The relation between concepts and mental language in William of Ockham's Thought

O objetivo dessa pesquisa é investigar a relação entre conceitos e linguagem mental no pensamento de William of Ockham. O conceito é a noção central da filosofia de Ockham e o ponto de partida de nossa pesquisa, entretanto não há uma definição unívoca da noção de conceito em suas obras. Quando Ockham aborda epistemologia, os conceitos são chamados de atos mentais e quando ele desenvolve sua linguagem mental, são chamados de signos mentais. Há ainda uma uma terceira maneira de lidar com conceitos que está ligada à noção de conceito como signo mental: os conceitos como universais. Portanto, há três aspectos de conceitos que consideramos fundamentais: o epistemológico, o semântico e o ontológico, aos quais as noções de conceito como ato, signo e universal se referem respectivamente. Assim, a primeira parte de nossa tese visa articular essas distintas acepções de conceito para elaborar uma visão geral dos conceitos em Ockham que servirá de base para a compreensão sua teoria do discurso mental. A hipótese da linguagem mental sugere que o pensamento tem uma estrutura gramatical profunda, essa teoria que atingiu seu ápice com Ockham no século XIV acabou desaparecendo no início da modernidade e retornando apenas no século XX com um modelo associado à programação de computadores. Na segunda parte da nossa pesquisa nós exploramos a linguagem mental de Ockham e suas origens conceituais. Em seguida, apresentamos o discurso mental de Thomas Hobbes, baseado no modelo computacional para fazer uma comparação com o discurso mental de Ockham. Hobbes aplica a noção de cálculo ao pensamento, o que significa que ele considera as operações mentais um certo tipo de cálculo. Comparamos um modelo de discurso mental de Ockham que é essencialmente gramatical com o discurso mental de Hobbes que é computacional. O objetivo dessa comparação é mostrar como a noção de que o pensamento é constituído como uma linguagem falada na O objetivo dessa comparação é mostrar como a noção de que o pensamento é constituído como uma linguagem falada na Idade Média deu lugar à noção de que a mente funciona como uma máquina no início da modernidade. Essa transformação do modo de conceber conceitos, mente e pensamento representam, em certa medida, a mudança de paradigma da filosofia medieval para a filosofia moderna. Através dessa comparação podemos justificar o fim da linguagem mental no medievo e compreender melhor os limites da linguagem mental de Ockham.The aim of this research is to investigate the relation between concepts and mental language in William of Ockham's thought. The concept is the central notion of Ockham's philosophy and the starting point of our research, however there is no univocal definition of the concept in his works. When Ockham approaches epistemology, concepts are called mental acts and when he develops his mental language, they are called mental signs. There is also a third way of addressing concepts that is related to the notion of concept as mental sign: concepts as universal. Therefore, there are three aspects of concepts that we consider fundamental: the epistemological, the semantical and the ontological, to which the notions of concept as act, sign, and universal refer respectively. Thus, the first part of our thesis aims to articulate these different meanings of concept to elaborate an overview of the concepts in Ockham that will serve as a basis for understanding his theory of mental discourse. The hypothesis of mental language suggests that thought has a deep grammatical structure, this theory that reached its culmination with Ockham in the 14th century eventually disappeared at the beginning of modernity and returned only in the 20th century with a model associated with computer programming. In the second part of our research we explored Ockham's mental language and its conceptual origins. Then, we present Thomas Hobbes' mental discourse, based on the computer model to compare with Ockham's mental discourse. Hobbes applies the notion of calculus to thought, which means that he considers mental operations a certain type of calculus. We compare a model of Ockham's mental discourse that is essentially grammatical with Hobbes' mental discourse that is computational. The purpose of this comparison is to show how the notion that thought is constituted as a mental language in the Middle Ages gave way to the notion that the mind functions as a machine in early modernity. This transformation of the way of conceiving concepts, mind, and thought represents, to some extent, the paradigm shift from the medieval philosophy to the modern. Through this comparison we can justify the end of medieval mental language and better understand the limits of Ockham's mental language.Cette recherche a pour objectif d'étudier la relation entre les concepts et le langage mental dans la pensée de Guillaume d'Ockham. Le concept est la notion centrale de la philosophie d'Ockham et le point de départ de notre recherche, cependant il est difficile de trouver une définition univoque du concept dans ses oeuvres. Lorsque Ockham aborde l'épistémologie, les concepts sont appelés actes mentaux et lorsqu'il développe son langage mental, ils sont appelés signes mentaux. Il existe également une troisième façon de traiter les concepts qui est liée à la notion de concept comme signe mental : les concepts comme universels. Par conséquent, il y a trois aspects des concepts que nous considérons comme fondamentaux : l'épistémologique, le sémantique et l'ontologique, auxquels se réfèrent respectivement les notions de concept comme acte, signe et universel. Ainsi, la première partie de notre thèse vise à articuler ces différentes acceptions de concept pour élaborer une synthèse des concepts chez Ockham qui servira de base à la compréhension de sa théorie du discours mental. L'hypothèse du langage mental suggère que la pensée a une structure grammaticale profonde, cette théorie qui a atteint son apogée avec Ockham au XIVe siècle a fini par disparaître au début de la modernité pour ne revenir qu'au XXe siècle avec un modèle associé à la programmation informatique. Dans la deuxième partie de nos recherches, nous nous sommes consacrés au langage mental d'Ockham et à ses origines conceptuelles. Ensuite, nous présentons le discours mental de Thomas Hobbes, en nous basant sur le modèle informatique pour faire une comparaison avec le discours mental d'Ockham. Hobbes applique la notion de calcul à la pensée, ce qui signifie qu'il considère les opérations mentales comme un certain type de calcul. Nous comparons un modèle du discours mental d'Ockham qui est essentiellement grammatical avec le discours mental de Hobbes qui est computationnel. L'objectif de cette comparaison est de montrer comment l'idée que la pensée est constituée comme un langage mental au Moyen-Âge a été remplacée par l'idée que l'esprit fonctionne comme une machine au début de la modernité. Cette transformation de la façon de concevoir les concepts, l'esprit et la pensée représente, dans une certaine mesure, le changement de paradigme de la philosophie médiévale à la philosophie moderne. Grâce à cette comparaison, nous pouvons justifier la fin du langage mental médiéval et mieux comprendre les limites du langage mental d'Ockham

Speaking about signs. Fourteenth-century views on suppositio materialis

Wetensch. publicati

The influence of the nominalist movement on the scientific thought of Bacon, Boyle and Locke

Imperial Users onl

Rebirth, reform, and resilience: universities in transition, 1300-1700

(print) 367 p., [1] p. of plates ; 24 cmUniversities in transition, 1300-1700JAMES M. KITTELSON : OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY Introduction : The Durability of the Universities of Old Europe 1 -- HEIKO A. OBERMAN : UNIVERSITY OF TUBINGEN University and Society on the Threshold of Modern Times : The German Connection 19 -- LEWIS W. SPITZ : STANFORD UNIVERSITY The Importance of the Reformation for Universities : Culture and Confession in the Critical Years 42 -- EDWARD GRANT : INDIANA UNIVERSITY Science and the Medieval University 68 -- WILLIAM J. COURTENAY : UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN The Role of English Thought in the Transformation of University Education in the Late Middle Ages 103 -- JOHN M. FLETCHER : UNIVERSITY OF ASTON IN BIRMINGHAM University Migrations in the Late Middle Ages with Particular Reference to the Stamford Secession 163 -- PAUL W. KNOLL : UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA The University of Cracow in the Conciliar Movement 190 -- GUY FITCH LYTLE : UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS The Careers of Oxford Students in the Later Middle Ages 213 -- JAMES H. OVERFIELD : UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT University Studies and the Clergy in Pre-Reformation Germany 254 -- M. A. SCREECH : UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, LONDON Two Attitudes toward Hebrew Studies : Erasmus and Rabelais 293 -- JOHN M. FLETCHER and JULIAN DEAHL : UNIVERSITY OF ASTON IN BIRMINGHAM European Universities, 1300-1700 : The Development of Research, 1969-1979, with a Summary Bibliography 324 -- Notes on Contributors 359 -- Index 36

Truth, time and sacred text : responses to medieval nominalism in John Wyclif's Summa de Ente and De Veritate Sacrae Scripturae.

Available from British Library Document Supply Centre-DSC:DXN035085 / BLDSC - British Library Document Supply CentreSIGLEGBUnited Kingdo

A explicação ockamiana de proposições passadas, ou instruções para um aprendiz

Na semântica ockhamiana, o predicado 'verdadeiro' deriva de uma outra relação semântica mais fundamental, a relação de suposição. O autor mostra como esta relação de dependência entre dois predicados semânticos figura na análise das condições de verdade de proposições passadas, um modelo que pode ser estendido a proposições futuras e possíveis. O texto procura indicar como a explicação das condições de verdade de proposições possíveis situa a semântica das modalidades aléticas em continuidade com a semântica de proposições não presentes. Este último ponto ganha em interesse se o colocarmos ao lado de um outro aspecto da teoria modal ockhamiana, a saber, o fato de modalidades serem definidas como todo termo que pode ser predicado de proposições inteiras. Como conclusão, o autor expõe os diferentes níveis de análise de modalidades aléticas, dentro do quadro teórico ockhamiano. AbstractWithin the ockhamist semantics, the predicate 'true' is explained by another more basic semantical relation, the relation of supposition. The author shows how this relationship between two semantical predicates figures in the analysis of the truth-conditions of propositions about the past, and demonstrates that it is a model that can be extended to propositions about both the future and the possible. The author indicates how the semantics of alethic modalities is in continuity with the semantics of propositions about the past and about the future. If we consider another aspect of Ockham's modal theory, viz., the fact that modalities are defined as any term that can be predicated of a whole proposition, the importance of this point becomes clear. In conclusion, the author points out the different levels of analysis of alethic modalities within an ockhamist framework

Nicole Oresme and Modi Rerum

This paper is the written version of my contribution to the International Conference «30 years Logica modernorum» held in Amsterdam in November 1997 in honor of the late prof. Lambertus M. de Rijk. Research on Oresme’s modi rerum theory was in the first stage, while now we can read the critical edition of Oresme’s Physics commentary, where modi are introduced and widely used. In this paper I shall consider Oresme’s polemical use of modi rerum, trying to set it in the larger context of both his ontology and his epistemology. Oresme’s challenge to either a realist or terminist ontology by means of modi rerum conceals probably an attack to William of Ockham; Oresme refers explicitly to Ockham concerning exclusive propositions, but I think that on many other occasions the polemical target of Oresme’s criticism can be reasonably identified in William of Ockham or in some unnamed followers of the Venerabilis Inceptor. Some hints are reserved also to the possible sources of Oresme’s modi rerum

Taking Ex nihilo seriously : ontology and providence in creation

EThOS - Electronic Theses Online ServiceGBUnited Kingdo

Foreknowledge, Free Will, and the Divine Power Distinction in Thomas Bradwardine\u27s De futuris contingentibus

Thomas Bradwardine (d. 1349) was an English philosopher, logician, and theologian of some note; but though recent scholarship has revived an interest in much of his work, little attention has been paid to an early treatise he wrote on the topic of future contingents, entitled De futuris contingentibus. In this thesis I aim to address this deficit, arguing in particular that the treatise makes original use of the divine power distinction to resolve the apparent conflict between God’s foreknowledge on the one hand, and human free will on the other. Bradwardine argues that God’s foreknowledge operates in accord with God’s ordained power, and so relative to God’s ordained power, our actions are indeed compelled; however, because of Bradwardine’s appeal to the distinction in power, he is able to maintain that our actions remain free relative to God’s absolute power, and are thus free, absolutely speaking. This solution is, I argue, unique to Bradwardine, although it seems to be abandoned in his later writing. Bradwardine’s approach to the problem is heavily influenced by three figures in particular — Boethius, Anselm of Canterbury, and John Duns Scotus — each of whose solutions I discuss in some detail. Furthermore, Bradwardine explicitly places his own solution in opposition to that of William Ockham, and so I give substantial attention to examining Ockham’s position. But while I agree with Bradwardine’s assessment that Ockham’s position undermines God’s foreknowledge in ways that should be untenable to someone of 14th-century Christian commitments, I argue that Bradwardine’s solution amounts to an equally untenable determinism. An appendix contains excerpts from my own English translation of the De futuris contingentibus (the first into any modern language), in parallel with the original Latin