Reasoning about obligations in Obligationes : a formal approach.

Despite the appearance of `obligation' in their name, medieval obligational dispu- tations between an Opponent and a Respondent seem to many to be unrelated to deontic logic. However, given that some of the example disputations found in me- dieval texts involve Respondent reasoning about his obligations within the context of the disputation, it is clear that some sort of deontic reasoning is involved. In this paper, we explain how the reasoning diers from that in ordinary basic deontic logic, and dene dynamic epistemic semantics within which the medieval obligations can be expressed and the examples evaluated. Obligations in this framework are history- based and closely connected to action, thus allowing for comparisons with, e.g., the knowledge-based obligations of Pacuit, Parikh, and Cogan, and stit-theory. The con- tributions of this paper are twofold: The introduction of a new type of obligation into the deontic logic family, and an explanation of the precise deontic concepts involved in obligationes

Формальная диалектика Чарльза Хэмблина и средневековый логический диспут

In this paper we reconstruct a famous Severin Boethius’s reasoning according to the idea of the medieval obligationes disputation. We create two different formalizations of the disputation: fi rst with the help of Ch. Hamblin’s approach specially designed to formalize such logical debates; second, on the basis of his formal dialectics. The two formalizations are used to analyze the logical properties of the rules of the medieval logical disputation and that of their formal dialectic’s counterparts. By means of comparing these reconstructions we are able to justify our two main conclusions: that the formalization of the medieval disputation suggested by Hamblin, though does provide a general account of it thus giving a broad view of its basic logical properties, but it fails to reconstruct the full picture of the disputation because it lacks in some the details of it. Another conclusion states that Hamblin’s formal dialectic and the medieval logical disputation are based on different logical theories.В статье на примере рассуждения Боэция реконструируется средневековый логический диспут с предписаниями (обязательствами): сначала при помощи подхода Ч. Хэмблина, предложенного им для формализации таких диспутов, затем — на основе его же формальной диалектики. Две формализации служат для анализа правил средневекового логического диспута и правил формальной диалектики и сравнения их логических свойств. Посредством сопоставления этих двух формализаций обосновываются основные выводы статьи. Первый вывод заключается в том, что формализация Хэмблином средневекового диспута не вполне адекватна, потому что хотя и она отражает его наиболее существенные логические характеристики, но некоторые особенности правил такого диспута оставляет за его рамками. Второй вывод говорит о том, что формальная диалектика Хэмблина и средневековый логический диспут опираются на разные логические теории

Reasoning about Obligations in Obligationes: A Formal Approach

Despite the appearance of `obligation' in their name, medieval obligational dispu- tations between an Opponent and a Respondent seem to many to be unrelated to deontic logic. However, given that some of the example disputations found in me- dieval texts involve Respondent reasoning about his obligations within the context of the disputation, it is clear that some sort of deontic reasoning is involved. In this paper, we explain how the reasoning diers from that in ordinary basic deontic logic, and dene dynamic epistemic semantics within which the medieval obligations can be expressed and the examples evaluated. Obligations in this framework are history- based and closely connected to action, thus allowing for comparisons with, e.g., the knowledge-based obligations of Pacuit, Parikh, and Cogan, and stit-theory. The con- tributions of this paper are twofold: The introduction of a new type of obligation into the deontic logic family, and an explanation of the precise deontic concepts involved in obligationes

The Art of Doubting in <i>Obligationes Parisienses</i>

Recent studies on obligationes tend to focus on the specific type of positio. This emphasis has led to a neglect of the less standard types, including dubitatio. While some claim that dubitatio is merely a trivial variant of positio, we show that the dubitatio rules given in the 13th-century treatise Obligationes Parisienses are by no means trivial and in fact lend themselves to a somewhat peculiar system of dialogue. Dubitatio in this treatise shares many aspects with dubitatio in two other 13th-century treatises, by William of Sherwood and Nicholas of Paris. We use these similarities to shed some light on the history of dubitatio in general and the interpretation of the Parisienses rules in particular

The Art of Doubting in <i>Obligationes Parisienses</i>

Recent studies on obligationes tend to focus on the specific type of positio. This emphasis has led to a neglect of the less standard types, including dubitatio. While some claim that dubitatio is merely a trivial variant of positio, we show that the dubitatio rules given in the 13th-century treatise Obligationes Parisienses are by no means trivial and in fact lend themselves to a somewhat peculiar system of dialogue. Dubitatio in this treatise shares many aspects with dubitatio in two other 13th-century treatises, by William of Sherwood and Nicholas of Paris. We use these similarities to shed some light on the history of dubitatio in general and the interpretation of the Parisienses rules in particular

The normative role of logic for reasoning

This paper advocates for the normative role of logic in reasoning. I offer a response, anchored in an externalist perspective, to two fronts of attack against the normativity thesis, namely Harman’s sceptical challenge and the accusation of naturalistic fallacy. On the one hand, I rework dialogical bridge principles and show that such principles satisfy adequacy criteria to deal with Harman’s challenge. On the other hand, I argue that it is possible to derive normative consequences from logical facts. This is because argumentative interactions among agents involve the acceptance of constitutive rules that entail obligations. Hence, since logical rules can be seen as constitutive of the social practice of reasoning, they create prescriptions for reasoning. Bridge principles make those obligations and prohibitions explicit

Ancestor Worship in The Logic of Games. How foundational were Aristotle\u27s contributions?

Notwithstanding their technical virtuosity and growing presence in mainstream thinking, game theoretic logics have attracted a sceptical question: Granted that logic can be done game theoretically, but what would justify the idea that this is the preferred way to do it?\u27\u27 A recent suggestion is that at least part of the desired support might be found in the Greek dialectical writings. If so, perhaps we could say that those works possess a kind of foundational significance. The relation of being foundational for is interesting in its own right. In this paper, I explore its ancient applicability to relevant, paraconsistent and nonmonotonic logics, before returning to the question of its ancestral tie, or want of one, to the modern logics of games