Negotiation Games

Negotiations, a model of concurrency with multi party negotiation as primitive, have been recently introduced by J. Desel and J. Esparza. We initiate the study of games for this model. We study coalition problems: can a given coalition of agents force that a negotiation terminates (resp. block the negotiation so that it goes on forever)?; can the coalition force a given outcome of the negotiation? We show that for arbitrary negotiations the problems are EXPTIME-complete. Then we show that for sound and deterministic or even weakly deterministic negotiations the problems can be solved in PTIME. Notice that the input of the problems is a negotiation, which can be exponentially more compact than its state space.Comment: In Proceedings GandALF 2015, arXiv:1509.06858. arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1405.682

Negotiation Games: Acquiring Skills by Playing

This paper shows the research done at the School of Industrial Engineers (ETSII) of the Technical University of Madrid (UPM), in two consecutive academic courses. In this negotiation game each team is formed by three students playing different roles, with a different degree of complexity. The game is played three different times changing the conditions and doing the Zones of Possible Agreement (ZOPA) smaller so the negotiation is going “harder” and it was more difficult for the team to achieve an agreement. Roles were distributed according to the student’s experience, since it was understood that difficulty of the roles was different, especially when there was set a time limit for negotiation. The combination of playing and training has shown that students without particularly good negotiating skills at the beginning of the experiment attained better final results than those who have natural negotiating skills, but no benefit of training

Two-player preplay negotiation games with conditional offers

We consider an extension of strategic normal form games with a phase before the actual play of the game, where players can make binding offers for transfer of utilities to other players after the play of the game, contingent on the recipient playing the strategy indicated in the offer. Such offers transform the payoff matrix of the original game but preserve its non-cooperative nature. The type of offers we focus on here are conditional on a suggested 'matching offer' of the same kind made in return by the receiver. Players can exchange a series of such offers, thus engaging in a bargaining process before a strategic normal form game is played. In this paper we study and analyze solution concepts for two-player normal form games with such preplay negotiation phase, under several assumptions for the bargaining power of the players, such as the possibility of withdrawing previously made offers and opting out from the negotiation process, as well as the value of time for the players in such negotiations. We obtain results describing the possible solutions of such bargaining games and analyze the degrees of efficiency and fairness that can be achieved in such negotiation process

Climate change in game theory context

The aim of this paper is to survey the game theory modelling of the behaviour of global players in mitigation and adaptation related to climate change. Three main fields are applied for the specific aspects of temperature rise: behaviour games, CPR problem and negotiation games. The game theory instruments are useful in analyzing strategies in uncertain circumstances, such as the occurrence and impacts of climate change. To analyze the international players’ relations, actions, attitude toward carbon emission, negotiation power and motives, several games are applied for the climate change in this paper. The solution is surveyed, too, for externality problem

Towards general cooperative game playing

Attempts to develop generic approaches to game playing have been around for several years in the field of Artificial Intelligence. However, games that involve explicit cooperation among otherwise competitive players cooperative negotiation games have not been addressed by current approaches. Yet, such games provide a much richer set of features, related with social aspects of interactions, which make them appealing for envisioning real-world applications. This work proposes a generic agent architecture Alpha to tackle cooperative negotiation games, combining elements such as search strategies, negotiation, opponent modeling and trust management. The architecture is then validated in the context of two different games that fall in this category Diplomacy and Werewolves. Alpha agents are tested in several scenarios, against other state-of-the-art agents. Besides highlighting the promising performance of the agents, the role of each architectural component in each game is assessed. (c) Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Climate change in game theory

The study provides an overview of the application possibilities of game theory to climate change. The characteristics of games are adapted to the topics of climate and carbon. The importance of uncertainty, probability, marginal value of adaptation, common pool resources, etc. are tailored to the context of international relations and the challenge of global warming

Supplier-Buyer Negotiation Games: Equilibrium Conditions and Supply Chain Efficiency

In a decentralized supply chain, supplier–buyer negotiations have a dynamic aspect that requires both players to consider the impact of their decisions on future decisions made by their counterpart. The interaction generally couples strongly the price decision of the supplier and the quantity decision of the buyer. We propose a basic model for a repeated supplier–buyer interaction, during several rounds. In each round, the supplier first quotes a price, and the buyer places an order at that price. We find conditions for existence and uniqueness of a well-behaved subgame-perfect equilibrium in the dynamic game. When costs are stationary and there are no holding costs, we identify some demand distributions for which these conditions are met, examine the efficiency of the equilibrium, and show that, as the number of rounds increases, the profits of the supply chain increase towards the supply chain optimum. In contrast, when costs vary over time or holding costs are present, the benefit from multi-period interactions is reduced and after a finite number of time periods, supply chain profits stay constant even when the number of rounds increases

Efficiency in negotiation: complexity and costly bargaining

Even with complete information, two-person bargaining can generate a large number of equilibria, involving disagreements and inefficiencies, in (i) negotiation games where disagreement payoffs are endogenously determined (Busch and Wen [6]) and (ii) costly bargaining games where there are transaction / participation costs (Anderlini and Felli [2]). We show that when the players have (at the margin) a preference for less complex strategies only efficient equilibria survive in negotiation games (with sufficiently patient players) while, in sharp contrast, it is only the most infficient outcome involving perpetual disagreement that survives in costly bargaining games.We also find that introducing small transaction costs to negotiation games dramatically alters the selection result: perpetual disagreement becomes the only feasible equilibrium outcome. Thus, in both alternating-offers bargaining games and repeated games with exit options (via bargaining and contracts), complexity considerations establish that the Coase Theorem is valid if and only if there are no transaction / participation costs