21 research outputs found
Effective reduction of cryptographic protocols specification for model-checking with Spin
In this article a practical application of the Spin model checker for verifying cryptographic
protocols was shown. An efficient framework for specifying a minimized protocol model while
retaining its functionality was described. Requirements for such a model were discussed, such
as powerful adversary, multiple protocol runs and a way of specifying validated properties as
formulas in temporal logic
On the Security of Cryptographic Protocols Using the Little Theorem of Witness Functions
In this paper, we show how practical the little theorem of witness functions
is in detecting security flaws in some category of cryptographic protocols. We
convey a formal analysis of the Needham-Schroeder symmetric-key protocol in the
theory of witness functions. We show how it helps to teach about a security
vulnerability in a given step of this protocol where the value of security of a
particular sensitive ticket in a sent message unexpectedly plummets compared
with its value when received. This vulnerability may be exploited by an
intruder to mount a replay attack as described by Denning and Sacco.Comment: Accepted at the 2019 IEEE Canadian Conference on Electrical &
Computer Engineering (CCECE) on March 1, 201
A BSP Algorithm for the State Space Construction of Security Protocols
International audienceThis paper presents a Bulk-Synchronous Parallel (BSP) algorithm to compute the discrete state space of structured models of security protocols. The BSP model of parallelism avoids concurrency related problems (mainly deadlocks and non-determinism) and allows us to design an efficient algorithm that is at the same time simple to express. A prototype implementation has been developed, allowing to run benchmarks showing the benefits of our algorithm
Automatic Methods for Analyzing Non-repudiation Protocole with an Active Intruder
International audienceNon-repudiation protocols have an important role in many areas where secured transactions with proofs of participation are necessary. Formal methods are clever and without error, therefore using them for verifying such protocols is crucial. In this purpose, we show how to partially represent non-repudiation as a combination of authentications on the Fair Zhou-Gollmann protocol. After discussing the limitations of this method, we define a new one based on the handling of the knowledge of protocol participants. This second method is general and of natural use, as it consists in adding simple annotations in the protocol specification. It is very easy to implement in tools able to handle participants knowledge. We have implemented it in the AVISPA Tool and analyzed the optimistic Cederquist-Corin-Dashti protocol, discovering two attacks. This extension of the AVISPA Tool for handling non-repudiation opens a highway to the specification of many other properties, without any more change in the tool itself
Analysis of Single Sign on for Multiple Web Applications
Abstract: In general, a coherent authentication strategy or a solid authentication framework is missing in recent authentication system. Over time this leads to a proliferation of applications, each of which comes with their own authentication needs and user repositories. At one time or another, everyone needs to remember multiple usernames and passwords to access different applications on a network. This poses a huge cost for the administration and support department accounts must be set up in each application for each employee, users forget their passwords, and so on. Single sign-on (SSO) is a session/user authentication process that permits a user to enter one name and password in order to access multiple applications. Through this paper we will discuss the basic sign on model and disadvantage of multi sign on system. Later on, the single sign on model will be presented, especially with the focus on the different SSO architectures; We will compare the SSO solution to the ACL with proxy signature
Security Protocol Specification and Verification with AnBx
Designing distributed protocols is complex and requires actions at very different levels: from the design of an interaction flow supporting the desired application-specific guarantees, to the selection of the most appropriate network-level protection mechanisms.
To tame this complexity, we propose AnBx, a formal protocol specification language based on the popular Alice & Bob notation. AnBx offers channels as the main abstraction for communication, providing different authenticity and/or confidentiality guarantees for message transmission.
AnBx extends existing proposals in the literature with a novel notion of forwarding channels, enforcing specific security guarantees from the message originator to the final recipient along a number of intermediate forwarding agents. We give a formal semantics of AnBx in terms of a state transition system expressed in the AVISPA Intermediate Format. We devise an ideal channel model
and a possible cryptographic implementation, and we show that, under mild restrictions, the two representations coincide, thus making AnBx amenable to automated verification with different tools. We demonstrate the benefits of the declarative specification style distinctive of AnBx by revisiting the design of two existing e-payment protocols, iKP and SET