Game Based Learning for Safety and Security Education

Safety and security education are important part of technology related education, because of recent number of increase in safety and security related incidents. Game based learning is an emerging and rapidly advancing forms of computer-assisted instruction. Game based learning for safety and security education enables students to learn concepts and skills without the risk of physical injury and security breach. In this paper, a pedestal grinder safety game and physical security game have been developed using industrial standard modeling and game development software. The average score of the knowledge test of grinder safety game was 82%, which is higher than traditional lecture only instruction method. In addition, the survey of physical security game shows 84% average satisfaction ratio from high school students who played the game during the summer camp. The results of these studies indicated that game based learning method can enhance students' learning without potential harm to the students

Markov Decision Processes with Applications in Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey

Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) consist of autonomous and resource-limited devices. The devices cooperate to monitor one or more physical phenomena within an area of interest. WSNs operate as stochastic systems because of randomness in the monitored environments. For long service time and low maintenance cost, WSNs require adaptive and robust methods to address data exchange, topology formulation, resource and power optimization, sensing coverage and object detection, and security challenges. In these problems, sensor nodes are to make optimized decisions from a set of accessible strategies to achieve design goals. This survey reviews numerous applications of the Markov decision process (MDP) framework, a powerful decision-making tool to develop adaptive algorithms and protocols for WSNs. Furthermore, various solution methods are discussed and compared to serve as a guide for using MDPs in WSNs

Symbolic Abstractions for Quantum Protocol Verification

Quantum protocols such as the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution protocol exchange qubits to achieve information-theoretic security guarantees. Many variants thereof were proposed, some of them being already deployed. Existing security proofs in that field are mostly tedious, error-prone pen-and-paper proofs of the core protocol only that rarely account for other crucial components such as authentication. This calls for formal and automated verification techniques that exhaustively explore all possible intruder behaviors and that scale well. The symbolic approach offers rigorous, mathematical frameworks and automated tools to analyze security protocols. Based on well-designed abstractions, it has allowed for large-scale formal analyses of real-life protocols such as TLS 1.3 and mobile telephony protocols. Hence a natural question is: Can we use this successful line of work to analyze quantum protocols? This paper proposes a first positive answer and motivates further research on this unexplored path

Information Leakage Games

We consider a game-theoretic setting to model the interplay between attacker and defender in the context of information flow, and to reason about their optimal strategies. In contrast with standard game theory, in our games the utility of a mixed strategy is a convex function of the distribution on the defender's pure actions, rather than the expected value of their utilities. Nevertheless, the important properties of game theory, notably the existence of a Nash equilibrium, still hold for our (zero-sum) leakage games, and we provide algorithms to compute the corresponding optimal strategies. As typical in (simultaneous) game theory, the optimal strategy is usually mixed, i.e., probabilistic, for both the attacker and the defender. From the point of view of information flow, this was to be expected in the case of the defender, since it is well known that randomization at the level of the system design may help to reduce information leaks. Regarding the attacker, however, this seems the first work (w.r.t. the literature in information flow) proving formally that in certain cases the optimal attack strategy is necessarily probabilistic

Analysis domain model for shared virtual environments

The field of shared virtual environments, which also encompasses online games and social 3D environments, has a system landscape consisting of multiple solutions that share great functional overlap. However, there is little system interoperability between the different solutions. A shared virtual environment has an associated problem domain that is highly complex raising difficult challenges to the development process, starting with the architectural design of the underlying system. This paper has two main contributions. The first contribution is a broad domain analysis of shared virtual environments, which enables developers to have a better understanding of the whole rather than the part(s). The second contribution is a reference domain model for discussing and describing solutions - the Analysis Domain Model

Ergodic mean-payo games for the analysis of attacks in crypto-currencies

Crypto-currencies are digital assets designed to work as a medium of exchange, e.g., Bitcoin, but they are susceptible to attacks (dishonest behavior of participants). A framework for the analysis of attacks in crypto-currencies requires (a) modeling of game-theoretic aspects to analyze incentives for deviation from honest behavior; (b) concurrent interactions between participants; and (c) analysis of long-term monetary gains. Traditional game-theoretic approaches for the analysis of security protocols consider either qualitative temporal properties such as safety and termination, or the very special class of one-shot (stateless) games. However, to analyze general attacks on protocols for crypto-currencies, both stateful analysis and quantitative objectives are necessary. In this work our main contributions are as follows: (a) we show how a class of concurrent mean-payo games, namely ergodic games, can model various attacks that arise naturally in crypto-currencies; (b) we present the first practical implementation of algorithms for ergodic games that scales to model realistic problems for crypto-currencies; and (c) we present experimental results showing that our framework can handle games with thousands of states and millions of transitions