Mental Imagery in Humanoid Robots

Mental imagery presents humans with the opportunity to predict prospective happenings based on own intended actions, to reminisce occurrences from the past and reproduce the perceptual experience. This cognitive capability is mandatory for human survival in this folding and changing world. By means of internal representation, mental imagery offers other cognitive functions (e.g., decision making, planning) the possibility to assess information on objects or events that are not being perceived. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that humans are able to employ this ability in the early stages of infancy. Although materialisation of humanoid robot employment in the future appears to be promising, comprehensive research on mental imagery in these robots is lacking. Working within a human environment required more than a set of pre-programmed actions. This thesis aims to investigate the use of mental imagery in humanoid robots, which could be used to serve the demands of their cognitive skills as in humans. Based on empirical data and neuro-imaging studies on mental imagery, the thesis proposes a novel neurorobotic framework which proposes to facilitate humanoid robots to exploit mental imagery. Through conduction of a series of experiments on mental rotation and tool use, the results from this study confirm this potential. Chapters 5 and 6 detail experiments on mental rotation that investigate a bio-constrained neural network framework accounting for mental rotation processes. They are based on neural mechanisms involving not only visual imagery, but also affordance encoding, motor simulation, and the anticipation of the visual consequences of actions. The proposed model is in agreement with the theoretical and empirical research on mental rotation. The models were validated with both a simulated and physical humanoid robot (iCub), engaged in solving a typical mental rotation task. The results show that the model is able to solve a typical mental rotation task and in agreement with data from psychology experiments, they also show response times linearly dependent on the angular disparity between the objects. Furthermore, the experiments in chapter 6 propose a novel neurorobotic model that has a macro-architecture constrained by knowledge on brain, which encompasses a rather general mental rotation mechanism and incorporates a biologically plausible decision making mechanism. The new model is tested within the humanoid robot iCub in tasks requiring to mentally rotate 2D geometrical images appearing on a computer screen. The results show that the robot has an enhanced capacity to generalize mental rotation of new objects and shows the possible effects of overt movements of the wrist on mental rotation. These results indicate that the model represents a further step in the identification of the embodied neural mechanisms that might underlie mental rotation in humans and might also give hints to enhance robots' planning capabilities. In Chapter 7, the primary purpose for conducting the experiment on tool use development through computational modelling refers to the demonstration that developmental characteristics of tool use identified in human infants can be attributed to intrinsic motivations. Through the processes of sensorimotor learning and rewarding mechanisms, intrinsic motivations play a key role as a driving force that drives infants to exhibit exploratory behaviours, i.e., play. Sensorimotor learning permits an emergence of other cognitive functions, i.e., affordances, mental imagery and problem-solving. Two hypotheses on tool use development are also conducted thoroughly. Secondly, the experiment tests two candidate mechanisms that might underlie an ability to use a tool in infants: overt movements and mental imagery. By means of reinforcement learning and sensorimotor learning, knowledge of how to use a tool might emerge through random movements or trial-and-error which might reveal a solution (sequence of actions) of solving a given tool use task accidentally. On the other hand, mental imagery was used to replace the outcome of overt movements in the processes of self-determined rewards. Instead of determining a reward from physical interactions, mental imagery allows the robots to evaluate a consequence of actions, in mind, before performing movements to solve a given tool use task. Therefore, collectively, the case of mental imagery in humanoid robots was systematically addressed by means of a number of neurorobotic models and, furthermore, two categories of spatial problem solving tasks: mental rotation and tool use. Mental rotation evidently involves the employment of mental imagery and this thesis confirms the potential for its exploitation by humanoid robots. Additionally, the studies on tool use demonstrate that the key components assumed and included in the experiments on mental rotation, namely affordances and mental imagery, can be acquired by robots through the processes of sensorimotor learning.Ministry of Science and Technology, the Thai Governmen

How conscious experience and working memory interact

Active components of classical working memory are conscious, but traditional theory does not account for this fact. Global Workspace theory suggests that consciousness is needed to recruit unconscious specialized networks that carry out detailed working memory functions. The IDA model provides a fine-grained analysis of this process, specifically of two classical workingmemory tasks, verbal rehearsal and the utilization of a visual image. In the process, new light is shed on the interactions between conscious and unconscious\ud aspects of working memory

Intention and motor representation in purposive action

Are there distinct roles for intention and motor representation in explaining the purposiveness of action? Standard accounts of action assign a role to intention but are silent on motor representation. The temptation is to suppose that nothing need be said here because motor representation is either only an enabling condition for purposive action or else merely a variety of intention. This paper provides reasons for resisting that temptation. Some motor representations, like intentions, coordinate actions in virtue of representing outcomes; but, unlike intentions, motor representations cannot feature as premises or conclusions in practical reasoning. This implies that motor representation has a distinctive role in explaining the purposiveness of action. It also gives rise to a problem: were the roles of intention and motor representation entirely independent, this would impair effective action. It is therefore necessary to explain how intentions interlock with motor representations. The solution, we argue, is to recognise that the contents of intentions can be partially determined by the contents of motor representations. Understanding this content-determining relation enables better understanding how intentions relate to actions

Where do bright ideas occur in our brain? Meta-analytic evidence from neuroimaging studies of domain-specific creativity

Many studies have assessed the neural underpinnings of creativity, failing to find a clear anatomical localization. We aimed to provide evidence for a multi-componential neural system for creativity. We applied a general activation likelihood estimation (ALE) meta-analysis to 45 fMRI studies. Three individual ALE analyses were performed to assess creativity in different cognitive domains (Musical, Verbal, and Visuo-spatial). The general ALE revealed that creativity relies on clusters of activations in the bilateral occipital, parietal, frontal, and temporal lobes. The individual ALE revealed different maximal activation in different domains. Musical creativity yields activations in the bilateral medial frontal gyrus, in the left cingulate gyrus, middle frontal gyrus, and inferior parietal lobule and in the right postcentral and fusiform gyri. Verbal creativity yields activations mainly located in the left hemisphere, in the prefrontal cortex, middle and superior temporal gyri, inferior parietal lobule, postcentral and supramarginal gyri, middle occipital gyrus, and insula. The right inferior frontal gyrus and the lingual gyrus were also activated. Visuo-spatial creativity activates the right middle and inferior frontal gyri, the bilateral thalamus and the left precentral gyrus. This evidence suggests that creativity relies on multi-componential neural networks and that different creativity domains depend on different brain regions

Simulation of an array-based neural net model

Research in cognitive science suggests that much of cognition involves the rapid manipulation of complex data structures. However, it is very unclear how this could be realized in neural networks or connectionist systems. A core question is: how could the interconnectivity of items in an abstract-level data structure be neurally encoded? The answer appeals mainly to positional relationships between activity patterns within neural arrays, rather than directly to neural connections in the traditional way. The new method was initially devised to account for abstract symbolic data structures, but it also supports cognitively useful spatial analogue, image-like representations. As the neural model is based on massive, uniform, parallel computations over 2D arrays, the massively parallel processor is a convenient tool for simulation work, although there are complications in using the machine to the fullest advantage. An MPP Pascal simulation program for a small pilot version of the model is running

From “Oh, OK” to “Ah, yes” to “Aha!”: Hyper-systemizing and the rewards of insight\ud

Hyper-systemizers are individuals displaying an unusually strong bias toward systemizing, i.e. toward explaining events and solving problems by appeal to mechanisms that do not involve intentions or agency. Hyper-systemizing in combination with deficit mentalizing ability typically presents clinically as an autistic spectrum disorder; however, the development of hyper-systemizing in combination with normal-range mentalizing ability is not well characterized. Based on a review and synthesis of clinical, observational, experimental, and neurofunctional studies, it is hypothesized that repeated episodes of insightful problem solving by systemizing result in attentional and motivational sensitization toward further systemizing via progressive and chronic deactivation of the default network. This hypothesis is distinguished from alternatives, and its correlational and causal implications are discussed. Predictions of the default-deactivation model accessible to survey-based instruments, standard cognitive measures and neurofunctional methods are outlined, and evidence pertaining to them considered

The Richness of Inner Experience: Relating Styles of Daydreaming to Creative Processes.

Psychologists have long hypothesized that daydreaming (i.e., engaging in stimulus-independent, task-unrelated thoughts and images) may facilitate creativity, but evidence for this hypothesis has been mixed. We propose that, to fully understand the relationship between daydreaming and creativity, it is essential to distinguish between different creative processes as well as between alternative styles of daydreaming. A prominent distinction in creativity research is that between analytic problem solving, which involves incremental and largely conscious processes, and insight, which is characterized by the spontaneity with which an idea springs to mind. In this aspect, insight resembles daydreaming. Indeed, recent evidence has linked daydreaming to creative performance. But like creativity, daydreaming is a multifaceted concept. Daydreams vary in style and content, a fact that is receiving little attention in contemporary research. Not all kinds of daydreaming are likely to have the same effects on creativity. We discuss different factors prevalent in people's daydreaming, such as mood, attentional focus, and intentionality, and consider how these factors may be related to creative processes. We further discuss implications for ways to enhance creativity through deliberate daydreaming practice

Mental rotation meets the motion aftereffect: the role of hV5/MT+ in visual mental imagery

A growing number of studies show that visual mental imagery recruits the same brain areas as visual perception. Although the necessity of hV5/MT+ for motion perception has been revealed by means of TMS, its relevance for motion imagery remains unclear. We induced a direction-selective adaptation in hV5/MT+ by means of an MAE while subjects performed a mental rotation task that elicits imagined motion. We concurrently measured behavioral performance and neural activity with fMRI, enabling us to directly assess the effect of a perturbation of hV5/MT+ on other cortical areas involved in the mental rotation task. The activity in hV5/MT+ increased as more mental rotation was required, and the perturbation of hV5/MT+ affected behavioral performance as well as the neural activity in this area. Moreover, several regions in the posterior parietal cortex were also affected by this perturbation. Our results show that hV5/MT+ is required for imagined visual motion and engages in an interaction with parietal cortex during this cognitive process

How Do Gestures Influence Thinking and Speaking? The Gesture-for-Conceptualization Hypothesis.

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Why it is important to build robots capable of doing science

Science, like any other cognitive activity, is grounded in the sensorimotor interaction of our bodies with the environment. Human embodiment thus constrains the class of scientific concepts and theories which are accessible to us. The paper explores the possibility of doing science with artificial cognitive agents, in the framework of an interactivist-constructivist cognitive model of science. Intelligent robots, by virtue of having different sensorimotor capabilities, may overcome the fundamental limitations of human science and provide important technological innovations. Mathematics and nanophysics are prime candidates for being studied by artificial scientists