Back to the actual future

The purpose of the paper is to rethink the role of actuality in the branching model of possibilities. We investigate the idea that the model should be enriched with an additional factor - the so-called Thin Red Line - which is supposed to represent the single possible course of events that gets actualized in time. We believe that this idea was often misconceived which prompted some unfortunate reactions. On the one hand, it suggested problematic semantic models of future tense and and on the other, it provoked questionable lines of criticism. We reassess the debate and point to potential pitfalls, focusing on the semantic dimension of the Thin Red Line theory. Our agenda transcends the semantics, however. We conclude that semantic considerations do not threaten the Thin Red Line theory and that the proper debate should be carried in the domain of metaphysics

Fatalism and Future Contingents

In this paper I address issues related to the problem of future contingents and the metaphysical doctrine of fatalism. Two classical responses to the problem of future contingents are the third truth value view and the all-false view. According to the former, future contingents take a third truth value which goes beyond truth and falsity. According to the latter, they are all false. I here illustrate and discuss two ways to respectively argue for those two views. Both ways are similar in spirit and intimately connected with fatalism, in the sense that they engage with the doctrine of fatalism and accept a large part of a standard fatalistic machinery

Against the Russellian open future

Todd (2016) proposes an analysis of future-directed sentences, in particular sentences of the form 'will(φ)', that is based on the classic Russellian analysis of definite descriptions. Todd's analysis is supposed to vindicate the claim that the future is metaphysically open while retaining a simple Ockhamist semantics of future contingents and the principles of classical logic, i.e. bivalence and the law of excluded middle. Consequently, an open futurist can straightforwardly retain classical logic without appeal to supervaluations, determinacy operators, or any further controversial semantical or metaphysical complication. In this paper, we will show that this quasi-Russellian analysis of 'will' both lacks linguistic motivation and faces a variety of significant problems. In particular, we show that the standard arguments for Russell's treatment of definite descriptions fail to apply to statements of the form 'will(φ)'

Knowledge of future contingents

This paper addresses the question whether future contingents are knowable, that is, whether one can know that things will go a certain way even though it is possible that things will not go that way. First I will consider a long-established view that implies a negative answer, and draw attention to some endemic problems that affect its credibility. Then I will sketch an alternative line of thought that prompts a positive answer: future contingents are knowable, although our epistemic access of them is limited in some important respects

History relativism as extreme assessment relativism : a note on Prior's Ockhamism

Since the early days of Ockhamist semantics, it has been recognized that the history - relative notion of truth which the theory postulates is problematic : it is unclear what it means that a sentence is true relative to a possible course of events; it is also unclear how such a notion of relative truth relates to the everyday notion of truth simpliciter. To rationalize the Ockhamist notion of truth I compare two relativistic theories : the assessment relativism of John MacFarlane and the history relativism of Belnap et al. In the end, I suggest that we may understand the history-relative notion of truth as the truth assessed relative to an end of time. On the formal level, I introduce a doomsday extension of a branching model and prove that history - relative truth in any given model is equivalent to doomsday - relative truth in the extended model. It turns out that this equivalence holds in general only if the end of time is also, in a sense, beyond time

The Thin Red Line, Molinism, and the Flow of Time

In addressing the problem of the (in)compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom, philosophers of religion encounter problems regarding the metaphysics and structure of time. Some models of temporal logic developed for completely independent reasons have proved especially appropriate for representing the temporal structure of the world as Molinism conceives it. In particular, some models of the Thin Red Line (TRL) seem to imply that conditionals of freedom are true or false, as Molinists maintain. Noting the resemblance between Molinism and TRL models, Restall (2011) has advanced some criticisms of Molinism that have also been leveled against TRL models. In particular, Restall believes that the implication p --> HFp is not true in TRL models. Because Molinists must also accept that this implication is not true, this is a problem for them. We will show that Restall\u2019s criticism is wide of the mark. Firstly, it will be demonstrated that in many open future models (not just TRL) the implication p --> HFp is invalid. Secondly, while it is possible to account for this implication, some modifications are required in respect of the branching time semantics. In proposing one such modification, we show that this new semantics can be adopted by advocates of the TRL and, as a consequence, by Molinists as well. We conclude that the principle stated by Restall is either a problem for many open future models (not just for Molinists) or can be accounted for by these models and so is not a problem for Molinists either

Future Contingents, Freedom, And Foreknowledge

This essay is a contribution to the new trend and old tradition of analyzing theological fatalism in light of its relationship to logical fatalism. All results pertain to branching temporal systems that use the A-theory and assume presentism. The project focuses on two kinds of views about branching time. One position is true futurism, which designates what will occur regardless of contingency. The opposing view is open futurism, by which no possible course of events is privileged over others; that is, there are no soft facts. A contextualist theory of temporal standpoints, standpoint inheritance, is designed to enhance Priorian temporal logics. The proposal helps all branching time systems, not only those with an open future. Even though an account of temporal standpoints goes a long way towards aiding various analyses from a linguistic standpoint, theories that designate a true future ultimately succumb to philosophical difficulties. Under open futurism, standpoint inheritance commandeers the best semantic evidence for true futurism. Standpoint inheritance accounts for the evidence, but the evidence does not support true futurism\u27s stronger claims. Furthermore, attempts to explain why one timeline is privileged as the actual future lead to fatalism. Open futurism and a related kind of open theism are the only viable alternatives under dynamic, branching time. If true futurism is feasible at all, it is so only with a static or eternalist basis. Standpoint inheritance is very general. It is applied to every system discussed in this analysis to handle damning linguistic shortcomings of traditional logics. Standpoint inheritance yields several other fruitful results, too. The theory helps clarify what it is for characterizations of God\u27s beliefs to be soft and how his beliefs must differ from normal beliefs to retain softness. For open futurism, all strings of consecutive will\u27s and was\u27s can be reduced to at most two such operators under standpoint inheritance, but not under traditional theories. The open futurist distinction between will and will-inevitably is clarified, too. Standpoint inheritance allows for a supervaluationist semantics using open futurism as its basis instead of the usual true futurism. The theory of standpoint inheritance enhances dynamic, branching accounts of time to better compete with their static correlates