Public Evidence from Secret Ballots

Elections seem simple---aren't they just counting? But they have a unique, challenging combination of security and privacy requirements. The stakes are high; the context is adversarial; the electorate needs to be convinced that the results are correct; and the secrecy of the ballot must be ensured. And they have practical constraints: time is of the essence, and voting systems need to be affordable and maintainable, and usable by voters, election officials, and pollworkers. It is thus not surprising that voting is a rich research area spanning theory, applied cryptography, practical systems analysis, usable security, and statistics. Election integrity involves two key concepts: convincing evidence that outcomes are correct and privacy, which amounts to convincing assurance that there is no evidence about how any given person voted. These are obviously in tension. We examine how current systems walk this tightrope.Comment: To appear in E-Vote-Id '1

Utah Marriage and Divorce Laws

A summary of current Utah domestic relations law, updated annually. Current legal forms and sample filing documents are included in the Appendix.https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/miscellanea/1000/thumbnail.jp

Utah Marriage and Divorce Laws

A summary of current Utah domestic relations law, updated annually. Selected sample filing documents and links to current legal forms are included in the Appendix.https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/miscellanea/1000/thumbnail.jp

Themis: an On-Site Voting System with Systematic Cast-as-intended Verification and Partial Accountability

International audienceWe propose an on-site voting system Themis, that aims at improving security when local authorities are not fully trusted. Voters vote thanks to voting sheets as well as smart cards that produce encrypted ballots. Electronic ballots are systematically audited, without compromising privacy. Moreover, the system includes a precise dispute resolution procedure identifying misbehaving parties. We conduct a full formal analysis of Themis using ProVerif, with a novel approach in order to cover the modular arithmetic needed in our protocol. In order to evaluate the usability of our system, we organized a voting experiment on a (small) group of voters

HVAC SYSTEM REMOTE MONITORING AND DIAGNOSIS

A monitoring system for an HVAC system of a building includes a monitoring server located remotely from the building. The monitoring server receives, from a device installed at the building, (i) time-domain current data based on a measured aggregate current supplied to a plurality of components of the HVAC system, and (ii) data based on frequency-domain current data of the measured aggregate current. Based on the received data, the monitoring server accesses (i) whether a failure has occurred in a first com ponent of the plurality of components and (ii) generates a preliminary advisory in response to determining that the failure has occurred. The monitoring server compares the preliminary advisory to a threshold value based on data stored from prior advisories. If the preliminary advisory is on a first side of the threshold value, the monitoring server provides the preliminary advisory as a first advisory to a technician for review

Scientific Opinion on the safety and efficacy of L-threonine produced by Escherichia coli strains NRRL B-30843, DSM 26131, KCCM11133P or DSM 25085 for all animal species based on a dossier submitted by AMAC EEIG

This opinion concerns L-threonine as a feed additive produced by four different strains derived from Escherichia coli K-12. Three strains are genetically modified (GM): NRRL B-30843, KCCM11133P and DSM 26131. L-Threonine produced by E. coli DSM 26131 could not be assessed because of the insufficient molecular characterisation of the genetic modification, and the lack of data on both the absence of the production strain and its recombinant DNA from the final product. No safety concerns were found in the products related to the genetic modification of the other GM strains or to antibiotic resistance of the producer strains. L-Threonine products made by fermentation using E. coli strains NRRL B-30843, KCCM11133P and DSM 25085 are free of the production strain and have a high purity (>= 98.8 %). L-Threonine, technically pure, produced by E. coli strains NRRL B-30843, KCCM11133P and DSM 25085 is safe for the target animals when used in appropriate amounts to supplement threonine-deficient feeds, for the consumer of animal products and for the environment. The FEEDAP Panel considers that L-threonine produced by E. coli strains NRRL B-30843, KCCM11133P or DSM 25085 is not an irritant to eyes and skin, and is not a skin sensitiser. There is no risk from inhalation of L-threonine, but concerns may arise from the content of endotoxins in the products. These L-threonine products are considered an efficacious source of the amino acid L-threonine for all animal species. For L-threonine to be as efficacious in ruminants as in non-ruminant species, it requires protection against degradation in the rumen. The Panel on Additives and Products or Substances used in Animal Feed ( FEEDAP) has concerns regarding the safety of the simultaneous oral administration of L-threonine via water for drinking and feed

Sixth International Joint Conference on Electronic Voting E-Vote-ID 2021. 5-8 October 2021

This volume contains papers presented at E-Vote-ID 2021, the Sixth International Joint Conference on Electronic Voting, held during October 5-8, 2021. Due to the extraordinary situation provoked by Covid-19 Pandemic, the conference is held online for second consecutive edition, instead of in the traditional venue in Bregenz, Austria. E-Vote-ID Conference resulted from the merging of EVOTE and Vote-ID and counting up to 17 years since the _rst E-Vote conference in Austria. Since that conference in 2004, over 1000 experts have attended the venue, including scholars, practitioners, authorities, electoral managers, vendors, and PhD Students. The conference collected the most relevant debates on the development of Electronic Voting, from aspects relating to security and usability through to practical experiences and applications of voting systems, also including legal, social or political aspects, amongst others; turning out to be an important global referent in relation to this issue. Also, this year, the conference consisted of: · Security, Usability and Technical Issues Track · Administrative, Legal, Political and Social Issues Track · Election and Practical Experiences Track · PhD Colloquium, Poster and Demo Session on the day before the conference E-VOTE-ID 2021 received 49 submissions, being, each of them, reviewed by 3 to 5 program committee members, using a double blind review process. As a result, 27 papers were accepted for its presentation in the conference. The selected papers cover a wide range of topics connected with electronic voting, including experiences and revisions of the real uses of E-voting systems and corresponding processes in elections. We would also like to thank the German Informatics Society (Gesellschaft für Informatik) with its ECOM working group and KASTEL for their partnership over many years. Further we would like to thank the Swiss Federal Chancellery and the Regional Government of Vorarlberg for their kind support. EVote- ID 2021 conference is kindly supported through European Union's Horizon 2020 projects ECEPS (grant agreement 857622) and mGov4EU (grant agreement 959072). Special thanks go to the members of the international program committee for their hard work in reviewing, discussing, and shepherding papers. They ensured the high quality of these proceedings with their knowledge and experience

PUF authentication and key-exchange by substring matching

Mechanisms for operating a prover device and a verifier device so that the verifier device can verify the authenticity of the prover device. The prover device generates a data string by: (a) submitting a challenge to a physical unclonable function (PUF) to obtain a response string, (b) selecting a substring from the response string, (c) injecting the selected substring into the data string, and (d) injecting random bits into bit positions of the data string not assigned to the selected substring. The verifier: (e) generates an estimated response string by evaluating a computational model of the PUF based on the challenge; (f) performs a search process to identify the selected substring within the data string using the estimated response string; and (g) determines whether the prover device is authentic based on a measure of similarity between the identified substring and a corresponding substring of the estimated response string

Electronic Voting: 6th International Joint Conference, E-Vote-ID 2021, Virtual Event, October 5–8, 2021: proceedings

This volume contains the papers presented at E-Vote-ID 2021, the Sixth International Joint Conference on Electronic Voting, held during October 5–8, 2021. Due to the extraordinary situation brought about by the COVID-19, the conference was held online for the second consecutive edition, instead of in the traditional venue in Bregenz, Austria. The E-Vote-ID conference is the result of the merger of the EVOTE and Vote-ID conferences, with first EVOTE conference taking place 17 years ago in Austria. Since that conference in 2004, over 1000 experts have attended the venue, including scholars, practitioners, authorities, electoral managers, vendors, and PhD students. The conference focuses on the most relevant debates on the development of electronic voting, from aspects relating to security and usability through to practical experiences and applications of voting systems, also including legal, social, or political aspects, amongst others, and has turned out to be an important global referent in relation to this issue