Poverty rankings of opportunity profiles

We address the problem of ranking distributions of opportunity sets in terms of poverty. In order to accomplish this task, we identify a suitable notion of ‘multidimensional poverty line’ and we characterize axiomatically several poverty rankings of opportunity profiles. Among them, the Head-Count and the Opportunity-Gap poverty rankings, which are the natural counterparts of the most widely used income poverty indices.Poverty, opportunity sets, head-count, poverty-gap.

Poverty Rankings of Opportunity Profiles

We address the problem of ranking distributions of opportunity sets in terms of poverty. In order to accomplish this task, we identify a suitable notion of `multidimensional poverty line', extend the most widely used income poverty criteria to opportunity profiles, and provide characterizations of a few poverty rankings that rely on such criteria.Poverty, opportunity sets, head-count, poverty-gap.

Freedom, Opportunity and Wellbeing

This paper reexamines key results from the measurement of opportunity freedom, or the extent to which a set of options offers a decision maker real opportunities to achieve. Three cases are investigated: no preferences, a single preference, and plural preferences. The three co the cardinality relation, the indirect utility relation, and the effective freedom relation variations are considered within a common axiomatic framework. Special attention is given to representations of freedom rankings, with the goal of providing practical approaches for measuring opportunity freedom and the extent of capabilities.

Appraising Diversity with an Ordinal Notion of Similarity: An Axiomatic Approach

This paper provides an axiomatic characterization of two rules for comparing alternative sets of objects on the basis of the diversity that they offer. The framework considered assumes a finite universe of objects and an a priori given ordinal quadernary relation that compares alternative pairs of objects on the basis of their ordinal dissimilarity. Very few properties of this quadernary relation are assumed (beside completeness, transitivity and a very natural form of symmetry). The two rules that we characterize are the maxi-max criterion and the lexi-max criterion. The maxi-max criterion considers that a set is more diverse than another if and only if the two objects that are the most dissimilar in the former are weakly as dissimilar as the two most dissimilar objects in the later. The lexi-max criterion is defined as usual as the lexicographic extension of the maxi-max criterion. Some connections with the broader issue of measuring freedom of choice are also provided.Diversity, Measurement, Axioms, Freedom of choice

Unstructured Direct Elicitation of Decision Rules

We investigate the feasibility of unstructured direct-elicitation (UDE) of decision rules consumers use to form consideration sets. With incentives to think hard and answer truthfully, tested formats ask respondents to state non-compensatory, compensatory, or mixed rules for agents who will select a product for the respondents. In a mobile-phone study two validation tasks (one delayed 3 weeks) ask respondents to indicate which of 32 mobile phones they would consider from a fractional 4[superscript 5]x2[superscript 2] design of features and levels. UDE predicts consideration sets better, across profiles and across respondents, than a structured direct-elicitation method (SDE). It predicts comparably to established incentive-aligned compensatory, non-compensatory, and mixed decompositional methods. In a more-complex (20x7x5[superscript 2]x4x3[superscript 4]x2[superscript 2]) automobile study, non-compensatory decomposition is not feasible and additive-utility decomposition is strained, but UDE scales well. Incentives are aligned for all methods using prize indemnity insurance to award a chance at $40,000 for an automobile plus cash. UDE predicts consideration sets better than either additive decomposition or an established SDE method (Casemap). We discuss the strengths and weaknesses of UDE relative to established methods.Research Grants Council (Hong Kong, China) (SAR (9041182, CityU 1454/06H))Pennsylvania State University (Smeal Small Research Grant

Finding the majority-rule equilibrium under lexicographic comparison of candidates

This paper considers the well studied problem of the existence of an undominated point, under the assumption of lexicographic preferences of voters, as espoused by Taylor in [24]. We extend Taylor's model to situations were we allow for (i) voters to have different ranings of the issues in n- dimensional issue space and (ii) a candidate to be disregarded by a voter if his stand on any one or more of the issues involved in the election is perceived to be too extreme by the voter and (iii) combinations of (i) and (ii). We extend the results of Taylor by demonstrating the non-existence of an equilibrium point in these models in general and then showing that under special cir- cumstances, specialized variants of the “median” point(s) represent equilib- rium or undominated points in these models too. Thus a model of voting behavior results that is closer approximation of reality in that historically incumbents tend to win. The primary conclusion of the paper is to suggest that incumbents tend to have an advantage when the election process is characterized by a large presence of special interests or as information be- comes more expensive to acquire