $\kappa \Sigma_{3}^{0}$.

Proof. The proof is essentially a syntactic check, using Lemma 6.2.12,
Remark 6.2.21. By Proposition 6.2.20 Part 4., $\kappa \Pi_{2}^{0}=\left\{U \backslash V: U, V \in \kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{1}^{0}\right\}$.
The $\kappa$-topology on $\kappa^{\kappa}$ is 'more' $\kappa$-connected than the ordinary topology is connected, in the sense that $\kappa$-closed sets are $\kappa$-connected, as are the V-shaped sets (sets of the form $N_{s} \backslash N_{s \frown s_{\alpha}}$ ):
Lemma 6.2.22. The following subsets of $\kappa^{\kappa}$ are $\kappa$-connected:

1. $N_{s}$, for any $s \in \kappa^{<\kappa}$;
2. $N_{s} \backslash N_{t}$ for any $s, t \in \kappa^{<\kappa}$ with $t \supsetneq s$,
3. $N_{s} \backslash \bigcup_{\alpha \in \lambda} N_{s_{\alpha}}$ for any $s, s_{\alpha} \in \kappa^{<\kappa}$ with $s_{\alpha} \supsetneq s$ and $\lambda<\kappa$; and
4. $C \subseteq \kappa^{\kappa}$ which is $\kappa$-closed.

Proof. Part 1. is clear. We prove Part 2., as Part 3. is a simple elaboration. Suppose $N_{s} \backslash N_{t}$ is partitioned by disjoint $\kappa$-open sets $A, B$. Then $\left\{A \cup N_{t}, B\right\}$ is a $\kappa$-open partition of $N_{s}$, contradicting Part 1.

For Part 4. as in the classical case, $\kappa^{\kappa}$ and $\emptyset$ are $\kappa$-connected. Otherwise, $C=\kappa^{\kappa} \backslash \bigcup_{\alpha \in \lambda} N_{s_{\alpha}}$ for some $s, s_{\alpha} \in \kappa^{<\kappa}$ with $s_{\alpha} \supsetneq s$ and $\lambda<\kappa$. Suppose for a contradiction that $C$ is not $\kappa$-connected, so $C=U \sqcup V$ where $U$ and $V$ are $\kappa$-open. Without loss of generality assume $\lambda=1$, i.e. $C=\kappa^{\kappa} \backslash N_{s}$ for some $s \in \kappa^{<\kappa}$. So, $C=\bigcup_{s \in J} N_{j}$ where $J \subseteq \kappa^{\operatorname{len}(s)} \backslash\{s\}$ is a maximal antichain. But the smallest such possibility is $|J|=\kappa$, so without loss of generality $U=\bigcup_{s \in J^{\prime}} N_{s}$ and $V=\bigcup_{s \in J^{\prime \prime}} N_{s}$ for $J^{\prime}, J^{\prime \prime} \subseteq J$. So, at least one of $J^{\prime}, J^{\prime \prime}$ has size $\kappa$, contradicting that $U, V$ are $\kappa$-open.


Figure 6.1: $\kappa$-open and $\kappa$-closed sets of $\kappa^{\kappa}$


Figure 6.2: $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{2}^{0}$ and $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Pi}_{2}^{0}$ sets of $\kappa^{\kappa}$


$$
B \in \kappa \Delta_{3}^{0}
$$

Figure 6.3: $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Delta}_{3}^{0}$ sets of $\kappa^{\kappa}$

The only $\kappa$-connected $\kappa$-open sets are the cones. So, e.g. every $\kappa$-connected $\kappa$-open $U=N_{s} \subseteq \kappa^{\kappa}$ is $\kappa$-homeomorphic to $\kappa^{\kappa}$ itself. Hence, we can represent the Borel $_{\kappa}$ sets in terms of $\kappa$-connected sets:

Corollary 6.2.23. Suppose $\kappa$ is inaccessible. If $B \in \operatorname{Bor}_{\kappa}\left(\tau_{\kappa}{ }^{\mathrm{b}}\right)$, then $B$ is a $<\kappa$ union of $\kappa$-connected Borel $_{\kappa}$ components.

Proof. By Lemma 6.2.6, every Borel ${ }_{\kappa}$ set, $B$, is of the form $B=\bigcup_{\alpha \in \lambda} N_{s_{\alpha}} \backslash V_{\alpha}$ for some $\kappa$-open $V_{\alpha}$ and some $\lambda<\kappa$ (with possibly nested $N_{s_{\alpha}}$ ). By Lemma 6.2.22, each of these components is $\kappa$-connected.

We conclude that not all fully clopen sets are Borel $_{\kappa}$ :

2. If $\kappa^{<\kappa}=\kappa$, then there are $\kappa$-many Borel $_{\kappa}$ sets. So, there are sets, $X \subseteq \kappa^{\kappa}$ which are clopen in the full topology which are not Borel $_{\kappa}$.

Proof. For Part 1., every cone $N_{s}$ is clopen in the full topology, as usual. Trivially, the complement of a clopen is clopen. Moreover, the family of clopen sets is $\kappa$ additive. Finally, recall that $\mathrm{Bor}_{\kappa}$ is the smallest $\kappa$-algebra containing the $\kappa$-open sets.

For Part 2. for each $s \in \kappa^{<\kappa}, N_{s}$ is a distinct Borel $_{\kappa}$ set. For the upper bound, we inductively prove that for each $\alpha<\kappa,\left|\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{\alpha}^{0}\right| \leq \kappa$. First, note that $\kappa^{<\kappa}=\kappa$ implies that $\left|\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{1}^{0}\right|=\kappa$. For the induction step, if this holds for all levels $\alpha<\beta$, then $\left|\kappa \Pi_{\alpha}^{0}\right| \leq \kappa$ for all $\alpha<\beta$, so $\left|\kappa \Sigma_{\beta}^{0}\right| \leq\left|\left\{U \subseteq \bigcup_{\alpha \in \beta} \kappa \Pi_{\alpha}^{0}:|U|<\kappa\right\}\right| \leq \kappa^{<\kappa}=\kappa$. So, there are at most $\kappa \times \kappa=\kappa$-many Borel $_{\kappa}$ sets. For the last part, note that there are $2^{\kappa}$-many sets which are clopen in the full topology.

We can construct a set which can only be represented as a union of $\kappa$-many disjoint cones, and the same is true of its complement, which is thus 'too complex' to be Borel $_{\kappa}$ :

Example 6.2.25. Let $\kappa$ be inaccessible. Then $\bigcup_{\alpha \in \kappa} N_{(2 \alpha)}$ is clopen in the full topology, but, by Lemma 6.2.12, it is not Borel ${ }_{\kappa}$.

Actually, $\bigcup_{\alpha \in \kappa} N_{(2 \alpha)}$ is clopen in the full topology but not Borel ${ }_{\kappa}$ even when $\kappa$ is not inaccessible, by a separate argument.

## The difference hierarchy on $\kappa \Sigma_{1}^{0}$

The representation in Proposition 6.2.20 indicates a non-collapsing stratification of $\mathrm{Bor}_{\kappa}$, namely the difference hierarchy on $\kappa$-open sets: Borel $_{\kappa}$ sets are small unions of 'V-shaped' sets ( $N_{s} \backslash N_{t}$ with $s \subsetneq t$ ) and cones, where some of these V-shaped sets can fall strictly within other V-shaped sets ( $N_{s} \backslash N_{t} \cup N_{q} \backslash N_{r}$ where $s \subsetneq t \subseteq q \subsetneq r)$. The depth of the nesting of these V-shaped sets corresponds to a difference hierarchy on the $\kappa$-open sets (building on the classical Hausdorff difference hierarchy of [112, 22.E]):

Definition 6.2.26. Let $\left(C_{\beta}\right)_{\beta \in \alpha}$ be an increasing sequence of subsets of $\kappa^{\kappa}$. For all $\alpha<\kappa$, we define $\alpha$-Diff $\left(\left(C_{\beta}\right)_{\beta \in \alpha}\right):=\left\{x \in \bigcup_{\beta \in \alpha} C_{\beta}\right.$ : the least $\beta<\alpha$ with $x \in C_{\beta}$ has parity opposite to that of $\alpha\}$.

Let $\Gamma \subseteq \mathscr{P}\left(\kappa^{\kappa}\right)$. We define $\alpha$-Diff $(\Gamma):=\left\{\alpha\right.$ - $\operatorname{Diff}\left(\left(C_{\beta}\right)_{\beta \in \alpha}\right):\left(C_{\beta}\right)_{\beta \in \alpha}$ is an increasing sequence of $\left.C_{\beta} \in \Gamma\right\}$. We let $\kappa$ - $\operatorname{Diff}(\Gamma):=\bigcup_{\alpha \in \kappa} \alpha$ - $\operatorname{Diff}(\Gamma)$.
Proposition 6.2.27. For all $\alpha<\beta<\kappa, \alpha-\operatorname{Diff}\left(\kappa \Sigma_{1}^{0}\right) \subsetneq \beta$ - $\operatorname{Diff}\left(\kappa \Sigma_{1}^{0}\right)$.
Proof. Let $\left(s_{\gamma}\right)_{\gamma \in \beta}$ be a sequence of $s_{\gamma} \in \kappa^{<\kappa}$ such that $s_{\gamma} \subsetneq s_{\gamma}^{\prime}$ for all $\gamma<\gamma^{\prime}<\beta$. Then a simple check shows that $\beta$ - $\operatorname{Diff}\left(\left(N_{s_{\gamma}}\right)_{\gamma \in \beta}\right) \in \beta$ - $\operatorname{Diff}\left(\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{1}^{0}\right) \backslash \alpha$ - $\operatorname{Diff}\left(\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{1}^{0}\right)$.

We can exactly characterise the Borel $_{\kappa}$ sets as the $\kappa$-difference hierarchy on the $\kappa$-open set:

Proposition 6.2.28. For any $C \subseteq \kappa^{\kappa}, C \in \kappa$ - $\operatorname{Diff}\left(\kappa \Sigma_{1}^{0}\right)$ if and only if $C$ is $\operatorname{Borel}_{\kappa}$.
Proof. First, we prove $\subseteq$ : if $C \in \kappa$ - $\operatorname{Diff}\left(\kappa \Sigma_{1}^{0}\right)$, then $C=\bigcup_{\beta \in \lambda} B_{\beta}$ for some $\lambda<\kappa$, where each $B_{\beta}$ is the difference of two open sets, i.e. the difference of two sets of the sequence defining $C$. So, $B_{\beta}$ is Borel $_{\kappa}$. Hence, $C$ is Borel ${ }_{\kappa}$.

In the other direction, note that $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{1}^{0} \subseteq \kappa$ - $\operatorname{Diff}\left(\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{1}^{0}\right)$, that $\kappa$ - $\operatorname{Diff}\left(\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{1}^{0}\right)$ is obviously closed under complements. So, it suffices to prove that $\kappa$ - $\operatorname{Diff}\left(\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{1}^{0}\right)$ is closed under $<\kappa$-unions. Suppose that $\left(C_{\beta}\right)_{\beta \in \lambda}$ in $\kappa$ - $\operatorname{Diff}\left(\kappa \Sigma_{1}^{0}\right)$. As $\kappa$ is regular, there is some $\mu<\kappa$ such that for all $\beta<\lambda, C_{\beta} \in \mu$ - $\operatorname{Diff}\left(\kappa \Sigma_{1}^{0}\right)$. So, by the standard argument (as in 112, Ex 22.26(i)]), $\bigcup_{\beta \in \lambda} C_{\beta} \in(\mu+1)$-Diff $\left(\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{1}^{0}\right)$. Hence, $\kappa$ - $\operatorname{Diff}\left(\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{1}^{0}\right)$ is a $\kappa$-algebra containing the open sets.

This is very unlike the classical case, where $\boldsymbol{\Delta}_{\alpha}^{0} \subsetneq \operatorname{Diff}\left(\boldsymbol{\Delta}_{\alpha}^{0}\right) \subseteq \boldsymbol{\Delta}_{\alpha+1}^{0}$ [89], 130, §37.III]. An immediate corollary of Proposition 6.2 .20 is the following:
Corollary 6.2.29. We have that $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Pi}_{2}^{0}=2$ - $\operatorname{Diff}\left(\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{1}^{0}\right)$.
Corollary 6.2.30. Singletons in $\kappa^{\kappa}$ are not Borel $_{\kappa}$.
Proof. Fix $x \in \kappa^{\kappa}$. The result follows by induction on $\alpha$, that $\{x\} \notin \alpha$ - $\operatorname{Diff}\left(\kappa \Sigma_{1}^{0}\right)$. Clearly, $\{x\}$ is not $\kappa$-open, nor is it the difference of two $\kappa$-open sets. Later steps only add components, so clearly do not include $\{x\}$.

## Complete and universal sets

A standard proof of the non-collapse of the classical Borel hierarchy constructs universal sets for each class, then diagonalises (e.g. [112, Theorem 22.4]). An alternative shows that there is a complete set for continuous Lipschitz function [6, Proposition 3.9]. By Lemma 6.2.6, neither argument generalises to the Borel ${ }_{\kappa}$ hierarchy. Here we are more precise, we prove that there are no sets which are complete for Lipschitz $\kappa$-continuous functions; nor are there universal sets. We first show that there are $\kappa$-complete sets.

As usual, for $C, D \subseteq X$, we say $f: X \rightarrow X$ is a reduction of $C$ to $D$ if $C=f^{-1}(D)$.
Definition 6.2.31. Let $\left(X, \tau_{\kappa}\right)$ be a $\kappa$-topological space, and let $\Gamma \subseteq \mathscr{P}(X)$ be such that $X \in \Gamma$. A subset $C \subseteq X$ is called $\kappa$-complete for $\Gamma$, if every set in $\Gamma$ can be reduced to $C$ with a $\kappa$-continuous function.

Every $\kappa$-open set, $U$, is $\kappa$-complete for $\kappa$-open sets, by noting that checking $x \in U$ only uses $<\kappa$-many bits (as in the full topology), but also that checking $x \notin U$ uses only $<\kappa$-many bits. Formally:

Proposition 6.2.32. If $\kappa^{<\kappa}=\kappa$, then any non-empty $\kappa$-open set, $U \subsetneq \kappa^{\kappa}$, is $\kappa$-complete for $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{1}^{0}$.

Proof. Let $U \subsetneq \kappa^{\kappa}$ be non-empty and $\kappa$-open, and let $V$ be a $\kappa$-open set. We construct a function $f: \kappa^{\kappa} \rightarrow \kappa^{\kappa}$ such that $f^{-1}(U)=V$. Let $A, B$ be antichains such that $|B|,|A|<\kappa, \uparrow A=U$, and $\uparrow B=V$. Let $A_{0}=\{a(0): a \in A\}$. Let $\beta:=\sup \{\operatorname{len}(b): b \in B\}$ (as $\kappa$ is regular, $\beta<\kappa$ ). Let $I:=\left\{s \in \kappa^{\beta}: s \perp B\right\}$. If $|B| \geq|A|$, let $\chi: B \rightarrow A$ be surjection and let $\phi: I \rightarrow \kappa \backslash A_{0}$ be a bijection. We define $f$ like so:

$$
f\left(s^{\frown} y\right)= \begin{cases}\chi(s)^{\frown} y & \text { if } s \in B, \text { and } y \in \kappa^{\kappa}, \\ \phi(s)^{\complement} y & \text { if } s \in I, \text { and } y \in \kappa^{\kappa} .\end{cases}
$$

Otherwise, $|B|<|A|$. Then let $\psi:|A| \rightarrow A$ and $v:\{t \subset \alpha: t \in B, \alpha \notin|A|\} \cup I \rightarrow$ $\kappa \backslash A_{0}$ be bijections. Then we define $f$ like so:

$$
f(x)= \begin{cases}\psi(\alpha) \frown y & \text { if } x=t \frown \alpha \frown y \text { for some } t \in B, \alpha \in|A|, \text { and } y \in \kappa^{\kappa}, \\ v(\alpha) \frown y & \text { if } x=t \frown \alpha \frown y \text { for some } t \in B, \alpha \notin|A|, \text { and } y \in \kappa^{\kappa}, \\ v(s)^{\curvearrowleft} y & \text { if } x=s^{\curvearrowright} y \text { for some } s \in I, y \in \kappa^{\kappa} .\end{cases}
$$

Clearly, $f^{-1}(U)=V$. It remains to check that $f$ is $\kappa$-continuous. First, suppose $|B| \geq|A|$. If $s=t \subset r$ for some $S$ such that $\phi^{-1}(s) \perp B$, then $f^{-1}\left(N_{s}\right)=N_{s^{\prime}}$ for some $s^{\prime} \in \kappa^{<\kappa}$. Otherwise, $f^{-1}\left(N_{s}\right)=\bigcup_{s^{\prime} \in S} N_{s^{\prime}}$ where $|S| \leq|B|$, so $f^{-1}\left(N_{s}\right)$ is $\kappa$-open. The case where $|B|<|A|$ is similar.

This reduction of $N_{s}$ to $N_{t}$ need not be a retraction, nor even surjective. One consequence of Proposition 6.2.32, using the standard proof in e.g. 112, Proposition 22.15], is that the only $\kappa$-clopen sets are $\emptyset$ and $\kappa^{\kappa}$ :

Proposition 6.2.33. If $\Gamma \subseteq \mathscr{P}\left(\kappa^{\kappa}\right)$ is closed under $\kappa$-continuous preimages, but not under complements, and every (non-empty) set in $\Gamma$ is $\kappa$-complete, then $\Gamma \cap$ $\neg \Gamma \subseteq\left\{\emptyset, \kappa^{\kappa}\right\}$.

Corollary 6.2.34. If $\kappa^{<\kappa}=\kappa$, then $\kappa \Delta_{1}^{0}=\left\{\emptyset, \kappa^{\kappa}\right\}$.
A parallel to Proposition 6.2 .32 holds for $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{2}^{0}$, which yields a parallel triviality result for $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Delta}_{2}^{0}$ :

Proposition 6.2.35. Suppose $\kappa^{<\kappa}=\kappa$. If $B \in \kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{2}^{0} \backslash\left(\kappa \boldsymbol{\Pi}_{1}^{0} \cup \kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{1}^{0}\right)$, then $B$ is $\kappa$-complete for $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{2}^{0}$. So, any $B \in 2$ - $\operatorname{Diff}\left(\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{1}^{0}\right) \backslash 1$ - $\operatorname{Diff}\left(\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{1}^{0}\right)$ is $\kappa$-complete for 2 -Diff $\left(\kappa \Sigma_{1}^{0}\right)$.

Proof. The proof is exactly similar to that of Proposition 6.2.32. One first proves that if $s \subsetneq t$, then $N_{s} \backslash N_{t}$ is $\kappa$-complete for $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{2}^{0}$. Then one proves that if $B_{1}, B_{2}$


Figure 6.4: The Borel $_{\kappa}$ hierarchy on $\kappa^{\kappa}$
are non-empty and $\kappa$-open, and $B_{1} \subsetneq B_{2}$, then $B_{1} \backslash B_{2}$ is $\kappa$-complete for $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{2}^{0}$. The other cases are a simple elaboration.

For the second part, by Corollary 6.2.29, $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Pi}_{2}^{0}=2$ - $\operatorname{Diff}\left(\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{1}^{0}\right)$. The result then follows by duality.

So, arguing as usual again (e.g. [112, Proposition 22.15]), we can show that if $\kappa^{<\kappa}=\kappa$, then $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Delta}_{2}^{0}=\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{1}^{0} \cup \kappa \boldsymbol{\Pi}_{1}^{0}$. This gives us the representation of Borel ${ }_{\kappa}$ hierarchy displayed in Figure 6.4.

The non-collapse of the ordinary Borel hierarchy in, e.g. [6, Proposition 3.9], relies on sets which are complete for Lipschitz functions, not just continuous functions. But we show that there are no sets which are complete for any Borel ${ }_{\kappa}$ class, even for functions which are $\kappa$-continuous and Lipschitz.

First, recall that if $\phi: \kappa^{<\kappa} \rightarrow \kappa^{<\kappa}$, we define $f_{\phi}: \kappa^{\kappa} \rightarrow \kappa^{\kappa}$ as $f_{\phi}(x)=$ $\bigcup_{\alpha \in \kappa} \phi(x \upharpoonright \alpha)$.

Lemma 6.2.36 (Folklore, e.g. [6, Lemma 3.7]). A function $f: \kappa^{\kappa} \rightarrow \kappa^{\kappa}$ is continuous if and only if there is a function $\phi: \kappa^{<\kappa} \rightarrow \kappa^{<\kappa}$ with $f_{\phi}=f$ such that:

1. $\phi$ is monotone, and
2. $\operatorname{len}\left(\bigcup_{\alpha \in \kappa} \phi(x\lceil\alpha))=\kappa\right.$ for all $x \in \kappa^{\kappa}$ (i.e. $\phi$ is continuous).

As usual, a function $\phi: \kappa^{<\kappa} \rightarrow \kappa^{<\kappa}$ is called Lipschitz if it is monotone and for all $s \in \kappa^{<\kappa}$ we have that len $(\phi(x))=\operatorname{len}(x)$. A function $f: \kappa^{\kappa} \rightarrow \kappa^{\kappa}$ is called Lipschitz if $f=f_{\phi}$ for some Lipschitz $\phi$. Both Lipschitz and $\kappa$-continuity imply continuity, so any proposed ' $\kappa$-topology version' of Lipschitz, $L_{\kappa}$, would imply being Lipschitz. So, if there are no sets which are complete for $\kappa$-continuous and Lipschitz functions, then there are no sets which are complete for $L_{\kappa}$ functions, for any such notion, $L_{\kappa}$.

Definition 6.2.37 (following [6, page 23]). Let $\left(X, \tau_{\kappa}\right)$ be a $\kappa$-topological space, and let $\Gamma \subseteq \mathscr{P}(X)$ be such that $X \in \Gamma$. A subset $C \subseteq X$ is called $L, \kappa$-hard for $\Gamma$
if every set it $\Gamma$ can be reduced to $C$ by a fully Lipschitz, $\kappa$-continuous function. If, in addition, $C \in \Gamma$, then we say that $C$ is $L$, $\kappa$-complete for $\Gamma$.

Proposition 6.2.38. If $\kappa$ is inaccessible, then there is no Borel $_{\kappa}$ set which is $L, \kappa$-hard for $\kappa \Sigma_{1}^{0}$. So, for each $\alpha \in \kappa$, there is no set which is $L, \kappa$-complete for $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{\alpha}^{0}$.

Proof. Let $B$ be any set such that there is an $\alpha<\kappa$, and an antichain $A \subseteq \kappa^{<\alpha}$ such that $B=\uparrow A$. Notice that every $\kappa$-open set satisfies this property. By Lemma 6.2.12, if $\kappa$ is inaccessible, every Borel $_{\kappa}$ set is also representable as $\uparrow A$ for such an antichain.

We prove that $B$ is not $L, \kappa$-hard for $\kappa$-open sets. If $B$ is empty, then it is clearly not $L, \kappa$-hard, so we are done. So, assume that there is an $x \in B$, and let $s=x \upharpoonright \alpha$ and $t=x \upharpoonright(\alpha+1)$. Suppose that $B$ is $L$, $\kappa$-hard for $\kappa$-open sets. Then, there is a Lipschitz, $\kappa$-continuous function, $\phi_{t}$, such that $f_{\phi_{t}}^{-1}(B)=N_{t}$. Since $B=\uparrow A$ for $A \subseteq \kappa^{<\alpha}$ and $\phi$ is Lipschitz, we have that either $N_{\phi_{t}}(s) \subseteq B$ or $N_{\phi_{t}}(s) \cap B=\emptyset$ : thus, either $N_{s} \subseteq f_{\phi_{t}}^{-1}(B)$ or $N_{s} \cap f_{\phi_{t}}^{-1}(B)=\emptyset$, but either way $f_{\phi_{t}}^{-1}(B) \neq N_{t}$, a contradiction.

The situation is somewhat simpler for universal sets on the Borel ${ }_{\kappa}$ hierarchy: if $\kappa$ is inaccessible, then there are no universal sets for the Borel ${ }_{\kappa}$ classes. As usual, if $C \subseteq X \times Y$ and $x \in X$, let $C_{x}=\{y \in Y:(x, y) \in X\}$. We consider the case where $X=Y=\kappa^{\kappa}$.

Proposition 6.2.39. If $\kappa$ is inaccessible, then there is no set which is universal for $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{1}^{0}$.

Proof. Let $U \subseteq\left(\kappa^{\kappa}\right)^{2}$ be $\kappa$-open. Then $U=\bigcup_{\alpha \in \mu} N_{s_{\alpha}} \times N_{t_{\alpha}}$ for some $\mu<\kappa$. Note that we may have distinct $x, y \in \pi_{1}(U)$ such that $U_{x}=U_{y}$ (Figure 6.5). As $U_{x}=\left(\bigcup_{\alpha \in S} N_{s_{\alpha}} \times N_{t_{\alpha}}\right)_{x}, U_{x}$ can be uniquely assigned a set $S \subseteq \mu$ consisting of those $\alpha$ such that $x \in N_{t_{\alpha}}$. This characterises the possible $U_{x}$ in terms of subsets of $\mu$. Using this injection, $\left|\left\{U_{x}: x \in X\right\}\right| \leq 2^{\mu}$. As $\kappa$ is a strong limit, $2^{\mu}<\kappa$. The bounded $\kappa$-topology has weight $\kappa$, so $\left|\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{1}^{0}\right| \geq \kappa$. Hence, not every $\kappa$-open subset of $X$ is a projection of $U$, i.e. $U$ is not universal for $\kappa \Sigma_{1}^{0}$.

Proposition 6.2.40. If $\kappa$ is inaccessible, then there is no set which is universal for $\kappa \Sigma_{2}^{0}$.

Proof. Note that $\left|\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{2}^{0}\right|=\kappa$. So, it suffices to prove that any $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{2}^{0}$ set has $<\kappa$-many distinct slices. By regularity, if $B \in \kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{2}^{0}$, then $B=C \cup U$ where $C$ is $\kappa$-closed, and $U$ is $\kappa$-open. As $C$ is $\kappa$-closed in $\left(\kappa^{\kappa}\right)^{2}$, there is a $\lambda<\kappa$ and basic open rectangles, $R_{\alpha}$, for each $\alpha<\lambda$, such that $C=\left(\kappa^{\kappa}\right)^{2} \backslash \bigcup_{\alpha \in \lambda} R_{\alpha}$. In other words, $C$ has $\lambda$-many 'holes' in it. As $U$ is $\kappa$-open, there is a $\mu<\kappa$ and basic open rectangles $R_{\beta}^{\prime}$ for each $\beta<\mu$ such that $U=\bigcup_{\beta \in \mu} R_{\beta}^{\prime}$. So, $U$ has $\mu$-many 'chunks'. For each $y \in Y$, $B_{y}=\kappa^{\kappa} \backslash\left(\bigcup_{\alpha \in \lambda}\left(R_{\alpha}\right)_{y}\right) \cup \bigcup_{\beta \in \mu}\left(R_{\mu}^{\prime}\right)_{y}$. So, every slice $B_{y}$ corresponds to a pair $(S, P)$, where $S \subseteq \lambda$ defines the holes in $C_{y}$, and $P \subseteq \mu$ defines the chunks of $U_{y}$. Hence, $\left|\left\{B_{y}: y \in \kappa^{\kappa}\right\}\right|=|\mathscr{P}(\mu) \times \mathscr{P}(\lambda)|$. As $\kappa$ is a strong limit, $\gamma<\kappa$ implies $|\mathscr{P}(\gamma)|<\kappa$, so $|\mathscr{P}(\mu) \times \mathscr{P}(\lambda)|<\kappa$. Hence, there are at most $<\kappa$-many distinct slices of any $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{2}^{0}$ set.


Figure 6.5: A $\kappa$-open set $U \subseteq\left(\kappa^{\kappa}\right)^{2}$ has few slices

Proposition 6.2.41. If $\kappa$ is inaccessible, then there is no set which is universal for $\kappa \Sigma_{3}^{0}$.

Proof. By Lemma 6.2.6. every Borel ${ }_{\kappa}$ set is $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{3}^{0}$. So, $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{3}^{0}$ is closed under complements and $\kappa$-continuous preimages. Suppose $U \in \kappa^{\kappa} \times \kappa^{\kappa}$ were universal for $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{3}^{0}$ sets. Then we diagonalise: let $f: \kappa^{\kappa} \rightarrow \kappa^{\kappa} \times \kappa^{\kappa}$ be such that $f(x)=(x, x)$. Let $D=f^{-1}(U)$. As $f$ is clearly $\kappa$-continuous, and as $\kappa \Sigma_{3}^{0}$ is closed under $\kappa$-continuous preimages, we know that $D \in \kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{3}^{0}$. As $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{3}^{0}$ is closed under complements, $\kappa^{\kappa} \backslash D \in$ $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{3}^{0}$. If $U$ is universal for $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{3}^{0}$, then there is $x_{0}$ such that $\pi_{x_{0}}(U)=\kappa^{\kappa} \backslash D$, i.e. $(x, x) \notin U \Longleftrightarrow\left(x_{0}, x\right) \in U$. So, $\left(x_{0}, x_{0}\right) \notin U \Longleftrightarrow\left(x_{0}, x_{0}\right) \in U$, a contradiction.

### 6.2.3 Linearly ordered spaces

The $\kappa$-Baire space is universal amongst $\kappa$-Polish spaces in the sense that each $\kappa$ Polish space is (fully) homeomorphic to a closed subset of $\kappa^{\kappa}$, however the situation is more complicated for $\kappa$-topologies (Proposition 6.2.44). This means we need a local theory of Borel $_{\kappa}$ sets on other $\kappa$-Polish spaces. We do so here on linearly ordered spaces. First, we define $\kappa$-Polishness.

Definition 6.2.42 (1) Definition 2.3], [37, Definition 2.2]). Assume $X$ has a basis, $\mathcal{B}$, where $|\mathcal{B}|=\kappa$.

1. We say that $X$ is strong $\kappa$-Choquet $\left(\mathrm{SC}_{\kappa}\right)$ if player II has a winning strategy for the strong $\kappa$-Choquet game on the (full) topology $\langle\mathcal{B}\rangle_{\kappa^{+}}$.
2. We say that $X$ is strong fair $\kappa$-Choquet $\left(f \mathrm{SC}_{\kappa}\right)$ if player II has a winning strategy for the strong fair $\kappa$-Choquet game on the (full) topology $\langle\mathcal{B}\rangle_{\kappa^{+}}$.

By [1. Theorem 2.21], a $\kappa$-topological space, $\left(X, \tau_{\kappa}\right)$, is $\kappa$-Polish if $\left\langle\tau_{\kappa}\right\rangle_{\kappa^{+}}$is regular, Hausdorff, $\kappa$-additive, and $f \mathrm{SC}_{\kappa}$.

Remark 6.2.43. The properties defined by replacing the full topology by the $\kappa$ topology in the definitions of $\mathrm{SC}_{\kappa}$ is equivalent to being $\mathrm{SC}_{\kappa}$, and exactly similarly for $f \mathrm{SC}_{\kappa}$ : we say that a set, $A$, is $\kappa$-topology strong Choquet if player II has a winning strategy in the strong $\kappa$-Choquet game on $A$ where the open sets must be chosen from the basis. Note that $A$ is $\mathrm{SC}_{\kappa}$ if and only if player II has a winning strategy in the $A$-game where both players must choose basic open sets [1, Remark 2.4], [37, Lemma 2.5]. Hence, SC $_{\kappa}$ implies $\kappa$-topology strong Choquet. The converse is trivial. Likewise for $f \mathrm{SC}_{\kappa}$.

Proposition 6.2.44. Not every $\kappa$-Polish $X$ is $\kappa$-homeomorphic to a Borel $_{\kappa} B \subseteq$ $\kappa^{\kappa}$.

Proof. Fix a space $(X, \tau)$ which is homeomorphic to a closed set in the full topology of $\kappa^{\kappa}$, but not to any clopen set in the full topology (for example $\left\{x \in 2^{\kappa}: x\right.$ has finitely many 0 s$\}$ ).

Suppose that $X$ is $\kappa$-homeomorphic to a Borel $_{\kappa}$ set $B \subseteq \kappa^{\kappa}$. By Proposition 6.2.24 Part 1. $B$ is clopen in the full topology. A $\kappa$-homeomorphism is a homeomorphism. Hence, $X$ is homeomorphic to a clopen set, namely $B$, in the full topology, a contradiction.

As in Corollary 6.2.23, we can characterise the Borel $_{\kappa}$ set of linearly ordered spaces as small unions of suitable components, in this case convex components. This yields a characterisation of the Borel $_{\kappa}$ sets in analogy to Lemma 6.2.6.

The idea is as follows: if owei $(X) \leq \kappa$, then the Borel $_{\kappa}$ sets of the $X$-interval $\kappa$-topology are formed by glueing $<\kappa$-many convex Borel $_{\kappa}$ sets together. These convex sets fall into three types: the 'open-ended' convex sets are $\kappa$-open, the 'closed-ended' are $\kappa$-closed, and the 'half-open-ended' are $\kappa \Sigma_{2}^{0}$. So, their unions are $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{2}^{0}$, hence Bor $_{\kappa}=\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{2}^{0}$. Formally: let $\operatorname{Conv}_{\kappa}(X):=\{B \subseteq X$ : there is a $\lambda<\kappa$ and pairwise disjoint convex Borel $_{\kappa} C_{\alpha} \subseteq X$ such that $\left.B=\bigcup_{\alpha \in \lambda} C_{\alpha}\right\}$.

Theorem 6.2.45. Let $\kappa$ be inaccessible. Let $X$ be a dense linear order such that $Q \subseteq X$ is order dense. Equip $X$ with the $Q$-interval $\kappa$-topology. Then $B$ is $\mathrm{Borel}_{\kappa}$ if and only if $B \in \operatorname{Conv}_{\kappa}(X)$.

Proof. Clearly $\operatorname{Conv}_{\kappa}(X) \subseteq \operatorname{Bor}_{\kappa}(X)$. So, we prove the converse. We show that $\operatorname{Conv}_{\kappa}(X)$ is a $\kappa$-algebra containing the $\kappa$-open sets. First, if $B \in \kappa \Sigma_{1}^{0}$, then $B$ is $\bigcup_{\alpha \in \lambda} B_{\alpha}$ where $B_{\alpha} \in \mathcal{B}$ for some $\lambda<\kappa$. By construction, each $B_{\alpha}$ is convex, so $\bigcup_{\alpha \in \lambda} B_{\alpha}$ is a suitable representation.

Closure under $<\kappa$-unions is immediate: let $B=\bigcup_{\alpha \in \lambda} B_{\alpha}$ such that $A_{\alpha}=$ $\bigcup_{\beta \in \lambda_{\alpha}} B_{\alpha, \beta}$ where $B_{\alpha, \beta}$ are convex and Borel $_{\kappa}$, then $B=\bigcup_{\alpha \in \sup _{\alpha \in \lambda} \lambda_{\alpha}} B_{\alpha}$. By regularity, $\sup _{\alpha \in \lambda} \lambda_{\alpha}<\kappa$. Note that the components may overlap, but this still constitutes a $<\kappa$ union of convex Borel $_{\kappa}$ sets.

So, it suffices to show closure under complementation: let $B=\bigcup_{\alpha \in \lambda} C_{\alpha}$ for convex $C_{\alpha} \in$ Bor $_{\kappa}$ and $\lambda<\kappa$. We prove that $X \backslash B=\bigcup_{\alpha \in \lambda} C_{\alpha}^{\prime}$ for some convex $C_{\alpha}^{\prime} \in$ Bor $_{\kappa}$.

Claim 6.2.46. If $C_{\alpha}<C_{\beta}$ are convex and Borel $_{\kappa}$, then $C[\alpha, \beta]:=\left\{x \in X: C_{\alpha}<\right.$ $\left.x<C_{\beta}\right\}$ is Borel $_{\kappa}$.

Proof. By assumption, $C_{\alpha} \cup C_{\beta} \in$ Bor $_{\kappa}$, so $C[\alpha, \beta] \subseteq X \backslash\left(C_{\alpha} \cup C_{\beta}\right)$. Then let $a \in C_{\alpha}$ and $b \in C_{\beta}$. Then $X \backslash\left(C_{\alpha} \cup C_{\beta} \cup(-\infty, a) \cup(b, \infty)\right)=C[\alpha, \beta]$. So, $C[\alpha, \beta]$ is $\mathrm{Borel}_{\kappa}$.

Let $\left\{C_{\alpha}^{\prime}: \alpha \in \zeta\right\}$ be a partition of $X \backslash B$ into maximal convex components. Both $(-\infty, \operatorname{bot}(B)]$ and $[\operatorname{top}(B), \infty)$ are also convex $\operatorname{Borel}_{\kappa}($ as $\lambda<\kappa)$. So, fix a $C_{\beta}^{\prime}$ which is not an initial or final segment. There are four cases describing how the components of $C_{\alpha}$ may be arranged. In each case, we show that the convex set, $C_{\beta}^{\prime}$, between the components is Borel $_{k}$.

1. Suppose that there are $\alpha, \gamma<\lambda$ with $C_{\alpha}<C_{\gamma}$, such that $C_{\alpha} \cup C_{\beta}^{\prime} \cup C_{\gamma}$ is convex, i.e. there is no $\delta$ such that $C_{\alpha}<C_{\delta}<C_{\gamma}$. Then $C_{\beta}^{\prime}=C[\alpha, \gamma]$, so $C_{\beta}^{\prime}$ is Borel $_{\kappa}$ by Claim 6.2.46.
2. There is an $\alpha$ such that $C_{\alpha}<C_{\beta}^{\prime}$ and $C_{\alpha} \cup C_{\beta}^{\prime}$ is convex, but no $\gamma$ such that $C_{\beta}^{\prime}<C_{\gamma}$ and $C_{\beta}^{\prime} \cup C_{\gamma}$ is convex. In which case, there is an infinit ${ }^{\text {Wh }}$ (strictly) monotone sequence $\left(C_{\alpha_{\gamma}}\right)_{\gamma \in \mu}$ with $\mu \leq \lambda$ such that $\left(C_{\alpha_{\gamma}}\right)_{\gamma \in \mu}$ is $<X_{X}$-decreasing, each $C_{\beta}^{\prime}<C_{\alpha_{\gamma}}$, such that no $C_{\gamma_{0}}$ is such that for all $\gamma<\mu$, $C_{\alpha_{\gamma}}<C_{\gamma_{0}}<C_{\beta}^{\prime}$. Without loss of generality, assume $\left(C_{\alpha_{\beta}}\right)_{\beta \in \mu}$ is increasing. By assumption, $Q$ is order dense in $X$, so let $\left(q_{\beta}\right)_{\beta \in \mu}$ be a $\mu$-length sequence approaching $A:=\operatorname{bot}\left(\bigcup_{\beta \in \mu} C_{\alpha_{\beta}}\right)$ (which is possibly a gap) with elements from $Q$. Then $\bigcup_{\beta \in \mu}\left(-\infty, q_{\beta}\right)=(\infty, A) \in \kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{1}^{0}$. So, $[A, \infty) \in \kappa \Pi_{1}^{0}$. Let $C_{\gamma}$ be the $<_{X}$-least such that $C_{\alpha_{\beta}}<C_{\gamma}$ for all $\beta \in \mu$, and let $r \in C_{\gamma}$. Then $\left\{x \in X: \forall \beta \in \mu\left(C_{\alpha_{\beta}}<x<C_{\gamma}\right)\right\}=[A, r) \backslash C_{\gamma}=C_{\beta}^{\prime}$, so $C_{\beta}^{\prime}$ is convex Borel ${ }_{\kappa}$ as required.
3. There is an $\gamma$ such that $C_{\beta}^{\prime}<C_{\gamma}$ and $C_{\beta}^{\prime} \cup C_{\gamma}$ is convex, but no $\alpha$ such that $C_{\alpha}<C_{\beta}^{\prime}$ and $C_{\alpha} \cup C_{\beta}^{\prime}$ is convex. But this is exactly dual to Case 2. (i.e. symmetrically, $\left(C_{\alpha_{\gamma}}\right)_{\gamma \in \mu}$ is $<_{X}$-decreasing, each $C_{\alpha_{\gamma}}>C_{\beta}^{\prime}$, such that no $C_{\gamma_{0}}$ is such that for all $\left.\gamma<\mu, C_{\alpha_{\gamma}}>C_{\gamma_{0}}>C_{\beta}^{\prime}\right)$.
4. There is neither a $\gamma$ such that $C_{\beta}^{\prime}<C_{\gamma}$ and $C_{\beta}^{\prime} \cup C_{\gamma}$ is convex, nor $\alpha$ such that $C_{\alpha}<C_{\beta}^{\prime}$ and $C_{\alpha} \cup C_{\beta}^{\prime}$ is convex. This is a combination of Cases 2. and 3. By assumption, $C_{\beta}^{\prime} \neq \emptyset$. By Cases 2. and 3. $C_{\beta}^{\prime}=\left[G, G^{\prime}\right]$ where $G, G^{\prime}$ are gaps, $\operatorname{cof}(G)<\kappa$, and $\operatorname{coi}\left(G^{\prime}\right)<\kappa$, hence $C_{\beta}^{\prime \prime}$ is Borel $_{\kappa}$.

So, $X \backslash B=(-\infty, \operatorname{bot}(B)] \cup \bigcup_{\beta \in \zeta} C_{\beta}^{\prime} \cup[\operatorname{top}(B), \infty)$ is a $\zeta$-union of convex Borel ${ }_{\kappa}$ sets. Hence, it remains to show that $\zeta<\kappa$. Every $C_{\beta}^{\prime}$ is either between exactly two $C_{\alpha}$, or is defined by a (pair of) subsequence(s) of $\lambda$. Using this surjection, $\zeta \leq\left|2^{\lambda}\right|$. As $\kappa$ is a strong limit, $\zeta<\kappa$. So, $X \backslash B \in \operatorname{Conv}_{\kappa}(X)$.

If the order topology on $X$ has large weight, then, by checking the endpoints of the Theorem 6.2.45 components, the only convex Borel $_{\kappa}$ sets are intervals themselves:

Corollary 6.2.47. Let $\kappa$ be inaccessible. Let $X$ be a dense linear order such that for all $(\alpha, \beta)$-gaps in $X, \alpha, \beta \geq \kappa$. Then for any order dense $Q$, a convex set, $A \subseteq X$, is Borel $_{\kappa}$ in the $Q$-interval $\kappa$-topology if and only if $A$ is an interval with $Q \cup\{ \pm \infty\}$-endpoints.

[^32]Meanwhile, if the weight of $X$ is small then the Borel $_{\kappa}$ hierarchy collapses even more quickly than in general (as in Lemma 6.2.6).

Theorem 6.2.48. Let $\kappa$ be inaccessible. Let $X$ be a dense linear order. Let $Q \subseteq X$ be order dense in $X$. Suppose that, for all $(\lambda, \mu)$-gaps in $X, \lambda, \mu \leq \kappa$. Let $\tau_{\kappa}^{Q}$ be the $Q$-interval $\kappa$-topology. Then $\operatorname{Bor}_{\kappa}\left(\tau_{\kappa}^{Q}\right)=\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{2}^{0}\left(\tau_{\kappa}^{Q}\right)$, and so $\operatorname{Bor}_{\kappa}\left(\tau_{\kappa}^{Q}\right)=\kappa \boldsymbol{\Delta}_{2}^{0}\left(\tau_{\kappa}^{Q}\right)$.

Proof. By Theorem 6.2.45, every Borel ${ }_{\kappa}$ set $B=\bigcup_{\alpha \in \lambda} C_{\alpha}$, for some convex, Borel ${ }_{\kappa}$ $C_{\alpha}$, and some $\lambda<\kappa$. As $\kappa \Sigma_{2}^{0}$ is closed under $<\kappa$-unions, it suffices to show that all convex Borel $_{\kappa}$ sets are $\kappa \Sigma_{2}^{0}$.

Recall that for any $q \in Q,\{q\}$ is a convex $\kappa$-closed set. Hence, if $C \subseteq X$ is a convex $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{\alpha}^{0}$ set such that $C<x$ and there is no $y \in X$ such that $C<y<q$, then $C \cup\{q\}$ is a convex $\kappa \Sigma_{\max \{\alpha, 2\}}^{0}$ set. So, it suffices to show that all convex Borel $_{\kappa}$ subsets with 'open' ends are $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{2}^{0}$, formally we prove the following: if $L, R \in$ $\operatorname{Ded}(X) \cup\{ \pm \infty\}$, and $(L, R)$ is Borel $_{\kappa}$, then $(L, R) \cap X$ is $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{2}^{0}$.

If $L, R \in Q \cup\{ \pm \infty\}$ then the result is trivial. So, we assume that $L \in \operatorname{Ded}(X) \backslash$ $Q$ ( $R$ is similar), i.e. $L$ is a $(\mu, \lambda)$-gap, by assumption $\mu, \lambda \leq \kappa$. There are three options.

1. If $\mu<\kappa$, then there is a $Q$-sequence, $\left(q_{\beta}\right)_{\beta \in \mu}$, approaching $L$ from above. Without loss of generality assume $q_{\beta}<R$ for all $\beta \in \mu$. Hence, $(L, R)=$ $\bigcup_{\beta \in \mu}\left(q_{\beta}, R\right)$.
2. If $\lambda<\kappa$, suppose that $\left(q_{\beta}^{\prime}\right)_{\beta \in \lambda}$ is a $Q$-sequence approximating $L$ from below. Then $(L, R)=X \backslash\left(\bigcup_{\beta \in \lambda}\left(-\infty, q_{\beta}^{\prime}\right) \cup[R, \infty)\right)$. Note that $[R, \infty) \in \kappa \Pi_{1}^{0}$, so $\bigcup_{\beta \in \lambda}\left(-\infty, q_{\beta}^{\prime}\right) \cup[R, \infty) \in \kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{2}^{0}$, so $(L, R) \in \kappa \Sigma_{2}^{0}$.
3. If $\mu=\lambda=\kappa$, we argue by induction that $(L, R)$ is not Borel $_{\kappa}$. For the base case, suppose $(L, R) \in \kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{1}^{0}$. Then, as $Q$ is order dense, $(L, R)=\bigcup_{\alpha \in \eta}\left(a_{\alpha}, b_{\alpha}\right)$ for some $a_{\alpha}, b_{\alpha} \in Q$, and some $\eta<\kappa$. As $\kappa$ is regular, $\operatorname{cof}\left(\bigcup_{\alpha \in \eta}\left(a_{\alpha}, b_{\alpha}\right)\right) \leq$ $\eta<\kappa=\operatorname{cof}((L, R))$, a contradiction.
So, suppose the hypothesis holds for $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{\alpha}^{0}$. Suppose $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Pi}_{\alpha}^{0}$ contains some ( $L, R$ ) where one of $L, R$ is a ( $\kappa, \kappa$ )-gap. Without loss of generality, suppose $R$ is the $(\kappa, \kappa)$-gap. By order density, let $q \in Q \cap(L, R)$. Then $(X \backslash(L, R)) \cap(q, \infty)=$ $(R, \infty)$ is in $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{\alpha}^{0}$. But by assumption, $R$ is a $(\kappa, \kappa)$-gap. This contradicts that $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{\alpha}^{0}$ has no convex sets with $(\kappa, \kappa)$-gaps as endpoints.

Finally, the $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{\alpha}^{0}$ step is exactly like the base case, by taking an increasing $<\kappa$-union.

So, for example, the Borel $_{\kappa}$ sets of $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ with the $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$-interval $\kappa$-topology are exactly the $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Delta}_{2}^{0}$ sets. Even so, there may be convex sets which are not Borel ${ }_{\kappa}$ with the interval $\kappa$-topology (strengthening the fact that $[\neg \omega, \infty$ ) is not $\kappa$-open, see Example 4.1.4):

Example 6.2.49. Let $\kappa$ be inaccessible. There is a $(\kappa, \kappa)$-gap, $G$, in $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ (and hence in $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$ ). So, $(G, \infty)$ is convex but not Borel $_{\kappa}$ in the $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$-interval $\kappa$-topology.

Moreover, the $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$-interval $\kappa$-topology Borel $_{\kappa}$ hierarchy doesn't even include the intervals with irrational endpoints (Corollary 6.2.50). This is a stark reminder of how different the two $\kappa$-topologies which generate the same topology can be.

Corollary 6.2.50. Let $\kappa$ be inaccessible, and let $a \in \mathbb{R}_{\kappa} \backslash \mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$. Then $(a, \infty)$ is not Borel $_{\kappa}$ for the $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$-interval $\kappa$-topology on $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$.
Proof. Let $\tau_{\kappa}^{\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}}$ be the $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$-interval $\kappa$-topology on $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$. Let $\tau^{\prime}$ be the $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$-interval $\kappa$-topology on $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$. We define a bijection $\phi: \tau^{\prime} \rightarrow \tau_{\kappa}^{\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}}$ like so: $\phi((p, q))=(p, q)$. Extend $\phi$ to $\Phi: \operatorname{Bor}_{\kappa}\left(\tau^{\prime}\right) \rightarrow \operatorname{Bor}_{\kappa}\left(\tau_{\kappa}^{\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}}\right)$ in the natural way. Let $a \in \mathbb{R}_{\kappa} \backslash \mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$. Note that $\Phi^{-1}(a, \infty)$ is a convex subset of $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$ which starts with a gap. By Theorems 6.2 .45 and 6.2.48, every convex Borel $_{\kappa}$ subset which starts with a gap must start with a $(\lambda, \mu)$-gap with at least one of $\mu, \lambda<\kappa$. As $\operatorname{bn}\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}\right)=\kappa$, if $a \in \mathbb{R}_{\kappa} \backslash \mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$, then $\operatorname{cof}((-\infty, a))=\operatorname{coi}\left((a, \infty)=\kappa\right.$. So, $a$ is a $(\kappa, \kappa)$-gap in $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$, so $(a, \infty)$ is not Borel $_{k}$.

Hence, $\{x\} \neq \bigcap_{\alpha \in \lambda} U_{\alpha}$ for any $\lambda<\kappa$ and $\kappa$-open $U_{\alpha}$, so $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ does not satisfy the $\kappa$-analogue of being a $G_{\delta}$ space (defined as in [56, 1.5H]). However, as we define $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Pi}_{2}^{0}$ as the $<\kappa$-unions of both $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{1}^{0}$ and $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Delta}_{1}^{0},\{x\}$ is a $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Pi}_{2}^{0}$ set.

More generally, by 'filling in' the small gaps in $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ (i.e. let $P:=\left\{p \in \operatorname{Ded}\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}\right)\right.$ : $\alpha \in \lambda$ and $p$ is an ( $\alpha, \kappa$ )-gap or ( $\kappa, \alpha)$-gap $\}$, and let $X:=P \cup \mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ ), we can construct an order which has no small gaps which is $f \mathrm{SC}_{\kappa}$, but need not be $\kappa$-Polish (as it is not necessarily $\kappa$-additive).

### 6.3 Analytic sets

Moving up the complexity hierarchy, we have the $\kappa$-analogues of analyticity on $\kappa^{\kappa}$ and linearly ordered spaces. On $\omega^{\omega}$, there are many classically equivalent definitions of analyticity, including projections, continuous images, and Borel images of, variously, $\omega^{\omega}$, closed sets, and Borel sets. On $\kappa^{\kappa}$, with the full topology and Borel hierarchy, not all of these are equivalent [135, Theorem 1.5]. The situation is more complex still for the $\kappa$-analogues of analyticity. Definitions using projections are trivial: these are identical to the Borel $_{\kappa}$ sets (Section 6.3.1). We show that the other candidates yield a substantive theory, and that the natural generalisations form a strict order. We begin by showing that projections do not in general increase complexity, vindicating Lebesgue's famous mistake [161, page 2]. We then state some general facts about the graphs of functions on $\kappa^{\kappa}$. Then, we define the notions of $\kappa$-analyticity, construct strict and bianalytic sets for these notions, and describe their relation to the full topology.

### 6.3.1 Projections of $\kappa$-closed and Borel $_{\kappa}$ sets

Under standard conditions, the projections of $\kappa$-closed sets on a product $X \times Y$ is still $\kappa$-closed in $X$.

Proposition 6.3.1. If $\kappa$ is inaccessible and $\tau_{\kappa}$ is a $\kappa$-additive $\kappa$-topology on $X$, then the Borel $_{\kappa}$ sets on $X \times \kappa^{\kappa}$ are of the form $\bigcup_{\alpha \in \lambda}\left(R_{\alpha} \backslash \bigcup_{\beta \in \mu_{\alpha}} R_{\beta}^{\alpha}\right)$ where $R_{\alpha}, R_{\beta}^{\alpha}$ are $\kappa$-open in $X \times \kappa^{\kappa}$ and $\lambda, \mu_{\alpha}<\kappa$.

Proof. By Lemma 6.2.6, every Borel $_{\kappa}$ subset of $X \times \kappa^{\kappa}$ is at most complexity $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{3}^{0}$, i.e. $\bigcup_{\alpha \in \nu} \bigcap_{\beta \in \nu_{\alpha}} S_{\alpha, \beta}$ where $S_{\alpha, \beta}$ are either $\kappa$-open or $\kappa$-closed in $X \times \kappa^{\kappa}$, and $\nu, \nu_{\alpha}<\lambda$. Fix a Borel ${ }_{\kappa} B$. Clearly if $S_{\alpha, \beta}$ are $\kappa$-closed, then $\bigcap_{\beta \in \nu_{\alpha}} S_{\alpha, \beta}$ is also $\kappa$-closed. Likewise, by $\kappa$-additivity, if $S_{\alpha, \beta}$ are $\kappa$-open, then $\bigcap_{\beta \in \nu_{\alpha}} C_{\alpha, \beta}$ is $\kappa$-open. So, $B=\bigcup_{\beta \in \nu^{\prime}}\left(O_{\beta} \cap C_{\beta}\right)$ where $O_{\beta}$ is $\kappa$-open, $C_{\beta}$ is $\kappa$-closed, and $\nu^{\prime}<\kappa$. In other words, $B=\bigcup_{\beta \in \nu^{\prime}}\left(O_{\beta} \backslash\left(X \times \kappa^{\kappa} \backslash C_{\beta}\right)\right)$. Finally, by Proposition 6.1.3, we can assume that $O_{\beta}$ are rectangles $R_{\beta}$.

So, the Borel $_{\kappa}$ subsets of $X \times \kappa^{\kappa}$ are of the form $\bigcup_{\alpha \in \lambda}\left(R_{\alpha} \backslash O_{\alpha}\right)$ where $O_{\alpha}$ is $\kappa$-open in $X \times \kappa^{\kappa}$. We now show that projections of $\kappa$-closed and Borel $_{\kappa}$ sets remain $\kappa$-closed and Borel $_{\kappa}$ respectively.

Proposition 6.3.2. Let $\kappa$ be inaccessible and $Y$ be $\kappa$-additive. Then, for any space $X$, and for any set $C \subseteq Y \times X$ which is $\kappa$-closed in $Y \times X, \pi_{1}(C)$ is $\kappa$-closed in $Y$.

Conversely, if $D$ is $\kappa$-closed in $Y$, there is a $C$ which is $\kappa$-closed in $Y \times X$ such that $\pi_{1}(C)=D$.

Proof. As $\kappa$ is regular, each $\kappa$-closed set $C \subseteq Y \times X$ can be represented as $Y \times X$ with $\lambda<\kappa$-many $\kappa$-open rectangles, $F_{\beta}$, removed. Then $\pi(C)=Y \backslash \bigcup_{\alpha \in \mu} S_{\alpha}$, where $\mu<\kappa$ and $S_{\alpha}=\bigcap_{F_{\beta} \in R_{\alpha}} \pi\left(F_{\beta}\right)$, where $R_{\alpha}$ is some collection of removed rectangles such that the second coordinate covers $X$. There may be several such collections $S_{\alpha}$, but crucially only $<\kappa$-many at most. Without loss of generality, we can assume that $F_{\beta}=U_{\beta} \times V_{\beta}$ where $U_{\beta}$ is open in $Y$ and $V_{\beta}$ is open in $Y$. So, $\pi_{1}\left(F_{\beta}\right)=U_{\beta}$. So, $\pi(C)=Y \backslash \bigcup_{S \in \mathscr{P}(\lambda)} \bigcap_{\beta \in S} \pi\left(F_{\beta}\right)=Y \backslash \bigcup_{S \in \mathscr{P}(\lambda)} \bigcap_{\beta \in S} U_{\beta}$ for some $Y_{\beta} \kappa$-open in $X$. By assumption, $Y$ is $\kappa$-additive, so $\bigcap_{\beta \in S} U_{\beta}$ is $\kappa$-open. But as $\kappa$ is inaccessible, $|\mathscr{P}(\lambda)|<\kappa$, so $\bigcup_{S \in \mathscr{P}(\lambda)} \bigcap_{\beta \in S} U_{\beta}$ is $\kappa$-open. Hence, $\pi(C)$ is $\kappa$-closed.

Conversely, let $D$ be $\kappa$-closed in $Y$. Then $\pi_{1}(C \times X)=C$. It is simple to check that $C \times X$ is $\kappa$-closed.

We have a corresponding result for the projection of Borel $_{\kappa}$ sets, irrespective of the $\kappa$-additivity of $Y$ :

Proposition 6.3.3. 1. Assume $\kappa$ is inaccessible. Let $C \in X \times Y$ be Borel $_{\kappa}$. Then $\pi(C)$ is Borel $_{\kappa}$ in $X$.
2. Conversely, if $B$ is Borel $_{\kappa}$ in $X$ there is set $D \subseteq X \times Y$ which is Borel $_{\kappa}$ such that $\pi_{1}(D)=B$.

Proof. For Part 1., by Lemma 6.2.6, as $\kappa$ is inaccessible, each Borel ${ }_{\kappa}$ set in $X \times Y$ consists of $\mu$-many (possibly nested) $\kappa$-open rectangles, $E \in \mathcal{E}$, with $\lambda$-many $\kappa$ open rectangles, $F_{\beta}$, removed, for some $\lambda, \mu<\kappa$. Fix such an $E$. This $E=$ $U \times V$ for $U, V \kappa$-open in $X$. The contribution of $E$ to $\pi(B)$ consists of $U \backslash$ $\bigcup_{\alpha \in \lambda^{\prime}} S_{\alpha}$, where $\lambda^{\prime}<\kappa$ and $S_{\alpha}=\bigcap_{F_{\beta} \in R_{i}} \pi\left(F_{\beta}\right)$, where $R_{\alpha}$ is some collection of removed rectangles such that the second coordinate covers $V$ of $E$. There may be several such collections $S_{\alpha}$, but crucially only $<\kappa$-many at most. So, $\pi(E)=U \backslash \bigcup_{S \in \mathscr{P}(\lambda)} \bigcap_{\beta \in S} \pi\left(F_{\beta}\right)=U \backslash \bigcup_{S \in \mathscr{P}(\lambda)} \bigcap_{\beta \in S} I_{\beta}$ for some $I_{\beta} \kappa$-open in $\kappa^{\kappa}$.


Figure 6.6: Projections of $\kappa$-closed sets

But as $\kappa$ is inaccessible, $|\mathscr{P}(\lambda)|<\kappa$, so $\pi(E)$ is Borel $_{\kappa}$. Then $\pi(B)=\pi\left(\bigcup_{E \in \mathcal{E}} E\right)$, so $\pi(B)$ is a $\mu<\kappa$ union of Borel $_{\kappa}$ sets, hence is Borel ${ }_{\kappa}$.

For Part 2. again check that $B \times Y$ is $\mathrm{Borel}_{\kappa}$, and that $\pi_{1}(B \times Y)=B$.
Corollary 6.3.4. If $\kappa$ is inaccessible, either:

1. $Y$ is $\kappa$-additive, in which case $C \subseteq X$ is $\kappa$-closed if and only if $\pi_{1}(D)=C$ for some $\kappa$-closed set $D$ in $Y \times X$, or
2. $Y$ is not $\kappa$-additive, in which case $\pi_{1}(D)=C$ for some $D$ which is $\kappa$-closed in $Y \times X$ if and only if $C=X \backslash \bigcap_{\alpha \in \lambda} O_{\alpha}$ where $O_{\alpha}$ are $\kappa$-open and $\lambda<\kappa$.

Proof. The first case is precisely Proposition 6.3.2,
The second case resembles Proposition 6.3.2 $\pi(C)=X \backslash \bigcup_{\alpha \in \mu} \bigcap_{\beta \in \lambda} O_{\alpha, j}$ for $\mu, \lambda<\kappa$, so, by inaccessibility, $\pi(C)=X \backslash \bigcap_{\alpha^{\prime} \in S} \bigcup_{\beta^{\prime} \in T} O_{\alpha^{\prime}, \beta^{\prime}}$ for $|S|,|T|<\kappa$ and some relabelling of the $O_{\alpha, \beta}$. So, $\pi(C)=X \backslash \bigcap_{\gamma \in \nu} O_{\gamma}$ for some $\kappa$-open $O_{\gamma}$ and $\nu<\kappa$.

So, for inaccessible $\kappa$, Lebesgue was right! 'Projection' as a function on Borel ${ }_{\kappa}$ sets does not increase descriptive complexity (unlike the classical case, 161, page 2]). So, we focus on other notions of $\kappa$-analyticity, which do increase complexity (Definition 6.3.6).

### 6.3.2 Notions of analyticity

Section 6.3.1 trivialises the generalisations of analyticity based on projections. This leaves three remaining distinct notions, which can be ordered by inclusion. For this, we first define Borel $_{\kappa}$ functions:

Definition 6.3.5. Let $\tau_{\kappa}$ and $\sigma_{\kappa}$ be $\kappa$-topologies on $X$ and $Y$ respectively. We say that $f: X \rightarrow Y$ is Borel $_{\kappa}$ if for every $U \in \sigma_{\kappa}$ is such that $f^{-1}(U) \in \operatorname{Bor}_{\kappa}\left(\tau_{\kappa}\right)$.

Definition 6.3.6. Let $X, Y$ be $\kappa$-Polish spaces with respective $\kappa$-topologies. A set $A \subseteq Y$ is called:
(a) strongly $X$-analytic if $A=f(X)$ where $f: X \rightarrow Y$ is $\kappa$-continuous,
(b) intermediately $X$-analytic if $A=f(B)$ where $B \subseteq X$ is $\operatorname{Borel}_{\kappa}$ and $f: B \rightarrow$ $Y$ is $\kappa$-continuous (in the subspace $\kappa$-topology on $B$ ), and
(c) weakly $X$-analytic if $A=f(X)$ where $f: X \rightarrow Y$ is a Borel $_{\kappa}$ function.

We write weakly analytic for weakly $\kappa^{\kappa}$-analytic, and so forth.
As in [135, page 3], we are also interested in injective $\kappa$-continuous and Borel ${ }_{\kappa}$ images. We say that $A$ is weakly injective-analytic if it is witnessed by an injective $\kappa$-continuous function, likewise for intermediately injective-analytic and strongly injective-analytic.

Obviously, every strongly injective-analytic set is strongly analytic (and so forth), and every Borel $_{\kappa}$ set is intermediately $X$-analytic (with the identity). As a concrete example, for all $s \in \kappa^{<\kappa}$, $N_{s}$ is strongly analytic, as witnessed by $f(x)=s^{\frown} x$.

Proposition 6.3.7. Let $X$ be a $\kappa$-Polish space with a $\kappa$-topology. Then, strong $X$ analyticity implies intermediate $X$-analyticity, which implies weak $X$-analyticity.

Proof. The implications from strongly $X$-analytic to intermediately $X$-analytic is trivial, so it suffices to prove intermediately $X$-analytic implies weakly $X$-analytic. Suppose $h$ is $\kappa$-continuous, $B \subseteq X$ is $\mathrm{Borel}_{\kappa}$, and $A=h(B) \neq \emptyset$. By assumption, there is a $y \in A$. Let $g$ be defined like so:

$$
g(x)= \begin{cases}x & \text { if } x \in B \\ y & \text { if } x \in X \backslash B\end{cases}
$$

Let $U$ be a basic open set in $X$, so $U \cup X \backslash B$ is $\operatorname{Borel}_{\kappa}$. Note that $g^{-1}(U)=U \cap B$ or $g^{-1}(U)=U \cup X \backslash B$. So, $g$ is a Borel $_{\kappa}$ function. Then $h \circ g: X \rightarrow X$ is a Borel $_{\kappa}$ function. Moreover, $(h \circ g)(X)=A$.

Corollary 6.3.8. Let $X$ be a $\kappa$-Polish space with a $\kappa$-topology. For a set $A \subseteq X$, the following are equivalent:

1. $A$ is weakly $X$-analytic,
2. $A=f(C)$ where $f: X \rightarrow Y$ is a Borel $_{\kappa}$ function (in the subspace $\kappa$-topology on $C$ ) and $C \subseteq Y$ is $\kappa$-closed, and
3. $A=f(B)$ where $f: B \rightarrow X$ is Borel $_{\kappa}$ (in the subspace $\kappa$-topology on $B$ ) and where $B \subseteq Y$ is Borel $_{\kappa}$.

Proof. It suffices to prove that Case 3. implies Case 1. An exactly similar argument to the proof of Proposition 6.3.7 suffices.

However, $\kappa$-continuous functions do not exhibit generalisations of all classical behaviour, in particular their graphs need not be Borel $_{k}$. This prohibits the generalisation of the proof of the equivalence in Proposition 2.1.13.

Example 6.3.9. Let $\kappa$ be inaccessible, and let $f\left((2 \alpha)^{\wedge} x\right)=f\left((2 \alpha+1)^{\wedge} x\right)=$ $(2 \alpha)^{\wedge} x$. Then $f$ is $\kappa$-continuous, but $\operatorname{Graph}(f)$ is not Borel $_{\kappa}$, as it cannot be represented as a union of $<\kappa$-many differences of $\kappa$-opens (use Corollary 6.2.25).

Example 6.3.10. Let $\kappa$ be inaccessible. Let $D:=\left\{(x, x): x \in \kappa^{\kappa}\right\}$, i.e. Graph(id). Then $D$ is not Borel $_{\kappa}$.

Example 6.3.11. Let $\kappa$ be inaccessible. Let $c_{x}: \kappa^{\kappa} \rightarrow \kappa^{\kappa}$ be the constant $x$ function. Clearly, $c_{x}$ is $\kappa$-continuous. Its graph, $\operatorname{Graph}\left(c_{x}\right)=\kappa^{\kappa} \times\{x\}$, is not Borel $_{\kappa}$ : if it were, then by Proposition 6.3.3, $\{x\}$ would be Borel $_{\kappa}$, contradicting Corollary 6.2.30.

Example 6.3.12. Let $\kappa$ be inaccessible. Fix a constant $c \in 2^{\kappa}$. We define $f$ : $2^{\kappa} \rightarrow 2^{\kappa}$ as

$$
f(x):= \begin{cases}c & \text { if } x=0^{\wedge} y \text { for some } y \in 2^{\kappa} \\ y & \text { if } x=1^{\wedge} y \text { for some } y \in 2^{\kappa} .\end{cases}
$$

Then $f\left(N_{0}\right)=\{c\}$, which is not open in $2^{\kappa}=f\left(2^{\kappa}\right)$. Hence, $f$ is $\kappa$-continuous but not an open map.

So, if $\kappa$ is inaccessible, then there are $\kappa$-continuous functions $f, g: \kappa^{\kappa} \rightarrow \kappa^{\kappa}$ such that $\operatorname{Graph}(f)$ is not Borel $_{\kappa}$ in $\left(\kappa^{\kappa}\right)^{2}$ and $g$ is not an open map in the full topology. Hence, the Borel Graph Theorem is not $\kappa$-topologically generalisable. Indeed, later, we show that the notions of analyticity can be distinguished on $\kappa^{\kappa}$, and that at least two can be distinguished on $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$ (Corollary 6.3.51).

### 6.3.3 $\kappa$-Baire space

We now focus on $\kappa^{\kappa}$ and our three notions of analyticity (i.e. of $\kappa^{\kappa}$-analyticity). By Section 6.3.2, we know that classical equivalences of notions of analyticity may fail. In fact, on $\kappa^{\kappa}$, we can prove an equivalence of strong analyticity (Corollary 6.3.14), which can be compared to Proposition 6.3.49, which shows that the $\kappa$-continuous images of $\kappa \Sigma_{2}^{0}\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}\right)$ sets are exactly intermediately $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$-analytic sets.

Proposition 6.3.13. Every $\kappa$-closed set is the $\kappa$-continuous retract of $\kappa^{\kappa}$, and hence strongly analytic.

Proof. Let $C=\kappa^{\kappa} \backslash \bigcup_{\alpha \in \lambda} N_{s_{\alpha}}$, and let $N_{s} \subseteq C$. We define $f$ like so:

$$
f(x)= \begin{cases}s^{\curvearrowright} y & \text { if } x=s_{\alpha} \frown y \text { for some } \alpha \in \lambda, y \in \kappa^{\kappa}, \\ x & \text { if } x \in C .\end{cases}
$$

Then $f\left(\kappa^{\kappa}\right)=C$, and $f$ is clear a $\kappa$-continuous retraction.
Corollary 6.3.14. A set $A \subseteq \kappa^{\kappa}$ is strongly analytic if and only if $A=f(C)$ where $C \subseteq \kappa^{\kappa}$ is $\kappa$-closed and $f: C \rightarrow \kappa^{\kappa}$ is $\kappa$-continuous (in the subspace $\kappa$-topology on $C$ ).

Proof. Let $C$ be $\kappa$-closed, $g: C \rightarrow \kappa^{\kappa}$ be $\kappa$-continuous (in the subspace $\kappa$ topology), and $A=g(C)$. Let $f: \kappa^{\kappa} \rightarrow C$ be a $\kappa$-continuous retract. Then $(f \circ g)\left(\kappa^{\kappa}\right)=A$ and $f \circ g$ is $\kappa$-continuous.

Singletons are strongly analytic, using the constant map $c_{x}$, and hence weakly and intermediately analytic, but not Borel $_{\kappa}$ (by Corollary 6.2.30). In contrast, sets of intermediate cardinality are not strongly analytic:

Proposition 6.3.15. If $A \subseteq \kappa^{\kappa}$ is such that $1<|A|<\kappa$, then $A$ is not strongly analytic.

Proof. Suppose $f\left(\kappa^{\kappa}\right)=A$ for a $\kappa$-continuous $f$. All the points of $a \in A$ are isolated i.e. there are non-overlapping $N_{s_{a}}$ such that $a \in N_{s_{a}}$, so the $f^{-1}\left(N_{s_{a}}\right)$ form a $\kappa$-open partition of $\kappa^{\kappa}$ of size $|A|<\kappa$, each of which is non-empty, so contains a cone. But this contradicts the fact that $\kappa^{\kappa}$ is $\kappa$-connected.

Proposition 6.3.16. If $A \subseteq \kappa^{\kappa}$ is such that $|A|<\kappa$, then $A$ is intermediately analytic.

Proof. Let $A=\left(x_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \lambda}$ be enumeration with $\lambda<\kappa$, and choose a $y \notin A$. Define $f$ like so:

$$
f(x)= \begin{cases}x_{\alpha} & \text { if } x \in N_{\alpha} \\ y & \text { otherwise }\end{cases}
$$

So, for any $s \in \kappa^{<\kappa}, f^{-1}\left(N_{s}\right)$ is a union of $<\kappa$-many $\kappa$-open sets (in particular $f^{-1}\left(N_{s}\right)=N_{s} \cup \bigcup_{\alpha \in S} N_{\alpha}$ where $\left.S \subseteq \lambda\right)$. So, $f$ is $\kappa$-continuous. Then $B:=\bigcup_{\alpha \in \lambda} N_{\alpha}$ is Borel $_{\kappa}$ (indeed, $B$ is $\kappa$-open) and $f(B)=A$, as required.

Corollary 6.3.17. The strongly analytic sets are a strict subset of the intermediately analytic sets.

However, there are some strongly analytic sets of size $\kappa$ : let $C:=\left\{\bar{\alpha}_{\kappa}: \alpha \in \kappa\right\}$, consisting of the constant sequences. Then $C$ is strongly analytic (using $f: \alpha \subset x \rightarrow$ $\bar{\alpha}_{\kappa}$ ), but not Borel ${ }_{\kappa}$. If $C$ were Borel $_{\kappa}, C \cap N_{0}=\left\{\overline{0}_{\kappa}\right\}$ is Borel ${ }_{\kappa}$, contradicting Corollary 6.2.30.

## Bianalytic, strict analytics, and Suslin's theorem

In this section, we show that the analogue of Suslin's theorem fails for $\kappa$-analytic and Borel $_{\kappa}$ sets, but that the weakly and intermediately analytic sets are closed under $<\kappa$-unions.

As in the classical situation, a set $A$ is called weakly bianalytic if $A$ and $\kappa^{\kappa} \backslash A$ are weakly analytic, and $A$ is called strictly weakly analytic if it is weakly analytic and not weakly bianalytic. We likewise define the equivalent notions for strong and intermediate analyticity. In this section, we prove the following failure of Suslin's theorem:

Theorem 6.3.18. The following proper inclusions hold:

1. $\operatorname{Bor}_{\kappa} \subsetneq\left\{A \subseteq \kappa^{\kappa}: A\right.$ is weakly bianalytic $\}$,
2. $\mathrm{Bor}_{\kappa} \subsetneq\left\{A \subseteq \kappa^{\kappa}: A\right.$ is intermediately bianalytic $\}$, and
3. $\mathrm{Bor}_{\kappa} \nsubseteq\left\{A \subseteq \kappa^{\kappa}: A\right.$ is strongly analytic $\}$ and $\operatorname{Bor}_{\kappa} \nsubseteq\left\{A \subseteq \kappa^{\kappa}: \kappa^{\kappa} \backslash A\right.$ is strongly analytic $\}$.

For this, we prove the following lemma:
Lemma 6.3.19. Let $\kappa=\kappa^{<\kappa}$.

1. There are $2^{\kappa}$-many $\kappa$-continuous $\kappa$-open functions.
2. There are $2^{\kappa}$-many strongly bianalytic sets which are not Borel $_{\kappa}$.

Proof. First, for each $z \in 2^{\kappa}$, we define $f_{z}: \kappa^{\kappa} \rightarrow \kappa^{\kappa}$ like so:

$$
f_{z}(x)= \begin{cases}x & \text { if } z(\alpha)=1, y \in \kappa^{\kappa}, \text { and } x=(2 \alpha) \subset y, \\ (2 \alpha)^{\wedge} y & \text { if } z(\alpha)=1, y \in \kappa^{\kappa}, \text { and } x=(2 \alpha+1) \subset y, \\ (2 \alpha+1)^{\wedge} y & \text { if } z(\alpha)=0, y \in \kappa^{\kappa}, \text { and } x=(2 \alpha) \subset y, \\ x & \text { if } z(\alpha)=0, y \in \kappa^{\kappa}, \text { and } x=(2 \alpha+1) \subset y .\end{cases}
$$

Let $s \in \kappa^{<\kappa}$. Then $f_{z}\left(N_{s}\right)=N_{t}$ and $\left(f_{z}\right)^{-1}\left(N_{s}\right)=N_{r} \cup N_{u}$ for some $t, r, u \in \kappa^{<\kappa}$. Hence, $f_{z}$ is $\kappa$-continuous and $\kappa$-open.

For Part 1., each $z \in 2^{\kappa}$ defines a distinct map, $f_{z}$, so there are at least $2^{\kappa}$-many such maps. There are only $2^{\kappa}$-many continuous functions, and every $\kappa$-continuous function is continuous, hence there are exactly $2^{\kappa}$-many such maps.

For Part 2., there are only $\kappa$-many Borel $_{\kappa}$ sets, but $f_{z}\left(\kappa^{\kappa}\right)$ is distinct for each $z \in 2^{\kappa}$, so $2^{\kappa}$-many of these sets are not Borel $_{\kappa}$. Moreover, for each $z \in 2^{\kappa}$ $f_{z}\left(\kappa^{\kappa}\right)$, there is a $z^{\prime} \in 2^{\kappa}$ such that $f_{z}\left(\kappa^{\kappa}\right)=\kappa^{\kappa} \backslash f_{z^{\prime}}\left(\kappa^{\kappa}\right)$. So, $f_{z}\left(\kappa^{\kappa}\right)$ is strongly bianalytic.

This immediately implies that Suslin's theorem fails (i.e. Theorem 6.3.18holds). For every $z, z^{\prime} \in 2^{\kappa}, f_{z}\left(\kappa^{\kappa}\right)$ to $f_{z^{\prime}}\left(\kappa^{\kappa}\right)$ are $\kappa$-homeomorphic: the map which swaps at every coordinate that differs between $z, z^{\prime}$ is a $\kappa$-homeomorphism. Using the argument from Corollary 6.2.25, we can identify some of the $f_{z}\left(\kappa^{\kappa}\right)$ which are not Borel $_{k}$ :

Proposition 6.3.20. Let $\kappa$ be inaccessible, and let $z \in 2^{\kappa}$ be such that $\mid\{\alpha \in \kappa$ : $z(\alpha)=0\}\left|=|\{\alpha \in \kappa: z(\alpha)=1\}|\right.$. Then $f_{z}\left(\kappa^{\kappa}\right)$ is not Borel $_{\kappa}$.

Singletons are also $\kappa$-analytic and non-Borel ${ }_{\kappa}$. For cardinality reasons, a singleton is neither weakly injective-analytic nor intermediately injective-analytic. So, unlike the classical case, the weakly injective-analytic sets are a proper subset of the weakly analytic sets. There are also non-Borel ${ }_{\kappa}$ injective-analytic sets:

Proposition 6.3.21. If $\kappa$ is inaccessible, then there is a non-Borel ${ }_{\kappa}$ set $A$ which is intermediately injective-analytic.

Proof. The set $A:=\bigcup_{\alpha \in \kappa} N_{(2 \alpha)}$ from Corollary 6.2.25 suffices: let $\phi: \kappa \rightarrow$ $\{2 \alpha: \alpha \in \kappa\}$ be a bijection. Let $f\left(\alpha^{〔} x\right)=\phi(\alpha)^{\wedge} x$. Then $f$ is injective and $\kappa$-continuous.

Despite the failure of Suslin's theorem, the bianalytic pointclasses exhibit some nice closure properties, in analogy with the Borel ${ }_{\kappa}$ sets:

Proposition 6.3.22. If $\kappa$ is inaccessible, then the intermediately analytic sets and the weakly analytic sets are closed under $<\kappa$-unions.

Proof. For the weak case, suppose $A_{\alpha}=g_{\alpha}\left(\kappa^{\kappa}\right)$ where $g_{\alpha}$ are Borel ${ }_{\kappa}$ maps for some $\alpha<\lambda$ with $\lambda<\kappa$. Fix an $\alpha<\lambda$ and some $y_{0} \in A_{\alpha}$. Let $g: \kappa^{\kappa} \rightarrow \kappa^{\kappa}$ be defined like so:

$$
g(x)= \begin{cases}g_{\alpha}(y) & \text { if } x=\alpha \subsetneq y \text { for some } \alpha<\lambda, y \in \kappa^{\kappa}, \\ y_{0} & \text { otherwise }\end{cases}
$$

This $g$ is $\operatorname{Borel}_{\kappa}$, as $g^{-1}\left(N_{\beta-s}\right)=g_{\alpha}^{-1}\left(N_{s}\right)$ (if $\beta<\lambda$ ), otherwise $g^{-1}\left(N_{\beta-s}\right)=$ $\kappa^{\kappa} \backslash \bigcup_{\alpha \in \lambda} g_{\alpha}^{-1}\left(\kappa^{\kappa}\right)$ (if $s(0) \geq \lambda$ ), both of which are Borel $_{\kappa}$ by the assumptions that $g_{\alpha}$ are all Borel ${ }_{\kappa}$ and $\lambda<\kappa$. Clearly, $A=g\left(\kappa^{\kappa}\right)$.

For the intermediate case, let $A=\bigcup_{\alpha \in \lambda} A_{\alpha}$ where $A_{\alpha}$ are intermediately analytic for some $\lambda<\kappa$. So, for each $\alpha<\lambda, A_{\alpha}=f_{\alpha}\left(B_{\alpha}\right)$ for some $\kappa$-continuous map, $f_{\alpha}$, and Borel ${ }_{\kappa}$ set, $B_{\alpha}$. Let $B:=\bigcup_{\alpha \in \lambda} \alpha \frown B_{\alpha}$. Clearly, $B$ is Borel ${ }_{\kappa}$. Let $f: \kappa^{\kappa} \rightarrow \kappa^{\kappa}$ be defined like so:

$$
f(x)=f_{\alpha}(y) \text { if } x=\alpha \subsetneq y \text { for some } \alpha<\lambda, y \in \kappa^{\kappa} .
$$

Obviously, $f(B)=\bigcup_{\alpha \in \lambda} B_{\alpha}$. Moreover, $f$ is $\kappa$-continuous, as for any cone, $N_{s}$, $f^{-1}\left(N_{s}\right)=\bigcup_{\alpha \in I} f_{\alpha}^{-1}\left(N_{s}\right)$ for some $I \subseteq \lambda$, and $f_{\alpha}^{-1}\left(N_{s}\right)$ is $\kappa$-open.

The strong analyticity analogue of Proposition 6.3.22 fails, by Proposition 6.3.15. A much more substantial pathology of strong analyticity is that it does not even contain all $\kappa$-open sets:

Proposition 6.3.23. A $\kappa$-open set, $A$, is strongly analytic if and only if $A=N_{s}$ for some $s \in \kappa^{<\kappa}$. Hence, not all $\kappa$-open sets are strongly analytic.

Proof. For each $s \in \kappa^{<\kappa}, f_{s}(x)=s^{\frown} x$ is a Borel $_{\kappa}$ function, and $f_{s}\left(\kappa^{\kappa}\right)=N_{s}$. Conversely, by Theorem 6.1.1, if $A$ is $\kappa$-connected and $f_{s}$ is $\operatorname{Borel}_{\kappa}$ then $f_{s}(A)$ is $\kappa$-connected. By Lemma 6.2.22, $\kappa^{\kappa}$ is $\kappa$-connected, so any strongly analytic set is $\kappa$-connected. But the only $\kappa$-connected $\kappa$-open sets are the cones (as in Lemma 6.2.22). For the final part, let $s, t \in \kappa^{<\kappa}$ be such that $s \perp t$. Then $N_{s} \sqcup N_{t}$ will do.

## The full topology and analyticity

So far, we have proved that the Borel $_{\kappa}$ sets are clopen in the full topology, and that the $\kappa$-analytics are strictly richer. In this section, we are more precise: we show that the intermediately analytic sets are of low complexity in the full topology, whilst the weakly analytic sets are of slightly higher complexity.

Proposition 6.3.24. Assume $\kappa$ is weakly compact. If $A$ is intermediately analytic, then $A$ is closed in the full topology. Hence, intermediately bianalytic sets are clopen in the full topology.
Proof. Let $A=f(B)$ for a $\kappa$-continuous $f$, and a Borel $_{\kappa} B$. Fix an $x \in \mathrm{cl}(A)$, it suffices to prove that $x \in A$. For all $\alpha<\kappa$, let $B_{\alpha}:=f^{-1}\left(N_{x\lceil\alpha}\right) \cap B$. As $x \in \operatorname{cl}(A)$, for each $\alpha, B_{\alpha} \neq \emptyset$. If $x \in A$, then we are done.

Otherwise, suppose $\bigcap_{\alpha \in \kappa} B_{\alpha}=\emptyset$. By Lemma 6.2.12, for each $\alpha<\kappa$, there is an optimal conelike partition, $\mathcal{P}\left(B_{\alpha}\right)$ and $\mathcal{F}\left(B_{\alpha}\right)$, for $B_{\alpha}$. Let $P_{s}^{B_{\alpha}}$ be the conelike elements of $\mathcal{P}\left(B_{\alpha}\right)$ for $s \in \mathcal{F}\left(B_{\alpha}\right)$. Likewise, let $\mathcal{P}(B)$ and $\mathcal{F}(B)$ be the optimal conelike partition of $B$, and let $P_{s}^{B}$ be the conelike elements of $\mathcal{P}(B)$ for $s \in \mathcal{F}(B)$.

Fix an $\alpha<\kappa$ and an $s \in \mathcal{F}\left(B_{\alpha}\right)$. As $f$ is $\kappa$-continuous, $f^{-1}\left(N_{x\lceil\alpha}\right)$ is a $\kappa$-open set, i.e. a $<\kappa$-union of cones. But $B_{\alpha}$ is the intersection of $B$ with these cones. So, if $P_{s}^{B_{\alpha}} \subsetneq N_{s}$, then $s \in \mathcal{F}(B)$ and $P_{s}^{B_{\alpha}}=P_{s}^{B}$. Hence, there are two possible cases:

1. $s \notin \mathcal{F}(B)$ and $P_{s}^{B_{\alpha}}=N_{s}$, or
2. $s \in \mathcal{F}(B)$ and $P_{s}^{B_{\alpha}}=P_{s}^{B}$.

Next, we prove that $\bigcap_{\alpha \in \kappa} B_{\alpha}=\emptyset$. Suppose, for a contradiction, that $\bigcap_{\alpha \in \kappa} B_{\alpha}$ is not-empty. By Lemma 6.2.16, there is an $s \in \bigcap_{\gamma<\alpha<\kappa} \mathcal{F}\left(B_{\alpha}\right)$. So, there are two corresponding cases:

1. $s \in \mathcal{F}(B)$, in which case, for all $\alpha>\gamma, P_{s}^{B_{\alpha}}=P_{s}^{B}$. As $\beta<\gamma$ implies $B_{\beta} \subseteq B_{\gamma}$, we have that $P_{s}^{B} \subseteq \bigcap_{\alpha \in \kappa} B_{\alpha}$ and thus $\bigcap_{\alpha \in \kappa} B_{\alpha}$ is non-empty, a contradiction.
2. $s \notin \mathcal{F}(B)$, in which case, for all $\alpha>\gamma, P_{s}^{B_{\alpha}}=N_{s}$. Thus $N_{s} \subseteq \bigcap_{\alpha \in \kappa} B_{\alpha}$, again contradiction.

So, $\bigcap_{\alpha \in \kappa} B_{\alpha}$ is non-empty. So, there is $z \in \bigcap_{\alpha \in \kappa} B_{\alpha}$. By definition $\left(B_{\alpha} \subseteq\right.$ $\left.f^{-1}\left(N_{x\lceil\alpha}\right)\right)$ is mapped to $f(z)=x$. So, $x \in A$.

This implies that there are strictly strongly analytic sets, and strictly intermediately analytic sets:

Corollary 6.3.25. Suppose $\kappa$ is weakly compact, and $x \in \kappa^{\kappa}$. Then:

1. $\kappa^{\kappa} \backslash\{x\}$ is not intermediately analytic, so $\{x\}$ is strictly intermediately analytic, , and
2. $\kappa^{\kappa} \backslash\{x\}$ is not strongly analytic, so $\{x\}$ is strictly strongly analytic.

Proof. It suffices to prove Part 1. This follows immediately from Proposition 6.3.24, as $\kappa^{\kappa} \backslash\{x\}$ is not closed in the full topology.

For a concrete example, let the doubling map $d: \kappa^{\kappa} \rightarrow \kappa^{\kappa}$ be: $d(x)=y_{x}$ where $y_{x}(2 \alpha)=y_{x}(2 \alpha+1)=x(\alpha)$, i.e. $d(x)=(x(0), x(0), x(1), x(1), \ldots)$ : if $A$ is intermediately analytic, $d(A)$ is intermediately analytic (as $d$ is $\kappa$-continuous) but $d(A)$ is not intermediately coanalytic (as $N_{s} \nsubseteq d(A)$ for all $s \in \kappa^{<\kappa}$, then by Proposition 6.3.24.

Conversely, singletons are weakly bianalytic.

Proposition 6.3.26. Suppose $\kappa$ is inaccessible. Then $\kappa^{\kappa} \backslash\{x\}$ is weakly analytic, so $\{x\}$ is weakly bianalytic. Moreover, $\kappa^{\kappa} \backslash\{x\}$ is weakly injective-analytic.

Proof. For simplicity, let $x=\overline{0}_{\kappa}$. Let for any $\beta>0$ and any $\alpha$, let $g$ : $\alpha \subset \beta \subset y \mapsto$ $\overline{0}_{\alpha} \frown(1+\beta) \frown y$. Then $g$ is a Borel $_{\kappa}$ map, because $g^{-1}\left(N_{s}\right)$ is either a cone, or is a $\kappa$-closed set. Finally, $g\left(\kappa^{\kappa}\right)=\kappa^{\kappa} \backslash\left\{\overline{0}_{\kappa}\right\}$. For the last part, note that $g$ is injective.

It is natural to ask whether the class of weakly analytic sets is in fact closed under complementation.

Intermediate analyticity is further stymied in that it does not include all the sets which are closed in the full topology:

Proposition 6.3.27. If $\kappa$ is inaccessible, then there is a set $A \subseteq \kappa^{\kappa}$ which is closed in the full topology, weakly analytic, but not intermediately analytic.

Proof. Let $C=\left\{\overline{0}_{\alpha} \frown 1 \frown \overline{0}_{\kappa}: \alpha \in \kappa\right\} \cup\left\{\overline{0}_{\kappa}\right\}$. The only limit point of $C$ is $\overline{0}_{\kappa}$, so $C$ is closed. This $C$ is weakly analytic with the map $\alpha \frown x \rightarrow \overline{0}_{\alpha} \frown 1 \frown \overline{0}_{\kappa}$

We prove that $C$ is not intermediately analytic. By Corollary 6.2.23, every Borel $_{\kappa}$ set is a $<\kappa$-union of $\kappa$-connected sets. So, by Theorem 6.1.1, every intermediately analytic set is a $<\kappa$-union of $\kappa$-connected sets.

For each, $x \in C \backslash\left\{\overline{0}_{\kappa}\right\},\{x\}$ is $\kappa$-clopen in the subspace $\kappa$-topology on $C$. Suppose, for a contradiction, $C=\bigcup_{\alpha \in \lambda} C_{\alpha}$ for some $\lambda<\kappa$ and $\kappa$-connected $C_{\alpha}$. Then, by the pigeonhole principle, there is a $C_{\alpha}$ of size at least 2. But if $x_{\alpha} \in C_{\alpha} \backslash\left\{\overline{0}_{\kappa}\right\}$ and $C_{\alpha} \neq\left\{x_{\alpha}\right\}$, then $\left\{x_{\alpha}\right\}$ is a proper clopen subset of $C_{\alpha}$, a contradiction.

It is not known to the author whether, assuming $\kappa$ is inaccessible, there is a set $A \subseteq \kappa^{\kappa}$ which is clopen in the full topology, but not intermediately analytic.

Meanwhile, the weakly analytic sets are strictly richer:
Proposition 6.3.28. There is a set $A \subseteq \kappa^{\kappa}$ which is $\mathrm{G}_{\delta}^{\kappa}$ but not open or closed in the full topology, such that $A$ is weakly injective-analytic.

Proof. Note that $A:=\left\{x \in \kappa^{\kappa}: \forall \alpha \exists \beta>\alpha(x(\beta) \neq 0)\right\}$ is a complete $\mathrm{G}_{\delta}^{\kappa}$ set (so is neither open nor closed in the full topology). We define a function $f: \kappa^{\kappa} \rightarrow \kappa^{\kappa}$ which 'throws away' $\kappa$-many points:

$$
f(x)=\overline{0}_{x(0)} \frown(1+x(1)) \frown \overline{0}_{x(2)} \frown(1+x(2)) \frown \ldots
$$

In which case, $f\left(\kappa^{\kappa}\right)=A$. We show that $f$ is Borel $_{\kappa}$. Let $D:=\left\{s \in \kappa^{<\kappa}\right.$ : $\forall \alpha(s(\alpha)=0 \rightarrow \exists \beta>\alpha$ where $s(\beta) \neq 0)\}$, and $\phi: \kappa^{<\kappa} \rightarrow D$ be the corresponding map to $f$. Clearly, $\phi$ is a bijection. If $s \in D$, then $f^{-1}\left(N_{s}\right)=N_{\phi^{-1}(s)}$. If $s \notin D$, then there is an $s^{\prime} \in D$ such that $s=s^{\prime} \overline{0}_{\alpha}$ for some $\alpha<\kappa$. So, the preimage of $N_{s}$ is $\bigcup_{\beta \geq \alpha} N_{\phi^{-1}\left(s^{\prime}\right)-\beta}$. Hence, $f^{-1}\left(N_{s}\right)$ is conelike in $N_{\phi^{-1}\left(s^{\prime}\right)}$, so is $\kappa$-closed. So, $f$ is Borel $_{\kappa}$.

This means we can properly separate the remaining notions of analyticity.

Corollary 6.3.29. Assume $\kappa$ is weakly compact. Then not all weakly analytic sets are intermediately analytic, and not all intermediately analytic sets are strongly analytic.

Proof. The weak inclusions are by Proposition 6.3.7. Strictness follows from Corollary 6.3.17, and Propositions 6.3.28 \& 6.3.24 respectively.

Question 6.3.30. If $A \subseteq \kappa^{\kappa}$ is clopen in the full topology, is $A$ weakly analytic (or equivalently weakly bianalytic)?

The weak analytics are not rich enough to include the closed sets of the full topology, but are almost rich enough, in that every weakly analytic $A$ is only a few points away from a closed set. As usual, let $\operatorname{cl}(A)$ be the closure of $A$ in the full topology.

Proposition 6.3.31. Let $\kappa^{<\kappa}=\kappa$. There are sets which are closed in the full topology which are not weakly analytic.

Proof. Every Borel $_{\kappa}{ }_{\kappa}$ function is continuous in the full topology, so let $C$ be a closed set which is not the continuous image of $\kappa^{\kappa}$ (as in [135, Theorem 1.5]).

Theorem 6.3.32. Let $\kappa$ be weakly compact. If $A$ is weakly analytic then $\mid \mathrm{cl}(A) \backslash$ $A \mid \leq \kappa$.

Proof. Let $g$ be a Borel $_{\kappa}$ function such that $g\left(\kappa^{\kappa}\right)=A$. Fix an $x \in \operatorname{cl}(A) \backslash A$. As $x \in \mathrm{cl}(A)$, we know that $N_{x \upharpoonright \alpha} \cap A \neq \emptyset$ for every $\alpha<\kappa$. For each $\alpha<\kappa$, we define $B_{\alpha}^{x}:=g^{-1}\left(N_{x\lceil\alpha}\right)$. As $f$ is Borel $_{\kappa}$, the sequence $\left(B_{\alpha}^{x}\right)_{\alpha \in \kappa}$ is a chain of non-empty Borel $_{\kappa}$ sets which is decreasing with respect to inclusion (by Remark 6.2.15). As $x \notin A$, we know that $\bigcap_{\alpha \in \kappa} B_{\alpha}^{x}=\emptyset$. So, by Lemma 6.2.16, $\bigcap_{\alpha \in \kappa} \mathcal{F}\left(B_{\alpha}^{x}\right) \neq \emptyset$, so pick an $s_{x} \in \bigcap_{\alpha \in \kappa} \mathcal{F}\left(B_{\alpha}^{x}\right)$. We define $f: \operatorname{cl}(A) \backslash A \rightarrow \kappa^{<\kappa}$ by $f(x)=s_{x}$. We just need to prove that $f$ is injective, and then the result follows from $\left|\kappa^{<\kappa}\right|=\kappa$.

Suppose $x, y \in \operatorname{cl}(A) \backslash A$ are such that $x \neq y$. Then there is an $\alpha<\kappa$ such that $N_{x\lceil\alpha} \cap N_{y\lceil\alpha}=\emptyset$. So, $B_{\alpha}^{x} \cap B_{\alpha}^{y}=g^{-1}\left(N_{x\lceil\alpha}\right) \cap g^{-1}\left(N_{y\lceil\alpha}\right)=\emptyset$. Note that $s=f(x) \in \mathcal{F}\left(B_{\alpha}^{x}\right)$, whilst $t=f(y) \in \mathcal{F}\left(B_{\alpha}^{y}\right)$. But now, if $s=t$ and $P_{s}^{x}$ and $P_{t}^{y}$ are the element associated to $s$ in $\mathcal{P}\left(B_{\alpha}^{x}\right)$ and $\mathcal{P}\left(B_{\alpha}^{x}\right)$, respectively, then we would have $B_{\alpha}^{x} \cap B_{\alpha}^{y} \supset P_{s}^{x} \cap P_{s}^{y}$, but $P_{s}^{x} \cap P_{s}^{y}$ is non-empty since both sets are conelike in the same $N_{s}$, a contradiction (by Remark 6.2.7). Thus $s \neq t$ as required.

Remark 6.3.33. Not all weakly analytic sets, $A$, are such that $|\mathrm{cl}(A) \backslash A|<\kappa$. For example, let $f: \kappa^{\kappa} \rightarrow \kappa^{\kappa}$ be such that for all $\alpha, \beta, \gamma<\kappa$ and all $x \in \kappa^{\kappa}$, we let $f\left(\alpha^{\sim} \beta^{\wedge} \gamma^{\wedge} x\right)=\alpha \frown \overline{0}_{\beta} \frown(\gamma+1) \frown x$. Then $f$ is Borel $_{\kappa}$ (as in Proposition 6.3.26). Then $f\left(\kappa^{\kappa}\right)=\kappa^{\kappa} \backslash\left\{\alpha^{\wedge} \overline{0}_{\kappa}: \alpha \in \kappa\right\}$, whilst $\operatorname{cl}\left(f\left(\kappa^{\kappa}\right)\right)=\kappa^{\kappa}$, so $\left|\mathrm{cl}\left(f\left(\kappa^{\kappa}\right)\right) \backslash f\left(\kappa^{\kappa}\right)\right|=\kappa$.

As a consequence of Theorem 6.3.32, all weakly analytic sets are $f \mathrm{SC}_{\kappa}$ :
Corollary 6.3.34. Let $\left(X, \tau_{\kappa}\right)$ be a $\kappa$-topological space. Every weakly analytic set of $\left(X, \tau_{\kappa}\right)$ is $\mathrm{G}_{\delta}^{\kappa}$ in the full topology $(X, \tau)$, and thus an $f \mathrm{SC}_{\kappa}$-space.

Proof. Let $A$ be weakly analytic. Then $A=(\operatorname{cl}(A) \backslash A) \cup \mathrm{cl}(A)$. By Theorem 6.3.32, $|\mathrm{cl}(A) \backslash A| \leq \kappa$. Singletons are closed in the full topology, so $\operatorname{cl}(A) \backslash A$ is $\mathrm{F}_{\sigma}^{\kappa}$, so $X \backslash(\mathrm{cl}(A) \backslash A)=B$ is $\mathrm{G}_{\delta}^{\kappa}$. Note that $A=\mathrm{cl}(A) \cap B$ is the intersection of two $\mathrm{G}_{\delta}^{\kappa}$ sets, hence $A$ is $\mathrm{G}_{\delta}^{\kappa}$. The last part follows from [1, Proposition 2.10].

Whilst it is not known whether the fully clopen sets are weakly analytic, the superclosed sets are known to be so:

Definition 6.3.35 ([1] page 9]). A tree $T \subseteq \kappa^{<\kappa}$ is called $<\kappa$-closed if for every limit $\alpha<\kappa$, and every $\alpha$-sequence in $T,\left(s_{\beta}\right)_{\beta \in \alpha}, T$ has a level $\alpha$ node $s$ above $\left(s_{\beta}\right)_{\beta \in \alpha}$. If, in addition, $T$ is pruned, $T$ is called superclosed. A set $C \subseteq \kappa^{\kappa}$ is superclosed if there is a superclosed $T$ such that $[T]=C$.

Proposition 6.3.36. Let $C \subseteq \kappa^{\kappa}$ be a non-empty superclosed set. Then there is a Borel ${ }_{\kappa}$ retraction $f: \kappa^{\kappa} \rightarrow C$.

Proof. The proof proceeds as in [135, Proposition 1.3], whilst ensuring that the function obtained is Borel $_{\kappa}$. Let $C=[T]$ for some superclosed $T \subseteq \kappa^{<\kappa}$. Without loss of generality, we may assume that $T$ is such that $N_{s} \cap C \neq \emptyset$ for all $s \in T$. We want to define a Borel $_{\kappa}$ retraction $f: \kappa^{\kappa} \rightarrow C$.

For every $z \in C$, we set $f(z)=z$, as required for a retraction.
To define $f$ on $\kappa^{\kappa} \backslash C$, let $A_{s}=\{s \frown \beta: \beta<\kappa, s \frown \beta \notin T\}$, and $B_{s}=\{s \curvearrowleft \beta: \beta<$ $\kappa, s \frown \beta \in T\}$ for every $s \in T$. We define functions $\phi_{s}: A_{s} \rightarrow B_{s}$ for every $s \in T$.

Let $U_{s}=\bigcup\left\{N_{s \sim \beta}: \beta<\kappa, s \neg \beta \notin T\right\}=\bigcup_{t \in A_{s}} N_{t}$. Notice that $U_{s}$ is not Borel ${ }_{\kappa}$ if and only if $\left|A_{s}\right|=\left|B_{s}\right|=\kappa$. If $U_{s}$ is Borel $_{\kappa}$, choose a $\gamma$ such that $s \sim \gamma \in T$ and define $\phi_{s}\left(s^{\sim} \beta\right)=s \frown \gamma$ for all $\beta<\kappa$ with $s \sim \beta \in A_{s}$. Otherwise, let $\phi_{s}$ be a bijection between $A_{s}$ and $B_{s}$.

Let $g$ be a choice function that associates a point $g(s) \in N_{s} \cap C$ to every $s \in T$. For every $z \in \kappa^{\kappa} \backslash C$, there is a unique $\alpha_{z}<\kappa$ such that $z \upharpoonright \alpha_{z} \in \delta(T)$. Since $T$ is superclosed, we know that $\alpha_{z}$ is a successor ordinal, so let $\beta_{z}$ be such that $\alpha_{z}=\beta_{z}+1$. Then, for every $z \in \kappa^{\kappa} \backslash C$, define $f(z)=g\left(\phi_{z\left\lceil\beta_{z}\right.}\left(z \uparrow\left(\beta_{z}+1\right)\right)\right)$.

It is clear that $f$ is a retraction. We claim that $f$ is also Borel $_{\kappa}$. Let $s \in T$. First, notice that for every $z \in N_{s}$, we have $f(z) \in N_{s} \cap C$, thus $N_{s} \subseteq f^{-1}\left(N_{s}\right)$. If, instead, $z \in \kappa^{\kappa} \backslash N_{s}$, we have that $f(z) \in N_{s}$ if and only if $z \notin C$ and $f(z)=g(s \upharpoonright(\beta+1))$ for some $\beta<\operatorname{len}(s)$ such that $g(s \upharpoonright(\beta+1)) \in N_{s}$ (one can take $\beta=\beta_{z}$, for concreteness). Let $B_{\alpha}^{\prime}=f^{-1}(g(s \upharpoonright(\alpha+1))) \backslash N_{s}$, and let

$$
B_{\alpha}=\bigcup\left\{N_{s\lceil\alpha \subset \beta}: \beta<\kappa, s\left\lceil\alpha \subset \beta \notin T \text { and } \phi_{s\lceil\alpha}(s \upharpoonright \alpha \subset \beta)=s \upharpoonright(\alpha+1)\right\} .\right.
$$

Then, $B_{\alpha}^{\prime}=\bigcup\left\{B_{\beta}: g(s\lceil(\alpha+1))=g(s\lceil(\beta+1))\}\right.$, and thus

$$
f^{-1}\left(N_{s}\right)=N_{s} \cup \bigcup\left\{B_{\alpha}: \alpha<\operatorname{len}(s), g\left(s\lceil(\alpha+1)) \in N_{s}\right\} .\right.
$$

If $U_{s\lceil\alpha}$ is Borel $_{\kappa}$, by the definition of $\phi_{s\lceil\alpha}$, we have that either $B_{\alpha}=U_{s \mid \alpha}$ or $B_{\alpha}=\emptyset$, and either way $B_{\alpha}$ is Borel $_{\kappa}$.

Otherwise, $U_{s \mid \alpha}$ is not Borel $_{\kappa}$. Then, by the definition of $\phi_{s \mid \alpha}$, we have that $B_{\alpha}=N_{s\lceil\alpha \sim \beta}$ for some $\beta$, and thus $B_{\alpha}$ is $\operatorname{Borel}_{\kappa}$ again. Thus, $f^{-1}\left(N_{s}\right)$ is the union of $<\kappa$-many Borel $_{\kappa}$ sets, and so it is Borel $_{\kappa}$. Since the cones, $N_{s}$, form a basis for the $\kappa$-topology of $\kappa^{\kappa}$, this proves that $f$ is Borel $_{\kappa}$.

Corollary 6.3.37. Every superclosed subset of $\kappa^{\kappa}$ is weakly analytic.

Indeed, every disjoint union of $\mathrm{SC}_{\kappa}$ sets is $\mathrm{SC}_{\kappa}$, e.g. $N_{s} \cup N_{t}$ is $\mathrm{SC}_{\kappa}$, so not all $\mathrm{SC}_{\kappa}$ are strongly analytic. So, by [1, Theorem 2.17], not all superclosed sets are strongly analytic.

We can summarise these properties of the analytic pointclasses in three tables. Table 6.1 summarises the closure properties from Proposition 6.3 .22 and Corollary 6.3 .25

|  | closed under complements | closed under $<\kappa$-unions |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| strongly analytic | no | no |
| intermediately analytic | no | yes |
| weakly analytic | $?$ | yes |

Table 6.1: Closure of pointclasses
In Table 6.2, 'No' in cell $(a, b)$ means that not all elements of column $a$ are elements of row $b$, and so on.

|  | clopen | open | closed | superclosed |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| strongly analytic | No | No | No | No |
| intermediately analytic | $?$ | $?$ | No | $?$ |
| weakly analytic | $?$ | $?$ | No | Yes |

Table 6.2: Inclusions between pointclasses
In Table 6.3, 'Yes' in cell $(a, b)$ means that there is an example of a set which is properly in column $a$ (i.e. not of lower complexity) which is in row $b$.

|  | clopen | open | closed | $F_{\sigma}$ | $G_{\delta}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| strongly analytic | Yes | $?$ | Yes | No | No |
| intermediately analytic | Yes | $?$ | Yes | No | No |
| weakly analytic | Yes | Yes | Yes | $?$ | Yes |

Table 6.3: Proper witnesses in pointclasses
Generalising the ordinary case, we let $\operatorname{Proj}_{\kappa}$ be the closure of $\left\{\kappa^{\kappa}\right\}$ under the images of Borel $_{\kappa}$ functions, and complements. By Corollary 6.3.34, we know that weakly coanalytics are $\mathrm{F}_{\sigma}^{\kappa}$. But it is not known if the Borel ${ }_{\kappa}$ image of a (fully) Borel set is (fully) Borel. Hence, a natural question is:

Question 6.3.38. Let $\mathcal{B} \subseteq \mathscr{P}\left(\kappa^{\kappa}\right)$ be the smallest $\kappa^{+}$-algebra containing all the cones (i.e. the full Borel pointclass). Is $\operatorname{Proj}_{\kappa} \subseteq \mathcal{B}$ ?

### 6.3.4 Linearly ordered spaces

Next, we study the $\kappa$-analytic set on linearly ordered spaces. Recall that we call a set strongly analytic, etc., if it is strongly $\kappa^{\kappa}$-analytic. In this section,
we focus on strong, intermediate, and weak $X$-analyticity, for a linearly ordered space, $X$. Projections are again dismissed as trivial (by Proposition 6.3.3). As in Section 6.2.3, the definition of $X$-analyticity on an arbitrary $\kappa$-Polish space, $X$, is complicated by the fact that $\kappa^{\kappa}$ is not $\kappa$-universal for $\kappa$-Polish spaces. This means we must choose the domain space carefully. Clearly, if $g(X)=\kappa^{\kappa}$ for some $\kappa$-continuous $g$, then every strongly analytic set is strongly $X$-analytic, and so on. But ( $\kappa^{\kappa}$-)analyticity can be pathological for some $\kappa$-Polish spaces:

Proposition 6.3.39. There is a $\kappa$-Polish space, $X$, such that $X$ is strongly $X$ analytic, but not weakly analytic. Hence, for each such $X$ :

1. weakly $X$-analytic and weakly analytic are distinct,
2. intermediately $X$-analytic and intermediately analytic are distinct, and
3. strongly $X$-analytic and strongly analytic are distinct.

Proof. Any $X$ is automatically strongly $X$-analytic. So, it suffices to give an $X$ which is not weakly analytic. Note that every Borel $_{\kappa}$ function is continuous, and there are sets $X \subseteq \kappa^{\kappa}$ which are not the continuous image of $\kappa^{\kappa}$ 135, Theorem 1.5]. By [1, Theorem 2.21], such a set $X$ is a $\kappa$-Polish space.

For this reason, we focus on $X$-analytic sets on $X$, and particularly on interval $\kappa$-topologies. Note that Corollary 6.3 .8 holds for such an $X$, but the analogue of Corollary 6.3.14 fails:

Remark 6.3.40. There is a $\kappa$-continuous image of a $\kappa$-closed set which is not strongly $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$-analytic: all strongly $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$-analytic sets are $\kappa$-connected, as $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ is $\kappa$ connected and $\kappa$-continuity preserves $\kappa$-connectedness, but $\{0,1\}=\operatorname{id}(\{0,1\})$ is $\kappa$-closed and not $\kappa$-connected. So too for any ordered field, $\mathbb{K}$, equipped with the $Q$-interval $\kappa$-topology, where $\{0,1\} \subseteq Q \subseteq \mathbb{K}$.

As in Section 6.3.3, some strongly $X$-analytic sets are not Borel $_{\kappa}$. This we now prove. Throughout this section, we use both the field and the order properties of $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$ and $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$. Recall the definition of $\kappa$-homogeneity from Definition 4.1.5.

Proposition 6.3.41. Let $\mathbb{K}$ be an $\kappa$-homogeneous ordered field such that $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})=$ $\kappa$, which has a $(\kappa, \kappa)$-gap. Equip $\mathbb{K}$ with the $\mathbb{K}$-interval $\kappa$-topology. Then, if $C \subseteq \mathbb{K}$ is a convex set, such that $C$ has cofinality and conitiality $\kappa$ or 1 (including singletons), then $C$ is strongly $\mathbb{K}$-analytic.

Proof. Let $a \in \mathbb{K}$. For $\{a\}$, use the constant map $f_{a}(x)=a$. Next we consider the improper intervals. For $[a, \infty)$, use the map $f(x)=X^{2}+a$. For $(a, \infty)$, we follow the construction in the comment following Example 4.1.13. Pick a $(\kappa, \kappa)$-gap, $G$, in $\mathbb{K}$. By $\kappa$-homogeneity, let $b$ be an order-reversing bijection from $(-\infty, G)$ to $(a, \infty)$, and let $r$ be an order isomorphism from $(G, \infty)$ to $(a, \infty)$. Then let $f:=b \cup r$. Clearly, $f(\mathbb{K})=(a, \infty)$. Note that $b$ is strictly decreasing, and $r$ is strictly increasing. Hence, by Lemma 4.2.7, $f$ is $\kappa$-continuous. So, $(a, \infty)$ is strongly $\mathbb{K}$-analytic. The improper interval $(-\infty, a)$ and $(-\infty, a]$ are similar, as
are there convex sets $(-\infty, G)$ and $[H, \infty)$, where $G$ is a $(\kappa, \lambda)$-gap and $H$ is a ( $\mu, \kappa$ )-gap for some $\mu, \lambda \leq \kappa$ ).

The remaining case is that of the intervals. Each case is similar, so we consider $[c, d)$ for some $c, d \in \mathbb{K}$. By the $\kappa$-homogeneity of $\mathbb{K}$, let $b:[0, \infty) \rightarrow[c, d)$ be an order isomorphism. Let $g:(-\infty, 0] \rightarrow\{c\}$ be the constant function with value $c$. Then $b \cup g$ is $\kappa$-continuous by the Glueing Lemma (Lemma 4.2.4). Finally, note that $(b \cup g)(\mathbb{K})=[c, d)$. The bounded convex set case is similar, e.g. if $G$ is a $(\kappa, \lambda)$-gap in $\mathbb{K}$, and $a \in \mathbb{K}$, then we use the same technique for ( $a, G]$.

Remark 6.3.42. In fact, using the same method, if $I, J \subseteq \mathbb{K}$ are intervals or improper intervals such that $|I|>1$ (equivalently, $|I|=|\mathbb{K}|$ ), then there is a $\kappa$-continuous $f: I \rightarrow \mathbb{K}$ such that $f(I)=J$.

Corollary 6.3.43. Let $\kappa$ be inaccessible. Let $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$ have the $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$-interval $\kappa$-topology. Then there are strongly $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$-bianalytic sets which are not Borel $_{\kappa}$.

Proof. By Propositions 2.3.11 and 2.3.20, $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$ has the requisite properties. By Theorem 6.2.48 and Example 6.2.49, if $G$ is a $(\kappa, \kappa)$-gap in $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$, then $(a, G]$ is not Borel $_{\kappa}$. By Proposition 6.3.41, $(a, G]$ is strongly $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$-bianalytic.

Remark 6.3.44. If $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ is $\kappa$-homogeneous, then Proposition 6.3.41 and Corollary 6.3 .43 (using Corollary 6.2.50 this time) also hold for $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$, with the $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$-interval $\kappa$-topologies.

The approach to Suslin's theorem in Corollary 6.3.43 and Remark 6.3.44 uses specific features of $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$ and $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$, particularly that they have base number $\kappa$, and they have ( $\kappa, \kappa$ )-gaps (for Proposition 6.3.41). They show the failure of Suslin's theorem for strong $X$-bianalyticity (hence also intermediate and weak $X$-bianalyticity) for $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$, and also for $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$, if $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ is $\kappa$-homogeneous (see Question 4.1.10).

More generally, Suslin's theorem fails for weakly $X$-bianalytics, using a strategy somewhat like that of Lemma 6.3.19,

Proposition 6.3.45. Let $\kappa$ be inaccessible. Let $X$ be an order, and equip $X$ with the $X$-interval $\kappa$-topology. Let $X$ be densely ordered, $\kappa$-homogeneous, and $\operatorname{cof}(X)=\operatorname{owei}(X)=\kappa$. Then there is a set $A \subseteq X$ which is weakly $X$-analytic, but not $\operatorname{Borel}_{\kappa}$.

Proof. Let $\left(p_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \kappa}$ be cofinal in $X$. For all $\alpha \in \kappa$, let $P_{\alpha}=\left(p_{\alpha}, p_{\alpha+1}\right]$. Note that $\bigcup_{\alpha \in \kappa} P_{\alpha} \subseteq X$, and for each limit $\alpha<\kappa$, the set $C_{\alpha}:=\left\{x \in X: \forall \beta<\alpha\left(p_{\beta}^{\prime}<\right.\right.$ $\left.x<p_{\alpha}\right\}$ may be nonempty. The collection $\left\{P_{\alpha}: \alpha \in \kappa\right\} \cup\left\{C_{\alpha}: \alpha<\kappa\right.$ is a limit ordinal\} is a partition of $X$.

As $X$ is densely ordered, for each $\alpha$, there is a $q_{\alpha} \in\left(p_{\alpha}, p_{\alpha+1}\right)$, so let $P_{\alpha}^{\prime}=$ $\left(p_{\alpha}, q_{\alpha}\right]$, and $P_{\alpha}^{\prime \prime}=\left(q_{\alpha}, p_{\alpha+1}\right]$. As $X$ is $\kappa$-homogeneous, for each $\alpha$, there is an order-isomorphism $h_{\alpha}: P_{\alpha}^{\prime \prime} \rightarrow P_{\alpha}^{\prime}$. Note that $h_{\alpha}$ is a $\kappa$-homeomorphism.

Now let $\alpha<\kappa$ be a limit such that $C_{\alpha} \neq \emptyset$. As owei $(X)=\kappa$, we know that $\operatorname{coi}\left(C_{\alpha}\right) \leq \kappa$. If $\operatorname{coi}\left(C_{\alpha}\right)=\kappa$, we use the same method as in $P_{\alpha}^{\prime \prime}: X$ is $\kappa$ homogeneous, so there is an order isomorphism, $g_{\alpha}: C_{\alpha} \rightarrow P_{\alpha}^{\prime}$, which is therefore a $\kappa$-homoeomorphism. Otherwise, $\operatorname{coi}\left(C_{\alpha}\right)<\kappa$. In which case, let $g_{\alpha}: C_{\alpha} \rightarrow\left\{p_{\alpha}\right\}$ be the constant map.

Then we define $f: X \rightarrow \bigcup_{\alpha \in \kappa} P_{\alpha}^{\prime}$ as follows:

$$
f(x)= \begin{cases}x & \text { if } x \in \bigcup_{\alpha \in \kappa} P_{\alpha}^{\prime} \\ h_{\alpha}(x) & \text { if } x \in P_{\alpha}^{\prime \prime} \\ g_{\alpha}(x) & \text { if } x \in C_{\alpha}\end{cases}
$$

Claim 6.3.46. The function $f$ is Borel $_{\kappa}$.
Proof. Let $(a, b) \subseteq X$. Let $I \subseteq \kappa$ be such that for all $\alpha \in I,\left(C_{\alpha} \cup P_{\alpha}^{\prime}\right) \cap(a, b) \neq \emptyset$. Note that $I$ is a convex set in $\kappa$. As $\left(p_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \kappa}$ is cofinal, $I$ is bounded above by some $p_{\alpha_{0}}$. So, in particular, $|I|<\kappa$. Let $\beta$ be the least in $I$ and $\gamma$ be the least $\gamma \in \kappa$ such that $\gamma>I$.

If $\gamma=\gamma_{0}+1$ for some $\gamma_{0}<\kappa$, then $f^{-1}(a, b)=(a, b) \cup I_{a}^{\prime \prime} \cup I_{b}^{\prime \prime} \cup C_{a} \cup C_{b}$, where $I_{a}^{\prime \prime} \subseteq P_{\beta}^{\prime \prime}$ and $I_{b}^{\prime \prime} \subseteq P_{\gamma}^{\prime \prime}$ are open intervals, and $C_{a} \subseteq C_{\beta}$ and $C_{b} \subseteq C_{\gamma}$ are convex sets. If $\beta$ is such that ( $C_{\beta}$ is non-empty and) $g_{\beta}$ is not constant, then $C_{a}$ is an interval; otherwise, if $g_{\beta}$ is constant, then $C_{a}=C_{\beta}$, and as coi $\left(C_{\beta}\right)<\kappa$ (and $\left.\operatorname{top}\left(C_{\beta}\right)=p_{\alpha}\right)$, then $C_{\beta}$ is $\kappa$-open. The case of $C_{b}$ is exactly similar.

Otherwise, $\gamma$ is a limit. The case of $C_{a}$ remains the same. For $C_{b}$, there is an extra step in the case where $g_{\gamma}$ is constant: suppose that $C_{\gamma}$ is non-empty. If $g_{\gamma}$ is not constant, then $C_{a}$ is an open interval. Otherwise, if $g_{\gamma}$ is constant, then either:

1. $C_{a}=C_{\beta}$, in which case, as $\operatorname{coi}\left(C_{\beta}\right)<\kappa\left(\right.$ and $\left.\operatorname{top}\left(C_{\beta}\right)=p_{\alpha}\right)$, we have that $C_{\beta}$ is $\kappa$-open as in the successor case, or
2. $C_{\alpha}=\emptyset$, in which case note that $\operatorname{coi}\left(C_{\alpha}\right)=\kappa$, and by assumption we have that $(a, b)$ contains a cofinal sequence of $p_{\alpha}$ with $\operatorname{bot}\left(C_{\gamma}\right)$. So, in fact, $b=p_{\gamma}$. Hence, by construction, $f^{-1}\left(\left(a, p_{\alpha}\right)\right)=O \cup(a, \infty) \backslash \bigcup_{\beta \in \operatorname{coi}\left(C_{\alpha}\right)}\left(c_{\beta}, \infty\right)$, where $\left(c_{\beta}\right)_{\beta \in \text { coi }\left(C_{\alpha}\right)}$ is coinitial in $C_{\alpha}$, and $O<C_{\gamma}$ is a $\kappa$-open set. As $\operatorname{coi}\left(C_{\alpha}\right)<\kappa$, $f^{-1}\left(\left(-\infty, p_{\alpha}\right)\right)$ is the complement of a $<\kappa$-sized union, i.e. a $\kappa$-closed set. So, $C_{b}$ is $\kappa$-closed.

Hence, $f^{-1}(a, b)$ is a union of finitely many open intervals and $\kappa$-closed sets, so is a Borel $_{\kappa}$ set. The $(a, \infty)$ and $(-\infty, a)$ cases are similar. Hence $f$ is $\mathrm{Borel}_{\kappa}$.

Finally note that $f(X)=\bigcup_{\alpha \in \kappa} P_{\alpha}^{\prime}$, which consists of $\kappa$-many disjoint convex


The same result holds if we instead assume that $\operatorname{coi}(X)=\kappa$, or indeed that there is an almost gap $A$ in $X$ such that $\operatorname{cof}(A)=\kappa$ or $\operatorname{coi}(A)=\kappa$.
Corollary 6.3.47. Let $\kappa$ be inaccessible. Let $X$ have the $X$-interval $\kappa$-topology, be densely ordered, $\kappa$-homogeneous, and $\operatorname{cof}(X)=\operatorname{owei}(X)=\kappa$. Then the $\operatorname{Borel}_{\kappa}$ sets are strictly contained in the weakly $X$-bianalytic sets.

Proof. Every Borel $_{\kappa}$ set on $X$ is weakly $X$-analytic. Let $f(X)$ be as in Proposition 6.3.45. This $f(X)$ is strongly $X$-analytic, hence weakly $X$-analytic. An exactly parallel proof to Proposition 6.3.45 shows that $X \backslash f(X)$ is not Borel $_{\kappa}$.
Example 6.3.48. Let $\kappa$ be inaccessible. On $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$, the set $\bigcup_{\alpha \in \kappa}(2 \alpha, 2 \alpha+1]$ is weakly $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$-analytic, but neither strongly $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$-connected, nor Borel $_{\kappa}$ for the $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$-interval $\kappa$ topology.

If $X$ is as in Proposition 6.3 .45 and has $\kappa$-many $G_{\alpha}$, where each $G_{\alpha}$ is an $\left(\beta_{\alpha}, \gamma_{\alpha}\right)$-gap for some $\beta_{\alpha}, \gamma_{\alpha}<\kappa$, then the $\kappa$-open sets $\left(G_{\alpha}, G_{\alpha+1}\right)$ partition $X$ into $\kappa$-many pieces. By copying the method in Lemma 6.3.19. $\bigcup_{\alpha \in \kappa}\left(G_{2 \alpha}, G_{2 \alpha+1}\right)$ is strongly $X$-bianalytic but not Borel $_{\kappa}$, so Suslin's theorem fails for strongly $X$ bianalytics.

On $\kappa^{\kappa}$, Corollary 6.3.14 holds. Likewise, if $\mathbb{K}$ is a $\kappa$-homogeneous ordered field such that $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})=\kappa$, which has a $(\kappa, \kappa)$-gap, then the intermediately $X$-analytic sets are exactly the $\kappa$-continuous images of $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Delta}_{2}^{0}$ sets (see also Remark 6.3.40). This gives us more of a description of the hierarchy of analyticity notions on $\kappa^{\kappa}$ and $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ :

Corollary 6.3.49. Let $\kappa$ be inaccessible. Let $X$ be a dense linear order. Let $Q \subseteq X$ be order dense in $X$. Suppose that, for all $(\lambda, \mu)$-gaps in $X, \lambda, \mu \leq \kappa$. Let $X$ have the $Q$-interval $\kappa$-topology. A set $A \subseteq \mathbb{K}$ is intermediately $\mathbb{K}$-analytic if and only if $A=f(D)$ where $D \subseteq \mathbb{K}$ is $\kappa \Delta_{2}^{0}$ and $f: D \rightarrow \mathbb{K}$ is $\kappa$-continuous (in the subspace $\kappa$-topology on $D$ ).

Proof. This is immediate from Theorem 6.2.48
But it is not known whether we can strengthen this to $\kappa$-closed sets (rather than $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Delta}_{2}^{0}$ sets).

Question 6.3.50. Suppose $\kappa$ is inaccessible, $\mathbb{K}$ is a $\kappa$-homogeneous ordered field such that $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})=\kappa$, which has a $(\kappa, \kappa)$-gap, and that $\mathbb{K}$ has the $\mathbb{K}$-interval $\kappa$ topology. Is a set $A \subseteq \mathbb{K}$ intermediately $\mathbb{K}$-analytic set $A \subseteq \mathbb{K}$ if and only if $A=f(C)$ where $C \subseteq \mathbb{K}$ is $\kappa$-closed and $f: C \rightarrow \mathbb{K}$ is $\kappa$-continuous (in the subspace $\kappa$-topology on $C)$ ?

This amounts to showing whether there is a $\kappa$-closed set, $C$, and a $\kappa$-continuous function, $f$, such that $f(C)=[0, \neg \omega)$. Using Remark 4.1.6. Example 4.1.13, the proof of Theorem 6.2.48, and the techniques in Proposition 6.3.41 and Remark 6.3 .42 , we can show the following: suppose $\kappa$ is inaccessible, $\mathbb{K}$ is a $\kappa$-homogeneous ordered field such that $\operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})=\kappa$, which has a $(\lambda, \lambda)$-gap for each infinite $\lambda \leq \kappa$, and $\mathbb{K}$ has the $\mathbb{K}$-interval $\kappa$-topology. Then, a set $A \subseteq \mathbb{K}$ is intermediately $\mathbb{K}$ analytic set $A \subseteq \mathbb{K}$ if and only if $A=f(C)$ where $C \subseteq \mathbb{K}$ is $\kappa$-closed and $f: C \rightarrow \mathbb{K}$ is $\kappa$-continuous (in the subspace $\kappa$-topology on $C$ ). However, this does not apply to $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ or $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$, as both are $\eta_{\kappa}$ (so have no $(\omega, \omega)$-gaps).

Corollary 6.3.51. 1. Let $\kappa$ be inaccessible. Let $X$ be a dense linear order. Let $Q \subseteq X$ be order dense in $X$. Suppose that, for all $(\lambda, \mu)$-gaps in $X, \lambda, \mu \leq \kappa$. Let $X$ have the $Q$-interval $\kappa$-topology. Strong $X$-analyticity implies, but is not implied by, intermediate $X$-analyticity, and intermediate $X$-analyticity implies weak $X$-analyticity.
2. Let $\kappa$ be weakly compact. Then strong analyticity implies, but is not implied by, intermediate analyticity, and intermediate analyticity implies, but is not implied by, weak analyticity.

Proof. The implications are exactly as in Proposition 6.3.7. The first non-implication is Remark 6.3.40. For the second pair of non-implications, we separate strong from intermediate analyticity using Corollary 6.3.17, and intermediate from weak analyticity using e.g. Proposition 6.3.27.

It is natural to ask whether, on suitable order $\kappa$-topologies, weak and intermediate $X$-analyticity coincide:

Question 6.3.52. Let $\kappa$ be inaccessible. Are weak and intermediate $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$-analyticity equivalent?

### 6.4 Distinct $\kappa$-topologies

Here, we show how to construct $\kappa$-topologies which are not $\kappa$-homeomorphic. Trivially, there are $2^{2^{\kappa^{\kappa}}}$ non- $\kappa$-homeomorphic $\kappa$-topologies on $\kappa^{\kappa}$ (any non-fully homeomorphic full topologies will do, e.g. [132, Theorem 1.4] ${ }^{[5]}$. Also, if $|X|=\kappa^{\kappa}$, then there are at least two non- $\kappa$-homeomorphic $\kappa$-topologies on $X$ (namely $2^{\kappa}$ and $\kappa^{\kappa}$ ), and if $\kappa^{<\kappa}=\kappa$, then there are at least three non- $\kappa$-homeomorphic $\kappa$-topologies on $X$ (the extra is $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ ). This follows from Table 6.4, and that $\kappa$-homeomorphisms preserve $\kappa$-additivity, $\kappa$-zero-dimensionality, and $\kappa$-connectedness. In this section, we prove the much stronger result that if $\kappa$ is inaccessible, then there are $2^{\kappa}$-many non- $\kappa$-homeomorphic $\kappa$-topologies on $\kappa^{\kappa}$ whose full topology is fully homeomorphic to $\left(\kappa^{\kappa},\left\langle\tau_{b}\right\rangle_{\infty}\right)$ (Corollary 6.4.4).

|  | $\kappa$-additive | $\kappa$-zero-dimensional | $\kappa$-connected |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $2^{\kappa}, \tau_{\kappa}^{\mathrm{b}}$ | yes | yes | no |
| $\kappa^{\kappa}, \tau_{\kappa}^{\mathrm{b}}$ | yes | no | yes |
| $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}, \tau_{\kappa}^{i}$ | no | no | yes |

Table 6.4: Non- $\kappa$-homeomorphic $\kappa$-topologies on a set of size $\kappa^{\kappa}$
Call a map a $\kappa$-embedding if it is a $\kappa$-homeomorphism on its image. Two $\kappa$ topologies $\left(X, \tau_{\kappa}\right)$ and $\left(Y, \sigma_{\kappa}\right)$, are mutually non- $\kappa$-embeddable if there is neither a $\kappa$-embedding from $X$ to $Y$ nor a $\kappa$-embedding from $Y$ to $X$.

By $\kappa$-additivity, the interval $\kappa$-topology on $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ does not $\kappa$-embed into the bounded $\kappa$-topology on $\kappa^{\kappa}$. The converse fails too:

Remark 6.4.1. If $\kappa^{<\kappa}=\kappa$, then the bounded $\kappa$-topology on $\kappa^{\kappa}$ does not $\kappa$-embed into the $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$-interval topology on $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ : suppose $I \subseteq \mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ is $\kappa$-homeomorphic to $\kappa^{\kappa}$, with homeomorphism $b: I \rightarrow \kappa^{\kappa}$. Then there are two cases. Either there is a $q \in \mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$ such that $q \in \mathbb{Q}_{\kappa} \backslash I$ where there are $i, j \in I$ such that $i<q<j$, in which case $\{b((-\infty, q)), b((q, \infty))\}$ is a $\kappa$-clopen partition of $\kappa^{\kappa}$, contradicting that $\kappa^{\kappa}$ is

[^33]$\kappa$-connected. Or there is no such $q$, in which case let $q^{\prime} \in I \cap \mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$. Then $\left\{q^{\prime}\right\}$ is $\kappa$-closed so $\left\{b\left(q^{\prime}\right)\right\}$ is $\kappa$-closed, contradicting Corollary 6.2.30.

Hence, the generalisation of Cantor's middle-third argument, by which $\kappa^{\kappa}$ embeds into $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$, yields a full embedding but not a $\kappa$-embedding.

Distinct $\kappa$-topologies may generate full topologies which are (fully) homeomorphic (in fact, identical), i.e. $\tau_{\kappa} \neq \sigma_{\kappa}$ such that $\left\langle\tau_{\kappa}\right\rangle_{\infty}=\left\langle\sigma_{\kappa}\right\rangle_{\infty}$. For example, the interval full topology on $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ is generated by a $\kappa^{\kappa}$-sized basis, $\tau_{\kappa}^{\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}}$, and a $\kappa$-sized basis $\tau_{\kappa}^{Q_{\kappa}}$. These even yield distinct Borel $_{\kappa}$ hierarchies (Corollary 6.2.50). We show that the standard $\kappa$-topologies $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ and $\kappa^{\kappa}$ generate homeomorphic (full) topologies, and moreover that we can build many pairwise distinct $\kappa$-topologies:

Theorem 6.4.2. Let $\kappa^{<\kappa}=\kappa$. Let $\tau_{\kappa}^{\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}}$ be the $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$-interval $\kappa$-topology on $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$, and let $\tau_{\kappa}^{\mathrm{b}}$ be the bounded $\kappa$-topology on $\kappa^{\kappa}$. Then the full topologies $\left\langle\tau_{\kappa}^{\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}}\right\rangle_{\infty}$ and $\left\langle\tau_{\kappa}^{\mathrm{b}}\right\rangle_{\infty}$ are (fully) homeomorphic.

Proof. A space is (fully) homeomorphic to $\left(\kappa^{\kappa},\left\langle\tau_{\kappa}^{\mathrm{b}}\right\rangle_{\infty}\right)$ if the full topology is $\kappa$ additive, $\mathrm{SC}_{\kappa}$, and all $\kappa$-Lindelöf sets have empty interior [1, Theorem 3.9]. The full topology on $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ is $\kappa$-additive: $\operatorname{bn}\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}\right)=\kappa$ so $<\kappa$-intersections of intervals do not generate the intervals $[a, b]$ for $a, b \in \mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$. Next, no $\kappa$-Lindelöf $A \subseteq \mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ includes any interval in $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$, as any interval can be divided into $\kappa$-many disjoint open sets using the dense set of $(\kappa, \kappa)$-gaps. So, it suffices to prove that $\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa},\left\langle\tau_{\kappa}^{\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}}\right\rangle_{\infty}\right)$ is $\mathrm{SC}_{\kappa}$. By Theorem 2.3.13, $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ is $\eta_{\kappa}$, so is $\kappa$-spherically complete. So, by [1, Theorem 2.31], $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ is $\mathrm{SC}_{\kappa}$ if and only if it is completely $\kappa$-metrisable. As $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ metrises itself, $\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa},\left\langle\tau_{\kappa}^{\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}}\right\rangle_{\infty}\right)$ is completely $\kappa$-metrisable, so is $\mathrm{SC}_{\kappa}$. Hence, $\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa},\left\langle\tau_{\kappa}^{\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}}\right\rangle_{\infty}\right)$ is homeomorphic to $\left(\kappa^{\kappa},\left\langle\tau_{\kappa}\right\rangle_{\infty}\right)$.

For interval $\kappa$-topologies, we can even guarantee that there are $\kappa$-many non-$\kappa$-bi-embeddable $\kappa$-topologies generating identical (not just $\kappa$-homeomorphic) full topologies: ${ }^{6}$

Proposition 6.4.3. Let $\kappa$ be inaccessible. There are $\kappa$-many non- $\kappa$-biembeddable interval $\kappa$-topologies on $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ generating the interval (full) topology.

Proof. For each $\lambda \leq \kappa$, let $\mathcal{B}_{\lambda}:=\left\{\bigcap_{\beta \in \alpha} I_{\beta}: I_{\beta} \subseteq \mathbb{R}_{\kappa}\right.$ is an interval and $\left.\alpha<\lambda\right\}$. Note that the $\kappa$-topology $\left\langle\mathcal{B}_{\lambda}\right\rangle_{\kappa}=: \tau_{\lambda}$ is $\lambda$-additive. The $(\lambda, \kappa)$-gaps are dense in $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ for every $\lambda \leq \kappa$, so each $\tau_{\lambda}$ is not $\lambda^{+}$-additive. Moreover, each $\tau_{\lambda}$ generates the ordinary interval topology as its full topology

We show that if $\lambda<\mu<\kappa$, then $\tau_{\lambda}$ does not $\kappa$-embed into $\tau_{\mu}$. Any subspace $X$ of an $\alpha$-additive $\kappa$-topological space $Y$ is again $\alpha$-additive. Thus if $\tau_{\lambda}$ embedded into $\tau_{\mu}$, then $\tau_{\lambda}$ is $\mu$-additive. But this is a contradiction: there are $(\mu, \kappa)$-gaps in $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$, hence $\tau_{\lambda}$ is not $\mu$-additive.

Finally, as $\kappa$ is inaccessible, there are $\kappa$-many cardinals below it, so the $\tau_{\lambda}$ witness the statement.

[^34]While these $\kappa$-topologies are not $\kappa$-homeomorphic, they form a chain of $\kappa$ embeddable spaces: $\tau_{\mu} \hookrightarrow \tau_{\lambda}$ for all $\mu<\lambda$ (but the converse fails). Using the standard technique in e.g. [37, Proposition 6.5], we can then construct $2^{\kappa}$-many distinct $\kappa$-topologies with the same full topology:

Corollary 6.4.4. Let $\kappa$ be inaccessible. There are $2^{\kappa}$-many non- $\kappa$-homeomorphic $\kappa$-topologies on $\kappa^{\kappa}$ whose full topology is fully homeomorphic to ( $\kappa^{\kappa},\left\langle\tau_{b}\right\rangle_{\infty}$ ).

Proof. By Proposition 6.4.3, there are $\kappa$-many non- $\kappa$-bi-embeddable $\kappa$-topologies on $\kappa^{\kappa}$. Enumerate them as $\tau_{\lambda}$ for $\lambda \in \kappa$. Let $\left(\kappa^{\kappa}\right)_{\lambda}$ be a (distinct) copy of $\kappa^{\kappa}$ with the $\kappa$-topology $\tau_{\lambda}$. For each non-empty $A \subseteq \kappa$, let $X_{A}$ be the set $\bigsqcup_{\lambda \in A}\left(\kappa^{\kappa}\right)_{\lambda}$ together with the $\kappa$-topology $\tau_{A}$ generated by sets of the form $\bigsqcup_{\lambda \in \kappa} U_{\lambda}$ for $U_{\lambda} \kappa$ open (possibly empty or $\kappa^{\kappa}$ ) in $\left(\kappa^{\kappa}\right)_{\lambda}$. Then, $\left(X_{A}, \tau_{A}\right)$ contains each space $\left(\kappa^{\kappa}\right)_{\lambda}$ as a $\kappa$-clopen subspace. Since each $\left(\kappa^{\kappa}\right)_{\lambda}$ is $\kappa$-connected, then $\left\{\left(\kappa^{\kappa}\right)_{\lambda}: \lambda \in A\right\}$ are exactly the $\kappa$-connected components of $X_{A}$.

Suppose $h: X_{A} \rightarrow X_{B}$ is a $\kappa$-homeomorphism for some $A, B \subseteq \kappa$ such that $A \neq B$. Then, $h$ maps each $\kappa$-connected component of $\bigsqcup_{\lambda \in A}\left(\kappa^{\kappa}\right)_{\lambda}$ to some $\kappa$ connected component of $\bigsqcup_{\lambda \in B}\left(\kappa^{\kappa}\right)_{\lambda}$. Since $A \neq B$, we can find $\lambda \in(A \backslash B \cup B \backslash A)$. But then, $h$ gives a homeomorphism between $\left(\kappa^{\kappa}\right)_{\lambda}$ and some $\left(\kappa^{\kappa}\right)_{\mu}$ for $\mu \neq \lambda$, contradicting Proposition 6.4.3.

## Chapter 7

## What are generalisations and what are they for?

The essence of mathematics is that it consists of generalizations.
K. Gödel, quoted in H. Wang
[204, 9.2.14, page 300]

In this chapter, we provide a philosophical account of generalisation in mathematics. We attempt to answer the what and the why questions: firstly, what are generalisations? Secondly, why do mathematicians generalise at all?

We provide a philosophical explication of generalisation which answers the first question. To this end, we compare generalisation to other processes of change in mathematical practice. We then analyse syntacticist accounts of the nature of generalisations, which are inspired by the philosophical literature, and instead suggest an account based on the content of pieces of mathematics, which we call semanticism. Along the way, we provide a typology for generalisations that we have seen in Chapters 3 to 6, and from the mathematical literature more broadly.

In answering the second question, we assess whether certain traditional accounts of the motivation of mathematical change fit generalisations.

Our core conclusions are that 1) generalisation in mathematics is a sui generis process of mathematical change which cannot be reduced to other processes, 2) neither explantoriness nor simplicity is necessary for the success of a generalisation, and 3) a syntacticist account of the nature of generalisation is untenable, we must instead opt for a form of semanticism.

### 7.1 Introduction

When doing mathematics, there are times when mathematicians describe themselves as generalising other pieces of mathematics. Moreover, this mathematical

[^35]practice tracks some underlying phenomenon. We see this in its use:
"Measurability [of infinite cardinals] is a direct generalization of the existence of ultrafilters over $\omega$ " (Kanamori, [108, page 26])
"[Boolean-valued models] are a generalization of ordinary models in the sense that the truth-values are not 0 and $1 \ldots$, but are elements of a given complete Boolean algebra." (Jech, [104, page 55])
"The concept of continuous mapping is a generalization of that of realvalued continuous function." (Nagata, 164, Ex II.12])

These uses, and those of mathematical practice more broadly, show clear and consistent patterns. We list further examples in Section 7.2.2. These connect generalisation to, amongst other things, expansion, corresponding properties, and more sophisticated structures with certain commonalities. The broader usage, as illustrated by our examples, gives us good reason to believe that generalisation is a genuine unified phenomenon in mathematics.

Mathematical practice is dynamic, featuring a number of processes of change (see [86, 122, 211]), of which mathematical generalisation is one. These processes are the ways by which mathematics as a practice develops, changes shape, expands (and contracts), is organised, restructured, clarified, and so forth. Whilst some processes are about restructuring 'old' mathematics (e.g. formalisation), others, including generalisation, describe the processes of generating 'new' mathematics. ${ }^{2}$ We encounter these other processes of change later, as we distinguish generalisation from them (Section 7.3).

Why go to the trouble of giving an account of generalisations? Certainly, there is a broad benefit of philosophically clarifying more vague aspects of mathematical practice. To understand mathematical practice properly, we need an appropriate conceptual toolbox, and that conceptual toolbox must include some account of generalisation.

A more particular philosophical problem is the unity of generalisation. The natural pre-theoretic attempts to characterise mathematical generalisation do not capture its essence well. 'Increased generality' is insufficient: ZFC is more general than Pythagoras' theorem, but the former does not generalise the latter (cf. Sections 7.4 and 7.5.3). One appealing formalisation, to reduce generalisation to logical universal generalisation, is discussed and rebutted in Section 7.5.2. Meanwhile, Section 7.2 .2 shows the diversity of generalisations, with various kinds (which we call species) of pieces of mathematics being appropriate for generalisation, and for generalisation acting differently for pieces of mathematics of the same species. These discordances stand in tension to the fact that generalisation seemingly forms

[^36]a harmonious grouping of instances of mathematical change. What, then, underlies generalisations to unite them?

The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 7.2 contains a diverse collection of examples, the zoo, which we use throughout, and an initial taxonomy of generalisations. We then make some initial observations on the nature of generalisation. Next, in Section 7.3, we argue that generalisation is a sui generis process of mathematical change, by showing that it cannot be reduced to or identified with domain expansions (as some generalisations expand domains whilst others do not), and abstraction (as generalisations may occur at a fixed level of abstraction). Section 7.4 describes the purposes and goals of generalisation. We see that no standard single goal motivates generalisation, instead the motivation is a more nuanced competing collection of goals. Finally, in Section 7.5, we broach the nature of generalisations. We argue that syntacticist accounts of the nature of generalisation are untenable. We propose an alternative non-syntactic schema for accounts, skeletal semanticism. Our proposed instantiation explains generalisation as pieces of content hanging together in an appropriately similar way, where the level of generality simultaneously increases.

### 7.2 The zoo

In this section, we describe the inhabitants of our zoo of generalisations. We classify these generalisations into various non-metaphysical types, called species (Section 7.2.1). Using these species, we identify a necessary condition on accounts of the nature of generalisation, the Adequacy Condition. We also classify accounts of the nature of generalisation based on how they treat the species. In Section 7.2.2, we meet the residents of the zoo. These are the example generalisations we use throughout. Lastly, in Section 7.2.3, we describe some initial features of generalisation which the examples demonstrate.

### 7.2.1 The species, and first dimensions

Generalisation is a process of change of real mathematics, and in discussing it, it is useful to have a classification of the types of pieces of real mathematics. With their purposes elsewhere, philosophers of mathematics typically classify mathematics metaphysically, into something like objects, syntactic strings/expressions, and concepts. This seems unhelpfully narrow for the analysis of mathematical methodology and practice. We describe a more refined, naturalistic classification of pieces of mathematics, which we call the species. The species are not intended as metaphysical categories, but something more like functional types, a form of scaffolding of mathematics. We make no claim about whether these map onto ontological types. And so, the species:

1. objects ${ }^{3}$
2. concepts;
3. object-types (possibly accessed using syntactic definitions);
4. operations, relations, and functions;
5. axioms;
6. theorems;
7. proofs (including syntactic formal proofs);
8. structures (including syntactic theories); and
9. areas, fields, and sub-disciplines.

The list is not exhaustive (questions, conjectures, diagrammes, and proof techniques/procedures may be further species), but is sufficient for our purposes.

We can classify accounts of the nature of generalisations by whether they are species-by-species, i.e. explain generalisation for each species individually (e.g. 'this is how object-generalisation works, this is how axiom-generalisation works', and so on), or unified.

Concurrently, many different species are suitable for generalisation (see Section 7.2.2. ${ }^{1}$ We treat each species as equally essential for candidate accounts of generalisation to explain, which yields the following:

The Adequacy Condition: an account of the nature of generalisations in mathematics must explicate the nature of generalisations of each species which can be generalised.

### 7.2.2 Meet the residents

Now the residents. Each of the following varieties of generalisation exposes some features which any account of mathematical generalisation must explicate. We outline these features in Section 7.2.3,

## Numbers and functions

A classic source of generalisations are those of number. First, we have the generalisations of finite arithmetic to 1 ) infinite cardinal arithmetic, 2 ) infinite ordinal arithmetic, and 3) numerosities respectively (see 141).

[^37]Secondly, a classic sequence of generalisations is from $\mathbb{N}$ to $\mathbb{Z}$ to $\mathbb{Q}$ to $\mathbb{R}$, and finally to $\mathbb{C}$. These, the Cantorian generalisation of finite arithmetic, and the generalisation from arithmetical to arbitrary functions (Section 7.2.2), are the most discussed examples in the literature (e.g. [33, page 86], [81, page 96], [122, page 210]).

Another number generalisation is from $\mathbb{Z}$ to the object-type (or concept) ring (see Section 7.2.3).

A final numerical example is the generalisation from $\mathbb{R}$ to $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ (detailed in Section 2.2.3). For each suitable cardinal, $\kappa$, the ordered field $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ satisfies generalisations of many of the properties of $\mathbb{R}$. These generate a host of generalisations of theorems (e.g. Chapter 4). The generalisation of a topology (on $\mathbb{R}$ ) to a $\kappa$-topology (on $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ ) and its resultant generalisation of continuity, $\kappa$-continuity, is important to us (see Chapters 4 and 6). The form of several of the resultant theorem-generalisations follow a recognisable pattern (and perhaps are predictable, more on this in Section 7.5.2), e.g. IVT (detailed in Section 4.2.2):

IVT1. Every continuous function from $\mathbb{R}$ to $\mathbb{R}$ passes through all intermediate points.

IVT2. Every $\kappa$-continuous function from $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ to $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ passes through all intermediate points.

Meanwhile, other theorem generalisations have a less recognisable, unfamiliar pattern, which diverges in form, and may even be unexpected before the process of generalisation begins. Such a case is BWT (Section 4.3):

BWT1. Every bounded $\mathbb{R}$ sequence has a convergent subsequence.
BWT2. Every 'nicely bounded $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ sequence has a convergent subsequence if and only if $\kappa$ has the tree property.

In all generalisations, the classical case must be recoverable from the generalised case (see the Golden Rule, Section 7.2.3). This is satisfied for BWT2. $\aleph_{0}$ has the tree property, so we recover the classical case using a little additional information about the relevant cardinal in the right-hand side of the generalised case.

A further broad class consists of the generalisations of functions. Some generalisations of functions are basically similar to those of number, like when the set of functions from $\mathbb{N}$ to $\mathbb{N}$ is expanded to the set of integer functions. A notable example is from Riemann integration to Lebesgue integration. Here, the generalisation expands the domain of application on a function, but within a fixed source of entities, i.e. the set of Riemann-integrable real functions on a bounded interval is included in the set of Lebesgue-integrable real functions on a bounded interval, but all of these are from an original source, namely the real functions (see Section 7.5.2.

A very different kind of generalisation of function is that from the algebraic (or algebraic and trigonometric, and so on) functions to arbitrary functions, i.e. in ahistorical terms, from the constructive/model-theoretic to the set-theoretic. We return to this in Section 7.2.3,

[^38]
## Two theorem generalisations

Our next two examples are generalisations of theorems. We mentioned the iterative object-type generalisation from $\mathbb{N}$ to $\mathbb{Z}$ to $\mathbb{Q}$, and so on. Another example of iteration, for the species theorem, is the sequence of generalisations of BFPT (cf. Section 4.2.3). For our purposes, the classical and the most general case are:

BFPT1. If $C \subseteq \mathbb{R}$ is a non-empty closed bounded interval, and $f: C \rightarrow C$ is $\mathbb{R}$-continuous, then there is some $x \in C$ such that $f(x)=x$.

BFPT2. If $V$ is a Banach space, $C \subseteq V$ is non-empty, closed, and convex, and $f: C \rightarrow C$ is $V$-continuous with a compact image, then there is some $x \in C$ such that $f(x)=x$.

Intermediate generalisations extend the result from $\mathbb{R}$ to $\mathbb{R}^{2}, \mathbb{R}^{3}$, and $\mathbb{R}^{n} 84$, Chapter 0]. Recastings of this result are discussed in Section 7.5.2.

We also have what we might call assumption-dropping generalisations, where it is merely observed in a proof that a certain property is not necessary, e.g. generalisations of proofs for particular metric spaces to arbitrary metric spaces, like the following (essentially due to Fréchet [199]):

MS1. For any $n \in \mathbb{N}$, every Cauchy sequence in $\mathbb{R}^{n}$ has a limit.
MS2. For any complete metric space, $X$, every Cauchy sequence in $X$ has a limit.
This is a theorem generalisation, which goes via a proof generalisation: in the proof, it is observed that only the metric properties of $\mathbb{R}^{n}$ are necessary, and hence the same proof holds for any metric space, hence the name 'assumption-dropping'.

## Background assumptions and axiom elimination

Further generalisations turn on changing relevant (possibly implicit, possibly metatheoretic) assumptions and axioms. These can be split into two kinds, those where we weaken object-theory, and those where we weaken the background mathematical theory.

The generalisation from Euclidean to Bolyai's absolute geometry is an example of the first kind ${ }^{6}$ The generalisation permits spaces of arbitrary curvature, so includes Euclidean geometries and (properly) non-Euclidean geometries (see [41, $\S 8.3, \S 9.1]$, [81, page 104]). Here, the eliminated axiom (the Parallel Postulate) is in the target object-theory.

We see this more dramatically in mathematical logic, where the fine-grained control of theories is central. For any choice principle, P, where ZFP is strictly weaker than ZFC (i.e. a fragment, see Section 3.1), it is natural to say that ZFP generalises ZFC.

[^39]For an example turning on weakening the background mathematical theory, take real analysis as our object-theory. This might ordinarily be carried out using ZFC as the background theory. This can be generalised to real analysis with ZFP in the background (see [90, page 72], [116, Chapter 1]). Similarly, given a fixed definition, we can say that the object-kind consisting of the objects which satisfy this definition under ZFP generalises the object-kind consisting of the objects satisfying that same definition under ZFC, so e.g. the real functions of ZFP generalise the real functions of ZFC.

## Trivialities, Frankenstein, and gruesome disjunks

Our final major class of examples are the edge cases: it is not immediately clear whether these are generalisations, and establishing this is one of our concerns. The three classes are 1) the 'underly general' trivialities, 2) the 'overly general' trivialities, and 3) the deliberately constructed 'Frankenstein' disjunctions.

The 'underly general' trivialities are when the classical case is the candidate generalised case. Conversely, the 'overly general' trivialities go very far. One might say, in keeping with some broad mathematical goal of maximality, that generalisations ought to go 'as far as possible'. This leads quickly to worries of over-generalisation. For example, one might ask whether the theory consisting of just the axiom Extensionality generalises ZFC, or whether any theorem can be generalised to the Verum, $T$. We use these as test cases for accounts of generalisation, but note that the inclusion of candidate 'over-generalisations' as generalisations is not obviously fatal for an account.

The final puzzles are the Frankenstein examples. Frankensteins are most easily described for theorems: we move from theorem " $\varphi$ " to theorem " $\varphi \vee \psi$ ", for some mathematical $\psi$. So, Cantor's theorem, "For any set $X,|X|<|\mathscr{P}(X)|$ " is converted into "For any set $X,|X|<|\mathscr{P}(X)|$ or $2+2=4$ ". We call this junk disjunct a disjunk. Disjunks are reminiscent of gruesome properties in metaphysics (see 182 ). Frankensteins can also be constructed for other species, e.g. using junk axioms in a theory or junk lines in a proof. Intuitively, it seems these should not count as generalisations. We discuss these in Sections 7.3.1, 7.4, and 7.5.3.

## Odds and ends

Examples are not yet standardised in the scattered literature. For reasons of space, we cannot develop all the examples used therein to which we allude, but we include a list here:

1. Abelian groups are generalised to groups (see Section 7.3.2).
2. Continuity at a point in $\mathbb{R}$ is generalised to continuity over the whole of $\mathbb{R}$ (see Section 7.3.2 and [146, page 19]).
3. Metric continuity is generalised to topological continuity (see Sections 7.3, 7.5.2, and [202, page 15]).

### 7.2.3 Initial features

These examples easily yield some initial principal features of generalisation, which we describe here. We first state the relationality of generalisation. We show that generalisation-relation is non-injective, relative, and possibly anti-reflexive and non-transitive, in the senses we define. We also show that certain generalisations can be recast as different species, whilst generalisations may be species independent. We categorise generalisation as either intra-species or inter-species. In the subsequent sections, we investigate the more fundamental nature of generalisation. Any account of the nature of generalisation must dovetail with these initial features.

## Relationality and the Golden Rule

Generalisation is relational, relating the classical and the generalised case. A necessary condition is:

Golden Rule. If a piece of mathematics $G$ is a generalisation of a piece of mathematics $C$, then the classical case $C$ is suitably recoverable from the generalised case $G$.

The simpler requirement, that the classical case must be an example of the generalisation, is too strong. This is because a piece of mathematics may be generalised in various ways: in logical universal generalisation, the classical case is recovered by replacing a variable with a fixed parameter; in cases where a certain property becomes constitutive of a new notion [202, page 46], e.g. from $\mathbb{Z}$ to ring, the classical case instantiates the new notion. A notable case is the recovery of BWT1. from BWT2. where we need a little additional information to recover the classical theorem (Section 7.2.2).

If the term 'suitable methods of recovery' is sufficiently generous, then the Golden Rule is not sufficient: Pythagoras' theorem can be recovered from ZFC, but the former does not generalise the latter. Indeed, from any theorem, we can (classically) recover any other theorem using one's preferred background theory of mathematics! So, only certain recovery methods suffice, including instantiation, fixing variable parameters and notions, adding axioms to theories, adding properties to definitions or object-types, and the fulfilment of certain antecedents in (bi)conditionals.

## Order theory of the generalisation-relation

Next, we extract information about the generalisation-relation, i.e. the relation between the classical case and the generalised case.

Finite arithmetic can be generalised to cardinal, ordinal, and numerosity arithmetic. These generalisations do not form a single unified theory of arithmetic. Hence, one piece of mathematics might have several mutually incompatible generalisations, so the generalisation-relation is not injective (though incomparable generalisations might have a common further generalisation, as suggested in [83|).

The sequence of generalisations from $\mathbb{N}$ to $\mathbb{Z}$ to $\mathbb{Q}$ to $\mathbb{R}$ to $\mathbb{C}$ shows that generalisations are relative: a generalised piece of mathematics can, itself, be generalised. Hence also the terms 'the classical case' and 'the generalised case' are relative, e.g. $\mathbb{Z}$ plays both rôles.

Meanwhile, the generalisations from arithmetic to arbitrary functions show that some generalisations are (absolutely) maximal. It is natural to say that the most general notion of a function is just anything which takes an input to an output: anything more general stops being a function. The point is that no hypothesis is made, except for functionality (see [31, pages 390-393]).7 Hence, the arbitrary functions are the most general notion we could reasonably use, i.e. they cannot be reasonably generalised. This means that not every piece of mathematics stands in the (forwards) generalisation-relation to some other piece of mathematics.

Some cases of iterated generalisation seem transitive. For example, it seems reasonable to say that $\mathbb{Q}$ generalises $\mathbb{N}($ via $\mathbb{Z})$. But not all such two-step generalisations seem transitive. It is doubtful that the object-type ring is rightly called a generalisation of $\mathbb{N}($ via $\mathbb{Z})$. This suggests the generalisation-relation is not (always) transitive. We leave open whether generalisation of a fixed sort is transitive.

Finally amongst the order-theoretic properties, we can ask if the generalisationrelation is reflexive, i.e. does a piece of mathematics generalise itself? If so, then 'underly general' trivialities count as generalisations. One can easily imagine this being a consequence of a formal theory of generalisations. In Section 7.5.2 we describe and critique a simple account which classifies pieces of mathematics as generalisations based on syntax alone, a basic version being: if ' $F(c)$ ' is a theorem then a theorem ' $\forall x(x \in D \rightarrow F(x))$ ', for some domain $D$, is a generalisation. In which case one generalisation would be ' $\forall x(x \in\{c\} \rightarrow F(x))$ '; but this is semantically equivalent to ' $F(c)$ '. So, pieces of mathematics would generalise themselves. Alternatively, one might have an intuition that a generalisation is, by definition, non-trivial (e.g. Villeneuve's account, see Section 7.5.2). Either option seems palatable: one could capture the latter view from the former perspective as "non-identity generalisations", then recapture the latter view by considering "generalisations or the identity".

## Intra-Species, inter-Species, and function

We can characterise generalisations as being either intra-species or inter-species. Most, but not all, of our examples are naturally viewed as intra-species, for example the object-to-object generalisation from $\mathbb{N}$ to $\mathbb{Z}$. The generalisation from $\mathbb{Z}$ to a ring is instead inter-species: $\mathbb{Z}$ is an object, whilst ring is an object-typ ${ }^{8}$ (or concept).

One complication here is the possibility of generalising a species. We see this play out in the generalisation of function (Section 7.2.2). On one level, the gener-

[^40]alisation from arbitrary to abstract functions is similar to the previous examples; for particular domains, e.g. $\mathbb{R}$, the generalisation consists of a domain expansion $\{f: \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}: f$ is algebraic $\}$ to the set $\{f: \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}\}$. But it is more naturally phrased as a concept generalisation, especially within its historical context (see [31, 157, 186]). Rather than a domain expansion, the concept function itself is generalised, or perhaps replaced. One must tread cautiously here. However, for our purposes, this can be largely coded as concept or object-type generalisations.

## A first pass at revisionism

Next, we show that pieces of mathematics can be recast, i.e. one piece of mathematics can be captured in multiple ways, notably with different species. Recasting might be articulated in terms of the preservation of mathematical content (see Section 7.5.3), but for now, we rely on an intuitive understanding of the term. We also note that recasting does not mean that generalisations of one species always come hand-in-hand with generalisations of other species. Section 7.5.2 analyses recasting in more detail.

The example generalisations typically have an obvious representation, which in turn has an obvious species. But we can often recast this representation. A very simple recasting is from " $\varphi \wedge \psi$ " to " $\psi \wedge \varphi$ ". But recasting transcends rearranging clauses. Here are some possible phrasings of BFPT:

BFPT1. If $C \subseteq \mathbb{R}$ is a non-empty closed bounded interval, and $f: C \rightarrow C$ is $\mathbb{R}$-continuous, then there is some $x \in C$ such that $f(x)=x$; or
$\operatorname{BFPT1a.} \operatorname{BFPT}(\mathbb{R})$ (i.e. $\mathbb{R}$ has a certain property of fields); or
BFPT1b. $\mathbb{R} \in B F P T$ (i.e. $\mathbb{R}$ is in the class of Brouwer's-fixed-point spaces).
These different statements are suitably mathematically equivalent, so we say that they recast the same piece of mathematics. Propositional recasting may be a kind of propositional equivalence (as in passive sentence-active sentence propositional equivalence, [65, §3]). Non-sentential recasting follows the same lines. We also appear to have inter-species recasting of generalisations, e.g. cardinal arithmetic generalises finite arithmetic (a theory generalisation), cardinal numbers generalise natural numbers (an object generalisation), and facts about cardinal numbers generalise facts about finite numbers (theorem generalisations). These seemingly capture the same generalisation.

Recasting can be used to analyse accounts of the nature of generalisation. Suppose we can recast $A$ as $B$ using recasting $R$, and $B$ is an example of a generalisation. Is $A$ then a generalisation? Does it depend on the type of recasting, $R$ ? For now, we allow a little flexibility, but favour accounts of generalisation which explain generalisations more naturalistically, i.e. those which don't resort to substantial recasting.

Finally, we observe that recasting does not require that generalisations of one species always correspond to generalisations in the other species. Instead, some generalisations happen independently of whether there is a corresponding generalisation in some other species. We see this in descriptive set theory, where some
theorems have different proofs in ZF and ZFC (see [161, §7.F]). Here, the theorem is not generalised, only the proof is. So, we cannot recast every generalisation into any other species. The legitimate extent of recasting and revision is a major topic in Section 7.5 .

### 7.3 What generalisations could not be: A lone figure

We can classify mathematical change into several patterns. Some patterns have a more tractable characterisation than generalisation, a few may even be formalisable. For example, (set-theoretic) reduction is the process of providing a settheoretic Ersatz for each piece of mathematics which replicate all relevant properties. Reduction is clearly distinct from generalisation. For others, the demarcation is less clear; might generalisations be a variety of domain expansions? We reject this, and argue that generalisation is a sui generis process of mathematical change, which cannot be reduced to other processes. Some pieces of mathematics may instantiate two processes, e.g. a generalisation which is an abstraction. However, these are not generalisations in virtue of being abstractions, rather they exhibit properties which make them properly called generalisations and properly called abstractions. To justify this position, we argue that generalisation is either not coextensional or not cointentional with two close processes of change of mathematics: domain expansion and abstraction.

Besides reduction, many processes are obviously conceptually distinct from generalisation, e.g. concept formation and axiomatisations [122, page 194], 211, page 163], so can be safely ignored. Specialisation acts in the opposite direction to generalisation, so is distinct [170, page 104]). Nor can mathematical generalisation be simply the mathematical instantiation of natural scientific generalisation. ${ }^{-1}$ Refinement is only slightly more difficult. A very rough description of theorem generalisation is

1. some generalisations say the same about more than the classical case; and
2. other generalisations say less about more than the classical case.

Meanwhile, we can roughly characterise a refinement as saying more about the same. Any reasonable precisification of these glosses suffices to distinguish the two processes. So, they are not coextensive.

[^41]Distinguishing refinement from generalisation is a test case for how we distinguish generalisation from other processes. Next, we show that domain expansion and abstraction do not cover all kinds of generalisation. So, we deny Colyvan's Dichotomy (loosely based on [33, page 99]), which states that generalisation is exactly the combination of domain expansion and abstraction:

To generalise is to:
1.) extend a system, or
2.) abstract a similarity between systems.

Colyvan's Dichotomy

We conclude with a revision of Colyvan's Dichotomy (Section 7.3.3).

### 7.3.1 Domain expansion

We begin with domain expansion (see [23, 142] for details). Some instances of generalisations are apparently also instances of domain expansions [33, page 99], [201, page 410]. The generalisation from the spaces $\mathbb{R}^{n}$ to the complete metric space is one example: generalising from MS1. to MS2. can be interpreted as a domain expansion, from the domain of $\mathbb{R}^{n}$ spaces to the domain of complete metric spaces (more on this on page 166).

So, in an uninteresting way, some generalisations are also domain expansions. But should we think that generalisation is simply some form of domain expansion? Some writers seem to use the terms interchangeably (e.g. Bellomo's reading of Peacock [12, page 377]). We disagree. We sketch an argument in the literature which would appear to separate the two processes straightforwardly, but show that it does not succeed. Instead, we provide further examples which do distinguish the processes.

## Domain expansion does not include generalisation

Villeneuve proposes to separate domain expansion from generalisation with generalised concepts which are (exactly) coextensional with the classical concept they generalise [202, page 10]. His principal example is the generalisation from metric continuity to topological continuity [202, page 15]. These coincide on $\mathbb{R}$. So, the argument goes, it is a generalisation without a domain expansion. However, this misdescribes the situation, as the focus on $\mathbb{R}$ artificially restricts the notion of topological continuity. In reality, the intended domain of topological continuity properly extends the domain of metric continuity, to include functions on (nonmetrisable) topological spaces. Restricting to the domain of metric functions is like saying that 'amongst non-negative integers, the theory of the integers is coextensive with that of the natural numbers'. This coextensivity is only due to an artificial restriction on the domain.

However, there are generalisations which are not domain expansion. We focus on abstraction and those which lack an intended domain ${ }^{[1]}$

[^42]Some generalisations are abstractive, for example from $\mathbb{Z}$ to the object-type (or concept) ring. Whilst the domain of $\mathbb{Z}$ is the integers, ring does not have a domain in the same sense (the 'underlying set' will not do: object-kinds/concepts do not have domains in the same way). One might suggest the class of rings as the domain of ring, but this does not yield a domain expansion: individual integers are not rings! Instead, $\mathbb{Z}$ is an element of the domain of ring.

Other generalisations may not be equipped with a domain at all, perhaps including the generalisation from ZFC to ZFP of page 163. Viewing this as a domain expansion of the class of models of ZFC does not help, as it stretches our restrictions on revisionism (the natural description is a generalisation of axioms), and this class is sensitive to the meta-theory, apparently unlike the generalisation itself.

## Generalisation does not include domain expansion

Conversely, some domain expansions are not generalisations. We argue for the conceptual difference between domain expansion and generalisation, and hence find a non-generalisation domain expansion. ${ }^{[12}$

Let $P$ and $Q$ be pieces of mathematics, with contextually associated domains $D$ and $E$ respectively. Here are two forms of account of domain expansion:

1. The simple view: $Q$ is a domain expansion of $P$ if and only if $D \subsetneq E$.
2. The refined view: $Q$ is a domain expansion of $P$ if and only if $D \subsetneq E$ and $E$ is of the right kind, as determined by $D$.

With the simple view, work goes into establishing why certain domain expansions are fruitful [12, page 369]. A typical explanation is that certain domain expansions are valued as they "round off a domain and simplify its theory by adjoining elements" (Manders [142, page 554], see also [91, page 161], translated in [213, page 216]) but according to the simple view, this 'rounding off' is not necessary for being a domain expansion: domain expansion is simply to expand the domain, nothing more. Meanwhile, the refined view distinguishes domain expansion from plain domain inclusion, and may take the 'rounding off' to be constitutive

Distinguishing generalisation from domain expansion under the simple view is easy: we use the bruteness of domain expansion, compared with some aspect of preservation of content (or substance, material, see Section 7.5.3) in generalisation. So, we create a Frankenstein's theorem, using the fundamental theory of arithmetic ${ }^{[3]}$ Let $D:=\mathbb{N} \cup\{-1\}$.
similar argument can be given if viewing $\mathbb{R}$ and $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ axiomatically.) This gives $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ a distinctly different flavour to domain expansion, making $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ the $\kappa$-analogue of $\mathbb{R}$ (see Section 7.3.3).
${ }^{12}$ A radically revised predicate, like $Q_{\text {triv }}$ (page 183), artificially turns any generalisation into a domain expansion. But this is clearly unnatural and unintended.
${ }^{13}$ Alternatively, extend a continuous $f:(0,1) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ which is right-continuous at 1 to $\hat{f}:(0,1] \rightarrow$ $\mathbb{R}$ by setting $\hat{f}(1)=\lim _{x \rightarrow 1} f(x)$. Whilst $\operatorname{Dom}(f) \subsetneq \operatorname{Dom}(\hat{f}), f$ and $\hat{f}$ apparently have the same content (e.g. they are inter-definable), with no increase in the 'level of generality' (see Section 7.5.3.

1. Every $n \in \mathbb{N}$ has a prime factorisation.
2. Every $n \in D$ either has a prime factorisation or is -1 .

This is a domain expansion under the simple view: $\mathbb{N} \subsetneq D$. However, this does not seem to be a generalisation, as the disjunk is irrelevant to the classical theorem, nor does this generalise the nature of the natural numbers.

This may not suffice given the refined view of domain expansion; as one could argue that domain expansion also has a naturality constraint which this Frankenstein's theorem violates. Even then, we may have some examples of domain expansions which are precisifications/numerical refinements of theorems, which seem not to be generalisations (e.g. they do not increase the level of generality, see 7.5.3). One possibility concerns the proofs of fragments of Goldbach's conjecture. A Goldbach fragment is any result which specifies a domain $D \subseteq \mathbb{N} \backslash\{0,1,2\}$, and states that for all $n \in D, n$ is the sum of two primes. Some Goldbach fragments are simple theorems of number theory, e.g. when $D=\{2+p: p$ is prime $\}$. Others are numerical checks (at the time of writing, the lower bound is $D=\left\{n \in \mathbb{N}: n \leq 4 \times 10^{18}\right\}$, [169]). Improved Goldbach fragments are domain expansions (they expand the domain, and maintain naturality), but do not seem to be generalisations, for they are not more general, they are just (in some sense) more complete.

We conclude that we can distinguish domain expansion from generalisation in terms of extension and nature, and neither includes the other.

### 7.3.2 Abstraction

Can we also distinguish generalisation from abstraction? Some suggest that abstraction always involves generalisation [146, page 19], whilst others presuppose some unstated division between the two (e.g. [85, page 329], [138, page 39], possibly also (28|). We tow a middle path: generalisations are not a type of abstraction, but some generalisations are abstractions. We distinguish these processes via differences in nature, by arguing that there are generalisations which are at fixed level of abstraction which cannot be abstractions.

Like generalisation, abstraction is difficult to get a good handle on. The Aristotelian characterisation of abstraction is subtractive: we exclude some of the properties of a fixed class of mathematical individuals, and thereby access a wider class. But this is not a full articulation. Abstraction principles 60, 140 give some further insight, but cannot be the full story either (see [13, page 82] on the diversity of abstraction).

We first articulate a rough notion of a level of abstraction (as in 61, 149), and in turn an even rougher outline of abstractness. The latter is deliberately imprecise, to fit a more full development.

Mathematicians talk about pieces of mathematics being more or less abstract. This can be cashed out as a hierarchy of levels of abstractions. We hold that abstractions must, by definition, increase the level of abstraction. ${ }^{[14]}$ We then ar-

[^43]gue that, for any plausible cashing out of these levels of abstraction, there are generalisations which are at the same level of abstraction.

First, a clarification: abstractness is closely tied to the metaphysical abstractconcrete debate for objects. Multiple levels of metaphysical abstractness would be dismissed by the Fregean, who condones only two levels of abstraction, abstract and non-abstract. But this cannot be the full story: there is some sense in which pieces of mathematics are more or less abstract, independent of whether they are metaphysically abstract or concrete. For example, Marquis holds that group and Abelian group are at the same level of abstraction ([147, page 14], see [13, pages 101-104] or [203, page 5] for further examples). We have a new problem of abstractness:
(NPoA). How do we account for the intra-mathematical scale of abstractness which is applied to pieces of mathematics?

The division between generalisation and abstraction can be defended without a precise account of the levels of abstraction, i.e. without a precise response to the new problem of abstractness. For this, we look at generalisations which are candidates of having a constant level of abstraction, however these levels are precisified.

We give a first-pass articulation of abstractness in mathematics, with just enough detail for our purposes (e.g. to distinguish it from familiarity). This should account for the intuitive epistemological dimension of mathematical abstractness (see [146, page 2]), and the structural/ontological complexity dimension. We want to avoid simplistic logical notions of abstractness, such as 'adding quantifiers' (possibly Villeneuve's position, see [202, page 112]). These simplistic notions seem too distinguishing, e.g. given a background set theory where we often code repeated variables together (e.g. $\forall x \forall y F(x, y) \equiv \forall z F\left(\pi_{1}(z), \pi_{2}(z)\right)$, see [161, §1C.2]). We give the following gloss:

> 'mathematical abstractness' is a measure of the complexity (or the construction) of pieces of mathematics and the ease with which we can refer to such pieces.

Complexity could then be cashed out through set-theoretic methods including size, membership-chain length [149, page 39], or $V$ or L-rank. This only applies to objects, which is sufficient for our arguments, but could be naturally extended to apply to other species. We would need to ensure that all abstractions do increase abstraction as just characterised, but this seems possible.

With this rough gloss, we can identify generalisations with a fixed level of abstraction. Consider the classical case of 'continuity at $x \in \mathbb{R}$ ', and its generalisation is 'for every $x \in \mathbb{R}$, continuity at $x$ ' 146, page 19]. This additional universal quantifier doesn't add any complexity to the construction, nor does it add any complexity in reference, so the level of abstraction is fixed.

Conversely, might all abstractions be generalisations? Marquis tentatively suggests so [146, page 19]. One line of thought is to suggest that, unlike generalisation, there is an organisational variety (or possibly rôle) of abstraction [13, page 109]. But we leave this open.

### 7.3.3 Colyvan's Dichotomy redux

Colyvan's Dichotomy fails as it overgenerates (e.g. including all domain expansions). We conclude that mathematical generalisation is a sui generis process of mathematical change. Here, we revise Colyvan's Dichotomy to include two further flavours of generalisation, parametrised analogues, and weakened background theory generalisation.

A possible new flavour is parametrised analogue generalisation (for example Footnote 11, see [123, page 296] or 170 for more on analogy), e.g. the generalisations from $\mathbb{R}$ to $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$. One could recast this as an abstraction to a class-function, $\mathbb{R}_{(-)}$. But this revision seems unnatural, as the practice supports talk of (a particular) $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ as a fixed field which is the $\left(\kappa^{\text {th }}\right)$ generalisation of $\mathbb{R}$. However, as $\mathbb{R}$ embeds into $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ (Proposition 2.3.25), this generalisation might be viewed as a particularly regular form of domain expansion, so too for other parameter analogues like it ${ }^{[5]}$

The other additional flavour is generalisation by weakening background assumption (somewhat like [146, page 16]). We might use the generalisation from ZFC- to ZFP-real analysis to show this flavour is distinct. It is obviously not a straightforward domain expansion; each time, the intended domain is the reals. It also is not an abstraction, as the level of abstraction remains constant: the theories have exactly corresponding objects, properties, and connections. Finally, no parameter is overtly changed, and a hidden parameter recapturing seems revisionist ${ }^{16}$ This gives our new classification (Table 7.1), where we do not commit to all examples of each generalisation method necessarily being generalisations.

| Input-Output Species | Generalisation Method |
| :---: | :---: |
| intra-species | domain expansions |
| inter-species | abstraction |
| weakened background theories |  |
| parametrised analogues? |  |

Table 7.1: Colyvan's Dichotomy Redux

[^44]
### 7.4 Why bother?

> [T]o think that mathematics pursues generality for the sake of generality is to misunderstand the sound truth that a natural generalization simplifies by reducing the number of assumptions and by thus letting us understand certain aspects of the whole.
H. Weyl, 209, page 454]

Why do mathematicians generalise? We set aside possible sociological or psychological reasons, such as enjoyment or pressure to publish, and instead focus on the philosophical and methodological motivation. There is some background noise from the overarching methodological purposes of mathematics, e.g. to push results further, or to open the door to further results. Refinement pushes results further, but need not generalise. In this section, we provide an account of the particular purposes (or measures of success) for generalising.

We outline three proposed comprehensive motivations for generalising, generality, explanation, and simplicity. We argue that each fails to be comprehensive. Instead, we picture a range of competing goals of generalisation, which must be balanced, where no goal is in itself necessary and sufficient. We suggest that the proposal for generalisation as being explanation-oriented reveals that generalisation is unification-oriented. Finally, we mention the identification of new structures as contributing goal of generalising.

## Generality

It might be thought that mathematicians generalise for a single fundamental reason (with possible supervening secondary goals). Both explanation and simplicity have been suggested as comprehensive analyses of the reason mathematicians generalise [122, page 208], [123, page 297], 209, page 454]. Generality itself is a natural third candidate. Here, we argue that each of these suggested factors fails, that at best each contributes, but must be balanced against other motivations.

First, we show that generalisation is not for the purpose of generality alone. We begin by fleshing out the notion of generality.

We can approach generality as a motivation by first reviewing the literature on generality (see [30, 47]): generality may involve having many applications [29, page 61], or connecting large numbers of theorems [29, page 82]. Poincaré takes a high density of some fact holding to yield generality, and suggests that expressions with several quantifiers also suffices [30, page 16], [31, page 406], [177, page 200]. Similarly, generality is associated with high dimensionality [31, page 407], and with extending procedures [85]. These provide a range of ways of attaining generality (which may conflict [19, 123]), rather than identifying generality itself. Despite
this complication, these flesh out the intuition of what generality ought to mean.
With some grip on generality itself, can we say that mathematicians generalise solely in order to increase generality? Certain histories of mathematics have suggested so [28, [165, §1]. For example, the generality of $19^{\text {th }}$ century mathematics is considered successful, compared to the redundancy of the many special-case lemmas in ancient Greek geometry [165, page 33].

However, we claim that self-motivation is implausible. Firstly, motivating generalisation by generality just pushes the problem one level up: why do we value generality then? Moreover, generality alone seems insufficient. Following Weyl [209, page 454], generalisation is not 'for the sake of generality': "mathematicians ... have pointed out that generalization is not an end in itself; what is to be found is rather the right generalization or the interesting one" (Breger, [20, page 221]). This 'right degree' of generality prohibits generality alone from being a motivation: if it were so, then generalising past the right degree of generality would still be considered successful, which it is not (e.g. the overly general trivialities, Section 7.2 .

But we do not want generality to be the enemy of generalisation. Rather, Weyl's comments hint at diverse goals for generalisation, each of which contributes to motivating generalisation.

## Explanation and, from the ashes, unification

[G]eneralization [is] constantly pursued ... as the means to reach really satisfactory explanations which account for scattered individual results.
S. Feferman, 58, page 3]

Some mathematical goals are organisational: we want to structure the diverse and wide-ranging mass of, e.g. mathematical entities and facts. Explanation has been suggested as a comprehensive organisational motivation for generalisation. Generalisation, being relation, helps add connections amongst pieces of mathematics. These connections may help explain various classical cases, or may unify a number of classical cases together. Kitcher sees this as the core motivation to generalise: generalisations are successful when they explain (\|122, page 208], corroborated in [71, [81, page 204]), and they explain when they unify [121]. We argue that a common-or-garden understanding of explanation is not sufficient for a comprehensive motivation for generalisation, but suggest that unification is plausibly a contributing motivation, to be balanced amongst others.

Kitcher's notion of explanatoriness is quite specific, turning on the mere existence of a common explanatory pattern for multiple pieces of mathematics (see [121, §6]). But this is primarily a notion of unification, rather than about explanations proper. Instead, we focus on an ordinary, explanation-focused notion of explanitoriness. We don't rely on a fixed notion of explanatoriness, but a rough gloss is 'it encourages understanding in the subject'.

The problem is that successful generalisations need not explain the classical case, nor the classical cases explain the generalised case ${ }^{177}$ We see both of these in the following example. A key property for the generalised real analysis of $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa^{-}}$ sequences is interval witnessing (Section 4.3). This helps describe the underlying structure of convergence in $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$. However, interval witnessing doesn't help explain any behaviour in $\mathbb{R}$ : every $\mathbb{R}$-sequence is interval witnessed. It is simply invisible in $\mathbb{R}$. Interval witnessing holds in classical analysis, but is entirely unexplanatory there. It is only explanatory in the generalised setting, where it shows when an $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$-sequence behaves like any $\mathbb{R}$-sequences do (so might still be unifying). This generalisation is more difficult to understand, and introduces structure which is unnecessary for understanding the classical case. It even curtails explanation of the classical structure, where more illuminating tailored explanations are available. It simply muddies the waters ${ }^{18}$

Conversely, the classical case doesn't explain the generalised case: the invisible structure of interval witnessing means that the tailored explanation of the classical convergence does not explain the behaviour in the generalised case. The classical explanation is too blunt, it says that $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$-sequences do not exhibit the exact behaviour of $\mathbb{R}$-sequences, without explaining the similarities to when an $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$-sequence is interval witnessing.

So, the success here does not derive from explaining the classical case or explaining the generalised case. But this does point towards a more plausible contributing goal: unification. Despite their failure to explain, unifying generalisations can be very successful. More fruitful unifications unify behaviour so as to 'extract a mathematical core', rather than simply corralling disparate pieces of mathematics. While interval witnessing does not explain the behaviour of $\mathbb{R}$-sequences, it does unify the behaviour of $\mathbb{R}$-sequences with (some) $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$-sequences ${ }^{19}$

Still, unification does not seem to be a comprehensive explanation. Unification seems to work well in e.g. natural science, where one might aim to generalise theories of the four fundamental forces to a comprehensive unified theory. But this pattern does not fit all generalisations. When generalising from Euclidean to absolute geometry, we do not corral together some old pieces of mathematics, rather we locate or extract a form for new pieces of mathematics (i.e. isolate a new structure, see page 176).

[^45]
## Simplicity

> The advantages of generalization in geometry [are] to simplify theories and shed an intuitive light on them. $\begin{array}{r}\text { M. Chasles, [27, pages 209-210], } \\ \text { translated in [151, page 142], } \\ \text { emphasis original }\end{array}$

Explanation and unification are only partial accounts of the motivation to generalise. An intuitively plausible goal of generalisation is to simplify. It has been suggested that simplification is necessary for the success of certain processes of mathematical change. This is explicit by the late $18^{\text {th }}$ century [165, §1.2.3.], [186, page 319]. More recently, simplicity has been suggested as the marker for the success for domain expansion [91, 142]. It has also been claimed for generalisations [123, page 297], [209, page 454]. We dispute this: structures can become much less simple when we generalise, whilst still being successful. As with explanatoriness, we argue that the necessity of simplification is implausible, but it is plausibly a contributing goal to be balanced against others.

We continue with the generalisation from $\mathbb{R}$ to $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$. The theory and objects themselves are just more complex: there are more objects, with more bizarre properties, fewer regularities, and the objects and theory are less graspable (see Chapter (4). The constructions of $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ are more involved, and there are fewer equivalent constructions $\left(\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}\right.$ can be constructed as the Cauchy, but not the Dedekind, completion of $\left.\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}\right)$. Classical facts about generalised continuity no longer hold universally, with numerous pathologies due to order-theoretic gaps in the field. This goes beyond unfamiliarity with $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$. However simplicity is cashed out, the $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ fields are less simple than $\mathbb{R}$. Nor can we say, following Weyl (|209, page 454], cf. [71|), that generalisations simplify by reducing the number of assumptions: we move from using ZFC for analysis on $\mathbb{R}$ to ZFC with large cardinal assumptions for $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ (see Section 4.3 and Chapter 6). However, it is obvious that these generalisations are at least somewhat successful. So, generalisations need not be simplifying to be successful.

## Isolating new structures

We conclude with another (non-comprehensive) contributing motivation. A contemporary account of mathematics is as the analysis of structures, but this gives no guidance on which structures are significant or interesting. Generalisation provides a way to identify significant new structures, by grounding them in classical cases: if the classical case is significant, generalisation may preserve (some of) this significance. This is unlike unification and simplicity, which concern established mathematics. Meanwhile, some generalisations generate new structures. Consider the generalisation of $\mathbb{N}$ to $\mathbb{Z}$. One could describe this generalisation as a unification of objects (e.g. unifying $\mathbb{N}$ and $\mathbb{Z} \backslash \mathbb{N}$ ) or a unification of theorems about $\mathbb{N}$ (unifying various special-case theorems which implicitly use negative integer, e.g.
"if $n<m$, then $m-n+k=k-n+m$ "). But a natural description of the $\mathbb{N}$-to- $\mathbb{Z}$ generalisation is as a process which isolates a new object, and then 'start afresh' with our analysis of $\mathbb{Z}$. So too in the $\mathbb{R}$-to- $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ generalisation. Rather than unifying disparate pieces of pre-existing mathematics, it seems that some generalisations involve the recognition of a new object or theory based on the classical cases.

### 7.5 Nature: The thing itself

[G]eneralizing is much more than just picking constants and replacing them with variables.
J. Tappenden, 197, page 264]

Let's take stock. We've seen various generalisations of several species (Section 7.2.2). Section 7.2.3 gave us some grip on the process of generalisation. We've argued that generalisation is a sui generis process of mathematical change, with non-trivial interactions with other processes (Section 7.3). Lastly, we saw that generalisation has its own distinctive, competing goals (Section 7.4).

In the remainder of this chapter, we propose an account of what generalisations are. We have already classified accounts of generalisation as being species-by-species or unified (Section 7.2.1). We briefly sketch two further dimensions, formality and resource use (Section 7.5.1). We use these to describe two approaches to explaining the nature of generalisation, syntacticism and semanticism. In Section 7.5.2, we analyse the syntacticist programme, a family of accounts which propose to explicate generalisation in terms of relations of form, with a principal focus on syntactic patterns of pieces of mathematics in their everyday capturings in natural or formal language. This has appealing simplicity and predictability/algorithmicality, and would place generalisations amongst the nicely formalisable process of mathematical change. We argue that even the most refined version of syntacticism is unsustainable, due ultimately to syntactic variance or a risk of recoursing to a substantial use of semantic resources. Instead, in Section 7.5.3, we propose a semanticist account which avoids the problems of syntacticism, at the cost of less predictability and simplicity. We outline a schema of semanticist accounts, and propose a version based on content (broadly construed). In Section 7.5.4, we submit semanticism to ordeals corresponding to those faced by syntacticism, and show that semanticism ultimately fares better.

### 7.5.1 Dimensions redux: Resources and formality

First, we classify accounts of the nature of processes of mathematical change based on their use of resources, and on their formality. We begin with resources. Pieces of mathematics exhibit only two fundamental features which could be used to ground an account of the nature of generalisation. These are (1) their everyday form in natural or mathematical language, and (2) meaning/nature. We call the former the syntactic features, and the later the semantic features. We elaborate
our particular conceptions of each of these features as we go on. If not drawing uniformly on these resources, accounts are patchy and case-by-case, and so struggle to explain how generalisation is a unitary phenomenon.

We can also discern a scale of formality in accounts of processes of mathematical change. Some processes are amenable to formal accounts, e.g. the simple view of domain expansion, or Buzaglo's account of concept expansion from [23]. They give a formal framework that precisely describes the relevant process of change, ideally a mathematical or logical one. Formal accounts may employ substantial technical machinery (e.g. Buzaglo's uses model-theoretic embeddings). Meanwhile, informal accounts explicate a process without a formal framework, e.g. Wagner's account of abstraction as the "incomplete, underdetermined, intermittent and open-ended translation between systems of presentation" [203, page 3].

| Unification: | unified | species-by-species |
| ---: | :---: | :---: |
| Resource Use: | semantic | syntactic |
| Formality: | formal | informal |

Table 7.2: Dimensions of Accounts of the Nature of Generalisation

### 7.5.2 Syntacticism

Full formality is the gold standard in accounts of processes of mathematical change. The strongest formalisations allow us to construct an instance of mathematical change, but this is implausible for generalisation, where outputs may be unpredictable from the inputs (more on this later). Abandoning constructibility, a weaker account is that the classical and generalised case exhibit a fixed syntactic pattern, typically a similarity pattern. So, checking that a candidate is a genuine generalisation becomes formal and routine, principally consisting of checking a pattern of syntactic form of the ordinary capturing of a piece of mathematics, in either a natural or formal language. We call this syntacticism. We focus on syntacticism as it is a particularly simple representative of the syntax-focused approaches to generalisation and is implicit in the literature ${ }^{20}$

Syntacticism is the easy road to generalisation. We don't need to muck about with the semantic content of mathematics, or do too much hard work in classifying types of generalisation: it is a simple, possibly unified, even formalisable account. However, we contend, it cannot be sustained. Our strategy has four steps. We first outline a basic Ramsey syntacticism, which fails the Adequacy Condition. We refine this to a more encompassing translation syntacticism. We then raise a problem concerning the choice of defining properties, and detail two responses (Anything Goes and verificational translation syntacticism), both of which are unsatisfactory. Finally, we describe a broader methodological problem, which faces syntacticism of any stripe (syntactic variance). It is not clear whether any version can overcome this challenge. Hence, in Section 7.5.3, we pursue an alternative semanticist account.

[^46]
## Ramsey syntacticism

We start by refining logical generalisation to a basic syntacticist account, Ramsey syntacticism. Whilst not explicit in the literature, this basic account is the common core of Villeneuve's syntacticism below, and of a stock of simple, logical conceptions of mathematical generalisation. We show that it fails the Adequacy Condition.

The most basic version of syntacticism says that (theorem) generalisation is just the replacement of a fixed parameter with a variable in some piece of mathematics. This reduces mathematical generalisation to logical universal generalisation. Clearly, we also require truth (see [81, page 89]), and the possibility to restrict the new variable to some domain, $D$. Formally:
7.5.2.I. A piece of mathematics, $\forall x \in D(F(x))$, is a generalisation if and only if it is true and $F(c)$ is a classical piece of mathematics with $c \in D$, for a suitable domain, $D$.

In such cases, the pattern of syntactic form which 7.5.2.1. explicates is entirely clear. According to 7.5.2.1. given a classical piece of mathematics, checking a candidate generalisation has only three steps. The first concerns syntax only, where we check that the classical and generalised cases are of the form $F(c)$ and $\forall x \in D(F(x))$ respectively. The second and the last steps are non-syntactic, but do not depend on any connection between the classical and generalised case: we check that the generalised case is true, and check that $c \in D$.

However, many generalisations do not take this form required for 7.5.2.1., for example the BFPT generalisations (from $\mathbb{R}$ to $\mathbb{R}^{2}$, and so on). We could recast the $\mathbb{R}^{2}$-generalisation with the domain $D=\left\{\mathbb{R}, \mathbb{R}^{2}\right\}$, but the general solution is to refine 7.5.2.1. slightly:

RAMSEY. A piece of mathematics, $\forall x \in D(F(x))$, is a generalisation if and only if it is true and $F(c)$ or $\forall x \in D^{\prime}(F(x))$ is a classical piece of mathematics with either $c \in D$ or $D^{\prime} \subsetneq D$ respectively, for a suitable domain, $D$.

Let's call this Ramsey syntacticism (after [173|). Versions of it have been alluded to several times (e.g. [171, page 108] and, with more suspicion, [137, page 138] \& [146, page 19]). Like 7.5.2.I., Ramsey syntacticism has specific and isolated minor uses of semantic resources. Crucially, it does not require a semantic connection between the classical and generalised case: RAMSEY. has non-syntactic conditions, but these conditions do not turn on a non-syntactic relation between the classical and generalised pieces of mathematics; rather, they concern the connection between associated objects, domains, and a check of a truth condition.

Ramsey syntacticism is formal, syntactically-focused, and appealingly simple and procedural: it provides the candidate generalisations, then the mathematician's job is to check that $c \in D$ (or $D \subseteq D^{\prime}$ ) and the truth of the candidate generalised case. That's all there is to generalisation! Granted, there must be some care about the domain, $D]^{21}$ but Ramsey syntacticism makes generalisation considerably more algorithmic than might initially be thought.

[^47]It also has certain logicist merits, as it reduces a piece of mathematical methodology to (a mild elaboration of) a piece of logical methodology. This reduction is to be expected, if mathematics reduces to logic. More pragmatically, be we logicist or not, we need an account of logical methodology anyway, and Ramsey syntacticism gives us two for the price of one.

An involved example shows that Ramsey syntacticism undergenerates theorem generalisations ${ }^{[22}$ But the real deathknell is its failure of the Adequacy Condition: it is mute on non-theorem generalisations (as observed in [146, page 19]). So, we next outline a more adequate version of syntacticism. Then we describe the critical problem for all versions of syntacticism: the Scylla and Charybdis of overgeneration and substantial appeals to semantics.

## Translation syntacticism

General objects and general methods appear to be, in [Chasles'] eyes, two sides of the same coin
K. Chemla, 29, page 58]

Ramsey syntacticism contains a seed of hope. Many non-propositional generalisations can be recaptured using recastings which are suitable for explication via RAMSEY. Easy cases are proofs, theories, and definitions. An example of such an account is Villeneuve's, which ultimately derives from parameter replacement:
"[logical universal generalisation] only applies to statements and, because our considerations are mathematical notions, we will develop the extended logical generalization process which will be characterized by a fixed-variable relation between the initial notion and the new notion." [202, page iv].

[^48]EVT1. Every continuous function from a closed bounded interval $I \subseteq \mathbb{R}$ to $\mathbb{R}$ attains its extrema.
EVT2. Every continuous function from a closed bounded interval $I \subseteq \mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ to $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ attains its extrema.
From EVT1. Ramsey syntacticism predicts EVT2. But EVT2. is false. A cunning recasting of EVT1. provides a fix: we also vary the notion of continuity: let $\tau_{\alpha_{0}}^{\prime}$ be the ordinary topology, $\tau_{\kappa}^{\prime}$ be the $\kappa$-topology, $\aleph_{0}$-schmontinuity be continuity, and $\kappa$-schmontinuity be $\kappa$-supercontinuity:

EVT3. Every $\aleph_{0}$-schmontinuous function on a $\tau^{\prime}\left(\aleph_{0}\right)$-closed bounded interval $I \subseteq \mathbb{R}\left(\aleph_{0}\right)$ attains its extrema.

EVT4. Every $\kappa$-schmontinuous function on a $\tau^{\prime}(\kappa)$-closed bounded interval $I \subseteq \mathbb{R}(\kappa)$ attains its extrema.

But this fix is wildly ad hoc: we must replace continuity with a function which haphazardly assigns notions of continuity based on the cardinal. This is gruesome to the extreme! It simply has no grounding in generalised real analysis (see Chapter 4 for details).

Taken literally, this fails the Adequacy Condition, as it is intentionally an account of notion (i.e. concepts) generalisation. But he gestures towards the wider project of capturing generalisations of various species through other species:
"definitions of notions, theorems, examples, proofs, etc. ... will be formalised by formulas ... [which] will not be not so different, from the point of view of the study of generalisation processes, to the formalisation of natural language." [202, page 57]. ${ }^{23}$

Let's take a (non-sentential!) generalisation to see this in action. Consider the following object-type in the variable $r$, which we capture using an open formula, and its generalisation:

OBJT1. $r \in \mathbb{R}$
OBJT2. $r \in \mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$
For generosity, let $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ be a parametrised version of $\mathbb{R}$, i.e. we have a class function $\mathbb{R}(-)$, where $\mathbb{R}(\kappa):=\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ (cf. Section 7.3.3). Let $\operatorname{Def}(x, k)$ mean that $x$ is defined to be of kind $k$, and Card be the class of cardinals. Then we recapture OB.JT1 with a sentential definition:

DEFR3. $\forall r\left(\operatorname{Def}\left(r,\left(\aleph_{0}-\right)\right.\right.$ real number $\left.) \leftrightarrow r \in \mathbb{R}\left(\aleph_{0}\right)\right)$
A RAMSEY. generalisation, essentially universal generalisation of an open formula, yields the new definition:

DEFR4. $\forall \kappa \in \operatorname{Card} \forall r(\operatorname{Def}(r, \kappa$-real number $) \leftrightarrow r \in \mathbb{R}(\kappa))$
The generalisation here is spot on. This approach could apply to several species, so is not immediately stumped by the Adequacy Condition. It is best understood translationally: we translate pieces of mathematics into a fixed species, so that generalisation always happens via this species ${ }^{24]}$ For example, the generalisation from Euclidean to absolute geometry could be captured with object-types, from a Euclidean space to an absolute space. This object-type is then translated into a (definitional) sentence, and the dance continues. Such translation is not very radical: it's ubiquitous in mathematics anyway (see Section 7.2.3). This approach could go via any 'fundamentally' generalisation-appropriate species, but the obvious candidate is the theorem. Non-sentential pieces of mathematics are translated into sentential pieces, generalised by RAMSEY. and then untranslated. Let's call this translation syntacticism.

[^49]
## Subduing translation syntacticism: Diversity and defining properties

In the next two sections, we show that translation syntacticism has an unenviable dilemma, either being disunited, or the need to appeal substantially to semantic resources. The underlying tension is between the need for a unified account, and the syntactic diversity of generalisations. We state this as two demands:
Demand 1. (Unity) Generalisations must be explained by one/few permissible syntactic patterns (for generalisation is a unitary phenomenon).

Demand 2. (Diversity) Ill-fitting pieces of mathematics must be captured/recast into a form which fits these patterns, using without resorting to substantial uses of semantic resources.

Translation syntacticism fairs well on Demand 1., by building an account of generalisation out of syntactic patterns for a single species. They must then specify what kind of capturings/recastings are permissible, i.e. how much flexibility is required to satisfy Demand 2. We argue that this is difficult to give a sustainable specification.

To gain traction, we consider object generalisation. Here, the syntacticist must describe the object with a syntactic expression. The choice of a defining property is non-trivial (see 197, page 268]). The syntacticist ideal would be a syntacticallydetermined choice of the 'correct' property, but it is quite clear that there is not even a naturalistic method of choice, let alone a syntactic method. Unpredictable analogues are notably difficult; for example, to make DEFR3. suitable for generalisation, we had to recast it using a predicate $\mathbb{R}(-)$ (not the object $\left.\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}\right)$. This is not predicted from the initial object-type string in OBJT1., it was post-rationalised. In general, it need not be clear what the right formulation of the classical case should be so that we can apply RAMSEY. (Chapter 4 and Footnote 22 contain further examples). We simply cannot always predict the right syntactic form in advance. So, the question becomes: how can the translation syntacticist choose the 'correct' properties at all?

## Defining properties via Anything Goes or verificational translation syntacticism

In this section, we consider two possible answers. One is to allow any property (Anything Goes), the other is to verify retrospectively (verificational translation syntacticism). We argue that the former fatally over-generates, whilst is doomed to succeed: it must be true, but is uninformative about the nature of generalisations. In the next section, we describe the challenge for the syntacticist to find a nonverificational solution to the property-choice problem, without employing semantic resources.

Suppose that the syntacticist says 'Anything Goes!': generalisation can be based on any property, i.e. any application of RAMSEY. to any mathematical statement constitutes a generalisation. We claim that this over-generates. Sometimes, we seem to have a unique correct generalisation (perhaps the infinite cardinals, see [140, page 147], cf. real definitions [197, 198], and unique concept expansion [23, chapter 7], [204, 7.3.3]). We also need to block contingent or accidental
properties (as in [17, page 483], [29], [81, page 82]), on pains of triviality. Here's an example: let $D_{1}(x)$ and $D_{2}(x)$ define objects $O_{1}$ and $O_{2}$ respectively. We introduce a new definition, $P_{\text {triv }}(-)(-)$, like so:

1. $P_{\text {triv }}(1)(x) \leftrightarrow D_{1}(x)$, and
2. $\left(\forall i \in\{1,2\} P_{\text {triv }}(x)\right) \leftrightarrow D_{2}(x)$.

According to Ramsey syntacticism, $\forall i \in\{1,2\} P_{\text {triv }}(i)(x)$ generalises $P_{\text {triv }}(1)(x)$. So, by Anything Goes, any defined object generalises any other. This is clearly unintended. In generalising, we have only certain properties in mind $\sqrt{25}$ blocking Anything Goes.

Instead, there must be a non-trivial choice of property. One option is to give up on predicting suitable properties, and instead verify retrospectively, saying "Yes, we did not know beforehand what generalisation-appropriate form of OBJT1. is, but in hindsight, there is a recapturing of OBJT1. in so that OBJT2. conforms to RAMSEY.' We have encountered several mildly verificational revisions (e.g. the class function $\mathbb{R}(-)$ in DEFR3., or Footnote 22). Villeneuve hints at it too, e.g. a generalisation is conservative if "it is possible to explain the translation from $N$ to $N^{\prime}$ using a using a fixed-variable" ([202, page 78], emphasis added). Taking the 'possibility' seriously means any redescription, even an unpredictable one, is a candidate $\sqrt{26}$ if descriptions $D$ and $D^{\prime}$ corefer, assuming a background theory of mathematics, then we can replace $D$ with $D^{\prime}$ for the purposes of checking a known generalisation. We call this verificational translation syntacticism $\sqrt{27}$

Let's see verificational translation syntacticism in action. Villeneuve claims that it is impossible to recover sequential continuity from topological continuity (pace topological nets, $[56, \S 1.6]$ ). But a suitable choice of definition makes this recovery easy: we simply declare that sequential continuity means 'topological continuity with the metric topology'. Then this is a logical universal generalisation, so Villeneuve's problem evaporates.

However, this flexibility spells the undoing of verificational translation syntacticism: triviality. The setup resembles $P_{\text {triv }}$. Let $C$ be a theorem, and $G$ be its generalisation (elaborations to other species are also possible). We define a new predicate $Q_{\text {triv }}(-)$ so that $Q_{\text {triv }}(1) \leftrightarrow C$ and $\left(\forall x \in\{1,2\} Q_{\text {triv }}(x)\right) \leftrightarrow G$. Hence we can phrase $C$ and $G$ as, respectively:

TRIV1. $Q_{\text {triv }}(1)$
TRIV2. $\forall x \in\{1,2\} Q_{\text {triv }}(x)$

[^50]Applying RAMSEY. to TRIV1. generates TRIV2. So, any candidate generalisation can be put in the form for verificational translation syntacticism, making the account true. But the selfsame examples show that verificational translation syntacticism is uninformative about the nature of generalisation: generalisation remains unexplicated.

## Syntactic variance

Translation syntacticism struggled with Demand 2. (Diversity), in the choice of defining properties for objects. We now give a methodological problem with syntacticism of any stripe, by pushing on Demand 1. (Unity), arguing that generalisations exhibit sufficiently strong syntactic variance to undermine any version of syntacticism. We outline a last-resort syntacticism, to specify a non-trivial canonical form, and present a significant challenge for this account.

There are both inter-generalisation and (our focus) intra-generalisation cases of syntactic variance. In the former, for a fixed species, the syntactic form of the classical case-generalisation pair can vary wildly between different generalisations:

PAVA1. An algebra, $\tau$, is topology if it is closed under $|\tau|$-sized unions and finite intersections.

PAVA2. An algebra, $\tau$, is $\kappa$-topology if it is closed under $\kappa$-sized unions and finite intersections.

DOEX1. The integers, $\mathbb{Z}$, are formed by closing $\mathbb{N}$ under negation.
DOEX2. The rationals, $\mathbb{Q}$, are formed by closing $\mathbb{Z}$ under division.
Each pair exhibits a different similarity pattern. The first pair is ideal for RAMSEY. with a constant that can be varied. The second pair requires substantial work: DOEX2. replaces both a constant $(\mathbb{N}$ to $\mathbb{Z})$ and a predicate (--closure to $\div$-closure). Even if a RAMSEY. appropriate revision is possible, it is more natural to say that this is simply a different pattern of similarity.

So, each species may have numerous possible axes of similarity between the generalised and classical case. To ensure unity between these axes, the syntacticist could appeal to a meta-similarity: whilst the two pairs do not share a pattern, the two patterns themselves somehow instantiate some further, more fundamental notion of similarity.

But meta-similarity is undone by intra-generalisation variance. Here, within a generalisation, the classical and generalised cases have radically different syntactic (natural) forms. Unpredictable analogies are particularly troubling. For example, the syntax of BWT1. and of BWT2. are radically different. Any syntactically similar analogue of BWT1. entirely misses the right-hand side of the generalisation!

Intra-generalisation syntactic variance is even worse for theories. Compare ZFP and ZFC. For some $P$, we can tell a clear syntactic story for the generalisation, e.g. $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}$ (see Section 3.1). But other P have wildly divergent syntax to AC , and
are not known to be $Z F$-equivalent to some $\mathrm{P}^{\prime}$ with a suitable syntactic relation to $A C \cdot{ }^{28}$ This comes out fiercely when P is about sets (and nothing else) e.g.:
$P_{31}$. The union of a countable set of countable sets is countable [95, Form 31].
As $P_{31}$ is syntactically unrelated to $A C$, the syntax of axiomatisations provides no evidence to think that $Z F+P_{31}$ generalises ZFC, and so the syntacticist must conclude that it does not. Yet $Z F+P_{31}$ generalises $Z F C$ (for $P_{31}$ is a proper fragment of $A C$ )!

To avoid the substantial use of semantic resources, the syntacticist must give an account in terms of a kind of unsystematic family resemblance of many syntactic patterns, where sometimes the pattern is not syntactic similarity, which includes the $Z F C$ to $Z F+P_{31}$ generalisation. What powers this family resemblance? One could be a syntacticist about generalisations themselves, with a semantic account of the family resemblance, e.g. use (i.e. the patterns are related for such-and-such a semantic reason). But this is semanticism par excellence. Semantics would then explicate the nature of generalisation, with the syntax being a non-explanatory artefact. Instead, syntacticism, properly so-called, should give an account of this family resemblance which turns on patterns of syntactic similarity, for which there is no clear candidate ${ }^{29}$

As a final roll of the dice, the syntacticist could revert to an account of syntactic similarity, with an additional claim that there is a non-arbitrary canonical recasting of any piece of mathematics into a form which is appropriate for syntactism. Some canonicity may be possible (e.g. the canonical derivation for proofs, see [64, §3], [208|). But, in general, it is unclear what this canonical form should be. Recasting $A C$ and $P_{31}$ so that they are syntactically similar (via 95, Form 1C]) apparently uses resources substantially outstripping the syntax of axiomatisation (as in Footnote 29), for example sneaking in a substantial use of semantic resources by using model-theoretic properties. Similarly, enriching syntax itself enough to have non-arbitrary canonical translations 'built in' just imports semantics into the syntax (i.e. semantic pollution, cf. $[174 \mid$ ). Specifying the canonical form is a significant challenge for the syntacticist.

Refinements of Ramsey syntacticism either cannot be sustained, or face the challenge of syntactically specifying a canonical form. And so the bell tolls for syntacticism. Syntax is clearly a useful indicator, which is practically helpful for

[^51]$P_{8 E}$. In a metric space, every sequentially continuous real-valued function is continuous.
As $P_{8 E}$ is $Z F$-equivalent to $A C_{\omega}$, thanks to substantial mathematical work (see 95), there is a (pseudo-)syntactic story about why $Z F+P_{8 E}$ generalises $Z F C$, via $Z F+A C_{\omega}$ (only 'pseudo' as it is via model-theoretic equivalence, an apparently semantic notion). But this story is back-to-front! We knew that $Z F+P_{8 E}$ generalised ZFC before showing that $P_{8 E}$ was $Z F$-equivalent to $A C_{\omega}$ : being a generalisation only depends on $\mathrm{P}_{8 \mathrm{E}}$ being a weak choice principle.
${ }^{29}$ The syntacticist might point to the proof theory: everything which can be derived from ZF $+P_{31}$ can be derived from ZFC, but not vice-versa. But this certainly goes beyond syntacticism, which concern the similarities of the syntactic forms of the axiomatisations, rather the substantially theoretically richer comparison of deductive power or deductive closures (see Footnote 20.
recognising and suggesting generalisations. But to provide an account of their nature, we pursue a different approach: semantics.

### 7.5.3 Semanticism

## Before one can generalise..., there

 must be a mathematical substanceH. Weyl, quoted in [210, page 171]

The resource dimension of accounts of generalisation maps out two systematic paths: accounts based on on a syntactic connection between the generalised and classical cases, and accounts which based on semantics connections. We have discussed syntactic approaches based on the similarity of syntactic form. Such accounts faced significant challenges in avoiding substantial uses of semantic resources. An alternative is to base an account on semantic resources themselves. 'Semantic resources' here is necessarily broad, for example BFPT and its generalisations share some clear similarity in meaning, whilst $\mathbb{R}$ and $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ are similar in nature. We describe how semantic resources are best understood, focusing on the semantic value of pieces of mathematics. Based on this, we suggest a schema, skeletal semanticism, for accounts of generalisations:

SkelSem. A piece of mathematics, $G$, is a generalisation of a piece of mathematics, $C$, if and only if the semantic value of $C$ and $G$ are suitably related.

SkelSem. itself is obviously simple-minded, and 'suitably related' is too permissive. We do not recommend this as an account; instead, it must be precisified into more plausible candidates by providing appropriate interpretations of semantic value and a suitable relation.

We suggest that some notions of semantic value are not optimal to flesh this out. Of the remaining, we focus on content as a possible candidate semantic value. We give some restrictions on the suitability of a notion of content for our purposes, which excludes certain off-the-shelf notions of content, but do not commit to any particular notion of content. We then suggest that the suitable relation of content should increase the level of generality whilst also preserving content (possibly in the sense of pieces hanging together similarly). We defend the resulting informal account against revenge problems inherited from the syntacticist (Section 7.5.4), and provide some practical examples of how semanticism explicates generalisations.

## A proposal: Content

Semanticism depends on a suitable relationship between the semantic values of the classical and generalised cases. So, we must clarify the notion of semantic value, and the suitable relationship. Here we focus on the semantic value. This presents a difficulty. We intend for semantic value to apply to all species of pieces of mathematics. We can think of semantic value in the ordinary way for, say, theorems (picking out, e.g., what a theorem says). For other species, semantic
value must be different. For objects, this broad sense of semantic value is intended to pick out something like the nature of the object.

Some species present easy insights into how a notion of semantic value should work. The theorems " $\varphi \wedge \psi$ " and " $\psi \wedge \varphi$ " should have the same value, which should be built from the values of the theorems " $\varphi$ " and " $\psi$ " in a suitable way (for more on this, see [15, §4.6]). The semantic value of some species (e.g. theorems, theories, and proofs) is plausibly covered by a single broad notion of semantic value, perhaps an elaboration of propositional content. The challenge is how to use propositional meaning to account for the semantic value of objects (see Section 7.5.4).

Several notions of semantic value, including material, substance, and content, all seem to have the requisite breadth We tentatively suggest basing our account on content, as it is a little more tractable; next, we place constraints on accounts of that content suit our purposes.

## Two constraints: Hyperintensionality and agent-dependency

We propose to flesh out the skeleton of semanticism with content. We do not intend to give an account of mathematical content (some options can be found in 94 , page 7]). Instead, we give two restrictions for a notion of content, which excludes certain off-the-shelf accounts: suitable hyperintensionality, and a preference for agent-independence.

We intend content to be a broad semantic feature of pieces of mathematics from various species, including theorems and objects. Theorem content should be close to propositional content, and object content should be close to nature. We focus on formal accounts of theorem-content, with the hope that these might form the heart of an account of cross-species content.

The content of a theorem should capture 'what the theorem says about how the mathematical world is', and so pieces of mathematics with the same content should be inter-replaceable in a mathematical argument. So, our notion of content must be hyperintensional (for details, see [120, §2]). However, content cannot be too hyperintensional. In Sections 7.2 .2 and 7.2 .3 we had:

BFPT1. If $C \subseteq \mathbb{R}$ is a non-empty closed bounded interval, and $f: C \rightarrow C$ is $\mathbb{R}$-continuous, then there is some $x \in C$ such that $f(x)=x$; and

BFPT1a. BFPT(R).
We take it that these have the same content. However, they have different components, one talks of functions on subspaces of a topological space, and properties of that function, the other concerns a property of topological spaces only. 'Very structured' versions of structured content come perilously close to syntax (see

[^52][119]), so would distinguish BFPT1. from BFPT1a. on the basis of their different components. This is too distinguishing. Instead, an appropriate notion of content must identify e.g. passive and active constructions (à la Frege [65, §3]), different subject-verb-object orderings (cf. [119, page 1360]), and the exemplar BFPT1.to-BFPT1a.-like recapturings. Standard notions of structured propositional content (see [120, §3.1]) may suffer here. But they contain the kernel of a notion, as the 'pieces' of a proposition seemingly do help constitute the content. We return to this later in this section with the image of the pieces hanging together.

We also suggest that content should be agent-independent. Agent-dependent accounts of content [10, page 89], [43, page 13] naturally lead to an agent-dependent version of semanticism, i.e. whether a candidate is really a generalisation is agentdependent. Agent-independent notions of content are preferable for semanticism, as they block problematic coded content (see Section 7.5.4) ${ }^{31}$ by substantiating the intuition that coding and translating artificially interpret some unintended content from the intended content of some mathematics (as in the purely arithmetical content of 101). The explication is agent-dependency: the agent artificially 'sees' the unintended coded content in the intended content, using the coding. Blocking coding blocks this problem.

## Flesh on the skeleton

In this section, we develop a candidate precisification of SkelSem. The account is informal, unified, and semantic. Our characterisations of the nature of generalisation turn on preservation or suitable relationships of content using a scale of generality, and a picture of pieces hanging together.

Two things happen in any generalisation: (1) something is preserved, and (2) something is changed. More refined versions of syntacticism propose to explain both parts at once: something is preserved (the syntactic pattern), whilst something is changed in that the generalisation is (somehow) strictly stronger. The semanticist must also specify which changes and preservations are adequate.

The semanticist must track whether something has changed in the appropriate way. Changing "The sum of the degrees in a triangle is $180^{\circ}$." to "La somme des degrés des angles d'un triangle est $180^{\circ}$." won't do. These two sentences have the same level of generality (cf. levels of abstraction, Section 7.3.2). It's fairly clear that any naturalistic cashing out of levels of generality suffices: some statements are just more general than others.

Generalisations must increase the level of generality. But increasing the level of generality need not automatically yield a generalisation, as nothing needs to be preserved. For example, the object 'the right-angle triangle with sides of length $3,4,5$ ' is of a lower generality than ZFC. But these do not constitute a generalisation: there is nothing linking the two cases. Instead, we require a connection in the content between the cases for them to constitute a generalisation. The hard

[^53]problem is: what is the required relationship between the content of the candidate generalised and classical case? ${ }^{32}$

The suitable relationship must be not too loose (to avoid the triangle-ZFC example), and not too strict (otherwise the classical and generalised cases would have exactly the same content). The problem cases from Section 7.2 .2 help us gain traction. The Frankenstein examples seem to violate the required suitable relationship. But we can't just ban case distinction altogether (à la [118, page 12]), as disjunction can be mathematically natural 196, 197. A semanticist explanation is that Frankensteins lack a relation of content. This could be understood as a claim about common patterns (and common pieces): if " $\varphi \vee \psi$ " is to generalise " $\varphi$ ", then the contents of " $\varphi$ " and " $\psi$ " must exhibit some common semantic pattern ${ }^{33}$

We claim that this common pattern can be explained with the image of pieces hanging together.Precisifying SkelSem. we get:

ConSem. A piece of mathematics, $G$, is a generalisation of a piece of mathematics, $C$, if and only if $G$ is of a higher level of generality than $G$, and $T$ and $S$, the content of $C$ and $G$ respectively, must hang together suitably similarly.

This picture is somewhat like structured propositional content, in that certain pieces (concepts, objects, etc.) are associated (or even constitutive) of the content. We call a number of pieces hanging together in a certain way a fabric of pieces. The picture we wish to develop is one where different fabrics exhibit similar (or the same) pattern. For some traction consider the ordinary mental visualisation of a mathematical structure. The picture of pieces hanging together, fabric, and so in, is exemplified in the ordinary way in such a mathematical structure: the objects and relations of a structure are pieces, as are substructures, and so on. In this case, the patterns that the pieces exhibit in a structure can be described through theorems, but the notion of a pattern is intended to be more inclusive (and less formal). For example, we can also think of pieces hanging in a certain way in an object-type, with a gap in the fabric for an object to fill. For the purposes of giving a semantic account of generalisation, there are various ways that some fabrics of pieces hanging together could be suitably similar. These include the following.

1. The fabric of a theorem is clearly sufficiently close to the fabric of a definition obtained from that theorem by removing one piece (i.e. definition by abstraction, Section 7.2.3).
2. A zoomed in subpattern is sufficiently close to a zoomed out pattern of which it is a subpattern.

[^54]3. Fabrics with different pieces but the same pattern of pieces (à la homeomorphism) are sufficiently close.

Notably, the first way is inter-species. As an example, take the generalisation of EVT from $\mathbb{R}$ to $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$. It is very natural to say that the pieces hang together in the same way here, but some pieces are replaced by analogous pieces (e.g. continuity with $\kappa$-supercontinuity). Note that this is not simply a similarity of syntactic form, it is rather a similarity between the respective relationships between objects, domains, concepts, and so forth. This need not be the semantic 'version' of generalisations by variable replacement: the same image seems to work for abstraction. For example, the way various pieces hang together in $\mathbb{Z}$ is also the way the pieces hang together in ring, except before where $\mathbb{Z}$ occupies a position in this image of pieces hanging together, now that position is unoccupied to represent a definition of a new object-type. Meanwhile, in a Frankenstein, the pieces need not hang together at all similarly, violating the suitability relation.

This version of semanticism is clearly informal. But it does not prohibit formalisation. Compare this to logical entailment, which one might characterise thusly: "A conclusion $c$ follows from premises $P$ if and only if any case in which each premise in $P$ is true is also a case in which $c$ is true" (Beall and Restall, [11, (V), page 2]). This permits a rich discussion about what cases are: classical models, states in Kripke model, situations for relevance logic, and so forth. By substituting formal components, ConSem. might be formalised. For example, a (non-causative) truthmaker articulation of content might be suitable (see (11), perhaps cashed out in terms of some kind of mathematical events semantics.

Keeping score, the semanticist accounts for the change in a generalisation as an increased level of generality, and the preservation with a suitable relationship between the respective contents of the classical and generalised case. We suggest the image of pieces hanging together as a way of grasping the suitable relationship, but an open question is whether this can be more fully articulated or even formalised.

### 7.5.4 Three attempts at revenge against semanticism

Semanticism is only as good as its defence against the problems of syntacticism; so here we make sure that semanticism can mount a robust defence against these problems. We first block a disunity problem with using semantic resources. Then we block more particular problems with our proposed semanticism.

## First revenge: Obligate pluralism

Syntacticism relied on translation. These approaches had difficulty explaining the unity generalisation across species. Likewise, the unification in semanticism relies on a broad semantic resource. One might complain that the unarticulated notion of broad content hides an untraversable difference between object content and theorem content. Perhaps articulating more fully would reveal that semanticism must base itself on at least two notions, propositional content and nature. This
disjunctiveness would have downstream effects which could inhibit the explanation of the unity of generalisation.

Besides standing our ground (reassert the underlying similarity between the nature of objects and the propositional content), we could grasp the thistle by accepting this disjunctivism, and then argue that the 'two disjuncts' version of content is far more united than, hence preferable to, syntacticism. Where the syntacticist requires at least one different explication for each species, the semanticism makes do with two, namely (something like) nature and (something like) propositional content. The disjunction into propositional content and nature can also be diluted by a kind of correspondence: we can capture the generalisation from Euclidean to absolute geometry as either theory-generalisation or objectgeneralisation, so too for other theories. With such a correspondence between object-generalisation (based on nature) and theory-generalised (based on propositional content), one might say that even though there is an ontological difference in semantic resources, this difference does not correspond to a disunited notion of generalisation, as we can recapture the semantic content in each direction.

So, it seems we can draw on semantic resources in a way that is unified, either with a very minor disunity (two semantic notions in correspondence) or no disunity (broad semantics).

## Second revenge: Translation and coding

Syntacticism needed some amount of translation between ways of capturing a piece of mathematics to get going. Semanticism might also need an amount of translation in the background machinery. If broad content is based on propositional content (possibly with nature for objects), then some translation is used to explicate the content of the other species, e.g. the content of proofs might supervene on the content of the sentences within them. This concern can be sharpened by apparently content-equivalent theories with different generalisation. Here, we outline and block this problem.

Different mathematical expressions can have the same content. If $C$ and $D$ have the same content, and $G$ generalises $C$, the semanticist is compelled to commit to $G$ being a generalisation of $D$. However, one might claim that some examples violate this. For example, theories may "simulate each other's intended content" (Martinot, [148, page 16]). But sometimes a generalisation of $C$ seems not to generalise $D$. Suppose that equivalence of theorem content amounts to intertranslatability ( $\sqrt{100}$, page 16], see $[70]$ for further alternative notions of equivalence). For example, there is a certain version of finite ZF , known as ZF -inf* (ZF with the infinity axiom replaced by its negation, plus the statement "every set is contained in a transitive set", see [175, pages 499-502]). Just as with ZFP, this ZF-inf* generalises ZFC, but $\mathrm{ZF}-\mathrm{inf}^{*}$ is also intertranslatable with PA [175, page 502]. However, PA does not seem to generalise ZFC: they are about different things, one is a theory of sets, the other of numbers.

The semanticist rejoinder is obvious, simply reject that intertranslatability implies the equivalence of content: PA clearly doesn't have equivalent content with any set theory, as it is not about sets. This 'translation' is really an encoding (we code PA into $\mathrm{ZF}-\mathrm{inf}^{*}$ ). Content need not be preserved via coding. One could
justify this using an agent-independent notion of content (see Section 7.5.3), by blocking the 'seeing' of unintended content via coding.

## Third revenge: Variance

One might think that suitability generates a further revenge problem, based on variance. A major reason for dismissing syntacticism was that a suitable syntactic relationship must be highly disjunctive, consisting of multiple syntactic (sub)relations with no natural (syntactic) commonalities. This was deemed unjustifiable. The sceptic might have the same reservations for semanticism: isn't the suitable semantic relationship of content too disjunctive?

Certainly, syntactic variance won't cause a problem, as content has considerable syntactic independence (e.g. passive and active expressions may have the same content). But what of variance in the relationship of content? Unlike syntactic similarity, there are many possible instantiations of the pieces hanging together similarly. There are subpatterns, corresponding patterns with some pieces swapped, corresponding patterns but one has a hole (definition by abstraction), and so on. These must be unified.

There seems no obvious reason to think that a suitable semantic relationship of content must be disjunctive. These instantiations have close affinities, but we do not have a definitive argument for their unity. We suggest that the image of the pieces hanging together is enough to give purchase on a notion of a suitable relationship which is, at worst, not radically varied. Perhaps this picture represents a small number of different fundamental ways the pieces can hang together, but that would represent far more unity than syntacticism.

### 7.5.5 Putting semanticism to work

Here, we give semanticist explanations of both uncontroversial and more puzzling generalisations. One generalisation was from a special proof of MS1. for $\mathbb{R}^{n}$, to the general proof of MS2. for any complete metric space (Section 7.2.2). The relationship between the respective contents here is clearly suitable: the pieces hang together in exactly the same way (the proof only used some structural properties, so the pieces obviously hang together exactly similarly). The generalised case clearly is of a higher level of generality: it concerns a more general notion (complete metric spaces rather than $\mathbb{R}^{n}$ ).

For other generalisations, like the one from $\mathbb{N}$ to $\mathbb{Z}$, the higher level of generality is clear, but the connection of content needs some work. The higher generality follows from $\mathbb{Z}$ being more inclusive in the sense of domain expansion, and also structurally more inclusive (as it is closed under subtraction). For the suitable relationship of content, we can find the pattern of $\mathbb{N}$-pieces within the pattern of $\mathbb{Z}$-pieces, i.e. we can cover some pieces and their connections which constitute the content of $\mathbb{Z}$, and the remaining pieces hang together in exactly the way that the pieces hang together in $\mathbb{N}$. This could be formalised via substructures.

Next, we use semanticism to explicate some more puzzling candidate generalisations. The higher level of generality requirement explains some problem cases,
for example it blocks the 'underly general' trivialities (Section 7.2.2). It is plausible that the level of generality is constant across Frankensteins as well. Theory generalisations were also puzzling. The generalisation from ZFC to ZFP, so difficult for syntacticism (Section 7.5.2), is explained easily in terms of content: this is a generalisation of theories of sets. For suitable P , both are clearly theories of sets (with varying conceptions on what counts as 'all sets', 99). Hence their respective contents are sufficiently related. Meanwhile, the higher level of generality essentially turns on the fact that ZFP $\not \vDash$ AC.

We can also explain the problematic 'over-generalising' candidate generalisations (Section 7.2.2): they are excluded, as they do not preserve content. One case was ZFC to the theory of Extensionality. Whilst ZFP is a generalisation of ZFC, as they both are reasonably considered theories of sets, Extensionality (alone) is not a theory of sets (it over-generates, applying to classes, sets, pluralities, and so on, [99, page 11]). This change of subject matter is enough to guarantee that the respective contents are not suitably related. The story from a non-trivial theorem (e.g. BFPT) to $T$ is similar, whilst BFPT has some content (about the fixed points of certain functions), $\top$ has no content at all. Indeed, a standard account of such logical tautologies is that they are topic neutral (see [139, §4]), so also must be content neutral.

### 7.6 Conclusion

Generalisations are ubiquitous in mathematics. Chapters 3 to 6 and Section 7.2 highlighted their diversity, yet there is a strong underlying sense of unity amongst them. Despite their mathematical prevalence, there is as yet much space for explicit, dedicated philosophical explications of generalisation. This chapter explores that space. We have grappled with certain micro-level philosophical phenomena surrounding mathematical generalisation. But taking a step back, our macro-level intention has been to show that generalisations are a genuine phenomenon and independent object of study in the philosophy of mathematics. Accounting for the nature of and motivation for generalisation has led us into rich philosophical territory, some quite traditional, whilst others less so. We've encountered ontology, content, divisions of mathematical practice, coding, translation, theoretical virtues, and methodological motivation. With this, we have attempted to show the philosophical weight which studying generalisation has, and that the analysis of generalisation can be self-sustaining and non-parasitical. We traced a framework for analysing generalisations, and proposed our own account of generalisation. This gives us more tools in our conceptual toolbox, and helps open up some little trod areas of mathematical practice for philosophical analysis, principally processes of mathematical change.

Our framework for understanding accounts of the nature of generalisations categorises them in various dimensions. For this, we introduced a non-metaphysical typology of species for pieces of mathematics, to better reflect mathematical practice (Section 7.2.1). With this, we can better scaffold a slew of debates in the philosophy of mathematical practice, and use this scaffolding to answer analogous questions around other processes of change. A key classification was between
unified and non-unified accounts. We also isolated dimensions of formality and resource-use (Section 7.5.1). These dimensions help classify and assess further proposals for accounts of the nature of generalisation, and can be transferred to other processes of mathematical change. Our framework yields a classification of the pieces of mathematics themselves, such as input-output species classification of the residents of the zoo (Section 7.2.2). These residents also demonstrated ordertheoretic properties of the generalisation-relation (Section 7.2.3), which can guide future proposals for (the semantics of) a logic of generalisation. We had three main ambitions. Let's see how we faced up.

Our first sizeable undertaking was to establish whether generalisation could be reduced to other processes of change in mathematics. In Section 7.3, we distinguished (mathematical) generalisation from the closest processes of change: domain expansion and abstraction. En route, we gestured at accounts of each process, and stressed the significance of levels of abstraction (Section 7.3.2). In these separations, we achieved our first major conclusion, that generalisation is a sui generis process of mathematical change, and so the philosophy of generalisation is not directly parasitical on such debates.

Our second undertaking was to give an account of the particular motivations of generalisation (Section 7.4). We countered candidate comprehensive analyses of the motivation to generalise, such as explanation and generality. This gave us our second main conclusion, that generalisation is motivated by a range of competing goals, like unification, simplicity, and isolating new structures. This opens up further bridges, this time between theoretical virtues and processes of mathematical change.

Our last, most significant, undertaking was to develop an account of the nature of generalisation. We uncovered what we take to be the fundamental divide on the nature of generalisation, the opposition between focusing on syntactic resources and on semantic resources. We inspected the champions of these families of accounts, syntacticism and semanticism, to see if they reflected the picture of generalisation we painted in the earlier parts. We saw that even the refined versions of syntacticism were unsustainable, and that there are underlying methodological problems with relying on the similarity of syntactic form at all, either being disunited or ultimately resorting to semantic resources (Section 7.5.2). Our counter-proposal was semanticism. We sketched a skeletal schema, then proposed to flesh this out on the basis of suitable preservations of mathematical content, with increased mathematical generality (Section 7.5.3). Our version of semanticism face up to the problems of unity, translation, and variance; and ultimately decided in favour of this version.

A major theme, playing a key rôle in unveiling the problems with syntacticism, was mathematical content (cf. Section 7.2.3). We took mathematical content to be broad and more inclusive than traditional notions of (say) propositional content, to better account for the meaning and about-ness of pieces of mathematics. This opens a bridge to a discussion about specifically mathematical semantics, and throws down a semantic gauntlet to philosophers to further articular a (possibly formal) notion of content, and of a suitable relationship of content. Those who rise to the challenge will lead us yet further into the sunlit uplands of semanticism.

It is the first mild day of March:
Each minute sweeter than before
The redbreast sings from the tall larch
That stands besides our door.

There is a blessing in the air, Which seems a sense of joy to yield To the bare trees, and mountains bare, And grass in the green field.

My sister! ('tis a wish of mine)
Now that our morning meal is done, Make haste, your morning tasks resign; Come for and feel the sun.

Edward will come with you; - and pray, Put on with speed your woodland dress; And bring no book; for this one day We'll give to idleness.
extract from To My Sister (1798), Wordsworth, the sainted forebear.

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## Samenvatting

Dit proefschrift beslaat twee onderzoeksgebieden. Het eerste, de beschrijvende verzameligenleer, is wiskundig van aard. Het andere, veralgemenisering in de wiskunde, valt onder de filosofie. Beschrijvende verzamelingenleer is de studie naar het gedrag van de definieerbare deelverzamelingen van een gegeven structuur, bijvoorbeeld van de reële getallen. In de hoofdstukken van wiskundige aard, presenteren we wiskundige stellingen die de beschrijvende verzamelingenleer koppelen aan de veralgemeniseerde beschrijvende verzamelingenleer. Aan de hand hiervan geven we een filosofische beschrijving van de redenen voor, en de aard van, veralgemenisering in de wiskunde.

In Hoofdstuk 3stratificeren we formele theorieën van verzamelingenleer op basis van deze beschrijvende complexiteit. Het aftelbare keuzeaxioma voor reële getallen is een van de meest elementaire verzwakkingen van het keuzeaxioma. Het is van belang voor veel deelgebieden van de wiskunde. Beschrijvende keuzeprincipes zijn varianten van deze verzwakking, die de beschrijvende complexiteit van verzamelingen in beschouwing nemen. Wij geven een techniek om de onafhankelijkheid van beschrijvende keuzeprincipes te bewijzen, gebaseerd op de techniek van Jensen forcing. Deze resultaten veralgemeniseren een stelling van Kanovei.

Hoofdstuk 4 geeft de essentie van een gegeneraliseerde reële analyse. Dat wil zeggen, een reële analyse op generalisaties van de reële getallen naar hogere oneindigheden. Dit bouwt voort op het werk van Galeotti en zijn coauteurs. We veralgemenen klassieke stellingen van de reële analyse tot bepaalde verzamelingen van functies, versterken de definitie van continuïteit, en weerleggen andere klassieke stellingen. We tonen ook aan dat een bepaalde eigenschap van kardinaalgetallen, de boomeigenschap, equivalent is aan de extremumstelling voor een bepaalde verzameling functies die de continue functies veralgemenen.

De vraag van Hoofdstuk 5 is of een robuuste notie van oneindige sommen kan worden ontwikkeld voor generalisaties van de reële getallen naar hogere oneindigheden. We geven enkele onverenigbaarheidsresultaten die suggereren van niet. We analyseren verschillende kandidaat-noties van oneindige sommen, zowel afkomstig uit de literatuur als origineel, en laten zien aan welke van de verlangde eigenschappen van een juist notie van som ze niet voldoen.

In Hoofdstuk 6 bestuderen we de beschrijvende verzamelingenleer die voortvloeit uit een veralgemenisering van de topologie, $\kappa$-topologie, die in de vorige twee hoofd-
stukken wordt gebruikt. We ontwikkelen deze op (geordende) veralgemeniseringen van de reële getallen, en op de veralgemeniseerde Baire-ruimte. We laten zien dat de theorie heel anders is dan die van de standaard (volledige) topologie. Voorbeelden van verschillen zijn: de ineenstorting van de Borel-hiërarchie, een gebrek aan universele of volledige verzamelingen, de 'grote fout' van Lebesgue (projecties verhogen de complexiteit niet), een strikte hiërarchie van noties van analyticiteit, en het falen van de stelling van Suslin.

Ten slotte geven we in Hoofdstuk 7 een filosofische uiteenzetting van de aard van veralgemenisering in de wiskunde, en beschrijven we de methodologische redenen waarom wiskundigen veralgemeniseren. Daarbij onderscheiden we veralgemenisering van andere veranderingsprocessen in de wiskunde, zoals abstractie en domeinuitbreiding. We geven een aantrekkelijke syntactische beschrijving van veralgemenisering, maar laten zien dat die tekortschiet. Uiteindelijk stellen we een semantische beschrijving van veralgemenisering voor, waarbij twee delen van de wiskunde samen een veralgemenisering vormen als ze een bepaalde inhoudelijke relatie hebben, en een verhoogd niveau van algemeenheid.

## Abstract

This dissertation has two major threads, one is mathematical, namely descriptive set theory, the other is philosophical, namely generalisation in mathematics. Descriptive set theory is the study of the behaviour of definable subsets of a given structure such as the real numbers. In the core mathematical chapters, we provide mathematical results connecting descriptive set theory and generalised descriptive set theory. Using these, we give a philosophical account of the motivations for, and the nature of, generalisation in mathematics.

In Chapter 3, we stratify set theories based on this descriptive complexity. The axiom of countable choice for reals is one of the most basic fragments of the axiom of choice needed in many parts of mathematics. Descriptive choice principles are a further stratification of this fragment by the descriptive complexity of the sets. We provide a separation technique for descriptive choice principles based on Jensen forcing. Our results generalise a theorem by Kanovei.

Chapter 4 gives the essentials of a generalised real analysis, that is a real analysis on generalisations of the real numbers to higher infinities. This builds on work by Galeotti and his coauthors. We generalise classical theorems of real analysis to certain sets of functions, strengthening continuity, and disprove other classical theorems. We also show that a certain cardinal property, the tree property, is equivalent to the Extreme Value Theorem for a set of functions which generalise the continuous functions.

The question of Chapter 5 is whether a robust notion of infinite sums can be developed on generalisations of the real numbers to higher infinities. We state some incompatibility results, which suggest not. We analyse several candidate notions of infinite sum, both from the literature and more novel, and show which of the expected properties of a notion of sum they fail.

In Chapter 6, we study the descriptive set theory arising from a generalisation of topology, $\kappa$-topology, which is used in the previous two chapters. We show that the theory is quite different from that of the standard (full) topology. Differences include a collapsing Borel hierarchy, a lack of universal or complete sets, Lebesgue's 'great mistake' holds (projections do not increase complexity), a strict hierarchy of notions of analyticity, and a failure of Suslin's theorem.

Lastly, in Chapter 7, we give a philosophical account of the nature of generalisation in mathematics, and describe the methodological reasons that mathemati-
cians generalise. In so doing, we distinguish generalisation from other processes of change in mathematics, such as abstraction and domain expansion. We suggest a semantic account of generalisation, where two pieces of mathematics constitute a generalisation if they have a certain relation of content, along with an increased level of generality.

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[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ The ordinal $\omega_{1}$ is also not an upper bound in ZF, as Miller has shown $152,153,154,155$, 156.

[^1]:    ${ }^{2}$ The proof has two steps: let $\operatorname{Det}(\Gamma)$ mean that for every $X \in \Gamma, G_{X}$ is determined (as defined in 103 page 629]). So, if $\Xi \subseteq \Xi^{\prime}$, then $\operatorname{Det}\left(\Xi^{\prime}\right)$ implies $\operatorname{Det}(\Xi)$. Next, by relativising the classical proof that $\operatorname{Det}\left(\mathcal{P}\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)\right)$ implies $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega}\right)$ (i.e. that of 163 , Theorem 1]), we get that $\operatorname{Det}\left(\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{3}^{0}\right)$ implies $\mathrm{AC}_{\omega}\left(\omega^{\omega} ; \mathbf{C t b l}\right)$ [5, Ex 21.24]. Andretta observes that the standard ZFC-proof of $\operatorname{Det}(\mathcal{B})$ is a $Z F-$ proof of $\operatorname{Det}\left(\boldsymbol{\Delta}_{1}^{1}\right)$ ([5] page 205], see 112, Theorem 2.5] for the standard proof). Hence, by Theorem 2.1.9 $\operatorname{Det}\left(\mathcal{B}^{*}\right)$ holds.

[^2]:    ${ }^{3}$ The ambiguity of notation is between wei $(\tau)$, the weight of the order $(\kappa$ - $)$ topology, and wei $(\mathbb{O})$, the weight of the order. For the most part, it is easy to distinguish which notion is intended by context.

[^3]:    ${ }^{4}$ A similar notion is $\alpha$-Archimedeanicity 53, page 23].

[^4]:    ${ }^{5}$ Also called $S$ cott cuts 188, Definition 2.3].
    ${ }^{6}$ For more detailed constructions of $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$, see 25 or 75 .

[^5]:    ${ }^{7}$ Also called ' $\infty$ ' 36, page 37]. However, we use $\infty$ to mean $>a$ for all $a \in \mathbb{K}$.

[^6]:    ${ }^{1}$ A revised version of Moore's "all analytic sets are Lebesgue measurable" 158, 3.6.7] can be proved in ZF, using Fremlin's notion of codeable Lebesgue measure 66, Theorem 563I].
    ${ }^{2}$ E.g. the model called Truss's model or $\mathcal{M} 12(\aleph)$ in 95.

[^7]:    ${ }^{3}$ By Proposition 3.1.1, any weaker Borel descriptive choice principles are provable in ZF.

[^8]:    ${ }^{4}$ In other words, $(\mathcal{M}, \preccurlyeq)$ is $<\omega_{1}$-closed.

[^9]:    ${ }^{5}$ Repetitiveness corresponds to simplicity in 205, Definition 3.3.17]. As we reserve simplicity for certain properties of ordered fields, we use an alternative name.

[^10]:    ${ }^{6}$ In 205, structured forcing notions are called sufficiently closed. We save closure for properties of topologies, hence we use different terminology.

[^11]:    ${ }^{1}$ Suppose $\left(a_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \mu}$ is not eventually constant. As $\operatorname{bn}\left(\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}\right)=\kappa,\left(a_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \mu}$ is not cofinal or coinitial $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$. Hence $\left(a_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \mu}$ defines a gap.

[^12]:    ${ }^{2}$ For example, an obvious alternative method is to use the order isomorphisms $f: \mathbb{Q}_{\kappa} \rightarrow I \cap \mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$ and $g: \mathbb{Q}_{\kappa} \rightarrow J \cap \mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$, let $\mathrm{Oz}_{\kappa}$ be the set of integers parts in $\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$, let $b_{z}:[f(z), f(z+1)) \rightarrow$ $[g(z), g(z+1))$ be the order isomorphism from Remark 4.1.6, and let $b:=\bigcup_{z \in \mathrm{O}_{\kappa}} b_{z}$. But this also fails, as $\bigcup_{z \in \mathrm{O}_{\kappa}}[f(z), f(z+1))=\operatorname{Dom}(b)$ need not be the set $I$, as possibly there is an $x \in I$ such that there is a $(\kappa, \kappa)$-gap, $G$ in $\mathrm{Oz}_{\kappa}$ where $x$ is in the gap defined by $f(G)$.

[^13]:    ${ }^{3}$ Note that if $f$ is continuous, and $x \in \mathbb{K}$, then $f(x)$ is the image almost gap of $f$ at $x$.
    ${ }^{4}$ One proof examines the behaviour of a $\kappa$-continuous $f$ at an almost gap, $A$, with image almost gap, $B$. The key technique checks the oscillations of $f$, i.e. whether $f$ can cofinally approach, then move away from, $B$ as $x \rightarrow A$ (informally: $f$ 'touches/passes through the line $y=B^{\prime}$ ). One can check that if $f$ is bounded in some interval, $I$, around $A$, then $f$ can only oscillate around $B$ if these oscillations are cofinally/coinitially decrease towards $B$ inside $I$. This 'dampened oscillation' argument is the gap-analogue of Proposition 4.2.9 ( $f$ can 'pass through' $B \kappa$-often as $x \rightarrow A$, but only if the oscillations are dampening towards $B$ ).

[^14]:    ${ }^{5}$ A similar glueing result holds for $\kappa$-supercontinuity, assuming $f([a, G])<H<f([G, b])$ and suitable boundedness, using the local $\kappa$-continuity property from page 73 .
    ${ }^{6}$ There are clearly at most wei $(\mathbb{K})$-many turning points (or turning gaps, i.e. where $f$ has an image almost gap, $A$, at some gap, $G$, and there is some interval, $I$, including $G$ where $f(I) \geq A$ or $f(I) \leq A$ ) for any continuous $f: \mathbb{K} \rightarrow \mathbb{K}$.

[^15]:    ${ }^{7}$ The analysis of BFPT is a key example for our philosophical analysis of generalisations in Section 7.2.2.

[^16]:    ${ }^{8}$ Note that Proposition 4.2.14 uses that id and $f$ intersect if they cross.

[^17]:    ${ }^{9} \mathrm{~A}$ connection between Bolzano-Weierstraß and the tree property was anticipated in reverse mathematics where Weak Kőnig's Lemma, the relevant analogue of the tree property, is equivalent to the Bolzano-Weierstraß theorem for $\mathbb{R}$ 69, Theorem 1.1]. Using [25, Theorem 5.8] and 76, Lemma 4.7], the equivalence with the Heine-Borel theorem, [76, Corollary 5.9] does not require $\kappa$ to be strongly inaccessible or $\mathbb{K}$ to be Cauchy complete.

[^18]:    ${ }^{10}$ Note that, in the limit case, there will be no minimal such $\varepsilon_{\gamma_{\alpha}}$.

[^19]:    ${ }^{11}$ If $\mathbb{K}$ has a set of almost ordinals, we can let $m_{\alpha}=e(\alpha)$ for each $\alpha \in \operatorname{bn}(\mathbb{K})$.

[^20]:    ${ }^{12}$ Reverse mathematics predicts this: over $\mathrm{RCA}_{0}$, the tree property of $\omega$ is equivalent to $\mathrm{BVT}(\mathbb{R})$ 193, IV.2.3].

[^21]:    ${ }^{13}$ Suslin's Question yields a second cardinal function, calibre 7, page 150], 107, Definition 1.19, pages 114-123, 147-149]. These coincide for order topologies 34. Theorem 2.7]. Calibre can also be $\kappa$-topologised; we do not know whether the $\kappa$-version coincides with $\mathfrak{s n}_{\kappa}$.
    ${ }^{14}$ A.k.a. cellularity 107, Definition 1.7]. See also 168, Theorem 3.8].
    ${ }^{15} \operatorname{By}$ [49, Theorem 1], $\operatorname{cof}\left(\operatorname{Ded}\left(\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}\right)\right)=\operatorname{coi}\left(\operatorname{Ded}\left(\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}\right)\right)=\kappa, \operatorname{wei}\left(\operatorname{Ded}\left(\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}\right)\right)=\kappa, \mathfrak{s n}\left(\operatorname{Ded}\left(\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}\right)\right)=\kappa^{+}$ and $\operatorname{Ded}\left(\mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}\right)$ is symmetrically complete.

[^22]:    ${ }^{1}$ By Remark 2．3．26，if $\mathbb{K}$ is an rcf and an $\eta_{2^{\aleph_{0}}}$ order，then $\mathbb{R} \hookrightarrow \mathbb{K}$ ．In which case，we could also consider the strengthening＂Ext $\mathbf{E}_{\mathbb{R}}$＂，requiring converging $\mathbb{R}^{\omega}$－series to have an $S$－sum．As $\operatorname{Ext}_{\mathbb{Q}}$ is already difficult to satisfy（e．g．Theorem 5．2．3），we focus on this．

[^23]:    ${ }^{2}$ Their definition is in the context of No; which we generalise to arbitrary ordered fields.

[^24]:    ${ }^{3} \mathrm{An}$ iterative version of this sum, taking $\sup \left(\mathrm{FS}\left(x^{+}\right)\right)-\sup \left(\mathrm{FS}\left(x^{-}\right)\right)$at limits steps only, is trivial for similar reasons at the first limit step. This contrasts with iterative infinite sums on ordinals, where standard ordinal addition and Lipparini's transfinite version of Hessenberg addition [133, Definitions $3.1 \& 5.1$ ] are non-trivial. Indeed, Lipparini's sum satisfies semiring versions of El [133, Lemma 3.3(4)], Ext, but fails Conc 133, page 517] and Ind 133, page 523].

[^25]:    ${ }^{4}$ Variations of this sum in the literature typically have an additional condition which prevents pathologies, such as the sum of a negative telescoping series, $\left(X^{n}-X^{n+1}\right)_{n \in \omega}$, being positive. E.g. Conway requires that there is a descending sequence $\left(i_{\beta}\right)_{\beta \in \alpha}$ in $\mathbb{G}$ such that if $j \neq i_{\beta}$ then $r_{j, \alpha} \neq 0$ for only finitely many $\alpha(36$, page 40], alternatively, see [14, Definition 2.9]).

[^26]:    ${ }^{5}$ This is the conceptual reverse of the classical case, where we build integrals from sums.
    ${ }^{6}$ Mere continuity would allow (multiple) $F$ where the series of partial sums of a positive sequence is non-increasing (a similar phenomenon is observed in 183, page 35]); $\kappa$-continuity blocks such 'jumping' $F$ (by Theorem 4.2.3).
    ${ }^{7}$ Personal e-mail, dated $8{ }^{\text {th }}$ September 2021.
    ${ }^{8}$ Personal e-mail, dated $9^{\text {th }}$ September 2021.

[^27]:    ${ }^{9}$ In |74. Theorem 4.7.1], Galeotti showed that every $\kappa$-continuous function can be approximated at a point by polygonal functions.

[^28]:    ${ }^{10}$ See $[24$ and 9, Theorem 2.23] for a different approach to generalising the Weierstraß' Approximation Theorem.

[^29]:    ${ }^{1}$ Fix $\left(\mathbb{Z}_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \mu},\left(w_{\beta}\right)_{\beta \in \nu}$, where $\mathbb{Z}_{\alpha}, w_{\beta} \in\left(\lambda^{*} \sqcup \kappa\right)^{\kappa}$, such that $\left(\mathbb{Z}_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \mu},\left(w_{\beta}\right)_{\beta \in \nu}$ is cofinal with $G$, and $\left(w_{\beta}\right)_{\beta \in \nu}$ is coinitial with $G$. By passing to a subsequence if necessary, we can assume that there is a least coordinate, $\alpha_{0}$, and smallest level, $\zeta_{0}$, such that for all $\alpha \in \mu$ with $\alpha \geq \alpha_{0}$, and for all $\zeta>\zeta_{0}$, we have that $\mathbb{z}_{\alpha}(\zeta) \in \kappa$, i.e. $\mathbb{Z}_{\alpha}$ only takes values in $\kappa$. Likewise, for $\left(w_{\beta}\right)_{\beta \in \nu}$. Let $火$ be the greatest common subsequence of any tail element of $\left(\mathbb{Z}_{\alpha}\right)_{\alpha \in \mu}$ and $\left(w_{\beta}\right)_{\beta \in \nu}$. Either $\mathbb{z}_{\alpha}\left(\eta_{1}\right)+1=w_{\beta}\left(\eta_{1}\right)$, or $\mathbb{z}_{\alpha}\left(\eta_{1}\right)$ is the copy of 0 in $\lambda^{*}$, and $w_{\beta}\left(\eta_{1}\right)$ is the copy of zero in $\kappa$ (otherwise $G$ is not a gap). So, $\mathbb{z}_{\alpha}=\mathfrak{k}^{\frown}(\gamma) \frown \mathbb{z}_{\alpha}^{\prime}$ and $w_{\beta}=\mathfrak{x}^{\frown}(\delta)^{\frown} \mathfrak{w}_{\beta}^{\prime}$ for suitable $\gamma, \delta, \mathbb{z}_{\alpha}^{\prime}$, and $\mathfrak{w}_{\beta}^{\prime}$. The only such gap is the one defined by $\left(\mathbb{K}^{\frown}(\gamma) \frown \bar{\alpha}_{\kappa}\right)_{\alpha \in \kappa}$ and $\left(\mathfrak{K}^{\frown} \frown(\delta) \frown \overline{-\beta}_{\kappa}\right)_{\beta \in \lambda}$.

[^30]:    ${ }^{2}$ This is not the $\kappa$-Borel hierarchy of, e.g. 74, Definition 3.5.11] or 135, §1], where $\kappa$ indicates the spaces considered have weight $\kappa$, and is otherwise the standard Borel hierarchy. In our terminology, Galeotti's $\mathbf{B}(X)$ is $\operatorname{Bor}_{\kappa^{+}}\left(\tau_{X}\right)$.

[^31]:    ${ }^{3}$ This is the most natural level to mix: mixing after $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{2}^{0}$ is similar to mixing at $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{2}^{0}$, but delayed to the first mixed level. Meanwhile, mixing earlier, i.e. $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{1}^{0^{\prime}}:=\left\{\bigcup_{\alpha \in \lambda} A_{\alpha}: A_{\alpha} \in\right.$ $\mathcal{B} \cup \neg \mathcal{B} \wedge \lambda<\kappa\}$, has several unsatisfying consequences. For example $\kappa \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{1}^{0^{\prime}}$ has a basis of clopen sets, which is not, in general, a natural assumption.

[^32]:    ${ }^{4}$ Finite subsets are obviously separable, as $Q$ is order dense.

[^33]:    ${ }^{5}$ In fact, 132 , Theorem 1.4] shows that there are $2^{2^{\kappa^{\kappa}}}$ distinct topologies. But as there are only $2^{\kappa^{\kappa}}$-many bijections of $\kappa^{\kappa}$, each (full) homeoemorphism class has size at most $2^{\kappa^{\kappa}}$, hence there are $2^{2^{\kappa^{\kappa}}}$ non-fully homeomorphic topologies (this argument is due to Stefan Geschke).

[^34]:    ${ }^{6}$ Interval $\kappa$-topologies essentially depend on the order, rather than the field structure of $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$. Appeals to field structure give a further way of distinguishing between interval $\kappa$-topologies on ordered fields (e.g. 3, Theorem 5.1]).
    ${ }^{7}$ Indeed, each $\tau_{\lambda}$ is $f \mathrm{SC}_{\kappa}$ (essentially by 37 , Proposition 4.3(a)]).

[^35]:    ${ }^{1}$ We use the word generalisation ambiguously to refer to the over-arching process of mathematical change, the classical case-generalised case pair, or the generalised case alone, as clarified by context.

[^36]:    ${ }^{2} \mathrm{~A}$ simple account of historical development suffices for our purposes (the real development need not be simple, see 186). To avoid the well-rehearsed historiographical problems with a Whig conception of generalisation as 'progress', we describe these processes as mathematical change. Our focus is the structure, rather than the history, of known generalisation, though the latter guides the analysis. Likewise, we exclude cognitive generalisations (cf. Footnote 9), and those from mathematics education (cf. 55 ).

[^37]:    3 "Objects" isn't meant in a metaphysically strong way: all reference to actually existing mathematical objects should be treated as us looking through 'Plato-tinted spectacles' 22, page 11].
    ${ }^{4}$ Which species? We think any. This 'generalisation maximalism' dovetails with the account of mathematics as the study of all (suitable) structures, but it's not really wedded to such a position. In short, given a tool, mathematicians tend to use it on anything they can.

[^38]:    ${ }^{5}$ Specially, bounded interval-witnessed $\kappa$-sequences (Section 4.3).

[^39]:    ${ }^{6}$ A very strong proposal of this kind is that constructive mathematics generalises classical mathematics. This seems to be Moschovakis' position for (some substantial fragment of) descriptive set theory 160 . We set such logical concerns to one side, and assume a classical background logic throughout.

[^40]:    ${ }^{7}$ For example, real functions can be generalised to real distributions [33, page 148], 192, page 4], but real distributions are still a kind of arbitrary function, so the notion of an arbitrary function is not generalised.
    ${ }^{8}$ Pace structuralist construals of $\mathbb{Z}$ as an object-type; but presumably the structuralist has some gloss of the everyday distinction between objects and types of objects in mathematics.

[^41]:    ${ }^{9}$ Gorskii unifies mathematical generalisation with scientific generalisation 81, 82. We think Gorskii's unification fails: types $A 2$ and $A 3$ are essentially scientific, types $A 4$ and $A 5$ are essentially mathematical, whilst $A 5$ is possibly instantiated by both, as a form of domain expansion. Gorskii's own mathematical instantiation of $A 5$, optical to electromagnetic theory, does not work as this is really a cognitive realisation, rather than a metaphysical domain expansion. But we can find scientific examples of real domain expansion, e.g. special to general relativity (we can also find mathematical examples of cognitive realisations in mathematics). Either way, domain expansion cannot explain generalisation by Section 7.3.1.
    ${ }^{10}$ This description is not taken to be necessary, but may be sufficient.

[^42]:    ${ }^{11}$ Sometimes domains are replaced. When generalising from $\mathbb{R}$ to $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$, rather than expanding the domain of $\mathbb{R}$, we build $\mathbb{R}_{\kappa}$ from a parametrised generalisation of $\mathbb{Q}, \mathbb{Q}_{\kappa}$ (Section 2.3.5). (A

[^43]:    ${ }^{14}$ This is notably different to abstraction in natural science, which (typically) involves redescriptions of the same phenomena at different levels of theory [124, page 51], 167, page 209], whilst mathematical abstraction links different pieces of mathematics.

[^44]:    ${ }^{15}$ For example, any $\eta_{2^{\aleph_{0}}}$-ordered rcf is a domain expansion of the ordered field $\mathbb{R}$ (Remark 2.3.26, to be a domain expansion of the order $\mathbb{R}$, it suffices to be an $\eta_{1}$-ordered rcf (Proposition 2.3.24. This suggests that domain expansion cannot be reduced to the superset relation, i.e. lends weight to the refined view of domain expansion.
    ${ }^{16}$ In other words, where the background theory is the parameter (e.g., model-theoretically, $\left.\mathbb{R}^{2 \mathrm{ZF}}\right)$.

[^45]:    ${ }^{17}$ Identifying unification and explanatoriness has also been questioned in the context of natural science, see 159, page 4].
    ${ }^{18}$ Infinite cardinal arithmetic is similar: it does not obviously explain classical finite arithmetic. Numerosities are even worse! Their definition requires an additional, superficially irrelevant, structure, like an arbitrary fixed ultrafilter (for more details on this, see [140, page 142]). But such an ultrafilter plays no rôle in explanations of finite cardinal arithmetic, and its existence is even independent of ZFC [212, page 28], which far outstrips the everyday set-theoretical strength required for explanations of finite cardinal arithmetic.
    ${ }^{19}$ The strength of unification over explanatoriness may turn on agent-independence (for details, see page 187): unification depends on the behaviour of mathematical objects, whilst explanatoriness depends on agents accessing the mathematics.

[^46]:    ${ }^{20}$ Other possible syntax-focused approaches to generalisation include those based on the deductive power of sentences and theories (see Footnote 29).

[^47]:    ${ }^{21}$ It would seem that only certain domains are suitable for 7.5.2 I. and RAMSEY. A natural precisification is that $D$ must be suitably determined by, e.g., the nature of $c$. This already sneaks in some substantial use of semantic resources.

[^48]:    ${ }^{22}$ Generalisations can reveal subtleties hidden in the classical case e.g. EVT (see Section 4.2.4).

[^49]:    ${ }^{23}$ All translations of Villeneuve are the author's.
    ${ }^{24} \mathrm{An}$ alternative pluralist syntacticism takes generalisation to consist of multiple processes. This is less unified, and may rely on translation anyway, so we focus on translational approaches. (It may also have commutativity problems: suppose $R_{S, S^{\prime}}(-)$ recaptures pieces of mathematics from species $S$ to $S^{\prime}$, and that $G_{S}$ is the generalisation-method for species $S$; if $P$ is of species $S$, why does $R_{S^{\prime}, S}\left(G_{S^{\prime}}\left(R_{S, S^{\prime}}(P)\right)\right)=G_{S}(P) ?$ )

[^50]:    ${ }^{25}$ It also automatically includes 'over-generalisations', e.g. BFPT to the Verum, $\top$, and 'undergeneralisations', e.g. rigid expressions like 'being $\mathbb{R}$ '.
    ${ }^{26}$ Villeneuve does not pursue this, instead claiming that some generalisation cannot be captured as logical universal generalisations. But his examples are only non-logical in their natural forms. Villeneuve allows some redescription away from the natural form (e.g. adding parameters 202, page 91]). So, even for Villeneuve, rediscription is a question of extent, not kind.
    ${ }^{27}$ There are natural versions of this for other species. Extra care is required for theorems: a redescribed theorem ought to say the same thing (perhaps formalised as inter-replacability). This suggests an overriding restriction on replacement, to preserve mathematical content(/etc., Section 7.5.3). This smells like using semantic resources already.

[^51]:    ${ }^{28}$ Sometimes P and $\mathrm{P}^{\prime}$ are $Z F$-equivalent, e.g:

[^52]:    ${ }^{30}$ We can exclude some other notions for our purposes. Topic and subject matter are insufficiently hyperintensional (e.g. differing theorems of real analysis have the same topic). Other notions are spurned for being too tied to particular species, e.g. meaning (tied to sentences), nature and, perhaps, essence (tied to objects). In 198, pages 351-352], (ontological) objects and concepts have essences; if objects and concepts exhaust ontology, then this essence is a broad semantic notion, all we need is to each reduce species to these two categories.

[^53]:    ${ }^{31}$ There does not seem to be a corresponding problem for the syntacticist: we typically take syntax to be worn on its sleeve (excluding extended/hidden notions of syntax, e.g. Villeneuve's hidden variables 202 , page 91$]$ ). But this need not be so for content; some examples of hidden/unintended content can be seen in 43, page 14], 101, 181, page 32], and Section 7.5.4.

[^54]:    ${ }^{32}$ Gorskii suggests relevance logic (81, pages $\left.84 \& 172\right]$, see [4, §3] for an introduction to relevance logic), but essential idea is that the generalised case must be relevant to the classical case, for a logical notion of relevance. But this will not do, as its semantics are typically Kripkean (i.e. using possible worlds [143, §1-3]), so is not hyperintensional enough to satisfy the conditions of page 187 (see 15 for more on the hyperintensional deficiencies of Kripke semantics, particularly [15, §2.1]).
    ${ }^{33}$ Relevance between the classical and generalised case doesn't suffice for an explanation here (cf. Footnote 32): however we flesh out the notion of relevance, we expect that " $\varphi \vee \psi$ " is always relevant to " $\varphi$ ".

