Long Night of the Tankers

Long Night of the Tankers presents a fresh account of a lesser-known but critical component of the Atlantic naval theatre during World War II. Using war diaries, after-action reports, and first-hand accounts, authors Bercuson and Herwig examine the story behind Operation Neuland, the German plan to interrupt vital oil supplies from reaching the United States and the United Kingdom by preventing Allied oil tankers from leaving refineries in the Caribbean. The story begins in February 1942 and follows this German attempt to scuttle the Allied war machine through to the end of the war. Told largely from the German perspective, it details the planning and execution of the Germans and the diplomatic, political, and military responses of the Allies, particularly the United States, to overcome the German effort. Winner, 2014 John Lyman Book Award for U.S. Naval History (North American Society for Oceanic History

“A Game of Human Chess”: The Double Cross System and MI-5’s Supremacy in World War II

World War II featured monumental battles, such as the Normandy invasions, the Battle of the Bulge, Stalingrad, Iwo Jima, El Alamein, and Kursk. While historical scholarship of the World War II generally focuses on the war’s grand military engagements, it is imperative to note that Allied and Axis intelligence units battled for supremacy in a war of deception. The Double Cross system employed by the British military intelligence division (MI-5) was, virtually from the war’s onset, successful in overwhelming its German opponent, the Abwehr by turning its agents into supportive double agents. Traditional historiography follows the classic spy narrative and credits the success of MI-5 to its daring agents, brilliant creators, or stalwart handlers who used wit and guile to deceive their German adversary. In this thesis I will argue that the success of the Double Cross system should be attributed to more than solely the actions of the Double Cross team. Though the operatives played an invaluable role, the existence of an overriding, well-structured system determined their success. By examining the uniqueness of the Double Cross system, this thesis will seek to illustrate that the victorious outcome of the British in the intelligence war was due to their tireless effort to perfect a system of counterespionage. In addition to the prewar foundations of British espionage, I will examine their success in terms of its comparative ideological advantage over their German adversaries. This thesis evaluates the glamourizing myth of individual performance that plagues all of today’s World War II scholarship and rejects its premises in favor of a modified approach that holds the systemic advantage of the Double Cross system as being of equal importance as the achievements of its personnel. By examining the system not only will the myth of individual supremacy be overturned, but also the system’s lasting legacies can be evaluated. The importance of the Double Cross system lies with the success MI-5 had during World War Two and its use as the blueprint for intelligence services moving forward after 1945

The Role of Female Cryptanalysts from 1914 to 1946

This thesis shows that the history of cryptanalysis in Britain in the first half of the twentieth century has focussed on the contribution of men to the virtual exclusion of that of women, and produces evidence to prove that, from the First World War onwards, women, although in a minority, were working at the same level as their male counterparts, despite their lack of mention in the published literature which generally holds that only men worked as cryptanalysts during this period. The present research identifies that this was not the case, and that though the number of confirmed female cryptanalysts remains small and elusive, these women were nonetheless important for the role that they played. This thesis examines published work on British cryptanalysis between 1914 and 1946, demonstrating that these accounts are almost exclusively by men and about men. The research presented uses original documentation and interviews to advance and place on record knowledge about female cryptanalysts who worked in high-level codebreaking during time both of war and peace in a gendered approach. The analysis sets out the case studies of six women - four cryptanalysts, one linguist and a decoder - who typify the roles that women held in cryptanalysis between 1914 and 1946, providing an in-depth study of their backgrounds and roles they carried out for the British Admiralty’s Room 40, the War Office’s MI1(b) and HushWAACs, and the Foreign Office’s Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS). The thesis provides a detailed historiographical chronology in a gendered approach of the women’s role in cryptanalysis from the beginnings of modern codebreaking in the First World War, through the interwar creation of GC&CS, to the vast cryptanalytical organisation at Bletchley Park during the Second World War, setting out the context of relevant literature and archival materials. Definitions are derived for key terms whose meanings have changed over the period, causing confusion and erroneous conclusions to be drawn, and key themes are identified which can be used in the identification of future female cryptanalysts. This thesis clearly identifies that women were working as high-grade cryptanalysts during the period 1914 to 1946, and offers pointers and analytical tools to potential further identifications in future research

Bomber command’s electronic warfare policy and suppression of enemy air defence posture during the Second World War

This thesis will examine the Electronic Warfare [EW] policies and subsequent Suppression of Enemy Air Defence [SEAD] postures of the Royal Air Force’s Bomber Command during the Second World War. It examines how EW was applied to the Luftwaffe (German Air Force) Integrated Air Defence System [IADS] so as to reduce Bomber Command aircraft losses, and determines whether EW policies were drafted in a proactive and/or reactive fashion vis-à-vis the Luftwaffe IADS. The thesis applies air power theory regarding the levels and methods of application by which SEAD was brought to bear against the IADS as a result of these EW policies. Ultimately, the thesis will argue that Bomber Command enacted both proactive and reactive EW policies at the Campaign and Localised SEAD levels using a combination of Manoeuvrist, Mass and Stealth/Surprise approaches

Tactics and Operational Research in the Battle of the Atlantic in WWII

This study concerns the naval campaign in the 1939-1945 conflict between the Allied and Axis forces known as the ‘Battle of the Atlantic’. To facilitate the understanding of this battle a computer-based battle model of a typical engagement between the opposing forces was created. The key naval assets in this conflict were the Allied merchant ships carrying vital supplies that were organised into convoys and were escorted for their protection by warships. On the Axis side were submarines (U-boats) including their organisation into Wolf Packs. The Axis goal for the U-boats was the cutting off of the supply of vital war materials, especially oil and fuel, that were carried in the Allied convoys to Britain and the Allied forces in the UK, Mediterranean theatre and on the Russian front. Allied air power played a key role eventually, as did radio signal detection and interception. The focus of the modelling work was on the battles over the convoys SC107 and TM1, which represented serious Allied failure and Axis tactical, but not strategic, victory. The model created was a convoy centric kinematic one and was not a dynamic model of forces and accelerations. During this study, it was found that the U-boat commanders were not using their U-boats and torpedoes to the full efficiency that they could have achieved. The reason lay in the direct orders to attack individually and not simultaneously. A counterfactual aspect was created in the model to explore the effects of simultaneous formation attacks by all the members of a Wolf Pack. A profound increase in sinking of convoy ships per U-boat was obtained and reductions in U-boat losses identified. If used this could have led to a temporary Axis victory in the Atlantic in 1942-1943, and might even have delayed Allied victory and impacted post war Europe

Considered policy or haphazard evolution? No. 617 Squadron RAF 1943 - 45

Following their breaching of German dams in May 1943, No. 617 Squadron, Royal Air Force, was maintained as a specialist precision bombing unit. For the remainder of the Second World War the Squadron carried out precision attacks using new and unconventional weapons, culminating with Barnes Wallis’s deep penetration bombs, TALLBOY and GRAND SLAM. This thesis will show that the numerous accounts of the Squadron’s history have failed to take account of many factors that determined its role. By concentrating on the operational record and weapons, both popular historians and scholars have given a distorted and interpretatively incomplete description of the Squadron’s development. This in turn has led to an incomplete perception of the Squadron’s Development and a misconception of its full contribution to the bomber offensive. This thesis identifies policy and decision making bodies and examines their role in selecting weapons and targets for the Squadron. It explores the issues which determined the role played by the Squadron: changes in Air Staff policy for Bomber Command, choice of targets, the development and production of weapons, and tactical requirements. Comparison is made between the planners’ original intentions and the final operational record. Many of the Squadron’s operations emerged from an inability to follow through from initial planning. Such failure resulted from factors that included unrealistic expectations of weapon performance, delays in the development of new weapons, and political intervention. Alternative targets were selected not only to take advantage of the Squadron’s existing capabilities but also to address specific issues that were often imposed on the planners by outside agencies which would have otherwise diverted Bomber Command from the main offensive. In other instances the Squadron was used to supplement existing operations carried out by main force. The gestation time for new weapons was such that when a weapon emerged its originally intended targets were no often longer relevant. Accordingly, new targets had to be found. The Squadron’s role in the development and assessment of weapons, equipment and new techniques for the Command is revealed to be greater than previously recognised. This new approach to the Squadron’s wartime role examines the policy and planning backstory to the Squadron’s operations. It reveals a hitherto unrecognised complexity in the evolution of the Squadron’s role, and demonstrates how haphazard delays and setbacks were transformed into new policy to meet ever changing requirements