New Formalized Results on the Meta-Theory of a Paraconsistent Logic

Classical logics are explosive, meaning that everything follows from a contradiction. Paraconsistent logics are logics that are not explosive. This paper presents the meta-theory of a paraconsistent infinite-valued logic, in particular new results showing that while the question of validity for a given formula can be reduced to a consideration of only finitely many truth values, this does not mean that the logic collapses to a finite-valued logic. All definitions and theorems are formalized in the Isabelle/HOL proof assistant

A Paraconsistent Higher Order Logic

Classical logic predicts that everything (thus nothing useful at all) follows from inconsistency. A paraconsistent logic is a logic where an inconsistency does not lead to such an explosion, and since in practice consistency is difficult to achieve there are many potential applications of paraconsistent logics in knowledge-based systems, logical semantics of natural language, etc. Higher order logics have the advantages of being expressive and with several automated theorem provers available. Also the type system can be helpful. We present a concise description of a paraconsistent higher order logic with countable infinite indeterminacy, where each basic formula can get its own indeterminate truth value (or as we prefer: truth code). The meaning of the logical operators is new and rather different from traditional many-valued logics as well as from logics based on bilattices. The adequacy of the logic is examined by a case study in the domain of medicine. Thus we try to build a bridge between the HOL and MVL communities. A sequent calculus is proposed based on recent work by Muskens.Comment: Originally in the proceedings of PCL 2002, editors Hendrik Decker, Joergen Villadsen, Toshiharu Waragai (http://floc02.diku.dk/PCL/). Correcte

A Note on a Modified Catuskoti

The `catuskoti' or tetralemma in Buddhist logic is a problematic subject from the modern logical point of view. Recently a many-valued paraconsistent logic was proposed in order to formalize catuskoti adequately by G. Priest. On the other hand a slight modification of the formalization of catuskoti seems to allow an appropriate interpretation in the framework of the classical propositional calculus in the mathematical logic developed by Russell-Whitehead and Hilbert-Ackermann.Comment: Appendix has been slightly corrected. No substantial change

Truth Values in t-norm based Systems Many-valued FUZZY Logic

In t-norm based systems many-valued logic, valuations of propositions form a non-countable set: interval [0,1]. In addition, we are given a set E of truth values p, subject to certain conditions, the valuation v is v=V(p), V reciprocal application of E on [0,1]. The general propositional algebra of t-norm based many-valued logic is then constructed from seven axioms. It contains classical logic (not many-valued) as a special case. It is first applied to the case where E=[0,1] and V is the identity. The result is a t-norm based many-valued logic in which contradiction can have a nonzero degree of truth but cannot be true; for this reason, this logic is called quasi-paraconsistent

AN EIGHT-VALUED PRACONSISTENT LOGIC

It is known that many-valued paraconsistent logics are useful for expressing uncertain and inconsistency-tolerant reasoning in a wide range of Computer Science. Some four-valued and sixteen-valued logics have especially been well-studied. Some four-valued logics are not so ne-grained, and some sixteen-valued logics are enough ne-grained, but rather complex. In this paper, a natural eight-valued paraconsistent logic rather than four-valued and sixteen-valued logics is introduced as a Gentzen-type sequent calculus. This eight-valued logic is enough ne-grained and simpler than sixteen-valued logic. A triplet valuation semantics is introduced for this logic, and the completeness theorem for this semantics is proved. The cut-elimination theorem for this logic is proved, and this logic is shown to be decidable

What is a Paraconsistent Logic?

Paraconsistent logics are logical systems that reject the classical principle, usually dubbed Explosion, that a contradiction implies everything. However, the received view about paraconsistency focuses only the inferential version of Explosion, which is concerned with formulae, thereby overlooking other possible accounts. In this paper, we propose to focus, additionally, on a meta-inferential version of Explosion, i.e. which is concerned with inferences or sequents. In doing so, we will offer a new characterization of paraconsistency by means of which a logic is paraconsistent if it invalidates either the inferential or the meta-inferential notion of Explosion. We show the non-triviality of this criterion by discussing a number of logics. On the one hand, logics which validate and invalidate both versions of Explosion, such as classical logic and Asenjo–Priest’s 3-valued logic LP. On the other hand, logics which validate one version of Explosion but not the other, such as the substructural logics TS and ST, introduced by Malinowski and Cobreros, Egré, Ripley and van Rooij, which are obtained via Malinowski’s and Frankowski’s q- and p-matrices, respectively