

2016

Summer 2016 Full Issue

The U.S Naval War College

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War College, The U.S Naval (2016) "Summer 2016 Full Issue," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 69 : No. 3 , Article 20.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss3/20>

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Summer 2016


Volume 69, Number 3



NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Summer 2016

Volume 69, Number 3



NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS
686 Cushing Road
Newport, RI 02841-1207

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DSN exchange, all lines: 841
Website: www.usnwc.edu/press
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Periodicals postage paid at Newport, RI. POSTMASTERS, send address changes to: *Naval War College Review*, Code 32S, Naval War College, 686 Cushing Rd., Newport, RI 02841-1207.

ISSN 0028-1484



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FROM THE EDITORS

Chinese island-building and related activities in the South China Sea continue to foster instability in the region and to pose a major challenge to the United States and its friends and allies there. In a speech delivered recently at Chatham House in London, Peter A. Dutton spells out the implications of these developments and makes the case that they are altering in a fundamental way the strategic environment of Southeast Asia. Peter Dutton is director of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the Naval War College.

In “Panning for Gold: Assessing Chinese Maritime Strategy from Primary Sources,” Ryan D. Martinson provides a valuable service to researchers attempting to make sense of the vast and growing body of Chinese-language publications relating to naval and maritime strategy. Cautioning that it may be a mistake to presume too much strategic purpose and coherence in the activities of the many Chinese government agencies and officials with responsibilities in this area, he argues that important insights nevertheless can be gleaned from this literature by weighing carefully the relative authoritativeness of authors and the institutions with which they are associated. Ryan Martinson is a research associate of the China Maritime Studies Institute.

There seems to be no clear end in sight to the “long war” in the Middle East that has engaged this country for the last fifteen years. It is all the more important that the United States improve its ability to assess the changing fortunes of conflict and make timely adjustments to its military strategy and operations. In “Strategic Assessment and Adaptation: Reassessing the Afghanistan Surge Decision,” Francis G. Hoffman offers a careful analysis of the shortcomings of our current approach to the admittedly difficult art of assessment, with particular emphasis on the need for a sharper focus on the strategic level and factors such as domestic politics and other international players. Frank Hoffman is a research analyst with the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University.

Zinaida Bechná and Bradley A. Thayer address an aspect of the Chinese challenge to fundamental American interests today that has been seriously neglected. In “NATO’s New Role: The Alliance’s Response to a Rising China,” they warn that the United States cannot expect its NATO partners to stand shoulder to shoulder with it in opposing China’s newfound willingness to upset the strategic status quo in East Asia. Europeans do not perceive China as a military threat to themselves

and are eager to do business with the People's Republic, while China very likely sees opportunities to play off the allies against us. Bechná and Thayer argue persuasively that the United States needs to make a concerted effort to strengthen NATO's commitment to the norms of the liberal international order and to enlist the alliance proactively to deter Chinese adventurism in the region.

In "The Destruction of Convoy PQ17: 27 June–10 July 1942," Milan Vego analyzes a largely forgotten naval battle of World War II that took place off the coast of northern Norway. The devastating German attack on a convoy of Allied merchant ships carrying arms to the Soviet Union via the Barents Sea caused the suspension of these operations for several months, with potentially dire consequences for the larger war effort against the Nazis. Milan Vego is professor of joint military operations at the Naval War College.

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A MARITIME OR CONTINENTAL ORDER FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE SOUTH CHINA SEA?

*Address by Peter Dutton at Chatham House, London, U.K.,
16 February 2016*

Since the sixteenth century, Southeast Asia has been open to maritime trade and political engagement, advanced and supported by naval and other military power. Although historical evidence demonstrates that international trade occurred prior to that time, often robustly, at various times Chinese imperial leaders sought to dominate the economic, political, and security elements of the region. During these periods, Southeast Asia fell under the sway of China's vast continental power and whatever naval power-projection capacities emperors built to augment it. At times, to serve the security and stability requirements of the dynasty, Chinese emperors sought to control or curtail regional trade. During these periods, Chinese continental power overwhelmed that of any regional state or combination of states, and therefore the primary locus of strategic action was continental. That is, China's land power and subsidiary naval forces were the primary determiners of the region's economic, political, and security order. With the introduction of superior Western naval technologies in the nineteenth century, however, the locus of strategic power in Southeast Asia shifted to the maritime domain, where it largely has remained since. This shift enabled seapower—eventually joined by power-projection capacities of airpower, space power, and cyber power—to ensure the South China Sea, and Southeast Asia more broadly, remained an integral component of an open, global, liberal, maritime order.

Today, China's land power is once again ascendant in the region in the form of missile, air, space, and cyber forces, augmented by a growing naval capability. Accordingly, the future locus of strategic power in the South China Sea—maritime or continental—is in play. So too may be the degree to which Southeast Asia, and especially continental Southeast Asia, will have freedom to choose trade and engagement policies without Beijing's imprimatur. My central thesis is that China's advances into the South China Sea pose a challenge to the capacity

of naval and other power-projection forces to ensure an open economic and political regional order. In particular, China's island building in the Spratly Islands creates a significant new strategic challenge to the open, global, liberal, maritime order in Southeast Asia.

Many have asked, what are the strategic implications of China's island-building program in the South China Sea, and why has America reinvigorated its freedom-of-navigation program to begin to address it?

Much has been made of American freedom-of-navigation operations in the South China Sea over the past few months. As I see it, the purpose of the U.S. freedom-of-navigation program is to support the maintenance of a rules-based international order at sea. Some Americans assume that this maritime order exists on its own, that the security, economic benefits, and political stability that flow from this order exist without any effort from us, like the oxygen we breathe. This is simply not the case. The maritime order that has promoted global economic growth since 1945 and the peaceful expansion of state interests into the oceans of the world since 1982 is an order that was created and must be tended. This order is expressed through a structure of international law and institutions, such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the customary law the convention reflects. But law never exists in a vacuum. Law exists because the sovereign authority of states establishes it, and it persists primarily because the power of states reinforces and sustains it. Thus, there is a fundamentally important correlation between law and power. Law cannot exist without power to reinforce it. And power without the limits of law is mere tyranny. This is as true at sea as it is on land. So the purpose of the freedom-of-navigation program, as I see it, is to marry American power with international law in order to reinforce the rights and obligations and the freedoms and duties that comprise international law of the sea.

Do these purposes serve only America's narrow interests? Certainly not. The global maritime system that was created in part through American leadership has produced secure oceans and tremendous growth in trade and national wealth around the world. Nowhere is this truer than in Asia, where several of the world's largest economies reside. True, the rules that govern international behavior in the maritime domain provide great security, stability, and wealth for the United States. But they have served the countries of Asia equally well. The objectives that freedom-of-navigation operations seek to achieve can be summed up in one simple word: access. Free access—that is, free use of the maritime domain, for all countries, to the fullest extent allowed under international law of the sea—is the essential component of an open regional order in every quarter of the globe.

What is the essence of an open regional order? An open regional order is one that is freely accessible to all countries—according to their interests and their capacities—for the purposes of economic and political engagement. An open region is one that is free of the irresistible gravitational pull of any one power. An open region is one in which regional states are free to pursue their economic and political interests and are not bound to accede to the demands of their strongest neighbor. Such freedom from undue political and economic influence is what makes a state truly free.

Since the very earliest days of the American republic, the nation's leaders certainly have seen free economic access to other regions of the world as a vital interest worth defending, with force if necessary. Economic access includes the right to undertake free commercial trade, finance, banking, direct investment, and government-to-government support; in short, free economic access involves the full range of economic activities available to all countries. One objective of the freedom-of-navigation program, therefore, is to ensure the oceans remain open to support the full range of *economic activities* in which countries and their citizens engage.

Imagine the damage that could be done to the economies of smaller states if they were forced to limit their economic policies to the preferences of the region's strongest state. History demonstrates that when one power dominates a region, other states have fewer and fewer political and economic choices. This is especially true when political issues become sharp. Disputes over territory and resources are certainly among those that tend to become sharp. The dominant state will use its economic monopoly to force other states to accept the political outcome it prefers. Thus, a state's freedom to pursue its own economic choices is a component of political independence. Accordingly, as I see it, ensuring free *political access* is a second American vital interest that is also an objective of the freedom-of-navigation program.

Third, ensuring American security and regional maritime stability is also an objective of the freedom-of-navigation program. History has shown that the world never has been stable politically for long, and supporting national security and international stability still requires the influence of naval power, which can only be wielded through access to the oceans. About naval power's ability to address inter-state instability, more than three decades ago the American statesman and ambassador Elliot Richardson stated, "[T]he classical uses of sea power have assumed fresh importance. . . . To back up friends, to warn potential enemies, to neutralize similar deployments by other naval powers, to exert influence in ambiguous situations, to demonstrate resolve through deployment of palpable force—all these are tasks that naval power is uniquely able to perform." Although

that statement was written during the Cold War, it is as relevant to the world we live in today as it was then, and as it was in the generations that preceded it.

Today, there are many ways in which the maritime rights and interests of smaller states in East Asia are threatened. In light of these concerns, Ambassador Richardson's words continue to have meaning as the United States seeks to guarantee free political and economic access in East Asia. To ensure the region's freedom and full American access to the region, the U.S. Navy's freedom-of-navigation program still helps to ensure that the United States can back up friends, warn potential enemies, neutralize military deployments by other powers, exert influence in ambiguous situations, and above all demonstrate resolve. These are especially important attributes of naval power in the highly charged atmosphere of the South China Sea today.

Given the context of military developments in the South China Sea, it should be increasingly clear that free economic access and free political access are underwritten by free security access—in this case, free naval access. In East Asia, where one regional state dominates land power, the presence of naval power ensures the existence of an overall military balance that guarantees an open regional order based on existing international laws, rules, principles, and norms. In short, naval power provides the foundation on which the region's economic and political freedoms rest.

What in East Asia threatens these three freedoms—political, economic, and security—making renewed commitment to the American freedom-of-navigation program all the more important? First, in the South China Sea, China's projection of its national power deeper into the maritime domain challenges the stable balance between land power and sea power that has up until now guaranteed a free, open, stable regional order in East Asia. All countries have a right to enhance national defense, and no one would deny that right to China. But creation of thousands of acres of new islands in the South China Sea—in a region that at least one state other than China claims as its continental shelf—followed by building on those islands the facilities necessary to project military power sufficient to dominate the other five regional claimants is, in my view, a major strategic event that heightens regional instability, threatens to increase the risk of military clashes, and, if not countered, has the tendency to remove the South China Sea from its place as a part of the global maritime commons by turning it into a strategic strait.

China's island-building campaign has heightened regional instability because, by projecting its power farther into the South China Sea and closer to its neighbors, it has weakened the ability of other states to support their territorial and resource zone claims and caused those states to shift their security postures. It is plain that other states in the region are beginning to work together to balance

China's forward military presence in ways that were not occurring before this development. Some may think this balancing is being coordinated or directed by the United States. But balancing behavior against China's power projection would be occurring with or without an American security presence in the region, since smaller states have an interest in maintaining their political and economic independence.

Indeed, during the years between about 1996 and 2009, as China's economy was growing at annual rates often in the double digits, China's relationship with its Southeast Asian neighbors was quite strong. China actively engaged its neighbors economically and politically, but did not make any moves that challenged their security or their ability to maintain their island and resource claims. By 2009 that began to change, and from 2012 to the present Chinese advances steadily undermined both regional stability and the capacity of smaller states to maintain their claims to islands and resources in the South China Sea. Although all parties to the South China Sea disputes have built up existing islands to some degree, China's island building is orders of magnitude greater than other states' similar activities. Additionally, no other state has built large islands where no island previously existed at all. A final distinction is also very important. Coming from the largest power in the neighborhood by far, China's actions have disproportionate effects. For these reasons, I reject the apologists who say China's island building is no different from the activities of its neighbors. On the contrary, China's island building in the Spratly Islands is the prime action that fundamentally changed regional political and security dynamics.

Some commentators focus on the statement by President Xi Jinping during his 2015 visit to Washington that China has no plan to militarize its newly built islands and their purpose is primarily to support civilian uses of the regional seas. We should all be looking forward to Chinese-provided public goods, but in the meantime remain clear-eyed about the military implications of the newly built islands. As a *Financial Times* article recently pointed out, "China has stepped up its construction of runways in the South China Sea since President Xi Jinping visited Washington in September, underscoring how U.S. efforts to counter China's assertive stance there appear to be having little effect. Satellite images of Subi Reef and Mischief Reef . . . suggest that Beijing will soon complete two runways that will join a newly operational landing strip on a third reef called Fiery Cross in the contested waters."

There are reports that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) maintains artillery vehicles on the newly constructed islands. However, whether or not China further militarizes those islands, the construction on them of facilities capable of supporting military operations—which in some cases has already been completed and in others remains under way—gives China the capacity to militarize the

southern portion of the South China Sea rapidly. As the recent commercial test flights demonstrated, the islands can have fighter aircraft on them within about two hours. Thus, promises not to militarize the islands further are insufficient to undo the existing damage to regional stability.

In addition to causing regional instability, China's island building weakens tactical stability during times of crisis and creates a critical new strategic dynamic in the South China Sea. Concerning the tactical situation, consider the EP-3 crisis in 2001 or the USNS *Impeccable* crisis in 2009. During each of these crises there was a reasonable buffer between the crisis itself and the possibility that one side or the other would use military force to resolve the issue. That buffer existed in part because in East Asia Chinese national defense capabilities were largely continental and American defense capabilities remained largely at sea. That calculus already has shifted somewhat as China deploys its naval forces more consistently farther from its shores. That calculus will change appreciably if China further militarizes the islands with missiles and airpower designed to deny access to the waters of the southern half of the South China Sea, as it is apparent the PLA can do within a short time.

How would crisis-management calculations about escalation and the use of force change if Chinese sea-denial assets were placed on the newly built islands? Military forces on small islands are similar to naval forces on platforms at sea, in that they are vulnerable to first use of force by other military forces in the region. Accordingly, in any crisis in the South China Sea between China and another country's naval forces, each side would receive a benefit from the first use of force, since such preemption reduces tactical vulnerability. This dynamic was set in motion by China's decision to build islands with military facilities on them. The effect of that decision—even if unintended—is to narrow the margin for tactical de-escalation in some future crisis. Thus, the political and military buffer between crisis and clash, or even conflict, is, in my view, narrowed dangerously.

Concerning the new strategic dynamic, China's island building has the tendency to turn the South China Sea into a strategic strait. In essence, it presents a situation for naval power much like a long Strait of Hormuz. How does the South China Sea, a body of water at least six hundred nautical miles wide, become a strait? If the Chinese place sea-denial military capabilities on the reclaimed islands, the South China Sea becomes a body of water that can be controlled from the land territory of a single country. When Chinese bases remained in the northern part of the South China Sea, it was clear they were defensive in nature and posed less of a threat to free movement of seapower in the South China Sea. But the new bases China has built on islands in the southern part of the South China Sea have military-sized runways, substantial port facilities, radar platforms, and space to accommodate military forces. The logical conclusion to draw from the

addition of these facilities to China's preexisting mainland bases is that the country seeks the capability to dominate the waters of the South China Sea at will. Building the islands is therefore, in my view, a significant strategic event. These actions leave the potential for the South China Sea to become a Chinese strait rather than an open component of the global maritime commons.

Why do I say the South China Sea is in danger of becoming a *strategic* strait? The South China Sea has global strategic importance as part of the maritime commons because fully 50 percent of global maritime commerce passes through it, as do 90 percent of East Asian energy imports. The South China Sea is therefore a key artery sustaining the global economy. Additionally, it is a major east-west pipeline for the flow of forces from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean and vice versa. If, during a time of political disagreement between China and other countries, the waterways of the South China Sea were threatened with closure, this would dampen seriously the ability of naval forces to—as Ambassador Richardson put it—back up friends, warn potential enemies, and exert influence.

This new reality in the South China Sea creates a new zone of competition between China and the United States, and requires the United States to behave differently. That is, the United States must demonstrate more openly and actively its resolve to use naval power to keep the region's waters open and thereby to continue to underwrite the region's economic and political freedoms.

What can be done to address the changes in the South China Sea? And will any American action be effective in changing the tide of growing Chinese power in the South China Sea?

There are at least four broad policy responses the United States can lead to improve the regional strategic trends in our favor. We can strengthen our own regional force posture; we can build the capacity of other regional states to support their own interests; we can reenergize like-minded states to reinforce the political, legal, and institutional power of the global maritime system; and we can undertake operational activities in the South China Sea to signal American determination to remain a meaningful part of an open regional order.

Will these policies be effective? If success depends on preventing Chinese advancement into the South China Sea, then our efforts probably will not be effective. The Chinese have demonstrated willingness to gain strategic space through nonmilitarized coercion, backed up by significant military and naval power, taking advantage of the fact that no party wants open conflict and leveraging the power of the great economic benefits China can bestow. These are hard forces to counter.

However, preventing Chinese advancement should not be the measure of success. The United States need not and should not undertake a containment

strategy. Therefore the United States does not need to dominate Southeast Asia or the South China Sea. It needs only to prevent China from doing so. Such a strategy might be termed an access strategy—one that seeks to preserve economic and political access underwritten by access for security purposes. Thus, if the objective is defined as maintaining access to—in Ambassador Richardson’s words—ensure seapower’s ability to back up friends, warn potential enemies, neutralize similar deployments by other naval powers, exert influence in ambiguous situations, and demonstrate resolve through deployment of palpable force, then it is my view that the United States can develop affordable, effective policies.

Nonetheless, this is not a light undertaking. The United States already has policies that support some activities in each of the four categories mentioned above. Whether the nation chooses to do more is a matter that must be addressed systematically through the political process, because it will involve serious trade-offs among domestic priorities and security concerns. The kind of strategic competition needed to maintain the maritime character of a major region of the globe is costly. Therefore we should engage in it only after a systematic review of our national interests, our specific objectives, the risks involved in various policy choices, and our policy trade-offs. The United States faces a strategic choice. We can compete to retain the maritime character of the region, or we can adapt to the reality of a region dominated by continental power. In my view, the open, global, liberal, maritime order that the United States helps lead is worth defending, since it has brought unprecedented wealth, political freedom, and security.


The American freedom-of-navigation program is a nonthreatening and neutral demonstration that our country will not shirk this duty. But it is just a very small start of what must be an overarching strategy with clear goals and objectives centered on maintaining political, economic, and security access. The most important objective will be to demonstrate that the United States will not retreat from the South China Sea, even as China advances. We must accept that a new zone of friction exists—and perhaps even create friction there when necessary to advance our own interests. Such friction will be necessary at times to reinforce the critical link that exists between power and law—a link that gives life and meaning to the law.

In closing, global maritime access and the security it provides, unlike the air we breathe, do not just exist as a state of nature. They must be established and then regularized through laws and institutions that support them. And then . . . they must be defended through political, economic, and military means when challenged.

PETER DUTTON

Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and the director of the China Maritime Studies Institute in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies of the Naval War College. He served in the Navy's Judge Advocate General Corps and as a naval flight officer, retiring in 2006 with the rank of commander.

The opinions expressed herein are the personal views of the author and are not meant to represent the official views of the Department of the Navy or any other agency of the federal government. This text differs in very minor ways from that delivered at Chatham House.



Rear Admiral P. Gardner Howe III is a native of Jacksonville, Florida. He was commissioned in 1984 following his graduation from the U.S. Naval Academy. He graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School in 1995 with a master of arts in national security affairs (special operations / low-intensity conflict), and from the National War College in 2002 with a master of arts in national security.

Howe's operational assignments have included a full range of duties in the Naval Special Warfare and Joint Special Operations communities. He commanded Naval Special Warfare Unit 3 in Bahrain; Naval Special Warfare Group 3 in San Diego, California; and Special Operations Command, Pacific in Hawaii. His service overseas includes multiple deployments to the western Pacific and Southwest Asia, and participation in Operations EARNEST WILL, PROVIDE PROMISE, ENDURING FREEDOM, and IRAQI FREEDOM.

Howe is the fifty-fifth President of the U.S. Naval War College.

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PRESIDENT'S FORUM



The Rules of the Game and Professional Military Ethics

IN THIS PRESIDENT'S FORUM, I'd like to share some thoughts about a recent addition to my bookshelf: *The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command*, by Andrew Gordon (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013). At first glance, it looks like a rather obscure history book on the battle of Jutland. After reading it, however, I now see it as an astute study of command culture with important insights on professional military ethics. This is a book with which every member of the maritime profession of arms should spend time.

Before diving into the book and its lessons, let me explain how it got on my bookshelf.

One of the best parts of this assignment is the opportunity to meet with all the great leaders who visit the Naval War College over the course of a year. Last fall, General James Mattis, USMC (Ret.), was here in Newport for a lecture of opportunity, and I had a chance to speak with him prior to the lecture. We discussed the leader development challenge the Navy is addressing today: how best to prepare our leaders for naval warfare at sea, with near-peer competitors, in an age of precision strike, and in an increasingly complex operational environment.

When I asked whether he had any recommendations on books to read that might be relevant, he stated without hesitation: "Gardner, you have to read *The Rules of the Game*—it tells the story of what happened to Britain's Royal Navy between Nelson at Trafalgar and Jellicoe at Jutland."

With only a foggy knowledge of Jellicoe and the faintest understanding of the battle of Jutland, I responded with a hearty "Wilco, sir," and we headed off to his lecture.

That night, I went home and ordered the book on Amazon. Three days later, the package arrived; I was ready to rip through the book and looked forward to its leadership lessons. Well, I opened the package and my jaw dropped—I saw this tome of a book, more than two inches thick and over seven hundred pages. My dreams of a quick read and quick lessons on leader development were dashed. But, motivated by the directness of General Mattis’s recommendation, I waded into the book. By the time I was finished, I knew I had read a seminal document with important implications for how I thought about the maritime profession of arms and the enduring ethical challenges our members face.

In the introduction, Gordon, a noted naval historian, explains that the book originated out of a simple disagreement with a retired naval officer about the appropriateness of the tactics the British employed at Jutland. In this discussion, Gordon suggested that, on meeting the German High Seas Fleet, the British 5th Battle Squadron either should have turned in succession immediately or turned all together, rather than turning in the delayed, in-succession manner in which it did. Gordon’s suggestion provoked such a strong response from his colleague that he decided to dive into his own primary-source research. Over the course of that research, Gordon’s focus shifted from the history of the battle and “could have / should have” questions to a detailed look at the command culture of the Royal Navy—more specifically, the *changes* in the command culture of the Royal Navy from Nelson at Trafalgar to Jellicoe at Jutland—and the key forces that drove those changes.

Shifting from Nelson’s Command Culture

The battle of Trafalgar was fought off the Spanish coast on 21 October 1805. In this most decisive naval engagement of the Napoleonic Wars, Nelson’s twenty-seven ships went up against the thirty-three ships of the combined Spanish and French fleets. Twenty-two Spanish and French ships were lost, while the British didn’t lose a single ship.

The manner in which Nelson commanded during this battle sealed his legacy as an extraordinary combat leader. He focused his energy on setting conditions for success in battle well before the battle itself. He held frequent, face-to-face meetings with his commanders to ensure they had a common understanding of the situation, the enemy, and his intent. He encouraged initiative and empowered his subordinate commanders at every level. Together, these actions allowed Nelson to execute decentralized operations effectively and succeed in combat. A master of what we now know as mission command, Nelson was a professional whose “greatest gift of leadership was to raise his juniors above the need of supervision” (Gordon, *The Rules of the Game*, p. 160).

About halfway through the book, Gordon has a chapter titled “The Long Calm Lee of Trafalgar.” It’s here that Gordon moves away from the battle of Jutland itself and spends the next two-hundred-plus pages recounting the changes in British command culture, and the drivers of those changes, in the century between Trafalgar and Jutland.

In the aftermath of Trafalgar, the Royal Navy reigned supreme across the oceans of the world during a period of significant social and technological change. This period witnessed the rise of Victorian culture as Britain enjoyed prosperity and the ever-increasing spread of its empire. Gordon writes (p. 179), “The Victorians sought to structure and codify as many fields of behavior as possible in order to regulate their world, disarm the unpredictable, and perpetuate the status quo.” As William Manchester writes in *The Last Lion*, central to the Victorian’s worldview was a “firm belief in obedience—absolute obedience to God, the Queen, and one’s superiors. . . . It was a time of pervasive authoritarianism . . . [and] [u]nquestioning submission to orders.”* The way to succeed in life, as in sport, was to play by the rules of the game—to comply with the established order. With some understanding, Gordon notes (p. 182) that “the tendency of the late Victorians to ritualize and regulate, and thereby ‘tokenize,’ warfare was perhaps a natural one for the world’s foremost territorial freeholder.”

This was also a period of significant technological change. As the Industrial Revolution progressed, ships’ propulsion transitioned from sail to steam and their weapons transitioned from cannon to guns. Gordon asserts (p. 183) that these changes resulted in a new era of seamanship for the Royal Navy, a “seamanship of iron and steam,” in which “mathematics were subverting the art of centuries and a vista of possibilities opened up for tightly choreographed geometrical evolutions—far beyond what had been possible with sailing fleets.”

Gordon argues (p. 182) that the combination of the social and technological changes during this period had a significant impact on the Royal Navy’s command culture. As they looked back to the legacy of Nelson and forward to the almost unlimited potential of controlled fleet actions, “the Victorians chose to extract the myth of the central genius directing the lovely obedient fleet with brilliance and precision.” Jutland would prove the shortcomings of this approach to command and control.

One interesting indicator of this authoritarian approach to command is the Royal Navy’s *Signal Book*, which Gordon calls (p. 183) “the supreme agent of centralization.” Dating from 1799, the *Signal Book* had been established before Nelson’s time, but what changed over this period was its size and role. In its early

* William Manchester, *The Last Lion*, vol. 1, *Visions of Glory 1874–1932* (New York: Random House, 1983), p. 70.

days, the *Signal Book*'s limitations were appreciated and its primary use was to supplement commander's intent. At the end of the nineteenth century, however, it had grown to over five hundred pages in two volumes, and had become enshrined as the key enabler not only of fleet maneuvering but also of effective naval operations.

At the end of *The Rules of the Game*, Gordon acknowledges (p. 564) that the Grand Fleet achieved its strategic objective at Jutland: maintaining sea control and holding the threat of the German High Seas Fleet at bay. At the same time, however, he questions whether Jellicoe and the Royal Navy "gave Jutland their best shot." Noting that "war is infinitely unpredictable in detail, nobody can expect to control it, and the power of a military force must include its capacity to respond rapidly and effectively to unscripted eventualities," he states (p. 565) that Jellicoe's "main fault was that 'control' was a contract he tried to make with fate; he feared losing it . . . and imposed a doctrinal regime which seemingly presumed to govern the very nature of war." One has to wonder, Gordon implicitly questions, how World War I might have transpired if the Grand Fleet had operated with a decentralized command structure, clear commander's intent, subordinate empowerment, and individual initiative.

As you can imagine, at seven hundred pages in length, there is much more to this book, including the following (p. 597):

- The story of Vice Admiral Sir George Tyron that recounts his attempts to reinstate a Nelsonian and decentralized approach to operations, the *Victoria-Camperdown* collision in 1893 that ended such efforts, and the resulting courts-martial that rewarded the members of the bridge team who, while knowing that the ordered maneuver was going to result in a collision, held fast to the culture of obedience and simply executed the order
- Gordon's own lessons learned from the research, and his offering of twenty-eight "syndromes" that impact maritime forces today
- Gordon's discussion about "regulators and ratcatchers," in which he points out that there is in peacetime a natural rise in the predominance of "regulators," and therefore there is a need to develop, deliberately and purposefully, "ratcatchers": officers comfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity and ready to exercise initiative when appropriate

It's important to highlight that *The Rules of the Game* is not without its critics. Some scholars of naval history see Gordon's treatment of Jellicoe as too negative and too pro-Beatty, and opine that *The Rules of the Game* fails to give the Royal Navy full credit for its successful incorporation of emerging technology (efficient and reliable mechanical propulsion, central direction of gunnery, signals intelligence, and wireless communications).

Key Takeaways

Despite such critiques, this has become a very important book to me. I read it while clarifying what the profession of arms means to me; what my professional identity was—and what it should be; and how I should think about ethics in this framework. Within this context, *The Rules of the Game* spoke loudly. It challenged me to think more broadly about professional military ethics, far beyond the rules-based, compliance focus of ethics to which I had become accustomed over the course of my career.

The story of the Royal Navy in the nineteenth century pointed out to me that a profession's identity, the culture that underpins it, is never static, but rather in a constant state of evolution. Left unattended, that culture will morph, and there is a natural tendency for bureaucratic attributes to dominate professional attributes. As a result, members of the profession have an *ethical responsibility* never, never to take the profession's identity for granted. We must assess the profession's identity constantly and deliberately, then nurture and sustain the attributes that best serve the client—for us, the American people.

Additionally, I saw a cautionary tale for the U.S. Navy, with parallels between what Gordon described as the “long, calm lee of Trafalgar” and the U.S. Navy's history since World War II. Reading and reflecting on *The Rules of the Game* made me realize that, as stewards of our profession, we have an ethical responsibility to ensure that our Navy doesn't fall prey to the potential for complacency and professional erosion in what could be described as our own “long, calm lee of Leyte Gulf.”

Finally, I saw a clear linkage between the key lessons of the book and our Navy's “Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority.” The Design highlights the critical importance of decentralized operations to achieve success in a complex environment, and calls for our Navy to focus on being prepared for decentralized operations. Trust and confidence are the critical enablers of decentralized operations. Bureaucratic organizations are characteristically low-trust and low-confidence organizations. *Only an organization with a strong professional identity engenders the trust and confidence necessary to fight and win in a complex environment.*

So, reading *The Rules of the Game* reinforced in me the idea that there is a war-fighting imperative that we view our Navy as a profession. Such a view isn't an academic exercise or a purely theoretical construct; it has practical and operational implications. As stewards of this profession, I see clearly that we have an ethical responsibility to ensure that our professional identity, including the attributes of our professional identity most essential for war fighting—integrity, accountability, initiative, and toughness—is never taken for granted, but rather constantly and deliberately developed, nurtured, and sustained.

During the centenary anniversary of the battle of Jutland this year, I encourage all members of the U.S. Navy to read (or reread) *The Rules of the Game*, reflect on the experiences of the Royal Navy, and commit to strengthening our sense of professional identity.

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Naval War College Review, Summer 2016, Vol. 69, No. 3

PANNING FOR GOLD

Assessing Chinese Maritime Strategy from Primary Sources

Ryan D. Martinson

What are the drivers behind China's vigorous pursuit of sea power? What are the interests Beijing seeks to advance by building a powerful blue-water navy and the world's largest coast guard? What are the principles that guide its use of sea power in pursuit of its national interest? How are China's state objectives, and approaches to pursuing them, evolving over time?

The answers to these questions are of obvious concern both to the states along China's maritime periphery, many of which are party to maritime disputes with Beijing, and to external powers with major interests in East Asia, such as the United States. Increasingly, Chinese actions have important implications for other parts of the watery world, such as the Indian Ocean region, where China has maintained a constant naval presence since late 2008.¹

Those seeking to gauge and define Chinese policy must be willing and able to draw on all available sources of information. Most fail to do so. The vast majority of analyses of China's maritime strategy focus almost entirely on Chinese behavior: what it has done, what it has built. In particular, most highlight a small number of events or cases from which they draw conclusions about Chinese strategy.

To be sure, Chinese actions are the best indicators of Chinese strategy. They reveal exactly what Chinese policy makers are willing to do. They provide raw data that cannot be manipulated. However, the specific drivers of a given behavior are often open to interpretation. Some analysts, for example, assume that Chinese actions in the "near seas" of East Asia are a product of a carefully designed and implemented national strategy, with head and arms working in perfect coordination. However, were these analysts familiar with the breadth of Chinese writings lamenting the country's lack of well-defined ends, ways, and means, they might revise this proposition. While strategy is surely involved, Chinese mariners

probably are not acting out a detailed script for regional dominance.² Moreover, a particular action may be the result of local initiative, or later may be judged a mistake, in which case it may not portend future behavior. The 2009 *Impeccable* incident, discussed below, may be a case in point.

Judicious use of authoritative statements about Chinese maritime strategy can validate and enrich assessments made on the basis of observed behavior, ameliorating the problems described above. Many of those who research and write on contemporary maritime issues, however, are not fully aware of the potential value of original Chinese documents. Moreover, those who are aware often disagree, sometimes fiercely, about which sources are most useful.³ This problem is exacerbated by the tremendous proliferation of Chinese documents in recent years, a challenge that has aptly been called “a poverty of riches.”⁴

This article seeks to describe the range of sources available for helping to understand Chinese maritime strategy and to assess their relative value. It comprises five parts. Part 1 outlines basic assumptions and defines key terminology. The subsequent three parts examine three distinct categories of sources, grouped according to the role of the author or speaker: those who formulate Chinese maritime strategy, those who implement the strategy, and the scholars and pundits who define and influence it. The article concludes by offering a set of general rules for assessing the value of Chinese sources on maritime strategy.

The primary aim of this article is to identify specific individuals and their affiliations and draw conclusions about why their statements may (or may not) shed light on Chinese maritime strategy. For illustration purposes, the article will offer examples of the type of information that may be gleaned from close reading of those sources. It does not, however, seek to define Chinese maritime strategy comprehensively, per se.

DEFINITIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS

This article focuses on Chinese “maritime strategy,” defined as state policy governing the development and use of sea power to achieve national objectives in peacetime.⁵ It adopts a narrow definition of sea power: those instruments the state wields directly to achieve objectives on or from the sea.⁶ These instruments include the Chinese military, above all the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy; Chinese maritime law enforcement forces, especially the China Coast Guard; and the maritime militia, i.e., civilian mariners, often fishermen, who sometimes perform state functions.

The term “maritime strategy” (海洋战略) seldom appears in Chinese documents. Chinese decision makers do not refer to one overall set of policies governing use and development of all the sea services. PLA Navy strategists write of “naval strategy” (海军战略) or “maritime security strategy” (海上安全战

略); the former only involves naval forces, while the latter seeks to leverage all the components of sea power (i.e., military, maritime law enforcement, and militia).⁷ Leaders in China's maritime agencies, especially the State Oceanic Administration (SOA), tend to use the term "maritime development strategy" (海洋发展战略), which refers to an overall national approach to leveraging the ocean and ocean-related industries to support Chinese economic development. Maritime development strategy also encompasses "maritime rights protection" (海洋维权), meaning the use of maritime law enforcement forces to defend and

There is very little publicly available information about the . . . entity . . . created . . . to formulate and coordinate maritime dispute policy among the SOA, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the military.

advance China's position in its maritime disputes.⁸ The term "maritime power strategy" (海洋强国战略) is often used synonymously with "maritime development strategy."⁹ Some in the SOA, including deputy director Sun Shuxian, speak

of "maritime rights protection strategy" (海洋维权战略), which refers very narrowly to the use of sea power to defend China's maritime claims.¹⁰

That Chinese policy makers seldom use the term "maritime strategy" is significant. It suggests a compartmentalization among China's sea services. This fact, however, does not invalidate use of this term when examining how China develops and uses sea power. For analytical purposes, Chinese maritime strategy comprises a set of policy guidelines—however compartmentalized—governing the development and use of sea power to pursue a range of peacetime purposes. These include, inter alia, deterring Taiwan from formally declaring independence, deterring American military intervention in a regional conflict involving China, defending and advancing China's position in its maritime disputes, expanding China's strategic depth in the maritime direction, ensuring sea-lane security, cultivating Chinese "soft power" through naval diplomacy, and protecting the lives and property of Chinese citizens in foreign lands.

This article assumes that the statements of those in positions of authority within the party-state or military are most likely to reflect actual policy. This assumption is uncontroversial. However, authority does not always imply reliability. Sometimes individuals who ostensibly hold positions of authority disseminate propaganda aimed at shaping opinions at home and abroad. In such instances, their views may be unreliable. This tendency will be discussed in some detail in part 2. This article also generally dismisses the public statements of Chinese diplomats, who naturally have a strong interest in downplaying Chinese ambitions and vindicating Chinese actions.

This article examines the statements of individuals. Because of their obvious importance and because they are the best-studied sources for understanding Chinese strategy, documents that the Chinese state issues directly are not examined in any detail. These include national defense white papers, five-year plans, party and government work reports, government yearbooks, and laws and regulations.¹¹

POLICY MAKERS

Major decisions affecting China's maritime strategy are made by senior members of the party-state in secret sessions in Beijing. Outside observers have little or no access to information on the content of these meetings. The Chinese legislature does not summon Chinese policy makers for public inquiries at which they are questioned about national security policy. The decisions of the Central Military Commission, which guide naval policy, are classified; when information is released, it is often dated and incomplete. There is very little publicly available information about the Maritime Rights and Interests Leading Small Group (中央海洋权益工作领导小组), an entity the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or Party) created in the second half of 2012 to formulate and coordinate maritime dispute policy among the SOA, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the military.¹² Sources on the State Oceanic Commission (国家海洋委员会), set up in 2013 to formulate China's maritime development strategy, are likewise extremely sparse.¹³ Scholars do, however, have access to "the strategy" as Chinese policy makers articulate it when they openly speak about maritime issues. Given the obvious authority of such sources, they should be regarded as key building blocks for any effort to define Chinese maritime strategy.

One such source is the official summary of a July 2013 CCP Politburo "study session." An innovation of Hu Jintao, Politburo study sessions take place at roughly one-month intervals. Two experts are invited to provide lectures on the topic under discussion.¹⁴ During these sessions, the Party leader outlines his views on the topic. These reflect state policy.

At the 30 July 2013 study session, the Politburo discussed the topic of building China into a "maritime power" (海洋强国), an objective identified eight months earlier in Hu Jintao's work report at the Eighteenth Party Congress. The official summary of the meeting provides a precious glimpse into how China's top leaders conceive of the country's relationship with the sea.

A close reading of this document reveals that the party-state's definition of "maritime power" is very broad. Maritime powers use the ocean to build wealth. Their marine science and technology are advanced. They are able to exploit marine resources effectively. When they use the ocean, they take steps to avoid

harming its ecology. That the two invited lecturers were both civilians is a clear indication of this economic focus.

However, maritime powers are also able to safeguard their maritime rights and interests, and a careful reading of Xi Jinping's remarks also suggests endorsement of an assertive turn—in his words, a “transformation” (转变)—in how China handles its maritime disputes, an assessment that observed behavior has borne out. In Xi's words, “We love peace and will continue along the path of peaceful development, but we absolutely cannot abandon our legitimate rights and interests, much less sacrifice our core interests.”¹⁵

Official coverage of Xi Jinping's attendance at the Fifth National Border and Coast Defense Work Meeting in Beijing in June 2014 offers another example of the availability and value of policy-maker statements. This event is relevant to China's maritime strategy because “ocean defense” (海防) involves much more than preventing foreign invasion along China's coast; it refers to actions to defend all “Chinese” space from encroachment, including offshore islands and remote waters under Chinese jurisdiction.¹⁶ The Xinhua news agency published an official summary of Xi's remarks. Xi recalled the humiliating and damaging experiences of modern Chinese history, when China “was poor and weak . . . and suffered several hundred instances of foreign encroachment.” As a result, China must place the highest priority on sovereignty and security, “resolutely safeguard territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests,” and build an “an impregnable wall [literally, “a wall of copper and iron”] for border and ocean defense.” Other senior leaders spoke at the event, but media coverage of the meeting gave them scant mention—the focus was Xi Jinping.¹⁷

Xi's remarks take on special meaning when contrasted with official media coverage of Hu Jintao's participation in the same meeting in January 2010. Aside from shaking hands and posing for group photos, Hu played no role in the earlier event. People's Republic of China (PRC) minister of national defense General Liang Guanglie delivered the keynote address. Liang's speech balanced out patriotic content—“defending the security of national territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests must be seen as the sacred mission of border and coastal defense work”—with conciliatory words about the need to “deepen and expand friendly relations with neighboring states.”¹⁸ Such comparisons both suggest the policy shift that has taken place in the intervening years and shed light on the role Xi may be playing personally in deciding China's maritime strategy.

Provincial leaders also play important roles in maritime policy. This is especially true for Hainan Province, which administers all the Chinese-claimed land features within the “nine-dash line” in the South China Sea. Hainan's marine policy, then, has direct repercussions for Chinese behavior at sea. Provincial leaders also play a large part in mobilizing civilian mariners to serve in the country's

maritime militia (海上民兵). At a meeting in December 2013, Hainan provincial party secretary Luo Baoming (罗保铭) spoke on the role of provincial militias. According to an official summary of his remarks, Luo stated that militias serve a key function in China's maritime disputes. Their presence in disputed waters "highlights" (彰显) Chinese sovereignty in the South China Sea.¹⁹ The province, then, must play a role in fostering their growth and development.

POLICY IMPLEMENTERS

Elements of Chinese maritime strategy are reflected in the statements of those charged with implementing it, above all senior officers within the Chinese military and the Chinese coast guard.²⁰ The civilians in the SOA who directly oversee China's maritime law-enforcement agencies also speak and write authoritatively about the ends, ways, and means of China's approach to the sea.

PLA Leaders

Among senior officers, the most authoritative statements are naturally those made by the PLA Navy commander, currently Admiral Wu Shengli (吴胜利).²¹ Admiral Wu is no Sergei Gorshkov, a senior officer who had pretensions to profound strategic insights.²² In contrast, Wu's statements are often clogged with jargon and therefore difficult to decipher. They are generally very short on details. However, in some cases they do offer valuable revelations about "the strategy."²³

In August 2014, Admiral Wu gave a very important speech at a ceremony, held aboard the aircraft carrier support ship *Xu Xiake*, to commemorate the 120th anniversary of the first Sino-Japanese War.²⁴ The text was published in the August 2014 issue of *China Military Science*, with "appropriate abridgment."²⁵ While the purpose of the event was to reflect on a historical event, Wu delivered his speech with contemporary issues very much in mind. For the student of Chinese strategy, it demonstrates the service's commitment to expanding its role in waters beyond Asia—in Wu's words, "wherever China's interests extend." It confirms that senior leaders fear that a powerful enemy (强敌—i.e., the United States) seeks to contain China. Its numerous references to Xi Jinping show that the head of state takes a keen interest in China's development and employment of sea power.

The content of Wu's speech also has important implications for understanding the nature of China's commitment to resolve its maritime disputes. He suggests that the ocean may be equivalent to the land in its importance, declaring that "we must not only protect every inch of land, but also every inch of the ocean." Wu talks about the need to protect both China's rights under international law and "historic rights passed down from ancestors," a reference to Chinese claims to waters within the nine-dash line in the South China Sea. Wu refers to China's claims to "island sovereignty and maritime rights and interests" as constituting

“core interests” (核心利益). Thus, not just offshore land features but also the zones of sovereignty and jurisdiction emanating from them may now be considered objects of vital state interest.²⁶ Wu’s remarks also provide more specific insights on current strategy: China should “continue to strengthen control over [its] claimed maritime space.” Wu’s speech, then, is an index of the PRC’s commitment to resolve the disputes in China’s favor.

The words of other flag officers may also serve as useful indicators of Chinese strategy. These regularly appear in service publications. On 19 March 2014, for example, *People’s Navy* published excerpts of speeches that senior PLA Navy leaders had given at a meeting held to discuss Xi Jinping’s maritime strategic thought. All sixteen of these eighth-hundred-to-nine-hundred-character excerpts are worth reading, but the remarks of Rear Admiral Zhang Zhaoyin (张兆垠), deputy commander of the South Sea Fleet, stand out.

Rear Admiral Zhang sheds light on the Chinese sea services’ overall approach to handling China’s disputes in the South China Sea. Zhang candidly acknowledges that the objective of Chinese strategy in the South China Sea is to “continuously expand the strength of Chinese administrative control” and to “progressively achieve effective administrative control” over Chinese-claimed waters.²⁷ That is—in contradiction to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs narrative that China merely responds to the provocations of other states—the PLA Navy, working in conjunction with the Chinese coast guard, is pursuing proactively a policy aimed at controlling disputed land and ocean areas in the South China Sea.²⁸

Coast Guard Leaders

The statements of leaders within the Chinese coast guard and their civilian overlords are also authoritative indicators of Chinese strategy. Liu Cigui (刘赐贵), head of the SOA from February 2011 to January 2015, frequently spoke and wrote on China’s efforts at “rights protection.”²⁹ Liu presided over China’s policy shift from a generally passive coast guard presence in disputed waters to actual efforts to assert control over disputed waters on the pretext of routine law enforcement.³⁰

Liu’s statements provide useful data for understanding China’s “maritime power” strategy and how it impacts China’s approach to its disputes. In a 7 June 2014 essay in a SOA-run newspaper, *China Ocean News*, Liu outlined what was involved for China to transform itself from a “major maritime state” (海洋大国) into a “powerful maritime state” (or “maritime power”—海洋强国). Liu’s article elaborates on many of the themes Xi Jinping had discussed in his remarks at the Politburo study session eleven months earlier. Liu describes the current period in very dark terms, as one in which states compete with one another for control over the ocean and the ability to use the ocean to become wealthy and powerful. He concludes with a very important admission:

As can be seen, for a long period going forward, China will face increasing challenges in its efforts to safeguard maritime rights and interests. The ocean very likely will become the primary direction from which come efforts to interfere with China's period of strategic opportunity [to engage in economic development] and threaten China's security. These realities require that we continuously improve our abilities to control the ocean, accelerate the pace of efforts to transform China into a maritime power, and more effectively safeguard and expand China's maritime rights and interests.

This and many other similar statements indicate that the national objective is peacetime control of the sea, and the consequences of failing to realize this aim could not be more severe.³¹

Prior to the creation of the China Coast Guard in mid-2013, China Marine Surveillance (CMS) was the constabulary agency most active along China's maritime periphery. Thus, the statements of senior CMS leaders also provide useful indicators for assessing key elements of "the strategy." In July 2012, just days after the Scarborough Shoal standoff ended with China in control of the feature, senior CMS officer Sun Shuxian attended a maritime conference held in Hainan. At the event, Sun suggested that China should use military force against other (unnamed) disputants, because doing so would "ensure a century of peace." Sun also said, "We do not want to be provocative, but we are not afraid of provocations and cannot tolerate provocations. We cannot simply respond by issuing statements that their actions are illegal and invalid. We must make the provocateurs pay a cost. By killing one, we can deter a hundred others, thereby preventing the situation from worsening."³² This episode sheds light on the personality of an important leader within China's sea services. Moreover, that Sun was subsequently appointed deputy commandant of the China Coast Guard and later promoted to deputy director of the SOA suggests a degree of endorsement within the party-state for Sun's aggressive attitude toward handling China's maritime disputes.

Certain commanders within China's other maritime law-enforcement agencies also have been forthcoming with information on their services' role in China's maritime strategy. Until his retirement in 2014, Wu Zhuang, the head of the South China Sea branch of Fisheries Law Enforcement, frequently gave interviews to Chinese news outlets. Wu's own history also sheds light on the mechanism through which policy leads to state behavior, in that individual personalities can play an important role in events at sea: it was Wu, apparently operating on his own initiative, who likely ordered Chinese fishing vessels to obstruct the operations of *Impeccable* in March 2009.³³

In a December 2012 interview, Wu spoke of the strategic logic behind a decision to begin convoying Chinese fishing vessels out to fishing grounds in disputed waters in the southeastern sections of the South China Sea. The lives and property of Chinese fishermen were being threatened by the maritime

law-enforcement forces of other states. Protecting them was a priority because their presence in disputed waters was extremely important, not for the fish they were catching, but for the political significance of their activities. Wu said, “Development of fisheries near the Spratly Islands involves questions of sovereignty over China’s Spratly Islands. ‘Development equals presence, presence equals occupation, and occupation equals sovereignty.’”³⁴ This statement, uttered by somebody in Wu’s position, may reflect how Chinese strategists conceive of the role of civilian economic activity in China’s maritime dispute strategy.

SCHOLARS AND PUNDITS

Any original research on Chinese maritime strategy should rely, to the maximum extent possible, on the statements of those who formulate and implement policy. Yet while these sources are far more numerous than most analysts recognize, leadership statements alone are inadequate. To fill the gaps, students of Chinese strategy must look to the writings of men and women whose vocation is to define and influence “the strategy.”

Studying the works of Chinese scholars, however, is an approach fraught with risk and uncertainty. The easy availability of scholarship and punditry on maritime affairs in China creates a strong temptation to draw heavily on these sources. At issue is when to regard a particular item as a primary source and when to regard it as a secondary source (and thus to subject it to the same standards of evidence as analyses written by non-Chinese scholars).

Any claim a Chinese scholar makes can be regarded as more or less authoritative depending on the extent to which he/she has privileged access to “the strategy.” Scholars who work at research units within the Chinese military or a civilian maritime agency likely have privileged access to at least some components of “the strategy.” The extent of access no doubt varies by rank and position; with seniority comes access. Regardless of rank or position, at best their statements may serve as proxies for the more authoritative statements of those they serve.

PLA Scholars

Given the prominent role of the navy in Chinese maritime strategy, PLA Navy scholars no doubt constitute the most authoritative sources in this category. They work in the Naval Research Institute (NRI), PLA Navy educational institutions (e.g., the Naval Command College in Nanjing and the Naval Academy in Dalian), and other military institutions, such as the National Defense University (NDU).

NRI scholars deserve special consideration. NRI was set up at the behest of the then commander of the PLA Navy Admiral Liu Huaqing. This was in 1985, during a period of intense ferment in the field of naval strategy.³⁵ NRI scholars and analysts continue to do important work on strategic issues, much of it for

internal use. Many NRI products, however, are publicly available. NRI scholar Senior Captain Zhang Wei (张炜) is among China's leading experts on the strategic use of sea power.³⁶ Interviewed for a July 2012 *People's Navy* article, Zhang recounted the joy she felt in discovering the theories of Gorshkov and Mahan, whose work had a "rational core" (合理内核) that transcended the immorality of their respective periods and systems.³⁷ Chinese policy makers have turned to her for guidance regarding some of the more difficult policy challenges facing the regime as it expands in the maritime direction.³⁸

Some publicly available NRI products serve to convey elements of "the strategy" directly to the fleet. For example, close reading of Senior Captain Ren Xiaofeng's (任筱锋) *Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations* sheds light on

Wu's [speech] confirms that senior leaders fear that a powerful enemy (the United States) seeks to contain China.

the political assumptions that animate PLA Navy interpretations of international law. Ren defines the PRC's official position on the nine-dash line

in the South China Sea, what he terms China's "traditional maritime boundary line" (传统海疆线), to mean that China "enjoys historic rights to all of the natural resources" within these waters. Ren's volume also outlines PLA Navy policies and procedures for handling encounters with foreign vessels conducting military surveys (军事测量) in China's exclusive economic zone.³⁹

The Naval Command College in Nanjing is home to several important PLA Navy scholars, including Senior Captain Feng Liang (冯梁), a professor in the strategic research department and director of the college's Maritime Security Center. Feng was a driving force in the creation of the Collaborative Innovation Center for South China Sea Studies (中国南海研究协同创新中心), a think tank located at Nanjing University, and continues to serve in a leadership position within this organization.⁴⁰ Collaborating with NRI's Zhang Wei, he wrote the award-winning book *Maritime Security of the State* (国家海上安全).⁴¹ While this volume, published in 2008, is now somewhat out of date, it provides a good baseline from which to gauge recent changes in China's maritime strategy.⁴² Among his publicly available works, Feng also coauthored *China's Peaceful Rise and the Maritime Security Environment* (中国的和平发展与海上安全环境), another volume highly regarded within the PLA.⁴³

The bulk of Feng's work likely involves directing research projects intended for internal use. His products are read by—or at least given to—Chinese policy makers. For instance, he led a research team studying the topic of "SLOC [sea lines of communication] security and expanding state interests"; its work purportedly has influenced Chinese policy makers. He has also researched the topic of the "21st Century Maritime Silk Road," again for the reference of leaders within the

military and the party-state.⁴⁴ Feng also has led projects studying questions vital to China's maritime dispute policy. He has researched strategic problems associated with infrastructure construction, presumably Chinese, on islands in the South China Sea. Moreover, Feng was an important force behind the decision for the Naval Command College to provide advanced training for maritime law-enforcement officers from CMS. He has also completed dozens of studies on the roles and missions of CMS forces in maritime rights protection operations, which doubtlessly have influenced the use of maritime law enforcement in China's disputes.⁴⁵

The PLA Air Force also constitutes an important agent in China's maritime strategy. As such, scholars working on its behalf have valuable insights on how and why China pursues sea power. For example, in a 2015 article published in *China Military Science*, Senior Colonel An Peng, head of research at the PLA Air Force Command College, wrote about the role of the PLA Air Force in China's strategic posture in the "maritime direction" (海上方向). Among other useful data, An's article highlights the prominent place of the American threat in Chinese strategic thinking. In peacetime, writes An, China must develop airpower to prevail in the "struggle to contain and counter the containment" (围堵反围堵, 遏制反遏制) of a certain, unnamed foreign superpower. In a conflict with another East Asian state, Chinese airpower must be potent enough to counter the same unnamed foreign superpower's "military intervention" (军事干预).⁴⁶

Some authoritative scholarly works are collective efforts published under the name of a single organization. In such cases, the degree of authority is a function of the institution, not any individual. Written/edited by three dozen scholars from the strategic studies department of the Academy of Military Science, the 2013 *Science of Military Strategy* (战略学) is a case in point. Despite its primary focus on the prosecution of war (page 4), this volume also has a chapter on peacetime military operations (chapter 8), which naturally include a broad spectrum of naval operations, from counterpiracy operations to sovereignty patrols through disputed waters (page 163). Indeed, much of the content in the section on the PLA Navy's "strategic tasks" focuses on the service's peacetime missions (pages 209–21).⁴⁷

The statements of some members of the PLA thinking class should be received with skepticism. These are the pundits.⁴⁸ Their frequent appearances on Chinese television and their prolific output of often-shallow analyses in the popular press suggest that shaping domestic and international opinion is a major function of their work. Their writings and commentary may be guided by instructions to convince domestic audiences that international affairs are important and that the party-state is taking steps to protect the nation, and to signal to foreign audiences that China is willing and able to defend its interests.⁴⁹

PLA Navy pundits include Senior Captain Li Jie (李杰) (Ret.) and Senior Captain Zhang Junshe (张军社), both from NRI; Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo (尹卓) (Ret.), director of the PLA Navy Informatization Expert Committee; and Rear Admiral Zhang Zhaozhong (张召忠), a professor at NDU.⁵⁰ For his part, Rear Admiral Zhang Zhaozhong has published numerous books and articles aimed at the mass-consumption market, and he frequently appears on Chinese television to talk about maritime issues.⁵¹ His views are sometimes far-fetched, making him the target of online pillorying.⁵² As Andrew Chubb shows, pundits such as Zhang Zhaozhong openly acknowledge their role as propagandists. This obviously casts doubt on the reliability of their statements.⁵³

Nevertheless, one cannot discard wholesale the statements of PLA pundits. In their role as transmitters of national defense policy to the Chinese people, the pundits may offer useful insights. For instance, when Zhang says that China has adopted a “cabbage strategy” (包心菜战略) in the South China Sea, who is to doubt him, especially when his description matches known behavior?⁵⁴ When NRI’s Li writes that a primary driver behind China’s “One Belt—One Road” strategy is to counteract perceived American efforts to hem China in from positions along the “first island chain,” and that the strategy requires a strong PLA Navy, what logic suggests he is lying?⁵⁵

The extent to which students of Chinese maritime strategy should ascribe value to the statements of military pundits clearly is debatable. Therefore, any scholarship that cites a member of their ranks must reckon with this debate.

SOA Scholars

The same assumption of privileged knowledge applies to researchers working for civilian maritime agencies. The SOA’s internal think tank is called the China Maritime Development Strategy Research Institute (中国海洋发展战略研究, officially translated as the China Institute for Marine Affairs—CIMA). CIMA scholars are assigned research projects for the direct benefit of Chinese policy makers, that is, for internal use. One area of focus has been maritime power, a topic CIMA researchers have studied for years. In 2010, CIMA researchers completed work on a report entitled *Research on China’s Maritime Strategy for the Years 2010–2020: Building China into a Mid-Level Maritime Power*, and in 2011 they began another major research project called *A Blueprint for Turning China into a Maritime Power*, both for internal consumption.⁵⁶ Although the original reports are unavailable, the public writings of CIMA scholars, including CIMA deputy director Zhang Haiwen (张海文), and researcher Wang Fang (王芳), make an excellent proxy.⁵⁷

Individual CIMA experts publish books, scholarly articles, and essays. CIMA researchers interpret the significance of new maritime policies, place the policies

into an international context, and contribute to the debate on China's proper relationship with the ocean. They also analyze developments in China's relations with states along its maritime periphery. Examining their assessments over time sheds light on the evolution of China's maritime strategy. In May 2007, for instance, several CIMA experts wrote an analysis of China's maritime security environment, publishing it in *China Ocean News*. Looking back at 2006, they conclude that the implementation of China's policies of "treating neighbors well, treating them as partners" and as "harmonious neighbors, secure neighbors, and wealthy neighbors," and the diplomatic approach of "building a harmonious world" had a certain restraining effect on the acquisitive activities of some states, thereby resulting in continuous improvement in the maritime situation near China.⁵⁸

Thus, in 2007 the consensus in Chinese maritime policy circles may have been that a conciliatory approach toward other disputants was proving effective. This suggests that China's decision to pursue a more assertive dispute strategy in subsequent years may have been a result of an internal debate in which Chinese policy makers decided ultimately that the former approach no longer was bearing fruit.

The statements of two CIMA researchers merit particular attention. One is CIMA director Gao Zhiguo. Gao was one of only two maritime experts who briefed the CCP Politburo during the July 2013 Politburo study session (discussed above).⁵⁹ Thus, he demonstrably has the ear of Chinese leaders. Aside from internal research projects, Gao publishes academic articles and commentary on maritime issues, often blending legal and strategic analysis. Gao collaborated with another Chinese scholar on a treatise outlining the legal bases for China's nine-dash line.⁶⁰ Gao has long advocated for China to draft a maritime basic law, a comprehensive document that, among other things, could define more fully the scope of Chinese maritime claims and the penalties for foreign mariners who encroach on them.⁶¹ Perhaps in part as a result of Gao's efforts, the SOA currently is taking the lead on researching and drafting a maritime basic law, an objective on the agenda of the current National People's Congress.⁶²

The second is Gao's deputy, Zhang Haiwen mentioned above. Like Gao, Zhang is a maritime legal expert. Much of her work involves internal reports prepared for Chinese policy makers' reference (决策参考建议). For example, Zhang has led a team researching the question of the rights of Chinese maritime law-enforcement vessels operating in disputed waters. Do foreign states, for instance, have the right to board CMS ships? Such work has very direct policy implications. Zhang also advises Chinese leaders on how to handle incidents at sea (突发事件).⁶³

CIMA also publishes institutional analyses. It produces the annual *China Oceans Development Report* (中国海洋发展报告), a volume that covers a full range of maritime-related topics, from maritime law to marine-related economic production. It is an important source for understanding how China conceives of its maritime rights and interests and how it uses the sea services to “safeguard” them.

CIMA has an avowed role in state propaganda efforts. In late 2012, at the height of tension among China and its neighbors in the East and South China Seas, Zhang Haiwen frequently appeared on television for the purpose of “correctly guiding public opinion” (正确引导舆论). The Chinese people needed to know the source of tensions—that foreigners were to blame—and they needed to know that Chinese leaders were acting to defend the nation, thereby “dispelling the misunderstandings” of Chinese nationalists.⁶⁴ Thus, in settings in which a large audience is presumed, the reliability of statements made by CIMA scholars—indeed, the statements of all scholars affiliated with the military or the party-state—should be scrutinized for any political purpose.

Outside Scholars and Pundits

Unlike their colleagues working for the sea services, outside scholars writing about Chinese maritime affairs cannot be assumed to have privileged access; instead, the case must be made. Unless it is, their writings lack authority and should not be treated as primary sources.

When outside scholars publish in authoritative periodicals, their statements may carry some authority. For example, in the days and weeks following the above-mentioned July 2013 Politburo study session, Rear Admiral Zheng Ming (Ret.) was invited by *China Ocean News* to offer his interpretation of the significance of Xi Jinping’s remarks. In the subsequent article, published on page 1 of the newspaper, Zheng highlighted Xi Jinping’s use of the twelve-character expression “sovereignty belongs to China, shelve the disputes, and engage in joint development” (主权属我, 搁置争议, 共同开发), an approach that Deng Xiaoping developed for handling China’s disputes.⁶⁵ Many people in China tend to omit the first part—“sovereignty belongs to China”—because it sounds uncompromising. Xi Jinping’s decision to include it, in Zheng’s view, indicates his resolve never to make concessions on China’s claims.⁶⁶ While Zheng Ming himself no longer may work for the Chinese military—and therefore cannot be presumed to possess privileged knowledge of the current strategy—the fact that a SOA publication would invite him to express his views on such an important topic suggests a degree of authority in his statements.⁶⁷

The work of outside scholars may carry special significance if one can demonstrate direct influence on those who make and implement policy. In such

cases, the scholarship itself is not important because of its privileged insights on Chinese strategy; rather, the fact that the scholar is “influential” may suggest that his/her work reflects thinking within the military, the party-state, or both. Even in the very best of circumstances, however, this approach is seldom conclusive.

The case of Zhang Wenmu (张文本) sheds light on some of these difficulties. Zhang is a professor at Beihang University (formerly Beijing University of Aero-

Liu presided over China’s policy shift from a generally passive coast guard presence in disputed waters to actual efforts to assert control over disputed waters on the pretext of routine law enforcement.

navitics and Astronautics). He was an early and ardent advocate for China to build a powerful navy and he sees international affairs in the starkest geostrategic terms. His analyses, often couched in

the idiom of Marxist thought, are sweeping in scope and prone to facile historical analogy. Zhang’s essays on maritime affairs are collected in *On Chinese Sea Power* (论中国海权), a volume that has gone through three editions.⁶⁸

It is clear that Zhang Wenmu’s ideas have some influence within the Chinese military and the party-state. He is invited regularly to conferences and roundtables on maritime affairs, including those sponsored by the SOA.⁶⁹ Indeed, in 2014 he was asked to lecture to a class of more than eighty SOA bureaucrats receiving a two-day course on maritime strategy.⁷⁰ At least some parts of the PLA attach importance to his work. For instance, he was interviewed about the strategic significance of China’s “One Belt—One Road” strategy, and the transcripts were published in the July 2015 issue of *National Defense*, a journal run by the PLA’s Academy of Military Science.⁷¹ All of this suggests that *some* of his views on the international environment and the use of sea power have *some* purchase among at least *some* leaders within the SOA and at least *some* faction of the PLA Navy. Ultimately, however, this is not very instructive for anybody seeking to understand Chinese maritime strategy.⁷²

The Chinese press publishes a wide selection of what might be called “naval-ist” publications. These include *Modern Ships* (现代舰船), *Naval and Merchant Ships* (舰船知识), and *Shipborne Weapons* (舰载武器). Analysts/pundits who write for these magazines often delve into important strategic and operational issues, sometimes with obvious erudition and candor. Seldom, however, do we learn anything about the scribes themselves, many of whom write under pseudonyms. Therefore, it is impossible to map out the connection between the views of authors writing for these publications and the thinking of the men and women who formulate and implement maritime strategy. In the end, the empirical value of their statements is negligible.

The statements of those affiliated with the Chinese military and the party-state are excellent sources for understanding elements of China's evolving maritime strategy. These sources, used in conjunction with behavioral indicators (building programs, behavior at sea, etc.), allow observers to define the primary contours of China's relationship with the sea. Listed below are some general principles for assessing the value of these sources, distilled from the cases examined above:

1. Chinese statements on maritime strategy are useful to the extent to which they can be shown to be authoritative.
2. The statements of men and women responsible for formulating and implementing policy are the most authoritative indicators of Chinese strategy.
3. The statements of Chinese scholars and pundits should be regarded as secondary sources (and judged as such) unless these individuals can be shown to have privileged access to "the strategy."
4. Scholars and pundits who work directly for China's sea services (or agencies that manage them) should be assumed to have some privileged access. This access is likely a function of rank and position.
5. Beware the statements of scholars/pundits who work for the sea services but whose primary work involves internal and external propaganda. The sincerity of their statements may be questionable.
6. Outside scholars and pundits cannot be assumed to have privileged access to "the strategy." Privileged access must be demonstrated.
7. That an outside scholar is known to be "influential" does not necessarily mean that his/her views reflect the mainstream thinking of Chinese policy makers.
8. The statements of unknown pundits writing for "navalist" publications have negligible value as indicators of China's maritime strategy.

NOTES

1. Andrew S. Erickson and Austin M. Strange, *Six Years . . . and Counting: Gulf of Aden Anti-piracy and China's Maritime Commons Presence* (Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation, 2015).
2. This is a theme in the work of Linda Jakobson. See Linda Jakobson, *China's Unpredictable Maritime Security Actors*, Lowy Institute Report (Sydney, NSW, Austral.: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 11 December 2014), available at www.lowyinstitute.org/.
3. For a recent debate on proper sources, see Lyle J. Goldstein, "How China Sees America's Moves in Asia: Worse than Containment," *National Interest Online*, 29 October 2014, nationalinterest.org/; Michael S. Chase,

- Timothy R. Heath, and Ely Ratner, "Engagement and Assurance: Debating the U.S.-Chinese Relationship," *National Interest Online*, 5 November 2014, nationalinterest.org/; and Lyle J. Goldstein, "The Great Debate: U.S.-Chinese Relations and the Future of Asia," *National Interest Online*, 10 November 2014, nationalinterest.org/.
4. James C. Mulvenon and Andrew Yang, eds., *A Poverty of Riches: New Challenges and Opportunities in PLA Research* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), available at www.rand.org/.
 5. Colin S. Gray and Roger W. Barnett, eds., *Seapower and Strategy* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989), p. 378.
 6. This definition regards sea power as an "input." See Geoffrey Till, *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 21.
 7. "Naval strategy" was a focus of Adm. Liu Huaqing. See 施昌学 [Shi Changxue], 海军司令刘华清 [*Navy Commander Liu Huaqing*] (Beijing: Long March, 2013), pp. 85–134. The term "maritime security strategy" was used by Sr. Capt. Zhang Wei and Sr. Capt. Feng Liang in their very important volume *Maritime Security of the State* (discussed below). See 张炜, 冯梁 [Zhang Wei and Feng Liang, eds.], 国家海上安全 [*Maritime Security of the State*] (Beijing: Haichao, 2008), pp. 472–77.
 8. See 国家海洋事业发展“十二五”规划 [Twelfth Five-Year Plan for Maritime Development], 国家海洋局 [SOA website], 11 April 2013, www.soa.gov.cn/.
 9. The thirteenth five-year plan (2016–20) calls for China to "strengthen top-level design of maritime strategy" (加强海洋战略顶层设计). Given the context—a national plan for economic and social development—the term "maritime strategy" is likely synonymous with "maritime development strategy." See 赵建东 [Zhao Jiandong], "十三五"规划的蓝色看点 ["On the Maritime Content of the 'Thirteenth Five-Year Plan'"], 国家海洋局 [SOA website], 7 March 2016, www.soa.gov.cn/.
 10. 罗毅 [Luo Yi], 中国海警局孙书贤副局长访问琼州学院畅谈走进海洋 ["Vice-Commandant of the China Coast Guard Sun Shuxian Visits Qiongzhou College to Talk about Maritime Affairs"], 海南热带海洋学院 [website of Hainan Tropical Ocean University], 14 August 2015, www.qzu.edu.cn/.
 11. Important yearbooks include the SOA's *China Ocean Yearbook* (中国海洋年鉴) and the Ministry of Agriculture's *China Fisheries Yearbook* (中国渔业年鉴).
 12. Bonnie Glaser, "China's Maritime Rights Protection Leading Small Group—Shrouded in Secrecy," *Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative*, 11 September 2015, amti.csis.org/; 海洋发展战略研究所课题组 [China Institute for Marine Affairs Research Group], 中国海洋发展报告 (2015) [*China's Ocean Development Report (2015)*] (Beijing: Ocean, 2015), p. 301.
 13. The decision to create the State Oceanic Commission appeared in legislation passed at the March 2013 National People's Congress. The legislation states that the State Oceanic Commission, a "high-level deliberation and coordination mechanism," was created to "strengthen planning and comprehensive coordination of maritime affairs . . . [,] assume responsibility for researching and formulating a national maritime development strategy, and conduct overall planning for major maritime projects. Its specific tasking would be carried out by the State Oceanic Administration." See 国务院机构改革和职能转变方案 [Program for State Council Organizational Reform and Functional Transformation], 中国政府网 [website of the central government of the PRC], 15 March 2013, www.gov.cn/.
 14. Pascal Abb, "China's Foreign Policy Think Tanks: Institutional Evolution and Changing Roles," *Journal of Contemporary China* 24, no. 93, p. 543.
 15. 习近平在中共中央政治局第八次集体学习时强调进一步关心海洋认识海洋经略海洋推动海洋强国建设不断取得新成就 ["At the Eighth Politburo Collective Study Session Xi Jinping Emphasized That China Should Do More to Take Interest in the Sea, Understand the Sea, and Strategically Manage the Sea, and Continually Do More to Promote China's Efforts to Become a Maritime Power"], 人民日报 [*People's Daily*], 1 August 2013, p. 1.
 16. 李兆春, 高新生 [Li Taochun and Gao Xinsheng], 话海防概念的释读 ["How to Interpret the Concept of Ocean Defense"], 中国海洋报 [*China Ocean News*], 22 July 2008, p. 4.
 17. 李宜良, 黎云 [Li Xuanliang and Li Yun], 习近平会见第五次全国边海防工作会议代表 李克强张高丽参加 ["Xi Jinping Meets

- the Delegates Attending the Fifth National Border and Coast Defense Work Meeting, Li Keqiang and Zhang Gaoli Also Attend”], Xinhua, 27 June 2014, politics.people.com.cn/.
18. 廖文根 [Liao Wen'gen], 全国边防工作会议召开胡锦涛温家宝李长春周永康会见全体代表 [“The National Border and Ocean Defense Work Meeting Opens, Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao, Li Changchun, and Zhou Yongkang Meet the Delegates”], 人民日报 [People's Daily], 30 January 2010, available at www.npc.gov.cn/.
 19. 周元 [Zhou Yuan], 罗保铭: 加强党管武装工作和国防后备力量建设 [“Luo Baoming: Strengthen Party Control over Armed Forces Work and Construction of National Defense Reserve Forces”], 中国政府网 [website of the central government of China], 7 December 2013, www.gov.cn/. The Chinese media have also covered Luo's visits to individual militia units. See, for example, 王凯 [Wang Kai], 罗保铭在海南琼海市潭门宣讲十八大精神纪实 [“An Account of Luo Baoming's Visit to Tanmen Village to Talk about the Spirit of the Eighteenth Party Congress”], 中国共产党新闻网 [CCP news website], 7 December 2012, cpc.people.com.cn/.
 20. The “Chinese coast guard” is a general term to describe all the maritime law-enforcement agencies charged with managing Chinese-claimed waters and offshore land features. The most important maritime law-enforcement agencies involved in implementing China's maritime strategy are China Marine Surveillance, Fisheries Law Enforcement, the Border Defense Coast Guard, and the China Coast Guard. See Ryan Martinson, “From Words to Actions: The Creation of the China Coast Guard” (paper for the “China as a ‘Maritime Power’” conference, Center for Naval Analyses, Arlington, VA, 28–29 July 2015), available at www.cna.org/.
 21. As a member of the Central Military Commission, Admiral Wu does more than just implement policy; he also plays a direct role in shaping it.
 22. China's closest analogue is the deceased Adm. Liu Huaqing. See 刘华清 [Liu Huaqing], 刘华清回忆录 [Liu Huaqing Memoirs] (Beijing: PLA, 2004). For an authoritative biography of Liu, see Shi Changxue, *Navy Commander Liu Huaqing*.
 23. For a discussion of Wu's influence on the PLA Navy, see Jeffrey Becker, “China's Military Modernization: The Legacy of Admiral Wu Shengli,” Jamestown Foundation *China Brief* 15, no. 16 (18 August 2015), www.jamestown.org/.
 24. 刘金来 [Liu Jinlai], 以史为鉴知耻奋进站在实现中国梦的高度肩负起强军兴军历史责任 [“Use History as a Reference, Be Aware of Shame and Struggle Forward, Look at Matters from the Perspective of Realizing the China Dream, and Assume the Historic Responsibility of Building a Strong Military”], 人民海军 [People's Navy], 29 August 2014, p. 1.
 25. 吴胜利 [Wu Shengli], 深刻吸取甲午战争历史教训坚定不移走经略海洋维护海权发展海军之路 [“Profoundly Absorb the Historical Lessons of the First Sino-Japanese War and Unswervingly Take the Path of Strategic Management of the Sea, Safeguarding Maritime Rights, and Developing the Navy”], 中国军事科学 [China Military Science], no. 4 (2014), pp. 1–4.
 26. The 2011 edition of *PLA Military Terminology* defines “maritime rights and interests” as “a general expression for the various rights and interests enjoyed by a sovereign state over the ocean. They include sovereignty in the territorial sea; the sovereign rights and jurisdictional rights in the contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, and the continental shelf; the rights enjoyed on the high seas and the international seabed; and the right of innocent passage through other states' territorial sea.” 中国人民解放军军语 [PLA Military Terminology] (Beijing: Academy of Military Science, September 2011), p. 26. While serving as SOA director, Liu Cigui defined “maritime rights and interests” as “a general expression for a state's rights and interests on the ocean, chiefly including rights and interests in waters outside of one's jurisdiction and rights and interests in waters under one's jurisdiction.” See also 高悦 [Gao Rui], 刘赐贵应邀在中共中央党校作专题报告坚决维护我国的海洋权益 [“Liu Cigui Gives a Speech at the Central Party School Entitled ‘Resolutely Safeguard China's Maritime Rights and Interests’”], 中国海洋报 [China Ocean News], 1 July 2013, p. 1.
 27. 张兆垠 [Zhang Zhaoyin], 切实有效维护南海海洋权益 [“Earnestly and Effectively Safeguard Maritime Rights and Interests in the

- South China Sea”, 人民海军 [*People's Navy*], 19 March 2014, p. 2.
28. For an academic variation of this theory, see You Ji, *Deciphering Beijing's Maritime Security Policy and Strategy in Managing Sovereignty Disputes in the China Seas*, Policy Brief (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 1 October 2013), available at www.rsis.edu.sg/.
 29. From 1983 to 2013, the State Oceanic Administration, an agency within the Ministry of Land and Resources, had authority over China Marine Surveillance, a maritime law-enforcement agency with the largest role in the administrative prong of China's maritime dispute strategy. The SOA now administers the new China Coast Guard, established in mid-2013 by combining CMS and three other maritime law-enforcement agencies.
 30. Liu left the SOA to become the governor of Hainan Province, where he remains at the time of this writing.
 31. 刘赐贵 [Liu Cigui], 努力实现从海洋大国向海洋强国的历史跨越 [“Work to Realize the Historic Crossover from Being a Major Maritime State to Being a Maritime Power”], 中国海洋报 [*China Ocean News*], 7 June 2014, p. 1.
 32. 孙书贤: 日本若敢越红线 中方不惜一战 [“Sun Shuxian: If Japan Dares to Cross Red Lines China Will Not Hesitate to Go to War”], 凤凰卫视 [*Phoenix TV*], 13 July 2012, news.ifeng.com/.
 33. This point was made by retired PLA Navy officer Rear Adm. Zheng Ming in an interview published in *Modern Ships*. 陈良飞, 余婷 [Chen Liangfei and Yu Ping], 钓鱼岛, 黄岩岛事件或可成为我国制定和实施海洋发展战略的一个切入点 [“The Diaoyu Island and Huangyan Island Incidents Could Perhaps Become an Entry Point for China's Formulation and Implementation of Its Maritime Development Strategy”], 现代舰船 [*Modern Ships*] (September 2012), p. 14. See also 刘斌 [Liu Bin], 中国海警局组建一年观察执行任务不再单打独斗了 [“A Look at China Coast Guard One Year after It Was Set Up, Forces No Longer Carry Out Missions Alone”], 南方周末 [*Southern Weekend*], 9 October 2014. An official history of Guangdong Province's role in ocean defense states that the South China Sea branch of Fisheries Law Enforcement decided to deploy a cutter to work with fishing vessels to “track, intercept, and expel” *Impeccable*. This decision was “based on the spirit of the instructions issued by a higher-level department” (根据上级部门的指示精神). This suggests that the branch did not receive specific instructions for how to handle the incident and therefore had wide latitude to decide how to act. See 广东海防史编委会 [Editorial Committee of Guangdong Ocean Defense History], 广东海防史 [*History of Guangdong Ocean Defense*] (Guangzhou: Zhongshan, 2010), p. 466.
 34. 项仙君 [Xiang Xianjun], 农业部南海区渔政局局长: 海洋强国梦从未这么近 [“Head of the South China Sea Branch of the Ministry of Agriculture's Fisheries Law Enforcement: The Dream of Maritime Power Has Never Been So Close”], 南方日报 [*Nanfang Daily*], 20 December 2012, available at politics.people.com.cn/.
 35. See Liu Huaqing, *Liu Huaqing Memoirs*, p. 435.
 36. For a translation of one of Zhang's articles, see Zhang Wei, “A General Review of the History of China's Sea-Power Theory Development,” *Naval War College Review* 68, no. 4 (Autumn 2015), pp. 80–93.
 37. 刘洪顺, 周振国 [Liu Hongshun and Zhou Zhenguó], 泼墨淬剑—记海军军事学术研究所研究员张炜 [“A Splash of Ink to Temper the Sword—A Profile of the Naval Research Institute's Zhang Wei”], 人民海军 [*People's Navy*], 23 July 2012, p. 1.
 38. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
 39. 任筱锋 [Ren Xiaofeng], 海上军事行动法手册 [*Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations*] (Beijing: Haichao, 2009), pp. 111, 190–92. Ren erroneously states that China's position on the nine-dash line had been articulated when China ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in May 1996.
 40. 柏杨 [Bo Yang], 站在桅杆上的眺望者 [“The Man Gazes Afar from Atop the Mast”], 人民海军 [*People's Navy*], 16 February 2015, p. 4; see also 顾博 [Gu Bo], 冯梁: 磨剑二十年 [“Feng Liang: Twenty Years of Sharpening His Sword”], 人民海军 [*People's Navy*], 4 April 2014, p. 3.
 41. See Bo Yang, “The Man Gazes Afar,” p. 4.

42. Academy of Military Science researcher Shi Xiaoqin calls this book a “weather vane” (风向标) for understanding the Chinese government’s views on the relationship between sea power and the pursuit of national wealth and power. See 师小芹 [Shi Xiaoqin], 论海权与中美关系 [*On Sea Power and China-U.S. Relations*] (Beijing: Military Science, 2012), p. 225. Zhang Wei and Feng Liang, *Maritime Security of the State*.
43. See Bo Yang, “The Man Gazes Afar,” p. 4. See also 程勇 [Cheng Yong], 探讨安全环境直面热点问题 [“Discussing Important Topics Regarding the Security Environment”], 人民海军 [*People’s Navy*], 27 December 2010, p. 2; 冯梁, 高子川, 段廷志 [Feng Liang, Gao Zichuan, and Duan Tingzhi], 中国的和平发展与海上安全环境 [*China’s Peaceful Rise and the Maritime Security Environment*] (Beijing: World Knowledge, 2010).
44. See Bo Yang, “The Man Gazes Afar,” p. 4.
45. Ibid.; Gu Bo, “Feng Liang,” p. 3. Other naval experts whose work, because of their affiliation with the PLA Navy, offers useful indicators of Chinese maritime strategy include Xie Shiting (谢适汀) from the Dalian Naval Academy and Liang Fang (梁芳) from NDU.
46. 安鹏 [An Peng], 加强海上方向空中力量建设的战略思考 [“Strategic Consideration on Strengthening the Air Forces in the Maritime Direction”], 中国军事科学 [*China Military Science*], no. 3 (2015), p. 83. Despite being less relevant in China’s maritime strategy, scholars working for the PLA ground forces do write about maritime affairs. These include Sr. Col. Xu Qiyu (徐弃郁), deputy director of the Institute for Strategic Studies at NDU; Shi Xiaoqin (师小芹), a scholar at the Academy of Military Science; and Maj. Gen. Zhang Shiping (张世平), a scholar at the Academy of Military Science. Of note, Shi Xiaoqin contributed to the very authoritative *Science of Military Strategy* (discussed below).
47. 军事科学院军事战略研究部 [Academy of Military Science Strategic Research Department], 战略学 [*Science of Military Strategy*] (Beijing: Military Science, 2013). For an excellent catalogue of authoritative volumes on Chinese military strategy, see M. Taylor Fravel and Christopher P. Twomey, “Projecting Strategy: The Myth of Chinese Counter-intervention,” *Washington Quarterly* 37, no. 4 (Winter 2015), pp. 171–87.
48. Distinct from a scholar, a pundit is a person who primarily writes articles for magazines and newspapers or mass-market books that do not expect scholarly standards of evidence.
49. Andrew Chubb, “Propaganda as Policy? Explaining the PLA’s ‘Hawkish Faction’ (Part Two),” Jamestown Foundation *China Brief* 13, no. 16 (9 August 2013), www.jamestown.org/.
50. Rear Admiral Zhang left active duty in mid-2015. Other branches of the Chinese military also have pundits who speak and write on maritime affairs. Maj. Gen. Luo Yuan (罗援) (Ret.) of the PLA ground forces is a prominent example. In October 2014, the China Coast Guard Academy in Ningbo held a conference to discuss how China can use its maritime law-enforcement forces to defend and advance its position in its maritime disputes. The event brought together scholars (including Sr. Capt. Feng Liang), pundits (including Luo Yuan, who was keynote speaker), and current and former service members (including Sun Shuxian and Yu Zhirong, introduced below). See 朱健, 石晶 [Zhu Jian and Shi Jing], 我院举办第二届“海洋维权与执法论坛” [“Academy Hosts Second ‘Maritime Rights Protection and Law Enforcement Forum’”], 公安海警学院学报 [*Journal of the Public Security Coast Guard Academy*], no. 4 (2014), inside cover.
51. For example, in 2011 Zhang published a four-hundred-page book entitled *Toward the Deep Blue*. For several reasons, it should not be considered a work of scholarship: (1) It contains no citations of any kind. (2) It was published by the Guangdong Economic Press (广东经济出版社), not a PLA-affiliated press. And (3) the book’s preface was written by the director of the Propaganda Department of Guangdong Province, who stated that among other things the purpose of the book was to “strengthen the maritime consciousness of the Chinese people.” 张召忠 [Zhang Zhaozhong], 走向深蓝 [*Toward the Deep Blue*] (Guangzhou: Guangdong Economic Press, 2011).
52. In a recent article, Zhang defended himself from his detractors. See 张召忠 [Zhang Zhaozhong], 张召忠回应美第七舰队司令: 你别撞上中国心烦时 [“Zhang Zhaozhong Responds to the Commander of the USN Seventh Fleet: Do Not Bump into China When China Is in a Bad Mood”], 凤凰军事

- [*Phoenix Military*], 18 February 2016, news.ifeng.com/.
53. Andrew Chubb, "Propaganda, Not Policy: Explaining the PLA's 'Hawkish Faction' (Part One)," Jamestown Foundation *China Brief* 13, no. 15 (25 July 2013), www.jamestown.org/.
 54. The "cabbage strategy" describes China's coordinated use of its sea services to control maritime space, especially waters around disputed land features. Zhang seems to have first used this term during a May 2013 Beijing TV news show. For a transcript of the interview, see 张召忠: 反制菲占岛 只需用"包心菜"战略 ["Zhang Zhaozhong: To Counter Philippine Occupation of Islands China Just Needs to Implement a 'Cabbage' Strategy"], 环球网 [*Global Times Online*], 27 May 2013, mil.huanqiu.com/.
 55. 李杰 [Li Jie], 缘何加力推进"海上丝路"战略 ["Why China Should Strengthen Its 'Maritime Silk Road' Strategy"], 军事文摘 [*Military Digest*], no. 9 (September 2015), pp. 6–10.
 56. 中国海洋发展战略高层论坛在京召开 ["A Senior-Level Forum on the Topic of China's Maritime Development Strategy Opens in Beijing"], 中国海洋报 [*China Ocean News*], 30 November 2010, p. 1, epaper.oceanol.com/; 香山论坛: 建设中国特色海洋强国 ["Xiangshan Forum: Constructing Maritime Power with Chinese Characteristics"], 中国海洋报 [*China Ocean News*], 1 January 2013, p. 3.
 57. 张海文, 王芳 [Zhang Haiwen and Wang Fang], 海洋强国战略是国家大战略的有机组成部分 ["Maritime Power Strategy Is an Organic Component of Grand Strategy"], 国际安全研究 [*International Security Studies*], no. 6 (2013), pp. 57–69. Obviously, the publicly available article is not identical to the internal reports. It is, however, unlikely that the publicly available article contradicts any of the content of the internal reports. Otherwise, there would be no point in writing and publishing in a public forum.
 58. 贾宇, 吴继陆, 疏震娅 [Jia Yu, Wu Jilu, and Shu Zhenya], 2006年我国周边海上形势综述 ["A Review of the Situation along China's Maritime Periphery in 2006"], 中国海洋报 [*China Ocean News*], 22 May 2007.
 59. "At the Eighth Politburo Collective Study Session Xi Jinping Emphasized That China Should Do More to Take Interest in the Sea, Understand the Sea, and Strategically Manage the Sea, and Continually Do More to Promote China's Efforts to Become a Maritime Power," p. 1.
 60. 高之国, 贾兵兵 [Gao Zhiguo and Jia Bingbing], 论南海九段线的历史, 地位和作用 [*The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status, and Implications*] (Beijing: Ocean, 2014). This book is a bilingual copy of an article the two authors originally published in a 2013 issue of the *American Journal of International Law*.
 61. 高之国, 辛崇阳 [Gao Zhiguo and Xin Chongyang], 制定我国海洋基本法的必要性与可行性——我国现行海洋政策, 立法, 执法的现状与问题 (上) ["On the Necessity and Feasibility of China Formulating a Maritime Basic Law (Part I)"], 中国海洋报 [*China Ocean News*], 5 November 2010, p. 1. See also 高之国, 辛崇阳 [Gao Zhiguo and Xin Chongyang], 制定我国海洋基本法的必要性与可行性——我国现行海洋政策, 立法, 执法的现状与问题 (下) ["On the Necessity and Feasibility of China Formulating a Maritime Basic Law (Part II)"], 中国海洋报 [*China Ocean News*], 9 November 2010, p. 1.
 62. 赵宁 [Zhao Ning], 国家海洋局召开海洋基本法立法座谈会 ["The State Oceanic Administration Holds a Meeting to Discuss Legislation of a Maritime Basic Law"], 中国海洋报 [*China Ocean News*], 29 December 2014, p. 1.
 63. 张斌键 [Zhang Binjian], 以法护海的中枢卫士——记国家海洋局海洋发展战略所副所长张海文 ["The Heroine Who Uses the Law to Safeguard the Sea—A Profile of Deputy Director of CIMA Zhang Haiwen"], 中国海洋报 [*China Ocean News*], 26 June 2013, p. 3.
 64. Ibid.
 65. 郑明 [Zheng Ming], "搁置争议 共同开发"前提是"主权属我" ["The Precondition for 'Shelving Disputes and Engaging in Joint Development' Is 'Sovereignty Is Mine'"], 中国海洋报 [*China Ocean News*], 3 September 2013.
 66. For more on the history and efficacy of the twelve-character strategy for handling disputes, see 温勇 [Wen Yong], 新形势下维护海洋权益解决海洋争议的思考—对邓小平"主权属我, 搁置争议, 共同开发"思想的再探讨 ["Considerations on Safeguarding Maritime Rights and Interests and Resolving

- Maritime Disputes in the New Situation—A Reconsideration of Deng Xiaoping’s Ideas on ‘Sovereignty Belongs to China, Shelve the Disputes, and Engage in Joint Development’”, *中国军事科学* [*China Military Science*], no. 2 (2015), pp. 67–74. Wen is a professor at the Dalian Naval Academy.
67. Yu Zhirong (郁志荣) is one of the more prolific retired maritime law-enforcement officers (former CMS) currently researching and writing on maritime strategy. He is a researcher at the China Maritime Development Research Center (中国海洋发展研究中心), which is an association of experts from the SOA, provincial and municipal maritime agencies, and Chinese universities. It was established in 2006. For information on this organization, see 黄冉 [Huang Ran], 国家海洋局局长刘赐贵会见中国海洋发展研究中心主任王曙光 [“SOA Director Liu Cigui Meeting the Director of the China Maritime Development Research Center Wang Shuguang”, 海洋局网站 [SOA website], 20 May 2011, www.soa.gov.cn/].
68. The most recent edition was published in 2014. See 张文木 [Zhang Wenmu], 论中国海权 [On Chinese Sea Power] (Beijing: Ocean, 2014).
69. See, for example, “海洋观与建设海洋强国”学术研讨会发言 (摘登) [“Remarks Made at an Academic Conference on the Topic of ‘Views of the Ocean and Building China into a Maritime Power’” (excerpts)], *中国海洋报* [*China Ocean News*], 1 September 2014, p. 3.
70. The title of Zhang’s lecture was “A Changing Global Situation and China’s National Security.” 路涛 [Lu Tao], 海洋强国战略培训班在京举办 [“A Training Class on China’s Maritime Power Strategy Takes Place in Beijing”], *中国海洋报* [*China Ocean News*], 26 November 2014, p. 2.
71. 从政治高度认识“一带一路”的战略意义—本刊专访北京航空航天大学战略问题研究中心张文木教授 [“A Political Understanding of the Strategic Significance of the ‘One Belt—One Road’—An Interview with Zhang Wenmu”], *国防* [*National Defense*], no. 7 (2015), pp. 22–25.
72. For additional detail on Zhang, see Lyle J. Goldstein, “Get Ready: China Could Pull a ‘Crimea’ in Asia,” *National Interest Online*, 11 April 2015, nationalinterest.org/. Other outside scholars who study Chinese maritime affairs but may have direct connections with policy makers, the sea services, or both include Hu Bo (胡波), a researcher at Peking University’s Maritime Research Institute; Ni Lexiong (倪乐雄), a professor at Shanghai University of Political Science and Law; Shi Yinhong (时殷弘), a professor at Renmin University; Wu Shicun (吴士存), president of China’s National Institute for South China Sea Studies; Zhang Jie (张洁), a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; Zhang Mingyi (张明义), a member of the Senior Advisory Committee on National Maritime Development; and Zhu Feng (朱锋), executive director of the China Center for Collaborative Studies of the South China Sea at Nanjing University.



STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT AND ADAPTATION

Reassessing the Afghanistan Surge Decision

Francis G. Hoffman

As former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld once noted, we go to war with the Army (and Navy) we have. However, we do not necessarily win wars with the same armed forces or strategy with which we began them. Often, these forces initially are not optimized for the particular conflict in which they become engaged, and even when they are, adaptive adversaries present unanticipated challenges. Often throughout history, leaders have needed to recognize that their initial plans were not successful and that adaptation (organizationally, doctrinally, or in weapons and equipment) was needed.¹

Because of war's inherently interactive nature, victory often depends on which side most quickly can recognize problems or gaps in performance and implement changes. Despite this well-grounded observation, interest has arisen only recently in how military organizations adapt during war.² Moreover, what literature does exist focuses heavily on operational and tactical forms of change, overlooking strategic adaptation.

This article explores that gap, beginning with an overview of the literature on assessment and adaptation. Next it establishes an analytical framework for both strategic assessment and adaptation that will serve as the basis for a subsequent analysis of a particular strategic reassessment: the Obama administration's surge decision in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.³ The article concludes by offering insights relevant to senior policy makers and the joint community.

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ASSESSMENT AS ART AND SCIENCE

In studying military adaptation over the course of the twentieth century, one historian concluded

that “[a]daptation in one form or another has been a characteristic of successful military institutions and human societies under the pressures of war.”⁴ Yet education and doctrine often overlook this strategic assessment and adaptation function.

While strategic assessment represents a crucial element of a state’s ability to adapt strategy to changing wartime conditions, it is not a regular field for scholarly study. This is odd, since it plays a critical role in determining the outcome and cost of wars.⁵ A major shortfall in the conduct of our national security system has been the lack of appreciation for a continuous assessment of strategy implementation. Our national security mechanisms should not stop when the president issues a decision. Instead, an “end-to-end” approach must encompass policy formulation, strategy development, planning guidance, resource allocation and alignment, implementation oversight, and performance assessment based on feedback loops.⁶

Research by a number of experienced policy makers and scholars underscores how important it is for the National Security Council (NSC) system to incorporate effective mechanisms for oversight and performance assessment—yet how hard some agencies resist the same.⁷ The NSC remains a valuable mechanism for ensuring that presidents entertain a full set of feasible options, i.e., that options and positions are vetted and aired; and that large governmental bureaucracies get the strategic direction they need.⁸ The NSC must also remain in oversight mode to ensure that strategic direction is implemented as intended.

The importance of campaign and operational assessment is well known to the American military community. Critical issues involved in assessment include evaluation of intelligence; likely international consequences of proposed actions; the operational plans proposed to obtain defined political objectives; and a state’s relative capabilities, including how well they relate to the requirements the strategy proposed is likely to entail.⁹ The role of metrics in operational assessments and their complexity in accurately measuring progress in counterinsurgency campaigns is also recognized. So too is the potential danger of politicization of metrics to satisfy bureaucratic or institutional politics.

During the Vietnam War, U.S. military operations were assessed using new techniques derived from systems analysis and operations research. Derived from the physical sciences, these proved less valuable in capturing the more political and socioeconomic aspects of the Vietnam War. The assessment of progress at Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) was oversimplified in one sense by concentration on body counts and kill ratios, then later overcomplicated by consideration of an abundance of metrics.¹⁰ When critics challenged MACV’s strategy, there was strong pressure to generate favorable indicators to buttress the appearance of progress.¹¹

American operations in Iraq and Afghanistan faced similarly daunting requirements for data collection.¹² The challenges involved in selecting, collecting, and analyzing the right metrics in combat theaters are significant. There are myriad political, sociocultural, and economic factors relevant to combating insurgencies and civil wars. At the operational level, participants can operate under a biased view of how well they are doing but overlook disquieting indicators. At the strategic level, the national command authority needs to establish sources and consider the resultant feedback to monitor progress and adapt as necessary.

American experience in and official doctrine for assessment are limited, resulting in “inventive but ad hoc solutions” at the operational level, as Ben Connable puts it in *Embracing the Fog of War*.¹³ The analytical community crafted measures to promote an understanding of the operational effectiveness of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Assessing progress was recognized as important because the perception of progress has an effect on the sustainability of the war effort.¹⁴ Joint doctrine evolved to capture these lessons.

Although operational-level metrics and campaign assessments are necessary, they are not sufficient at the national level. An operational assessment provides insights into the progress of a strategy or campaign plan, but it should not be confused with a national strategic-level assessment, which must incorporate a much larger perspective involving international risks, opportunity costs, coalition dynamics, and national resources. A strategic assessment often will take a regional if not a global perspective, and will factor in political elements. A strategic assessment also must account for domestic political constraints, resourcing, and opportunity costs. The experience of the last fifteen years reveals more ad hoc solutions applied to this higher and less-quantitative form of strategic review.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

To explore this challenge, I used Risa Brooks’s attributes of strategic assessment as an analytical framework.¹⁵ To evaluate the strategic logic and the appropriateness of the strategic adaptation decision, I added a fifth element. The five factors are defined as follows:

- *Performance-assessment mechanisms* capture the quality of institutional structures and processes devoted to evaluations of our intelligence concerning enemy capabilities and capacities, as well as the evaluation of our own political and military activities and progress. Such mechanisms also must include a capacity to assess the interdependent political, diplomatic, and developmental activities consistent with effective counterinsurgency.

- *Collaborative information-sharing environment* describes the routines and conventions of dialogue associated with exchanging information at the apex of decision making. Key to information sharing is the degree of openness and how forthcoming participants are about options and assessments not favorable to their preferred policy outcomes. “Collaborative” means a climate in which parties are free to explore options, test assumptions, and debate the merits of those options. A collaborative context is not consensus driven, but instead searches for good options and viable compromises.
- *Strategic coordination* captures the overall governmental structure and mechanisms used to develop and make policy decisions. These influence how well policy is defined, how strategies are developed, and how well military aspects are coordinated with diplomatic activities and other aspects of the state. These measures should identify disconnects among the respective elements of a strategy, questionable assumptions, unintended consequences, and inconsistent objectives.¹⁶
- *Decision-making authorization clarity* captures how state leaders articulate and promulgate decisions and the degree to which those decisions are communicated unambiguously. Within this dimension, decision-making flexibility, subordinates’ prerogatives, and accountability for constituent pieces of a larger strategy are allocated and defined.
- *Strategic coherence* evaluates the inherent logic of the proposed adaptation and its linkage of ends, ways, and means. A coherent strategy matches a selected approach to the diagnosed problem and allocates commensurate responsibility and resources.¹⁷ Coherence integrates the use of all instruments and tools of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. The purpose of a strategy is to establish and preserve the alignment of ends, ways, and means.¹⁸ That alignment is the essence of coherence.

As Richard Betts has noted, “Strategy fails when the chosen means prove insufficient to the ends. This can happen because the wrong means are chosen or because the ends are too ambitious or slippery.”¹⁹ To that we should add, “. . . or because the wrong way is selected.” All three—ends, ways, and means—have to be tied together coherently.

This set of factors is crucial to creating a foundation for understanding adaptation at the strategic level. One cannot understand strategic-level adaptation without considering the mechanisms and institutional capacity for strategic assessment. The criteria employed in our evaluation of the strategic adaptations in this case study are presented in the table below.

Assessment and Adaptation Factors	Criteria
1. Performance-assessment mechanisms	Did the NSC have a process to monitor independently data collected on progress and costs, and other relevant metrics?
2. Collaborative environment	Did the process allow perspectives and intelligence to be completely shared in a climate in which parties were free to explore policy aims, assumptions, and options openly?
3. Strategic coordination	Did the coordination process produce both strategic positions and options? Were they integrated and coordinated?
4. Decision-making authorization clarity	Was a clear presidential decision issued, in writing, with timely guidance?
5. Strategic coherence	Did the selected strategy adaptation resolve the diagnosed problem and align ends, ways, and means?

ASSESSING THE OBAMA ASSESSMENT

The detailed history of the protracted debate over Afghanistan strategy has been covered elsewhere.²⁰ This section focuses on an analysis of the major components of the assessment.

Performance-Assessment Mechanisms

Even state-of-the-art operational assessment leaves much to be desired, and there is no evidence from the Afghan surge debate to suggest that strategic assessment is any easier to perform or yields better results. Multiple assessments by RAND, NATO allies, and service schools concluded that the complex metrics collection systems used in Afghanistan did not meet policy needs or those of military decision makers.²¹ One study on operational assessment noted, “Once again, . . . the pitfalls in trying to quantify complex dynamics [have] made the production of accurate and useful assessments a persistently elusive aim.”²²

The challenges in Afghanistan included the complexity of the counterinsurgency effort and the management of a large coalition. ISAF eventually put an extensive effort into data collection, but the focus was on operational and tactical data, and not at the right level for strategic audiences. One scholar concluded that the flaws in the currently used approaches “are sufficiently egregious” that professional military judgment on assessments is “rightfully distrusted.”²³ The ingrained optimism—the “can-do” spirit—of the U.S. military may be an additional complicating factor.²⁴

Assessments in Afghanistan proved especially problematic owing to that campaign’s dynamics, producing numerous criticisms and recommendations for innovative solutions.²⁵ NATO produced a major evaluation of the credibility of assessment methods for both Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and Operation

ENDURING FREEDOM. That effort found that “[i]n both of these campaigns, senior leaders across the various coalition nations demanded reams of quantitative data from their operational commanders which, in some cases, may have been an attempt to compensate for a lack of operational and strategic clarity and the inability to discern meaningful progress over time.”²⁶

The NATO study includes a report that one regional command in Afghanistan required subordinate units to collect and transmit some four hundred different metrics. A senior assessment officer in Kabul once estimated that more than two thousand mandatory reportable quantitative metrics were levied on subordinate units across the theater.²⁷

In Afghanistan in the summer of 2009, the newly appointed commander of ISAF, Lieutenant General Stanley McChrystal, knew the critical importance of assessment and indicators at both the operational and strategic levels of war. Specifically, he understood that ISAF needed to identify and refine appropriate indicators to assess progress so as to clarify the difference between operational measures of effectiveness critical to practitioners on the ground and strategic measures more appropriate to national capitals.²⁸ In contrast, the component agencies tended to define their contributions and metrics in terms of inputs or traditional tasks rather than the actual outputs achieved.

McChrystal’s strategic review, which received augmentation by volunteer scholars, warrants more study in that it is an exception: it strove to be a real strategic assessment.²⁹ However, its orientation was on defining the requirements for a fully resourced and effective counterinsurgency effort, answering the presumed question about what it would take to defeat the Taliban, as opposed to providing a clear delineation of national interests, policy, and options. In addition, while the ISAF review was quite impressive, it lacked a broad enough charter and representation (State Department, embassy, coalition, and interagency) to serve as the basis for subsequent NSC deliberations. Moreover, it failed to address the trans-regional and political barriers that were the real problem in obtaining desired results. Some believe that the McChrystal approach should be continued—but they fail to recognize how critically the report was received at the White House.

In any case, theater military commands are not structured to produce such strategic assessments. The ISAF product failed to incorporate alliance perspectives, much less the concerns of U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry; and it did not truly address Pakistan. It was too narrow, so it only spurred the larger and longer review that the president and NSC staff started immediately upon receiving ISAF’s inputs and troop request.

Overall, in this case, performance-assessment mechanisms were limited, particularly at the NSC, which in the summer of 2009 was not yet effectively overseeing the administration’s foreign policy agenda.

Collaborative Information-Sharing Environment

The president's desire for disciplined debate, his request for options, and his evident discomfort with early portions of the debate suggest that information sharing was limited. The president's reaching out to his staff and to the vice chairman to gain additional insights and to push for more-constrained options suggests that this component of the process was not fully satisfied.

Some scholars suggest that, by trying to preclude political interference, the military input to the Afghanistan assessment process ended up degrading the civil-military discourse needed both to understand and to alter the strategy in that campaign.³⁰ No overt efforts to manipulate assessment data in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM have been identified, but the strategic dialogue between national and theater-level officials certainly was strained. Participants share considerable agreement that candor and trust were corrupted early in the process, and that their resultant low levels negatively impacted the decision-making process. On several occasions, speeches, leaks, and comments to the media or Congress created the impression that the military was trying to maneuver the president into a box.³¹ McChrystal's assessment was leaked almost as soon as it arrived in Washington, and Ambassador Eikenberry's secret cables also were deliberately given to the media. Both former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and General McChrystal believe that these leaks and media comments negatively impacted the decision-making process. Policy options and strategic discourse between civilian and military officials at the NSC are best conducted in a climate in which candor exists and options and various positions are debated thoroughly. Such a context helps produce sound policy decisions and strategies.³²

Strategic Coordination

In the case of Afghanistan, the NSC initially was not aware of the existence of resource gaps, confusion over the mission, or inconsistent objectives. It was not aware that the ISAF staff was unclear about U.S. policy objectives, and that, in the absence of clear policy aims or guidance, ISAF was making a counterinsurgency approach the basis of its strategy. The terms of reference for the ISAF strategic assessment, issued by Mr. Gates, were vague, but ISAF took many steps to ensure its own review had a strategic focus.

The greatest challenge in the surge debate was over the assessment of strategy options. A president and his policy team need options, and Mr. Obama expressly asked for distinct options. These should include a full range of credible options, not just the preferred solution. A military leader with NSC experience notes that representatives "must generate real strategic options to give the president actual choices; however, the ends to which each option can aspire and the inherent risks involved in them are often dissimilar, and the nation's senior civilian leadership needs to understand those dynamics as well."³³

If the president does not believe in the validity of the options the military provides, he will seek options elsewhere. The military did not give President George W. Bush a range of options for Iraq in 2006 until he insisted on their development, nor did it give President Obama a range of options for Afghanistan in 2009. Mr. Obama was not well served by the seemingly united front created by a Secretary of Defense, a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), and a regional combatant commander who aligned behind, and limited discussion to, one option. Because of this, the president was engaged in deliberations more than was typical, and he felt compelled to generate his own option.³⁴

A second weak spot in the 2009 assessment was the isolation of the political element of the strategy from the military component. There was little doubt the thirty-thousand-troop surge would enhance security. It would blunt the Taliban's momentum, buying additional time by slowing, if not reversing, Taliban gains. The injection of additional forces could lead Taliban leaders to reconsider and to recognize that the United States was increasingly committed to securing U.S. interests, which could lead to more mutually beneficial negotiations within Afghanistan. Yet while the proposed new strategy accepted Afghan president Karzai as a difficult partner, the surge decision was not used to create additional political leverage and conditionality for Karzai to reform his government and mitigate levels of corruption and incompetence. Furthermore, the NSC decision did not assess and resolve correctly whether the Afghan security forces could meet their recruiting goals and minimum effectiveness standards within the resource constraints and timelines President Obama had framed. Creating sustainable Afghan national security forces clearly would be a longer-term but relevant issue if U.S. security interests were to be served. Finally, the State Department's contributions were long on promise but short on delivery. Both the strategic assessment and NSC oversight should have tested State's capacity actually to support the plan.

Coordination requires that both sides actually endeavor to understand various civilian and military perspectives. This is not a simple matter. As Dr. Janine Davidson, a former Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) policy official, has noted:

The "professional" military officer has certain expectations about how to craft "best military advice" for the President that are deeply embedded into the organizational culture and in fact hard-wired into the institutionalized and incredibly detailed military planning processes. This planning process is designed with expectations about the roles civilian leadership will play in providing guidance, which are in many ways out of synch with the expectations of the President and his civilian advisers. Ultimately, the output of the military's planning process fails to deliver the type of nuanced advice in the form of creative options that the President needs.³⁵

Ultimately, the nation's best interests are served when strategy decisions are the product of a rigorous process in which civilian policy makers have options and are informed about risks.³⁶ Such reviews require a thorough examination of a full range of feasible options. In this case, however, it was only with the personal involvement of and "pushing" by the president that discrete policy options were developed and debated. Ultimately, again with the deliberate engagement of the president, competing factions hashed out a consensus on both the aims and the specific "ways" of a strategy. However, because the gaps in political strategy were left open, and because the requisite nonmilitary contributions from State and the Agency for International Development were not tested for true feasibility, the strategic coordination phase, while deliberate, was less than robust, and therefore not fully satisfactory.

Decision-Making Authorization Clarity

There appears to be little doubt that the president was immersed fully in making, and invested fully in, the final strategic decisions in 2009. However, the six-page strategic memorandum that President Obama purportedly authored contains contradictions. The president apparently intended, on the basis of a reading of Gordon Goldstein's *Lessons in Disaster*, that the Vietnam War problem of unclear objectives would not be repeated.³⁷ Yet his strategic guidance, while intended to reduce ambiguity and reflect the president's commitment to the decision, evidences distinct tensions between the diagnosis of the problems in Afghanistan and a limited allocation of resources and time.

Clarity was augmented by the discourse among the principals, and by the president directly questioning each to receive an express assent to the final strategy. From the inauguration in January 2009 through late November, the ISAF commander may have had some questions about what the new administration really wanted to achieve in Afghanistan; that doubt or ambiguity was clarified during the surge debate. The president's 29 November memo reinforces the clarity of the commander's intent. The U.S. goal in Afghanistan was "to deny safe haven to al Qaeda and to deny the Taliban the ability to overthrow the Afghan government." The military mission was defined in six operational objectives, which were to be "limited in scope and scale to only what is necessary to attain the U.S. goal."³⁸ In case there was any question, the president's memo noted, "This approach is not fully resourced counterinsurgency or nation building."³⁹ However, the president also listed numerous military and civilian tasks at the operational level that are fully consistent with a broad counterinsurgency approach. The guidance instructs the military to reverse the Taliban's momentum, deny it access to and control of key population centers and lines of communication, disrupt the insurgency and

its Al Qaeda allies, and degrade their capability to a point at which Afghan national security forces could manage the threat.

There is little doubt the president reshaped the mission's scale; authorized resources for specific purposes; and introduced a temporal dimension, framing a faster introduction of U.S. forces. But while he narrowed the mission and authorized a substantial force, that force was to accomplish many challenging tasks within a tight time frame. Moreover, that time frame was introduced into the debate only belatedly, at a time when military commanders were not inclined to argue with the president. Overall, this element of the framework was satisfied only partially.

Strategic Coherence

Senior leaders, both civilians and military officers, are hard pressed in their deliberations to preserve the vital linkages between policy and strategy and between objectives and operations. Richard Betts has warned that busy leaders have little time to ensure that the logic of a strategy is tested or that the coherence of ends, ways, and means is preserved. Often what is left is a strategy that "has unexamined assumptions and slogans left over from coping with their main preoccupations."⁴⁰

The adaptations the Obama administration proposed in 2009 sought to align U.S. strategy better with policy aims, but ended up focusing almost entirely on the military "means"—the size and duration of the surge—rather than the possible "ways." Despite references throughout the strategy review to the centrality of Afghan politics and governance, there is little evidence that alternative political strategies were considered.⁴¹

As Secretary Gates has noted, the concept of an efficient, corruption-free, effective Afghan central government was "a fantasy."⁴² By 2009, there was growing recognition that the highly centralized Afghan government created through the 2001 Bonn Agreement and the 2004 constitution was becoming untenable.⁴³ While McChrystal's staff was cognizant of the need for a bottom-up approach to complement efforts to build the capacity of the central government, the White House review process did not generate alternative political strategies to induce Kabul to devolve power or reduce its perceived corruption.⁴⁴

Policy and strategic discussions during this reassessment too often focused on the familiar military component (force levels, deployment timelines, and so forth) and too little on the larger challenge of political reform, state building, and host-nation capacity. The need for some political influence over Karzai was evident, but was not incorporated into the U.S. strategy. Unlike in Iraq, there was no discussion about using conditionality of U.S. support as a form of leverage to

push for political reforms in Kabul. Absent those changes, as Ambassador Eikenberry stressed, success from the surge would be limited.⁴⁵

The strategic assessment conducted in 2009 better defined U.S. core interests, policy, and plans. Were those criteria exhaustive, the strategy review would be judged a success. However, the decision was promulgated with a defined time limit. This had some utility, in that it created a sense of urgency for deploying troops and accelerating Afghan force training. But it also generated the perception of limited U.S. commitment to success. The premature announcement of the withdrawal was an error induced by U.S. domestic politics.⁴⁶ This signaled to both our allies and regional powers that American patience was waning—and could be outlasted. This did not contribute to positive coalition or host-nation perceptions or to U.S. strategic success. Moreover, the civilian and political components of the surge were not well integrated into the final strategy, leaving them less likely to be implemented as needed.

INSIGHTS

Improving Performance Assessment

Continuous monitoring of strategy implementation is a task shared among the NSC, OSD, and Joint Staff. Periodic reassessment is necessary for the successful prosecution of any strategy, and its scope should include intelligence, assumptions, and execution. In this case, a lack of staff mechanisms for monitoring prevented the necessary reassessment and the timely development of potential solutions for the president. The NSC staff should institutionalize these mechanisms rather than depend on ad hoc tasking.

The experience of the last two wars suggests that improved strategic oversight is needed.⁴⁷ Instead of a planning board, strategic planning directorate, or war czar, some form of implementation board or strategy assessment directorate appears warranted.⁴⁸ Implementation oversight really should be the most important role the NSC staff plays on behalf of the cabinet. But “unless the President himself makes it very clear that the NSC staff has specific authority to oversee implementation, there is a strong resistance from the Departments to respond to the NSC staff,” as a former NSC staffer has noted.⁴⁹

The functional departments should not view this role for the NSC staff as “intrusive.”⁵⁰ And the cost of a dozen personnel at the White House seems a pittance if it helps a harried set of leaders understand how well their strategic direction is being implemented or how the adversary is reacting. It certainly amounts to far less than the bill for poorly crafted strategies or ineffective operations. The NSC leadership should be able to conduct independent and rigorous strategic

reassessments, and employ red-teaming techniques.⁵¹ Reassessments must be brutally objective and consider external and diverse viewpoints (including those of coalition partners). It is hard for folks to “grade their own homework” objectively or to recognize quickly that a preferred plan is not succeeding. The employment of staff dedicated to these reassessments would help to avoid strategic inertia and the politicization of the assessment process.⁵²

Building and Sustaining a Collaborative Environment

Given the complex nature of contemporary conflict, integrated strategy development and assessment processes are necessary. In an atmosphere of deliberation, candor, and transparency, efforts should focus on maximizing the value of diverse and interdisciplinary inputs to policy/strategy development and assessment.

The experience of the past fourteen years suggests that effective civilian and military interaction is (and always has been) critical to the framing of realistic policy objectives and effective strategy.⁵³ Effective civil-military relations are critical to effectiveness in assessing and adapting national policy.⁵⁴

Senior joint leaders must strive to sustain a professional relationship with civilian policy makers and avoid the appearance of trying to go around or negate presidential decisions. An absence of friction within policy debates would be suspect, but such friction never should be publicly evident, at least emanating from military professionals.⁵⁵

Collaboration does not mean tension-free debate or the subordination of the military. The existing NSC system has tensions built into it; these make debates uncomfortable but productive. Instead of fighting the process or trying to impose a military framework on civilian politicians, military leaders should understand the process and embrace it.⁵⁶ As former CJCS Mike Mullen has noted, “Policy and strategy should constantly struggle with one another. Some in the military no doubt would prefer political leadership that lays out a specific strategy and then gets out of the way, leaving the balance of the implementation to commanders in the field. But the experience of the last nine years tells us two things: A clear strategy for military operations is essential; and that strategy will have to change as those operations evolve.”⁵⁷

Senior military leaders should understand that influence and trust go together and that, just as networking and relationships with peers are important to professional success, the same relationship building will pay dividends vis-à-vis political leaders.⁵⁸ Moreover, civil-military relations are an important professional ethic and part of the educational process for both civilian and military leaders.⁵⁹ Senior officers embrace that ethic, but also must temper their public communications carefully to avoid creating an impression that they are attempting to influence decisions in the public arena.

Improving Strategic Coordination

It is important for senior military leaders to understand the decision-making process and participate in that process fully. American history contains examples of problems encountered in the meshing of civilian and military perspectives.⁶⁰ Given the iterative nature of policy and strategy formulation, some tense interaction should be expected; however, a deep historical understanding of strategy and solid relationships should overcome friction at the council table.

An important insight for senior policy advisers is to understand how decisions are made and how information is evaluated in the policy/strategy process. Policy makers are not hardwired to apply lockstep templates or a linear, military-style decision-making process. NSC staff officials will not be graduates of professional military education (PME) programs. Civilian political officials often will explore an array of options without defining a firm political end state. They may be more comfortable exploring “the art of the possible” and examining political factors and risks differently, including in a far more fluid or intuitive manner. They may be more comfortable with ambiguity, political elements, and other intangibles.

During reassessment, as during strategy development, senior military leaders should be prepared to challenge assumptions and vague policy aims, as well as to offer creative options (ways) to satisfy desired ends. As one military observer to this process has concluded, “To be effective and to assist the president in crafting and implementing national-security policy involving military force, senior military leaders must embrace a more involved role in the back-and-forth dialogue necessary to build effective policies and workable strategies.”⁶¹

Senior joint leaders must give the president options as, at the end of the day, he is the accountable decision maker. As General Martin Dempsey observed, “That’s what being commander in chief is all about.”⁶² Options not wholly acceptable or valid for military reasons may still be viable to policy makers and should be considered, even when they are neither preferred nor supported. Of several possible “sins” in strategy development, the commandant of the Army War College, Major General William Rapp, noted that the first is for the military to present a single option to civilian leaders, trying to force a decision rather than engender a dialogue. The next-worst course is to offer an artificially framed suite of strategic options centered on the option desired, with all the rest designed to be presented as throwaways.⁶³

Policy makers want options, but these need to be real options; they must be feasible and suitable; they cannot merely be politically expedient, nor merely satisfy preferred military paradigms.⁶⁴ A failure to provide more than a single solution will cede the initiative to the NSC staff or other outlets. Senior military officers critical of what they perceive as recent NSC staff intrusions into strategy options overlook their own responsibility for previously having shorted President

Obama's request for an array of strategic options in Afghanistan. In the Afghanistan case study, a number of options did emerge, but the NSC process failed to reconcile those competing views productively.⁶⁵

The Department of Defense should adapt its education programs to prepare officers better for the complexity of national-level policy-making processes at the interagency level. Those reforms should emphasize a more iterative mode of policy-strategic interaction.⁶⁶ We are preparing future military leaders for frustration or failure if they come away from the classroom with only a linear and mechanistic approach to strategy, one that is long on process and short on the reality of strategy development at the highest levels. Educational programs also should ensure that military officers understand the interplay of all elements of national power. Senior military leaders need to be able to participate in and shape national strategy discussions involving these elements, not just to apply military tools.⁶⁷

Gaining Better Strategic Decision Clarity

It is clear that military leaders were unclear on U.S. policy aims in Afghanistan during much of the first year of the Obama administration.⁶⁸ Theoretically, the president himself established the strategic clarity behind the Afghan surge in a formal document late in the deliberative reassessment process. Despite that document, some, such as Professor Hew Strachan, have claimed that there was a lack of clear political guidance, resulting in doubt about what the actual U.S. policy was.⁶⁹ Yet the ISAF commander and the U.S. ambassador, along with their chains of command all the way back to Washington, participated in a rather painstaking review of that policy. If, after the December decision and the presidential speech, there was confusion about either the policy or the resulting strategy, it was not because senior military leaders were absent from the council table or they lacked the president's written guidance. More accurately, the final decision contained compromises that reduced clarity and imposed constraints on the strategy that Central Command and ISAF preferred, in terms of time and force levels. A lack of agreement on an element of the strategy is not the same as a lack of clarity. The president's guidance memo was clear on the "how" and the "what," but was silent on the inherently political "why" and the desired end being sought. Understanding Mr. Obama's intent would have helped.

The NSC staff can also do a better job of generating presidential policy decisions in a timely manner. To preserve strategic coherence and coordination at lower levels across the joint force, senior defense leaders should ensure these decisions are promulgated.

Establishing Greater Strategic Coherence

At the national level, policies and strategy are inseparable. National strategies must focus on achieving political objectives. Because war is a political act,

military strategies must be embedded in and supportive of overall national strategies. The latter must address the use of all elements of national power, they should be founded on a strategic logic, and the two types must be linked coherently to each other. Sustaining coherency, as Betts notes, involves asking “whether choices at any level do or do not maintain a logical consistency with levels above and below, and ultimately a consistency between political ends and military means.” Senior military leaders must be prepared to serve as the principal strategists to ensure a coherent linkage between desired policy objectives and a detailed and feasible plan to obtain them.

Strategic coherence in conflicts such as Afghanistan includes a political element, and during that conflict U.S. military officers appeared reticent in engaging in that element of strategic discourse (General Petraeus was an exception). Yet senior officers have to be cognizant of all instruments of power and the elements that drive conflict. National and military strategies are not separate, and military officers cannot simply isolate themselves in a professional “lane.”⁷⁰ Civilian officials expect to receive inputs from military leaders who truly are expert in their sphere (the application of military force), but they also prize advice from senior officials who understand how the different components of U.S. power are integrated and best applied coherently.⁷¹

The political literacy of U.S. military officers is considered suspect by some of the military’s own strategists.⁷² This may be a function of the U.S. military’s apolitical character, which some scholarly observers find to be too focused on connecting operations to tactics and too ready to perceive the operational level of war as a “politics-free zone.”⁷³ Instead, the interplay of political factors, including coalition and domestic politics, must be understood as part of high-level strategy. American military officers must get past their reserve about the role played by politics, in all its forms. Political considerations do not constitute simply an inconvenient restraint on military operations.⁷⁴ Over the course of the last decade, the American military community has experienced the consequences of political illiteracy and has absorbed a keener appreciation for political influence at all levels.⁷⁵ PME institutions should ensure their curricula capture and reflect this hard-earned experience.

The military literacy of civilian officials requires equal attention. Civilian leaders need a better appreciation for the complexities of military strategy and operations. Richard Betts’s observation from fifteen years ago remains just as true today: “For strategy to bridge policy and operations, civilian and military professionals on either side of the divide need more empathy with the priorities and limitations that those on the other side face. . . . Civilians cannot do this responsibly, however, unless they acquire much more empirical knowledge of tactics, logistics, and operational doctrines than is normal for top-level staff these days.”⁷⁶

Our senior military leaders must be completely frank about the limits of raw military power, risk, and time frames for action.⁷⁷ They also should ensure that military resources are not being risked without commensurate support from other agencies. In Afghanistan, the U.S. military was overinvested in doing its part, and it let military contributions get well ahead of the other instruments in the strategy.⁷⁸ So security conditions were established, at great cost, to enable political and economic activities; but then nonmilitary elements of the strategy were completely absent, were not feasible, or were executed poorly.

Donald Rumsfeld was right: indeed, we do go to war with the military we have, and with an initial strategy as well. But wars rarely are won or concluded with the same force or the original strategy. The nature of war as a competitive clash of wills requires leaders, as the conflict evolves, to assess progress, recognize shortfalls, and resolve gaps in strategy or operational methods. The case studied herein supports the conclusion that the capacity to oversee implementation, conduct assessments, and alter strategy under fire during wartime is a clear contributor to strategic success. Professor Williamson Murray concluded a 2011 study of military adaptation with the claim that “[t]he ability to adapt at every level of war from the tactical to the strategic and political would seem to be more important . . . than [at] any time since 1941.”⁷⁹ If that is true, this research is both timely and relevant.

U.S. policy makers and our military leaders eventually learned this lesson in both Iraq and Afghanistan. They adapted strategies to reflect new or changed circumstances. The joint force adapted its approaches in both conflicts and changed the senior commanders. However, this case shows we have room for improvement in tying together policy and strategy changes while conducting wartime reassessments. While senior-level courses at joint PME institutions address national decision-making processes, more attention to enhancing political literacy of future leaders appears warranted.

Future military leaders should draw on this case to enhance their understanding of strategic decision making and the assessment processes at the apex of our government. Strategic success in the future undoubtedly will depend on the factors that facilitated past successful strategies: proactivity in making choices, flexibility over rigidity, and discipline in thinking when applying force in the pursuit of political goals.⁸⁰ It also will require an understanding of the influence of cognitive limitations, organizational politics, military culture, and civil-military relations that can preclude the timely conduct of strategic assessments.⁸¹

NOTES

- This essay is adapted from a chapter published in Dr. Richard D. Hooker Jr. and Dr. Joseph J. Collins, eds., *Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long War* (Washington, DC: National Defense Univ. Press, 2015). I gratefully acknowledge the substantive contributions of Dr. Alex Crowther, Max Kelly, and Alan Dowling to this essay. Additionally, the two anonymous reviewers at the *Naval War College Review* materially sharpened the focus of the essay.
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69. Hew Strachan, "Strategy or Alibi? Obama, McChrystal and the Operational Level of War," *Survival* 52, no. 5 (October/November 2010), pp. 157–58.
70. Dempsey, interview.
71. *Ibid.*
72. Celestino Perez Jr., "Strategic Discontent, Political Literacy, and Professional Military Education," *The Strategy Bridge* (blog), 14 January 2016, thestrategybridge.com/.

73. Strachan, "Strategy or Alibi?" p. 160.
74. Lawrence Freedman, "The Counterrevolution in Strategic Affairs," *Daedalus* 140, no. 3 (Summer 2011), p. 16.
75. Antulio J. Echevarria II, *Toward an American Way of War* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004). See also his more extensive examination of the putative American way of war, *Reconsidering the American Way of War: US Military Practice from the Revolution to Afghanistan* (Washington, DC: Georgetown Univ. Press, 2014).
76. Betts, "Is Strategy an Illusion?," p. 49.
77. Dempsey, interview. "Senior military leaders can help by gently and respectfully educating civilian decision makers on the various aspects of military force and warfighting." Rapp, "Civil-Military Relations," p. 17.
78. Dempsey and McChrystal, interviews.
79. Murray, *Military Adaptation in War*, pp. 306–307.
80. Richard Hart Sinnreich, in *Successful Strategies: Triumphant in War and Peace from Antiquity to the Present*, ed. Williamson Murray and Richard Hart Sinnreich (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2014), p. 446.
81. Theo Farrell, introduction to *Military Adaptation in Afghanistan*, ed. Farrell, Osinga, and Russell, p. 3.

NATO'S NEW ROLE

The Alliance's Response to a Rising China

Zinaida Bechná and Bradley A. Thayer

Russia's actions in Crimea and Ukraine have been momentous in their consequences for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Moscow has instilled new life in the almost seventy-year-old alliance. Doubts about its relevance and utility in the post-Cold War period have faded, at least for the time being, as leaders ponder what Russian leader Vladimir Putin will do next to challenge the alliance. This uncertainty weighs heavily on the heads of state and government of NATO's twenty-eight members.¹ NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen characterized the situation well when he wrote, "In these turbulent times NATO must be prepared to undertake the full range of missions and to defend Allies against the full range of threats."²

These are indeed turbulent times. But this is not a novel situation for the alliance. Since its 1949 founding, NATO has experienced and survived many crises, including those in Berlin in 1958 and 1961, the Multilateral Force debate after the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, and the deployment of intermediate-range ballistic missiles in the 1980s. With the end of the Cold War, NATO confronted another crisis: one of confidence.

Our central argument is that the transatlantic relationship is challenged by not only Russia's *Machtpolitik* actions in Crimea and Ukraine but also the rise of China and the lack of a shared security identity between the United States and

major NATO members. The deleterious consequences of China's rise are discerned increasingly well from Washington. As a result of Beijing's rise and the U.S. strategic rebalancing to Asia to reassure allies there and deter potential aggression, Europe is less important to the United States than

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Naval War College Review, Summer 2016, Vol. 69, No. 3

it was during the Cold War.³ Yet a strong U.S. commitment to NATO remains important precisely because of the expansion of China's capabilities and the risk it poses to NATO.⁴

The consequences for NATO of the rise of China must be analyzed to identify policy solutions that will prevent a decline in the transatlantic alliance. To contribute to this objective, we review the major military, political, and normative aspects of the NATO alliance and argue that an explicit "Norms and Principles" component within NATO should be created to reinforce Western identity so as to help the organization remain unified in the face of a rising China.

Our argument is significant for two reasons. First, the rise of China has the potential to drive the transatlantic alliance apart. This is only in part because the United States increasingly is focused on China as a hegemonic threat. Before Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. commitment to NATO was under strain as a result of the Obama administration's reorientation to confront the rise of China.⁵ Russia's actions have given the United States pause, and Washington is laboring to increase its presence in Europe while doing the same in Asia. In contrast, many in Europe view China not as a threat but as an increasingly sophisticated market, trading partner, investor, and lender. Generally, European capitals seek to maintain excellent relations with Beijing.⁶ Should this divergence continue to grow, it could place the United States and Europe at strategic loggerheads.

Second, a basic tenet of strategy is to divide your adversary from its allies and even win those allies over to your side. Thus, strategists should expect that China will seek to divide the West, if China's rise continues and security competition intensifies.⁷ A United States allied with Europe is a far stronger competitor than a United States divided from major European allies, who may remain observers or de facto neutrals in a Sino-American crisis. Accordingly, as Sino-American security competition increases, it is reasonable to expect that China will try to divide the United States from key NATO members through diplomatic and economic means. Members of the transatlantic community should anticipate this challenge and be prepared to meet it. In doing so, the normative aspect of the alliance can play a key role.

NATO AS A MILITARY ALLIANCE

NATO's historical role as a military alliance was to deter attacks on its members and defend them if necessary. NATO was spectacularly successful in this during the Cold War, and we submit that this should not change—NATO's military role remains significant.

Historically, NATO was designed as a military alliance to protect security, and it has been most effective and successful in performing this difficult task for over forty years.⁸ Indeed, NATO has proved to be one of the most successful alliances

in history.⁹ It served as an instrument to build sustainable security on the inter-governmental level. The key objective was to contain the Soviet threat. NATO provided the security umbrella under which European states were able to bury ancient hatreds and unite against a common threat.

With the end of the Cold War, the complicated and rather messy institutional security frameworks—not only NATO, but also the World Trade Organization, Western European Union, European Community, and Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe—were the result of a correlation of military, political, and economic efforts designed to advance European security in an evolving world. But despite the proliferation of new institutions and alliance missions, the central military concern over Russia never went away. The principal military role of the alliance remained to secure members, especially new member states on Russia's periphery, against the Russian threat. Events in Estonia in 2007, in Georgia in 2008, and against Ukraine today demonstrate that the concern over the actions of Putin's Russia is significant, and thus NATO's military mission should remain in place.

NATO AS A POLITICAL ALLIANCE

NATO is also an alliance, so it is a political creature. As with its military role, we argue that this should not change. In essence, the political problems during the Cold War were threefold.

The first major challenge for the alliance was to incorporate West Germany into the alliance, despite a legacy of tremendous resistance to German rearmament, particularly by the French.¹⁰ The hatred and fear directed toward Germany were unparalleled and served as a source of tension within the alliance.

The second challenge was to maintain the coherence and unity of the alliance whenever a significant alliance member chose to leave its military structure or to select neutrality. This was a central concern of Washington in the case of West Germany. As diplomatic historian Marc Trachtenberg argues, the fear that West Germany would accept a Soviet offer of unification in return for German neutrality was considerable in the 1950s and again with the appeal of Gorbachev in the mid- and late 1980s.¹¹ Yet France was a major concern in this respect as well. De Gaulle's 1966 decision to remove France from the military structure of the alliance but remain within the political structure was a major, albeit temporary, crisis for the alliance.

The third challenge was the fundamental question of the credibility of the U.S. commitment to maintain a robust, extended deterrent in the face of the growth in military power of the Warsaw Pact, particularly after the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the continuation of the buildup in conventional and nuclear forces into the 1970s and 1980s. U.S. credibility also fluctuated owing to

strategic setbacks the United States encountered, especially the fall of Saigon in 1975 and the Iranian Revolution of 1979. The degree to which such events might have emboldened the Soviet Union is less significant than the perception among NATO members that the U.S. commitment to NATO was weakening. Reassuring the Europeans—in the face of the ups and downs of political debates in the United States; concern over U.S. decline with relation to a rising Japan; and the significant, threatening Soviet buildup—was a substantial task.

In the post-Cold War period, the political situation is positive. Germany is unified and a core member of the alliance. Moreover, since 2009 France has once again been participating fully in the military command structure of the alliance. In addition, the extended deterrent of the United States is not questioned in the manner it was during the Cold War. Yet despite these improvements, the alliance confronts major political problems. First, the United States is a hegemon in relative decline in relation to China and, as a result of China's economic and military growth, U.S. military resources and political attention are increasingly drawn toward Asia. This generates concern within the alliance, especially as Russia under Putin has taken a more belligerent course.¹²

These concerns are significant now, and have the potential to become worse in the future, as they are the seeds out of which might grow a “decoupling” of the alliance. All else being equal, a tight coupling of NATO's military capabilities and political intent augments the alliance's deterrent capability and its political health. The threat from Russia is not the threat from the Soviet Union, to be sure. However, the lopsided nature of the threat from China—an increasing threat to the United States and its interests but a far lesser threat to European states—does introduce the potential for divergence.

Within the alliance, perceptions vary considerably regarding the threat China poses. For example, May-Britt Stumbaum, an expert on the European Union (EU)–China relationship, argues that, “given their significantly different global outlooks, the United States and the European Union differ fundamentally in their perceptions of China's rise.”¹³ She submits that

Europe does not and will probably never share the United States' hard power perspective on Asia-Pacific. The U.S.' rebalancing to Asia-Pacific was spurred by strategic military consideration and is seen in an economic view only secondarily. . . . For the Europeans, and particularly Germany, the Asia-Pacific region and the relationship with China is shaped by the “tyranny of distance,” with Russia in between consuming most of the strategic thinking and resources that Germany and Europe entertain eastward.¹⁴

Moreover, some European analysts, like Chinese ones, tout the importance of multipolarity in global politics, and the necessity for strategic cooperation in

the EU-China relationship.¹⁵ For instance, Gustaaf Geeraerts asserts that, “as [a] consequence of increased international engagement and increasing economic interests abroad, Europe and China are geopolitically more proximate than ever before.”¹⁶ As these arguments suggest, this introduces the possibility that a wealthier and more prominent, powerful, and assertive China will be able to entice some European states into passivity, or even neutrality, in the event of a Sino-American crisis or confrontation.

NATO AS A NORMATIVE ALLIANCE

Although the normative component may be overlooked, given the traditional emphasis on the other two responsibilities, NATO has always incorporated this aspect. Among its members, the alliance advanced political principles regarding individual liberty, democracy, human rights, and due process and the rule of law. NATO represented political norms as much as it did military power, and these norms provided a stark contrast to oppression within the Soviet bloc.

NATO’s normative component advanced four major objectives:

- It defined national security and united alliance members.¹⁷ It served as the ultimate reason for the struggle with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Freedom and human rights were legitimate and superior to totalitarianism, and had to be defended against threats.
- It defined what the alliance was and was not: normatively, NATO was the opposite of the Warsaw Pact—a bastion of freedom opposed to tyranny.
- It provided a standard against which the domestic politics of member states would be measured.
- It served as a weapon to undermine the legitimacy of communism in the minds of the Soviet peoples, Soviet allies, and others worldwide, just as the Soviets attempted to undermine NATO.

The normative content was not fixed but evolved to include opposition to racism and strongly nationalistic political sentiments, with all components remaining important.

Of course, the alliance was not perfect in its adherence to these norms during the Cold War or after. NATO sided with many authoritarian governments with dismal human rights records. Yet it is equally true that at different times in the course of the Cold War the alliance exerted significant pressure on Spain to democratize, and it helped to stabilize the relationship between Greece and Turkey.¹⁸ The alliance worked to establish stable civil-military relations and to professionalize the militaries of these countries. It worked to foster democratic norms in these cases, as well as in the post-Cold War era. It has had considerable

success in transforming NATO from an alliance composed of a mix of authoritarian and democratic governments to a fully democratic alliance.¹⁹

While NATO is a military and political alliance, it is also a Western alliance, so one of its aims is to protect and advance shared Western values and norms. With the end of the military and political threat from the Soviet Union, NATO had an opportunity to place greater emphasis on Western identity and values. The role of NATO evolved toward a “European security identity.”²⁰ In essence, this identity meant supporting democracy in aspiring members. Indeed, to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, “democracy” meant membership in the Western alliance and their commitment to accept its values and norms. As during the Cold War, the alliance proved to be not only a military institution but a democratic political organization as well, one that supports “a set of values that run counter to military nationalism, chauvinism, and racism” by promoting a military that is characterized by subordination “to elected officials, parliamentary control over defense budget[s], civilian expertise throughout the military-security apparatus, and respect for human and civil rights among conscripts.”²¹

These democratic standards were also evinced in the “Study on NATO Enlargement” of 1995.²² The document illuminated core principles and norms for each country joining the alliance during the three rounds of enlargement after the Cold War. It defined requirements applicable to future members of NATO (even though it avoided an explicit formulation). The main requirements were four: (1) a stable, democratic political system; (2) support of the population for the country’s accession to NATO; (3) military readiness; and (4) elimination of all unresolved territorial disputes with neighboring countries, and strengthening of integration tendencies.²³

The study’s overall emphasis was on political rather than military criteria, and political readiness for accession to NATO was also given increased attention in the three rounds of expansion occurring in 1999, 2004, and 2009. Certainly, the common threat from the USSR created NATO in 1949. However, well before the demise of the Soviet Union, Europe and the United States shared democratic values, a security identity, and institutional ties that bound them. Both sets of factors—military power and values—will help to shape and sustain the future of transatlantic relations in conjunction with other factors, including perceived interests and threat assessments. Europe and the United States have much more in common with each other than with any other major powers in the world. Indeed, when we reflect on the alliance’s history, we can see that NATO has always had an important normative component. NATO’s “normative pillar” has weathered many “normative storms,” just as have the military and political pillars.²⁴ Yet, in the present period, as NATO faces the profound challenge of the rise of China,

the normative component will play an even larger role: as the cement for the alliance.

THE RISE OF CHINA AND ITS IMPACT ON THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE

Whether China and the United States are destined to compete for domination in international politics is one of the major questions facing practitioners of that discipline. The answer depends to a large degree on whether China will be accommodated within the international system led by the United States or will seek to compete with the United States, resulting in intense security rivalry between Beijing and Washington. While there are excellent arguments in favor of the former position, our study assumes that the future of the relationship will be confrontational.²⁵

We recognize that China's impressive economic growth is slowing, in part owing to the 2015–16 collapse of the stock market, but that it nevertheless remains positive. China will become an economic superpower; but Beijing does have serious economic problems, such as increasing resource scarcities, pollution, and other environmental destruction, as well as ubiquitous corruption, a collapse of trust in personal and commercial relationships, and gross disparities in income and regional development. Huge inefficiencies and losses are likely to result in a leveling off of China's economic growth.²⁶

Although our argument is not deterministic, we are pessimistic about the future of the Sino-American relationship because of structural and domestic factors. Briefly, there are five major reasons for despair when we consider the likelihood of Sino-American security competition.²⁷

First, China has numerous border disputes in the South and East China Seas and with India, and of course there is tension with Taiwan. Each of these conflicts is dangerous, particularly those in the South China Sea, owing to the perceived national security interests of Beijing, Washington, and allies, including the risk of intentional or inadvertent escalation.²⁸

Second, we must consider Beijing's and Washington's conflicting grand strategic interests. The world has witnessed China's abandonment of Deng's Twenty-Four-Character Strategy and his talk of a "peaceful rise" in favor of rapid military expansion and what can only be described as a strategic autism, or tone deafness, that has alarmed Australia, Japan, India, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations states, to the benefit of the United States. Unfortunately, unless Beijing changes its trajectory, it is on a collision course with Washington. The United States faces an increasingly hostile China, a fact that is regularly on display in the East and South China Seas and in international forums.²⁹ China's actions over the

last few years have been increasingly bold, including in its abandonment of any apparent concern over consequences.

Third, the systemic problems of alliances, mutual concerns over credibility, buck-passing, “chain ganging,” and abandonment confront the United States within the explicit or *de facto* alliances it maintains with Japan, India, and the Philippines (the relationship with Vietnam is warming as well).³⁰ Positive relations with these states provide prodigious benefits, but also introduce pathways to conflict with China, such as by emboldening an ally to take precipitous action.³¹

Fourth, there are structural causes of conflict. The classic problems of international politics stem from anarchy; that condition intensifies the security dilemma and contributes to spirals of misperception. The world has witnessed increased Chinese demands; until recently they have been largely economic, but increasingly are political and territorial, particularly in the East and South China Seas. Such demands cause a reaction in Washington.³² This provokes a response from China—and thus starts a spiral of increased tension, greater mutual suspicion, and more-intensive security competition.

Fifth, at the domestic level, even if the Chinese leadership wants to present a peaceful stance, its ability to do so will be jeopardized by domestic changes in China. According to Susan Shirk, given the lessons the Communist Party took from Tiananmen—avoid public splits, suppress popular movements, keep the People’s Liberation Army on the party’s side—today’s increasingly virulent nationalism, spreading mass protests, and availability of information through the Internet and commercial media may destabilize China by provoking a reaction from the deeply insecure Chinese leadership.³³

We do recognize that responsible Chinese leadership may find an avenue by which to avoid confrontation with the United States and Japan.³⁴ However, working against this possibility is a motivation for conflict that is rooted in an internal fragility resulting from the leadership’s need to prove to the public, the military, the internal security agencies, and indeed China’s leaders themselves that they are staunch defenders of national pride and sovereignty.³⁵ Thus, to back down in a crisis would entail considerable risk for the regime. Moreover, should internal destabilization occur, perhaps as a result of economic inequality or a push for greater liberalization, the risk of war with the United States and other powers would greatly increase. Any such crisis always brings with it the increased possibility of misperception, as well as a heightened fear that foreigners may exploit domestic instability to destabilize the country.

Stefan Halper argues that the threat China poses is greater by far than has been recognized.³⁶ The threat is not just a military or economic one; it arises also from a new market-authoritarian model, one that provides both rapid growth

and stability, and thus the promise of a better quality of life. Absent are Western freedoms, including the possibility of political plurality or opposition.

China's modernization has provided the most compelling demonstration of how to liberalize economically without surrendering to liberal politics. China's success has provided three major advantages to China. First, China undermines American power and Western economic institutions. Second, as a matter of ideological struggle, China is also seen as a success—a rising economic and military power—in contrast to a United States in relative decline. Third, China's success assists with building alliance relationships, and gives developing countries and emerging markets the freedom to deny Western conditions of financial engagement. For example, China provides states in economic crisis, such as Angola, Cambodia, Chad, Iran, Myanmar, Sudan, Uzbekistan, and Venezuela, with an alternative to following the dictates of Western institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Beijing's creation in late 2015 of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank was a major step in that direction. Also, such countries no longer must choose between emulating the Western model and rejecting capitalism, because China provides a model of market-based economic development and modernization paired with authoritarianism.

To Halper's concerns we would add that China's rise carries with it the explicit rejection of fundamental Western norms held by NATO members. While many violations of Western norms in the realm of human and civil rights occur within China, of particular importance today is the lack of a strong culture of antiracism. In his exceptional study of contemporary China, Martin Jacques writes that "there is a widely held view, not least in East Asia, that racism is a 'white problem': it is what white people do to others. In both China and Taiwan, the official position is that racism is a phenomenon of Western culture, with Hong Kong holding a similar view. This is nonsense."³⁷ Jacques notes the ubiquity of racism in China: "All peoples are prone to such ways of thinking—or, to put it another way, all races harbour racial prejudices, engage in racist modes of thought and practice racism against other races. Racism, in fact, is a universal phenomenon from which no race is exempt, even those who have suffered grievously at its hands."³⁸

Racial discrimination arising in a potentially unstable empire with an embattled Communist Party could have grave consequences for regional stability in Asia. Moreover, in China we see the resurrection of the ideal of a racially based state through the myth of a Chinese people of the same race, blood, and culture. The myth of descent from the Yellow Emperor is the basis of a racial nationalism and xenophobia that submits that there are primal biological and cultural bonds among the Chinese that cannot be altered.³⁹ These bonds compel a common adherence to state patriotism and nationalism. The Chinese are said not only to

share a common ancestry but also to derive from progenitors who, in the distant past even before the reign of the Yellow Emperor, separated themselves from non-East Asians, thus becoming the “core of the yellow race.”⁴⁰

For M. Dujon Johnson, an African American sinologist who lived for many years in China, Chinese racism is endemic—such an obvious aspect of life that the fact of its existence is not worth discussing: “In Chinese society one of the reasons that the issue of race and racism is rarely discussed openly . . . is because racism is universally accepted and justified behind the veil of Asian cultural values.” He continues, “[T]hose who hold these views consider . . . [Chinese] cultural perspectives of other ethnic groups to be unassailable no matter how inaccurate or offensive they may be.”⁴¹ Johnson states that his experiences have demonstrated to him “on a daily basis how life in Chinese society is racially segregated and in many aspects similar to a system of racial apartheid.”⁴²

While the growth of Chinese power will have many positive elements for the Chinese, and perhaps for the global economy, it is unfortunate for the advancement of human rights in international politics that China remains authoritarian, with discriminatory beliefs still accepted in the public sphere. The growth of Chinese power is inextricably linked to an ideology that does not share NATO’s concern for individual freedoms, human rights, and antiracism, and thus is a major normative challenge to the West.

THE IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO: WESTERN VALUES IN THE FACE OF CHINA’S RISE

NATO has confronted threats before, but the rise of China is unlike any previous challenge. To a considerable degree, this is because there is gross disparity among alliance members in their views of the threat Beijing poses. In Washington and among Asia-Pacific allies, there is growing awareness of the adverse geopolitical consequences of the rise of China. At the same time, for European alliance members the rise of China is a positive economic development and does not represent a security threat.⁴³ This is evident from the recent trends in the EU-China relationship, particularly Chinese investment in the EU. As Nicola Casarini writes: “Since the advent of the financial crisis, the eurozone has been experiencing a massive surge in outbound direct investment by Chinese firms—a trend that is likely to accelerate in the future, as the debt crisis provides big investors with lucrative opportunities.”⁴⁴ She continues:

In March 2012, the Chinese government also injected \$30 billion into the China Investment Corporation (the Chinese sovereign wealth fund) to be used specifically for acquiring industrial and strategic assets in Europe . . . [while] the “strategic partnership” launched in 2003 has also become highly institutionalised: alongside an annual

EU-China summit and HED [High-Level Economic and Trade Dialogue] there is now an EU-China High-Level Strategic Dialogue . . . [that organizes discussion along specific topics:] political dialogues, economic and sectoral dialogues (of which there are now more than 80), and people-to-people dialogues.⁴⁵

This situation opens an avenue for China to divide the Western alliance. China is likely to do so because in a confrontation with the United States, China will want to weaken the United States by isolating it from as many of its allies as possible. This is unlikely to be accomplished in East or South Asia, because of the threat China's rise poses for the countries there. However, China is not usually perceived as a direct threat to Europe. As Oliver Bräuner, a researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, argues, "China is generally not regarded as a military threat. The EU and its member states do not have any direct hard security interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Europeans have not followed the United States in its so-called pivot (or rebalancing) to Asia that was announced by the Obama administration in October 2011"; "the EU and its member states remain very much focused on security threats originating from its immediate neighborhood, namely, the Middle East, Northern Africa, and, to a certain degree, Russia."⁴⁶ In Bräuner's assessment, the "EU-China relationship continues to be dominated by the economic interests of individual member states, both in trade and increasingly in investments. Furthermore, owing to a lack of direct security interests in the Asia-Pacific, Europeans do not generally see China as a security threat or a strategic competitor," and so "the EU has so far failed to develop a strategic approach toward the potential security implications of transfers of European militarily sensitive technologies that goes beyond the existing arms embargo and currently lacks effective mechanisms to control the flow of such technologies to China."⁴⁷

Consequently, China will have every incentive over time to grow its economic, political, cultural, and social ties in Europe in an effort to supplant the United States as the major partner of European states. Clearly, this effort will be less successful in a country such as Great Britain that has a "special relationship" with the United States. It also will be less enticing for NATO members along the Russian periphery that are heavily dependent on NATO's military commitment. However, for many European states, particularly those that are heavily indebted, China's wealth might make China a more valuable ally than the United States.⁴⁸ First, China will be a significant potential lender for European states, and Beijing's importance in this role will only grow as European debt increases. Second, China will be able to capitalize on anti-American sentiment. Third, as it does today, China will be able to serve as a critical market for European goods as well as a manufacturing source for European industries and consumers. Fourth, we

should expect China to be very creative in its efforts to gain influence and in its messaging to targeted states. The confluence of these factors means that some NATO members may be gradually but increasingly drawn away from active support for the NATO alliance. Accordingly, we should recognize that Europe might become a zone of competition between the United States and China.

In response, NATO must strengthen its normative component that serves not only as a common bond uniting alliance members but as an enforcement component as well. As noted earlier, the NATO alliance's normative aspect had a powerful effect on its members during the Cold War and afterward. NATO will depend on that normative aspect once again as an enforcement mechanism to ensure not only that alliance members do not align with China but equally importantly that they recognize that China violates fundamental Western norms and therefore is unacceptable as a strategic partner.

Ideally, the United States would be able to maintain the alliance through a common perception of both threat and normative considerations. However, as this study has emphasized, alliance members are unlikely to share a common threat perception (although some NATO allies are alarmed at China's actions in the South China Sea), so the normative component will be particularly important. And the normative aspect should not be underestimated, particularly regarding its influence on European states, which place considerable emphasis on the normative elements of international politics.⁴⁹ This may provide a foundation on which NATO can build a unified Western response to the rise of China.

To that end, we advocate that NATO consider creating a "Norms and Principles Committee" to advance two broad objectives:⁵⁰

The first is to ensure that all current and prospective alliance members abide by the political norms and principles necessary to ensure that the alliance as a whole is animated by the right ideology. An alliance such as NATO does not constitute simply a response to a threat. It serves as a major political, military, and normative force in the transatlantic area. Its normative power is significant—sufficient to ensure that the alliance promotes its shared norms, which serve to illuminate its differences from authoritarian governments in China and Russia.

Second, such a committee would be able to advance these values beyond the present alliance membership. Building on steps the alliance already takes with prospective members, establishing a "Norms and Principles Committee" would underscore the importance of adherence to political liberty and human rights, not only as a condition for membership, but as a guidepost for potential partners, such as Japan, India, other U.S. allies, and even current adversaries around the world.

Despite the difficulties in achieving respect for human and civil rights, there is a clear distinction between respect for these values in the West and in China.

The West has moved in the right direction, toward societies that are more open, tolerant, and inclusive; China has not. That stark difference between these societies reflects the divergent norms that animate the West in contrast to China, and it can serve in the future as NATO's foundation as the alliance's military and political roles shift in relative importance.

This study has explored the multifaceted implications for NATO, including its health as an alliance, of the rise of China. The military and political rationales for NATO remain sound, and our analysis should not be interpreted as an effort to detract from the importance of those aspects. This is especially so given the uncertainties represented by Vladimir Putin's Russia, which remains a significant threat to NATO members and to stability in Europe.

At the same time, as we have stressed, the rise of China has the potential to damage greatly the transatlantic foundation of the alliance owing to the multifaceted nature of that rise and the dependence many modern economies have on China. To maintain the unity of the alliance, we urge that the normative element serve as the common thread, as it represents the starkest delineation between the West and China. The normative emphasis remains the surest foundation for the alliance in a time of divergent threat perceptions and conflicting interests.

In spite of having identified the risks China's rise poses for the alliance, we fervently hope that the tension in the Sino-American relationship will decline in the future. While it is difficult at present to discern any immediate cause for such a reduction, perhaps some future liberalization in China will permit such an outcome. Indeed, in the event of political liberalization, NATO may become China's greatest ally against Russia. The same normative interests that unite the transatlantic alliance may serve as an instrument of support should China undergo democratization.

However, in the present lamentable situation, China and the United States appear headed for a clash; and in these circumstances the West must recognize that it is shared political principles that provide the foundation for its shared political system. Western nations have fundamentally transformed their societies in a positive direction, and they must recognize that fact. Aligning with a state—no matter how economically powerful—that explicitly rejects Western norms might arrest the progress of those norms, or even perhaps open the door to their reversal, including in the West.

NOTES

1. Soon to be twenty-nine member states, with the addition of Montenegro. At the time of writing, Montenegro was not yet a member.
2. Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen points out that the character of the international security has changed, in "NATO Leaders Take Decisions to Ensure Robust Alliance," *North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, 5 September 2014, www.nato.int/.
3. For example, see the lack of emphasis the Obama administration placed on Europe in its *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* (Washington, DC: 5 January 2012), available at www.archive.defense.gov/.
4. For an interesting analysis of the tensions in defense spending between the United States and European members of NATO, see Jan Techau, *The Politics of 2 Percent: NATO and the Security Vacuum in Europe* (Brussels: Carnegie Europe, 2015).
5. An excellent overview of the pivot to Asia is provided by Aaron L. Friedberg, "Bucking Beijing: An Alternative U.S. China Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 91, no. 5 (September/October 2012), pp. 48–58.
6. For example, the Greek government supports Chinese investments in Greece's privatization process and is in favor of strengthening bilateral cooperation. "Beijing is seen in many quarters of Europe as something akin to an economic savior. The price might be steep." Minxin Pei, "The China-Europe Lovefest," *National Interest*, 25 June 2014, www.nationalinterest.org/.
7. We recognize that China's rise is not preordained and evaluate this in more detail below. The fundamental point is that its economy will grow at rates greater than that of the United States, causing a redistribution of power in the international system.
8. Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004).
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13. May-Britt U. Stumbaum, *Toward a Transatlantic Approach to Technology Transfers to China* (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2010), p. 1, available at www.gmfus.org/. For different threat perceptions between the United States and European members of NATO, see Roland Benedikter, "China, die USA und die Europäische Union: 'Engere Beziehung' als Symptom der Spaltung des Westens?," in *China: Situation und Perspektiven des Neuen Weltpolitischen Akteurs*, ed. Roland Benedikter and Verena Nowotny (Wiesbaden, Ger.: Springer, 2014), pp. 169–211.
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 33. Susan L. Shirk, *China: Fragile Superpower* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2007). For a related argument, see Teresa Wright, *Accepting Authoritarianism: State-Society Relations in China's Reform Era* (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 2010).
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44. Nicola Casarini, "The EU-China Partnership: 10 Years On," European Union Institute for Security Studies *Issue Brief*, no. 35 (October 2013), p. 3.
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50. Our intent here is to delineate the two major objectives of the committee. Clearly, NATO would have to consider the merits of establishing a committee dedicated to these objectives versus subsuming them under established committees.

THE DESTRUCTION OF CONVOY PQ17

27 June–10 July 1942

Milan Vego

The most critical problem for the Western Allies in the northern European theater in 1941–42 was the urgent need to secure the war matériel being sent to the Soviet Union. Initially, the Germans did not react strongly against the Allied convoys sailing to northern Russia. However, that began to change quickly after February 1942, when the Germans redeployed almost all their heavy surface forces and a large number of U-boats from home waters to northern Norway. Attacks by the German Luftwaffe and U-boats became not only more intensive but

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increasingly deadly. Correspondingly, the Allied convoys suffered ever-larger losses.

Because there were no prospects for opening a second front in 1942, it was vitally important for the Western Allies to keep the Soviet Union in the war; otherwise victory over Nazi Germany would be impossible. Hence, all efforts were made to supply Russia with increasing amounts of war matériel. However, the Western Allies faced serious difficulties in supplying Russia. The routes that offered the shortest transit times were also the most dangerous. The Western Allies had three main alternatives: (1) across the Pacific to Vladivostok; (2) across the southern Atlantic and around the Cape of Good Hope to the port of Basra in the Persian Gulf (called the “Persian Corridor”); and (3) across the northern Atlantic to Iceland and then to the north Russian ports of Arkhangelsk

and Murmansk (the Arctic route). Each of these routes had advantages and disadvantages. (1) The Pacific route to Vladivostok passed near northern Hokkaido. Hence, after Japan opened hostilities with the United States and Britain in December 1941, it could be used only by Soviet-flag ships. Plus, adding the distance from Russia's Pacific coast to the front lines in the west, this route was the longest of the three. (2) Shipping from U.S. east coast ports had to go via the Cape of Good Hope until July 1943, when the Mediterranean route was opened. The Cape route was about 14,500 miles long and required some seventy-six days to transit.¹ (3) The shortest but the most dangerous route was the Arctic option. The Germans proffered a serious threat to Allied ships by using the Luftwaffe, U-boats, and heavy surface ships based in northern Norway. The Allied problem was made worse by the very poor sailing conditions caused by extreme cold, bad weather, and ice. Despite all these difficulties, the Soviets adamantly insisted on use of the northern route because it could deliver badly needed war matériel more quickly and closer to their forces at the front. Another possible reason was Soviet fear of too strong an Anglo-American presence in Persia.² The decision to establish the Arctic route was made by British prime minister Winston S. Churchill (1874–1965), with the full support of President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882–1945).³ Admiral Sir Dudley Pound (1877–1943), the British First Sea Lord (1939–43), and Admiral Sir John Tovey (1885–1971), commander in chief (CINC) of the Home Fleet, were opposed to that decision.⁴

The single most devastating action in the resupply effort was the German attack on Convoy PQ17 in July 1942. The Luftwaffe and U-boats sank twenty-two out of thirty-six merchant ships plus one out of three rescue ships during the weeklong attacks. The planned augmentation of this effort in the form of a foray (code-named Unternehmen [Operation] RÖSSELSPRUNG) by the battleship *Tirpitz* and other heavy surface ships was short-lived in execution because Allied forces detected the German ships prematurely. Nevertheless, the Germans achieved a significant victory against the Allies' efforts to supply their embattled Russian ally. In the aftermath, all convoys to Russia via the Arctic route were suspended for almost two months; the next convoy did not sail until 2 September 1942. During the next two years, convoys ran only during the long, dark months of winter. This resulted in much smaller losses than in 1942; subsequently, only four ships were lost, three in 1944 and one in March 1945.⁵

In operational terms, the German attack against Convoy PQ17 was a *major naval/joint operation vs. enemy maritime trade*. For the Allies, the defense of Convoy PQ17 amounted to a *major naval/joint operation to defend maritime trade*. Strategically, this operation was an integral part of the Allies' efforts to defend and preserve their military-economic potential at sea, while the Germans' objective was to destroy it.

STRATEGIC SETTING

At the turn of 1941–42, the strategic situation for the Western Allies in the European theater was very unfavorable. The Germans controlled the entire coast of Western Europe from northern Norway to the Franco-Spanish border in the Bay of Biscay. However, the Germans suffered a series of setbacks in the fall of 1941 and early winter of 1941/42 on the eastern front. Their forces were stopped at the gates of Leningrad (Saint Petersburg today) and Moscow and in southern Russia. They were forced to retreat in the battle of Moscow (2 October 1941–7 January 1942). Yet despite these reverses, the Wehrmacht's power was not broken.

Germany's invasion of Denmark and Norway in April 1940 radically changed the strategic situation in the northern area in Germany's favor. By obtaining control of the Jutland Peninsula / Danish Straits and Norway, Germany greatly weakened Britain's strategic position in the northern area. This loss was somewhat ameliorated by the Anglo-American occupation of Iceland in June 1941; this greatly improved the Allies' ability to control surrounding sea areas within the effective range of their land-based aircraft. They were also able to carry out raids against the German-controlled Norwegian coast.⁶

By controlling Norway, the Germans made it impossible for the British to blockade the Shetlands–southern Norway line, as had happened in World War I (when Britain and the United States established the Northern Barrage minefield). Germany also greatly weakened the British position in the Shetland–Faeroes–Iceland gap. Passage through the northern portion of the North Sea was opened up for German naval forces.⁷ Control of the Norwegian coast significantly improved the effectiveness of the Kriegsmarine (navy) and Luftwaffe (air force) in their attacks on enemy maritime traffic in the northern Atlantic Ocean and the Barents Sea.

Nazi Germany also greatly benefited economically from controlling Norway. Among other things, the Germans obtained control of some commodities important to their war industries, including aluminum, copper, paper, and timber. Germany also gained more secure export of Swedish iron ore through Narvik.⁸ Along the 1,745–nautical mile (nm)–long route from Oslo in the south to Kirkenes beyond North Cape, some two hundred thousand tons of shipping moved every day. At the same time, the political situation in Norway was difficult for the Germans. The Germans realized that the majority of the populace was pro-British. These Norwegians hoped for a British victory, and that the Germans and Soviets would exhaust themselves in the war.⁹

Hitler placed great strategic importance on Germany's continued control of Norway. He was extremely concerned about the possibility of enemy landings there. Hitler's views were shared by Admiral Erich Raeder (1876–1960), CINC of the Kriegsmarine and the Naval Warfare Directorate (Seekriegsleitung—SKL).

On 10 October 1941, Hitler issued his instruction (Führerweisung) Nr. 37, which assigned new missions to the German armed forces in northern Norway. The Kriegsmarine was directed to attack enemy sea traffic to Murmansk and protect German traffic in the Arctic. Army High Command (Armeekorps, or AOK) Norway, the Luftwaffe, and the Kriegsmarine were directed to cooperate closely during the coming months in preparing to oppose possible enemy landings in front and on the sea flanks of the German forces. Hitler directed the 5th Air Fleet to return to Norway and establish the post of Air Leader (Fliegerführer) North.¹⁰

On 14 December 1941, Hitler ordered a buildup of defense installations in Norway and the improvement of roads in the coastal area. He believed that if the Western Allies were successful in capturing Norway, they would be able to supply the Soviet Union regularly, thereby posing a serious threat to the German northern front. The enemy also would be able to operate in the Baltic. Information gathered by German agents as well as statements made by Western leaders and other reports in the Western press lent these views new urgency.¹¹

In meetings with Admiral Raeder on 29 December 1941 and 12 January 1942, Hitler pronounced that the enemy threat to Norway required redeployment of heavy German ships as a deterrent against such a landing. On the basis of information from Swedish sources, he believed the British and Americans might land between Trondheim and Kirkenes. Hitler considered Norway to be the “Schicksalzone” (“Zone of Destiny”) of the entire war.¹² At a meeting with Raeder on 22 January, Hitler stated that, from the latest information, Britain and the United States were planning to attack northern Norway. If successful, this would decisively influence the war.¹³ In Hitler’s view, every German heavy surface ship that was not in Norway was in the wrong place. Raeder fully agreed with that assessment.¹⁴ Hitler demanded unconditional execution of his orders aimed at enhancing the security of the northern area.¹⁵

The führer ordered deployment of additional air and naval forces to Norway. Reichsmarschal Hermann Göring (1893–1946), CINC of the Luftwaffe, was directed to reinforce the Luftwaffe’s forces in Norway. And these measures had to be sped up, because the danger was immediate.¹⁶ Among other things, the Brest group (battle cruisers *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* and heavy cruiser *Prinz Eugen*) would be redeployed to Norway. Hitler also ordered deployment of additional S-boats (fast-attack craft) to northern Norway and a significant increase in heavy artillery for defense against enemy landings.¹⁷

OPERATING AREA

During the attack on and defense of Convoy PQ17 in July 1942, the opposing naval and air forces operated in both the Norwegian and Barents Seas (see


map 1); however, the majority of combat actions took place in the Barents. The 550,000-square-mile Barents Sea borders in the west on the Greenland Sea; in the north on the Svalbard Islands (of which the largest is Spitsbergen) and Franz Josef Land (Zemlya Frantsa Iosifa); in the east on Novaya Zemlya; and in the south on the Kola Peninsula and northern Norway. Jan Mayen and Bear Islands are the most important islands within the Barents Sea. The seventy-square-mile Bear Island (Bjørnøya) is the southernmost of the Svalbards. Its highest elevation is about 1,760 feet. The 34-mile-long, 144-square-mile Jan Mayen is a mountainous, volcanic island partly covered by glaciers.

The weather, ice conditions, and duration of daylight in the Barents Sea and the adjoining littoral area greatly influenced the combat employment of surface ships, submarines, and aircraft. In the summer months, good visibility and low sea state generally prevailed.¹⁸ This facilitated air reconnaissance and shadowing. At the same time, long hours of daylight made it considerably more difficult for submarines to conduct their typical night surface attacks. Lack of cloud cover made it more difficult for torpedo bombers to conduct surprise attacks.¹⁹ However, summer visibility was frequently reduced by the presence of fog: June averaged nine days of heavy fog, August nineteen.²⁰ Dense fog posed a great disadvantage for the attacker because the target could remain concealed.²¹

During the winter months, gales of great violence were frequent. This often negatively affected fully laden eastbound convoys. Deck cargo such as tanks, wagons, and locomotives endangered the safety of ships, forcing them to return to a port of origin. Heavy snow and ice on a ship's upper deck and top-hamper were dangerous if allowed to accumulate, and once formed increased the bulk significantly. The westbound convoys did not carry much cargo. Therefore the light ships ballasted their bows up so as to submerge their propellers, which sometimes made them unmanageable. Escorts also suffered badly; they lost boats, davits, and men on many occasions.²² Air reconnaissance and the use of destroyers were difficult because of high sea states.²³

In the Greenland and Barents Seas, the pack ice affected routing of Allied ships bound to and from northern Russia. Generally, it was desirable to keep as far as possible from the German airfields in northern Norway and to evade U-boats lurking between Jan Mayen and Bear Islands. One way to do this was to take ships through the ice; however, the Allies soon learned that the thin hulls of escorts were easily damaged. Also, the ice prevented a convoy from maneuvering as a whole.²⁴ In general, ice was always a danger for surface ships, even outside the pack—small floes could not be detected easily—so it was preferable to leave a margin of about forty miles from the ice boundary.²⁵

The pack ice and icebergs were carried down the east coast of Greenland through the Denmark Strait. The major part of the Denmark Strait was usually



covered by ice. However, ice was seldom found within the hundred-fathom line, because the boundary between the northward-flowing, warm Irminger Current and the cold East Greenland Current usually overlay that line. Sometimes ice crossed that line and came within sight of Iceland's coast.²⁶ The ice situation in the Denmark Strait greatly affected the routing of Allied convoys to northern Russia. Generally, ice along Iceland's north coast meant that Allied ships sailing out of Reykjavík bound northeastward were unable to pass around the west and north coasts from Reykjavík, instead being routed southward.²⁷

The boundaries of the pack ice in the Barents Sea changed considerably over the course of a year. From December to early June, the pack ice normally extended close to or beyond Bear Island. For example, in March the pack's southern limit was the northwestern tip of Jan Mayen Island and the west coast of Spitsbergen, and extending from there to Bear Island and to the Kanin Peninsula.²⁸ In April, when ice conditions were the worst, with the pack ice boundary at its southernmost, it might be necessary to route ships nearly a hundred miles farther south—leaving only about 150–200 miles to the Norwegian coast.²⁹ In contrast, when the pack ice boundary moved northward, it was possible to sail in a west-to-east direction in the area between North Cape and Spitsbergen. In a mild season, there was a passage of fifty miles between Bear Island and the ice edge, which allowed routing convoys farther north.³⁰ Doing so allowed Allied ships to avoid contact with the German surface ships based in northern Norway.

Because of the ice conditions in 1942, Allied ships had to traverse the 260 nm distance between longitudes 20 degrees E and 35 degrees E while sailing only 220–40 nm from the Norwegian coast. These conditions prevailed through the end of June.³¹ In March and April 1942 the ice limits were farther south than at any other time of the year. This forced the convoys to northern Russia to pass south of Bear Island, and thus within about 250 miles of the Norwegian coast.³² After April, the sea area gradually enlarged because the ice boundary moved north and east. Thereafter, it was more difficult for German surface ships to attack Allied convoys. In August, pack ice ran from Scoresby Strait off Greenland northward, then from Bell Strait (in western Spitsbergen) south of South Cape and Hope Island, then in a northeastern direction.³³ In June 1942, the pack ice boundaries fell between the March and August lines.³⁴

ALLIED OPERATIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURE

The highest British naval authority was the Admiralty, led by First Lord Albert V. Alexander. (His position was the equivalent of today's Secretary of the Navy in the United States.) The Admiralty itself consisted of five sea lords plus four other high officials. The First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff was Admiral Pound.

He was the highest naval official responsible for naval operations. In contrast to the Air Ministry, the Admiralty's responsibilities included operational planning and execution. The most important Admiralty divisions were Plans and Operations, Trade, and Intelligence. The work of the Plans and Operations Division was closely coordinated with the Intelligence Division.³⁵

The Home Fleet was the principal operational-level command for operations in European waters. At the outbreak of war in September 1939, the Home Fleet consisted of the 2nd Battle Squadron, Battle Cruiser Squadron, aircraft carriers, cruisers (2nd, 7th, 12th, and 18th squadrons), Destroyer Command (6th, 7th, 8th, and 18th Destroyer Flotillas), submarines (2nd and 6th Submarine Flotillas), and minesweepers (1st Minesweeping Flotilla), plus the Orkneys and Shetland forces. The majority of the Home Fleet's forces were based at Scapa Flow in the Orkneys and Portland, England. Other bases were at Rosyth and Dundee in Scotland and Blyth and the Humber in England.³⁶

During the war, the composition of the Home Fleet underwent significant changes because many of its heavy units were assigned to other major commands. The CINC of the Home Fleet after November 1940 was Admiral Tovey. On 26 March 1942, the U.S. Navy formed Task Force (TF) 39, initially led by Rear Admiral John W. Wilcox, to reinforce the Home Fleet. On 26 March, TF 39, composed of the battleship *Washington* (BB 56), carrier *Wasp* (CV 7), and heavy cruisers *Wichita* (CA 45) and *Tuscaloosa* (CA 37), plus eight destroyers, sailed from Portland, Maine, for Scapa Flow. One day later Admiral Wilcox was washed away and disappeared in a heavy sea. He was replaced by Rear Admiral Robert C. Giffen.³⁷

The Home Fleet's geographic area of responsibility was never defined. Yet it clearly encompassed the northern part of the North Sea and the waters north of the Shetlands/Faeroes/Iceland/Greenland line. The southern part of the North Sea and the English Channel constituted separate commands deploying light forces. The squarish ocean area from the northernmost tip of Scotland and southwestern tip of England extending to longitude 30 degrees W was the responsibility of the Western Approaches Command in Liverpool (moved from Plymouth on 7 February 1941). On 17 February 1942, Admiral Sir Percy Noble was appointed CINC of Western Approaches Command. Its main responsibility was the protection of convoys between North American and British ports.

Initially, the main mission of the Home Fleet was to prevent German naval forces from breaking out of the North Sea and operating in the Atlantic. After the summer of 1941, its focus shifted to Norwegian waters and the Barents Sea. Overall responsibility for convoys to northern Russia rested with Admiral Tovey, CINC of the Home Fleet, but Western Approaches Command provided the ships necessary for the close, direct screening of convoys.

CONVOYS TO NORTHERN RUSSIA

The first convoy to northern Russia (code-named DERVISH) departed from Hvalfjord, Iceland, on 21 August 1941—only two months after the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. This convoy consisted of only six merchant ships, and all reached the Soviet port of Arkhangelsk in the White Sea after a ten-day voyage.³⁸ On 13 September 1941, a decision was made to give a serial number to each convoy heading to or from northern Russia.³⁹ The first of the eastbound PQ convoys (named after convoy planning officer Commander Philip Quellyn Roberts) left Hvalfjord on 28 September 1941.⁴⁰ The first westbound convoy, QP1, left Arkhangelsk on 28 September and arrived at Dunnet Head, northern Scotland, on 11 October.⁴¹ Between 1941 and 1945, forty-two eastbound escorted convoys (composed of 848 ships) and thirty-six westbound escorted convoys (composed of 735 ships), plus one eastbound and one westbound unescorted convoy, sailed the Arctic route between Russia and the West.⁴²

Ports of origins for the Allied convoys to the Soviet Union were on the U.S. east coast and in northern Scotland. The American ships sailed from Philadelphia and then joined one of the transatlantic convoys in Halifax or Sydney, Nova Scotia, Canada. Afterward they sailed across the northern Atlantic to a breakaway point for continuing their voyage to Iceland. The British ships were organized into convoys at Gare Loch or Loch Ewe on the western coast of Scotland. They joined American-flag ships at Hvalfjord or Reykjavík, where PQ convoys were formed.⁴³

Murmansk in the Kola Inlet and Arkhangelsk in the White Sea were the principal destination ports for Allied convoys to northern Russia. Because of the influence of the Gulf Stream, the Kola Inlet is ice-free year-round; Arkhangelsk was closed to large ships for six months out of the year because of ice.⁴⁴ The port facilities in both Murmansk and Arkhangelsk were very primitive.⁴⁵

The sea routes from Reykjavík to Murmansk and Arkhangelsk are 1,500 and 1,900 nm in length, respectively; however, the length of the convoy route to Murmansk was some two thousand nautical miles because of the need to keep as far as possible from the Luftwaffe's aircraft. Transit time for a convoy from Iceland to Murmansk was about ten days, to Arkhangelsk twelve days.⁴⁶ The merchant ships from the United States already had a long distance to traverse merely to reach their assembly points in Iceland. For example, a merchant vessel sailing out of Philadelphia had to traverse some 645 nm to Halifax or 960 nm to Sydney. Distances from Halifax or Sydney to Reykjavík are 1,940 and 1,655 nm, respectively. The PQ convoy route ran generally through the Denmark Strait (which was mined); then as far north as ice conditions allowed, while proceeding eastward; then south toward the Kola Inlet or southeastward to Arkhangelsk.⁴⁷

Allied convoys to Russia generally varied in size between fifteen and thirty ships, although some were larger. Smaller convoys ran until early 1942, when a decision was made to increase the size of convoys bound to Russia.⁴⁸ On 26 February 1942, Admiral Tovey requested that westbound and eastbound convoys sail simultaneously so that their transits through the most dangerous areas could be synchronized. This would entail fourteen-day cycles for convoys to and from Russia.⁴⁹ A decision was made that a pair of convoys would sail starting in early March 1942, and the practice became standard thereafter.⁵⁰ In May, Admiral Tovey advocated reducing the number of convoys during the coming months because improved weather conditions would greatly facilitate operations of the enemy's reconnaissance aircraft and bombers, and because the ice boundary would not have receded northward sufficiently to avoid these attacks.⁵¹ However, the Admiralty rejected his recommendation.


The Allied convoys were potentially subject to attack by enemy surface ships and U-boats along the entire route, and for some 1,400 miles by aircraft.⁵² Both ends of the convoy route were within range of the Luftwaffe's reconnaissance aircraft. In contrast, the British reconnaissance seaplanes operated from a single base, Sullom Voe in the Shetland Islands. The Germans believed that these planes were also based on the Langanes Peninsula, Iceland (see map 2). The maneuvering area for a convoy and its covering forces was limited northward and westward by ice and southward by the enemy-occupied coast. Within that conveying area the currents were uncertain, and frequent gales could disperse a convoy, driving ships many miles from their intended route.⁵³

Initially, the Allied convoys to northern Russia were weakly defended from attacks by German aircraft and U-boats. This highly unfavorable situation began to change for the better in the spring of 1942. In late April, additional destroyers, corvettes, and trawlers were transferred from Western Approaches Command to the Home Fleet, bringing the number of antisubmarine (A/S) escorts for each convoy to about ten.⁵⁴ However, the Allies' continuing shortage of destroyers combined with the difficulty in refueling them limited their ability to hunt U-boats at any significant distance from a convoy.⁵⁵ Each convoy was accompanied by at least one fleet oiler for refueling the short-legged destroyers and corvettes.

Each eastbound convoy was accompanied by two submarines to discourage enemy surface attack. Several British and the Soviet submarines patrolled the areas northwest and west off North Cape.⁵⁶

The Allies tried repeatedly to involve the Soviet Northern Fleet further in protecting convoys. Admiral Tovey in his messages to the Admiralty "pressed for strong and continuous Russian patrol activity off the Kola Inlet, to make that area untenable by U-boats, and for short-range and long-range fighter protection."⁵⁷

MAP 2
OPERATIONAL SITUATION, JUNE 1942
(GERMAN PERSPECTIVE)



Tovey believed that this provision of fighter cover—both long-range (two hundred miles off the Kola Inlet) and short-range (sixty miles off), during the most dangerous part of the voyage—was both crucial and within Soviet capabilities. The Soviet Northern Fleet had sufficient destroyers and smaller A/S ships to operate farther from its bases than heretofore, and Tovey felt the Soviets should take over responsibility for defense of the convoys during the White Sea segment of the passage. Also, the Soviet submarines based in Polyarny, Kola Peninsula, could be employed for scouting and intercepting the German heavy surface ships.⁵⁸

The British requested that the Russians not only reinforce escorts at the eastern end of the voyage by providing long-range fighters or A/S air escort but also bomb enemy airfields during convoy transits to discourage surface attacks east of Bear Island.⁵⁹ Although the Soviets repeatedly promised that they would provide adequate protection to the Allied convoys, they seldom did so in practice.⁶⁰ Formally, the Soviets took responsibility for protecting Allied convoys once they crossed longitude 18 degrees E.⁶¹ They also conducted intensive reconnaissance of the German naval and air bases in northern Norway. The submarines of the Soviet Northern Fleet patrolled off the Norwegian coast, covering the possible deployment routes of German surface forces.⁶² However, the fact was that the Soviets were unable to provide adequate protection to the Allied convoys during the most dangerous phase of the transit.⁶³

GERMAN OPERATIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURE

The German operational command organization in the northern theater was highly fragmented. The Germans never established a true multiservice or joint command in this theater; instead, each service controlled its own forces. Cooperation was supposed to be secured through the posting of liaison officers at the main headquarters of each of the three services. The highest command echelon controlling army troops in Norway and Finland was High Army Command Norway, led by General Nikolaus von Falkenhorst, from Command Post Finland in Rovaniemi, Finland. It was created from Group XXI in December 1941 and disbanded in December 1944. Army Norway was directly subordinate to the High Command of the (German) Army (Oberkommando des Heeres, or OKH).

Kriegsmarine CINC Admiral Raeder and Luftwaffe CINC Reichsmarschal Göring had operational command over all their respective forces. Raeder headed the High Command of the Navy (Oberkommando der Marine—OKM) (established 11 January 1936). The Naval Warfare Directorate, formed on 1 April 1937, had responsibility for the conduct of naval warfare as a whole. The Operations Directorate (1./SKL) was the most important of the six SKL staff directorates in 1942. The OKM also had a permanent representative at Hitler's headquarters (see

**FIGURE 1
GERMAN NAVAL ORGANIZATION IN NORWAY, JUNE 1942**




figure 1). Contact with the Luftwaffe was maintained through a liaison officer to the Luftwaffe CINC.⁶⁴

By the end of 1941, the highest operational-level headquarters of the Kriegsmarine were Fleet Command (Flottenkommando) and four naval group commands (Marinegruppenkommandos—MGKs): North, East, West, and South. Other major commands were Naval Station Baltic (Marinestation Ostsee), Naval Station North Sea (Marinestation Nordsee), and German Naval Command Italy (Deutsches Marinekommando Italien). Naval Group Command North (MGK Nord) was led (21 September 1940–2 March 1943) by General Admiral Rolf Carls (1885–1945). On 10 August 1940 it had been renamed from Naval Group Command East (MGK Ost) and moved from Kiel to Sengwarden, near Wilhelmshaven.⁶⁵ At the same time, Naval Group Command West (MGK West) was moved from Sengwarden to Paris.⁶⁶ Naval Group Command North was responsible for all Kriegsmarine activities in the German Bight, the northern part of the North Sea, the northern Atlantic Ocean (north of Scotland), and the Arctic.⁶⁷

In 1942, the major part of German fleet forces was deployed in northern Norway. The fleet commander (June 1941–July 1944) was Admiral Otto Schniewind, flying his flag in *Tirpitz*. Directly subordinate to the fleet commander were the positions of commander of battleships (Befehlshaber der Schlachtschiffe—B.d.S.) (June 1941–May 1942) and the respective leaders of destroyers (Führer der


Zerstörer) (August 1940–May 1945), T(orpedo)-boats (Führer der Torpedoboote) (August 1940–April 1942), and U-boats (Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote) (November 1939–July 1942). The post of leader of the U-boats (Führer der U-Boote) had been renamed commander of U-boats (Befehlshaber der U-Boote) on 17 October 1939; the latter German term signified a command's enhanced importance. In the operational chain of command, Commander of U-boats Admiral Karl Dönitz became directly subordinate to the OKM; administratively, U-boats remained subordinate to the fleet command.⁶⁸ The commander of battleships was renamed commander of the cruisers (Befehlshaber der Kreuzer, or B.d.K.) in June 1942, and the leader of the torpedo boats became leader of the S-boats (Führer der Schnellboote) in April 1942.

Directly subordinate to Naval Group Command North was the Commanding Admiral Norway (Kommandierende Admiral Norwegen), led by General Admiral Hermann Boehm. The entire Norwegian coast was divided into three geographically based commands: Admiral Norwegian Polar Coast (Tromsø), Admiral Norwegian Northern Coast (Trondheim), and Admiral Norwegian Western Coast (Bergen), plus Commandant of Naval Defenses Oslofjord (Horten). In accordance with Hitler's Instruction Nr. 37, the operational staff of Admiral Arctic was established on 16 October 1941, at which point Admiral Polar Coast became subordinate to Admiral Arctic.⁶⁹ Admiral Hubert Schmundt, with headquarters in Kirkenes, was the first Admiral Arctic (October 1941–August 1942). He, in turn, was subordinate to Commanding Admiral Norway. However, at the beginning of 1942 Commanding Admiral Norway proposed that Admiral Arctic should be directly subordinate to Naval Group Command North. The aim was to unify conduct of the naval war in Arctic waters. Another reason for this change in command relationships was that Commanding Admiral Norway lacked the technical means to conduct communications.⁷⁰

After April 1942, Commanding Admiral Norway became responsible for the security of sea traffic around North Cape to the frontline forces in Finland, and for supplying Mountain Corps Norway in Finnmark.⁷¹ Admiral Arctic was also directed to attack enemy maritime traffic, protect German coastal shipping, and conduct defensive mining of coastal waters and ports. A special naval commander was to be appointed to accomplish these tasks.⁷² However, in practice it was Admiral Carls who controlled all operations in the Arctic—Admiral Schmundt essentially only transmitted his orders to subordinate commanders.⁷³

On 18 June 1942, the SKL directed that Admiral Arctic be responsible for the conduct of U-boat warfare against enemy traffic and escorts in the area east of the Denmark Strait and Jan Mayen Island. The weight of the main effort (*Schwerpunkt*) was to be the employment of U-boats against PQ convoys; however,

FIGURE 2
ORGANIZATION OF THE FIFTH AIR FLEET, JUNE 1942



Source: Mueller-Meinhard, p. 519.

should an Allied landing occur, the main effort would shift to enemy transports and escorts.⁷⁴

After the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, the 5th Air Fleet (Luftflotte 5), led by General Hans-Jürgen Stumpff (1889–1968), was the highest Luftwaffe command echelon in Norway and Finland. Until the end of 1941, the Air Leader North (West) in Stavanger was the principal subordinate commander of the 5th Air Fleet (see map 2). His forces were based in the area of Stavanger and Trondheim.⁷⁵ In Hitler’s Instruction Nr. 37 of October 1941, the führer directed that a major part of the 5th Air Fleet be transferred from Finland back to Norway. Headquarters were moved to Oslo, while an operational command post was established at Kemi, near Kirkenes. The Air Leader North (West) was in Forus/Stavanger, Air Leader Lofoten in Bardufoss, and Air Leader North (East) in Kirkenes (see figure 2).⁷⁶ After June 1941, all fighter aircraft were subordinate to the Fighter Air Leader, Norway (Jagdfliiegerführer Norwegen), with his staff at Forus, near Stavanger. The Air District Command, Norway (Luftgau-Kommando Norwegen) in Oslo had responsibility for all air bases and ground-based Luftwaffe units and installations.

The 5th Air Fleet’s operational area (*Operationsgebiet*) encompassed the Skagerrak (between Norway and Denmark); the northern part of the North Sea and northern Scotland; the northern Atlantic; the Arctic Ocean; and the

Murmansk front.⁷⁷ Its main missions were defending against any enemy amphibious landing; reconnoitering coastal waters; and attacking Arctic convoys, in cooperation with the Kriegsmarine.⁷⁸ Specifically, the 5th Air Fleet was responsible for cooperating with naval forces, providing security for German sea supplies, conducting offensive mining, and defending against enemy raids. In cooperating with the U-boats, the Luftwaffe's main tasks were to provide reconnaissance of the operating area of the U-boats engaging enemy convoys; combat any enemy fighter aircraft posing a threat to the U-boats; and conduct joint attacks with the U-boats on the PQ convoys. In cooperating with naval surface forces, the Luftwaffe's main missions were reconnoitering the operating area and attacking sea targets within the framework of an operation.⁷⁹

In practice, cooperation between the Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine in the northern area was unsatisfactory. The major reason was that both practiced rather rigid, centralized command and control. For example, if Admiral Arctic had a need for air reconnaissance, he had to send a request to Naval Group Command North in Sengwarden; from there the request was transmitted to the 5th Air Fleet in Oslo/Kemi. This resulted in a long delay in obtaining permission. If granted, the latter headquarters then gave orders to the respective air commanders.⁸⁰ Other factors that made radio communications difficult were a lack of interoperability (the Kriegsmarine and the Luftwaffe used different radio transmitters) and the difficult, mountainous terrain of Norway. All radio communications ran via Naval Group Command North in Sengwarden; employment of the Luftwaffe was directed from Oslo; but radio communications between Oslo and Sengwarden were inadequate.⁸¹ Combined with the unsatisfactory technical aspect of communications, this made it very difficult to organize cooperation between the Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine. After Raeder complained about the problem, Hitler issued orders to reinforce Luftwaffe units in Norway and to improve cooperation with the Kriegsmarine. The leaders of the Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine discussed the problem, and decided to exchange liaison officers between the 5th Air Fleet and Admiral Arctic.⁸²

ALLIED VS. GERMAN NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

For both the Allies and the Germans, accurate and timely intelligence about the enemy's order of battle (OOB), plans, intentions, and movements was essential to a successful outcome of the war in Arctic waters. The British Admiralty's Naval Intelligence Division (NID) was responsible for preparing at least daily, and often hourly, reports regarding enemy forces anywhere in the world. The Operational Intelligence Centre (OIC), created in February 1939, was the most important of NID's eight sections. It was headed by a navy captain.⁸³ As part of the Joint

Intelligence Committee, the Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) worked closely with his counterparts in the War Office and the Air Ministry.⁸⁴

The British relied on several sources of intelligence to deduce enemy intentions, plans, and movements. These included direction finding, photographic reconnaissance, captured enemy documents, prisoners of war, and signals intelligence, the last being the most important. The main source of decrypted enemy messages was the cryptanalysts at the Government Code and Cypher School at Bletchley Park, Buckinghamshire, England.⁸⁵

Normally, German ships did not use radio communications while at anchor in Trondheim; however, they did use radio transmissions between ships anchored at Vestfjord and Altafjord. And shore commands communicated by radio with the heavy ships when they were at sea—sending a steady stream of messages, in fact. So the absence of such signals was a good indicator that the ships were still in port or in some other fjord.⁸⁶

Air reconnaissance of the German naval bases/anchorages and airfields in northern Norway was extremely difficult because of the long distances involved and the often-appalling weather. The British deployed submarines in the area between North Cape and Bear Island. The Allies' network of Norwegian agents, which would prove so valuable later in the war, had not yet been fully established.⁸⁷ However, the British were lucky in having some excellent Swedish sources of information on German forces in Norway. The British naval attaché in Stockholm, Captain Henry Denham, established good relations with the Swedish secret service, especially Major Törnberg (assistant to Major Carl Petersén, head of C-Bureau, a unit for secret intelligence collection). The Swedes had a good source of intelligence because the Germans' telegraph and teleprinter lines to their naval, army, and Luftwaffe forces in Norway passed through Swedish territory. The Swedes were successful in tapping those lines and in breaking a number of German ciphers. Denham was often provided with the results of the Swedish cryptanalysts' work. To avoid suspicion being cast on the Swedish secret service, Denham met his contacts in a park or some other public place. All the information passed over had to be memorized until Denham could get back to his embassy and send a signal to the DNI in London. Among other things, these Swedish sources gave the first positive clue about the movements of the battleship *Bismarck* in May 1941.⁸⁸

For the British, the single most critical factor in their ultimate success in the Battle of the Atlantic was their ability to read the German navy's radio messages. Yet while many of these messages were read, not all were; and the codes were generally difficult to crack.⁸⁹ But the British did break the German naval cipher HYDRA, which was used by not only the patrol vessels and minesweepers but

also the U-boats based in Norway, as well as the heavy ships. (The exception was special operations, when the NEPTUNE cipher was used; the British code breakers at Bletchley Park partially penetrated it.) Major changes in the German cipher settings occurred every forty-eight hours, and minor ones every twenty-four hours. Bletchley Park largely mastered the daily changes of cipher settings; it was the major changes that caused a problem. Once a major code change was broken, the lesser ones were usually cracked quickly.⁹⁰ However, delays did occur, leaving gaps varying in length from four to forty-eight hours.⁹¹ Hence, there were cases when the British were blind or not current at a critical moment. With regard to messages sent by landlines, the British were unable to learn anything about them unless they received the information from Stockholm. They were also unaware of German written instructions. In short, even the best intelligence sources could not be relied on to give a complete and continuous picture of what *was happening*, let alone what was *going to happen*, on the other side of the North Sea.⁹²

Further, on 1 February 1942, the Germans directed all U-boat cipher operators to abandon the use of HYDRA codes to tighten security. They introduced a new version of the Enigma coding machine, the Triton M4, that used four instead of three rotors. Codes generated by the Triton M4 (called SHARK by the British) were unreadable using then-existing methods of decoding.⁹³ It was not until late 1942 that Bletchley Park decoders were able to read these messages.⁹⁴

The primary source of intelligence for the Kriegsmarine was the Naval Intelligence Service (Marinenachrichtendienst—MND). It was established in June 1941; the Naval Intelligence Inspectorate (Marinenachrichten Inspektion) was dissolved.⁹⁵ The Naval Communications Service (Amtsgruppe Marinenachrichtendienst—4./SKL) was one of MND's most important office groups. Its Division of Radio Intelligence (Funkaufklärung) (4./SKL/III), or B-Dienst (Beobachtung-Dienst—Observation Service), was primarily responsible for monitoring, deciphering, and evaluating enemy radio communications.⁹⁶ B-Dienst was highly regarded by the rest of the Kriegsmarine for its professionalism and the high quality of its analysis. Admiral Raeder highly praised its work.⁹⁷ B-Dienst and German Military Intelligence (the Abwehr) had a loose administrative relationship because two of the Abwehr's departments dealt with "naval matters" (Group IV: Radio Intelligence and Group V: Naval Espionage).⁹⁸

B-Dienst played a pivotal role in the first part of the Battle of the Atlantic.⁹⁹ Generally, B-Dienst had a reasonably clear and current picture of the convoy situation. It provided essential information to U-boats for their attacks on Allied convoys.¹⁰⁰ It achieved a great success in March 1942 when it cracked the Allied convoy code. This enabled Dönitz to receive decoded signals within twenty-four hours of their transmission. From June through November 1942, almost all orders to U-boats were based on German knowledge of decoded signals.¹⁰¹

The Germans had relatively good knowledge of the Allies' naval OOB in northern Scotland and Iceland. Most of the information came from radio intercepts obtained by B-Dienst, photographic reconnaissance by Luftwaffe aircraft, and reports from U-boats.

Initially, the Germans did not have precise information on Allied efforts to supply the Soviet Union via the Arctic route. Yet already in September 1941, the German Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht and the OKM noticed the increased importance of the convoys to northern Russia. They believed at first that supplies brought in by these convoys were solely intended for the support of Soviet forces fighting on the Murmansk front. They also thought that the Soviets, with the help of the British and Canadians, would try to capture vitally important nickel mines at Petsamo. This estimate of the situation was expressed in Hitler's Instruction Nr. 36 for winter operations in Norway, issued on 22 September 1941.¹⁰²

However, air reconnaissance and information obtained from agents indicated that the enemy convoys were bringing in supplies to be used on the entire eastern front. The Germans also deduced that Murmansk and Arkhangelsk were the principal destination ports for the enemy convoys. German radio intercepts revealed that the enemy used convoys with a P-Q designation for northern Russian convoys; eastbound convoys were designated PQ, westbound QP. The Germans knew that the enemy had sent seven eastbound convoys (PQ1–PQ7) by the end of 1941. However, because of bad weather conditions in the Arctic, the Germans never learned the positions of or the nature of the screens for those convoys.¹⁰³


By mid-January 1942, the SKL had a clearer picture of the operational situation. It learned that the convoys originated in Scottish ports. Yet it erroneously believed that partial convoys from the United States stopped at Seydisfjord, Iceland, and from there sailed three to four times per month to northern Russia (see map 3). The screen was composed of cruisers and destroyers, with sometimes a single aircraft carrier.¹⁰⁴

In mid-February 1942, the Germans learned that the route for the PQ convoys ran from Iceland to the southern tip of Bear Island, then eastward to longitude 38°40' E, then southward to latitude 70 degrees N, where the routes to Murmansk and Arkhangelsk separated. The return QP convoys left at the same time as the PQ convoys heading to the north Russian ports. The QPs were routed eastward and southward of the PQ route. Intervals between successive convoy pairs were about fifteen days.¹⁰⁵

ALLIED PLANS

Allied planning for Convoys PQ17 and QP13 followed a well-established pattern. While the Admiralty and the Home Fleet were gravely concerned about the safety of convoys to northern Russia during the summer months, they had

**MAP 3
OPERATIONAL IDEA FOR THE ATTACK ON CONVOY PQ17, JULY 1942
(OPERATION RÖSSELSPRUNG—KNIGHT'S MOVE)**



no choice but to send them; political reasons—support of the embattled Soviet Union—trumped purely military considerations.¹⁰⁶ The time of sailing of the convoys could not be concealed from the Germans for more than a day or two at most. Hence, it was clear to Admirals Pound and Tovey that sooner or later a major disaster was bound to occur. This would be so especially if convoys continued to run in the summer months, when perpetual daylight prevailed. Pound believed firmly that another sortie by *Tirpitz* (the first foray, against convoys PQ12 and QP8 on 13 March 1942, had failed) was inevitable. He argued strongly to the War Cabinet that convoys should be postponed until at least the following winter. However, he was overruled because of strong pressure from Churchill and Roosevelt. Preparations for Convoy PQ17 went ahead.¹⁰⁷

Admiral Tovey received information in June 1942 that the enemy intended to bring out his main force to attack an eastbound convoy. This meant that enemy surface ships would be operating in the area between Norway and Spitsbergen—where British ships would be operating about a thousand miles from friendly air bases. The British destroyers also would be too short on fuel to escort any damaged ships.¹⁰⁸ The only hope, Tovey argued, was to induce the Germans to use their heavy ships toward the west. This would mean that an eastbound convoy, after reaching longitude 10 degrees E, would temporarily delay its transit for twelve to eighteen hours (unless it was known that the German heavy ships were still in port, or that the weather prevented shadowing by enemy aircraft). Tovey hoped that this temporary withdrawal would tempt the German heavy ships to pursue, cause them to return to port, or force them to sail into the operating area of the British and Russian submarines.¹⁰⁹

The Admiralty rejected Tovey's proposal. Yet the Admiralty's instructions issued on 27 June envisaged the possibility, under certain circumstances, of the convoy being temporarily turned back, on Admiralty orders.¹¹⁰ The same document stated that the safety of the convoy against surface attack west of Bear Island "must be met by our surface forces, and to the eastward of that meridian [10 degrees E] must be met by submarines; and that the cruiser covering force was not intended to go east of Bear Island, unless the convoy was threatened by the presence of a surface force which the cruisers could fight, or in any case to go beyond 25° E."¹¹¹

Convoy PQ17 consisted of thirty-six merchant ships (twenty-three of them American), plus three rescue ships that technically were not part of the convoy. Commodore John C. K. Dowding commanded the convoy.¹¹² The convoy carried 156,492 tons of weapons, equipment, and other supplies. Among weapons and equipment, 594 tanks, 4,246 motor vehicles, and 297 aircraft were on board.¹¹³ The plan envisaged that three oilers (designated Force Q) would accompany the

convoy to refuel both the destroyers accompanying Convoys PQ17 and QP13 and those with the Cruiser Covering Force.¹¹⁴

The route for Convoy PQ17 ran from Hvalfjord around the western and northern coasts of Iceland; through the Denmark Strait; past the east coast of Jan Mayen; northeast to the vicinity of latitude 75 degrees N, longitude 19 degrees E; from there due east, passing north of Bear Island; then proceeding southeast.¹¹⁵ Upon crossing the longitude of the Kola Inlet (approximately 33 degrees E), the convoy route south would split, with one track leading into Murmansk and another on to Arkhangelsk.¹¹⁶ This route ran more to the north than usual because the ice boundary had moved farther away from Bear Island. This increased the distance from the enemy air bases in northern Norway.¹¹⁷ It also made Convoy PQ17's route longer than usual.¹¹⁸

Defenses for the PQ17/QP13 convoys were similar to those for the PQ16/QP12 convoys. They consisted of a direct A/S screen and a "long-range escort force" sailing with the convoy, a Cruiser Covering Force for close cover, and a Battle Fleet for distant cover and support. The direct A/S screen and the long-range escort force for Convoy PQ17 were under Commander John E. Broome, RN. The direct A/S screen consisted of four corvettes, two auxiliary antiaircraft (AA) ships, four minesweepers, and four armed trawlers. The long-range escort consisted of six destroyers and two submarines (see sidebar, "Allied Order of Battle").¹¹⁹

The Cruiser Covering Force was designated Cruiser Squadron 1 (CS 1). It consisted of two British (*London, Norfolk*) and two U.S. cruisers (*Tuscaloosa, Wichita*) under Rear Admiral Louis K. Hamilton, plus one British (*Somali*) and two U.S. destroyers (*Wainwright, Rowan*). CS 1, in turn, was organized into three divisions: 1st Division (*London, Norfolk*), 2nd Division (*Tuscaloosa, Wichita*), and 3rd Division (*Somali, Wainwright, Rowan*).¹²⁰ This force would provide cover as far as Bear Island.¹²¹ The Battle Fleet, under Admiral Tovey, was composed of the British battleship *Duke of York*, the U.S. battleship *Washington*, the British carrier *Victorious*, the British cruisers *Cumberland* and *Nigeria*, and twelve destroyers.¹²²

Tovey's plan was for the Battle Fleet to reach latitude 65°56' N and longitude 10°30' E at 0730 on 1 July. After four destroyers from Seydisfjord joined the force, the remaining fleet destroyers would be detached to Seydisfjord and the Battle Force would proceed to provide distant cover for Convoy PQ17. CINC Rosyth (Scotland) was asked to arrange A/S escort and long-range fighter escort for the Battle Force as far northward as possible.¹²³

Initially, eight British and one Free French submarines were assigned to and deployed in patrolling areas between North Cape and Bear Island.¹²⁴ British

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ALLIED ORDER OF BATTLE**CONVOY PQ17**

(Commodore John C. K. Dowding)

Total: 39 Ships

36 merchant ships (23 U.S., 8 U.K., 2 Soviet, 2 Panamanian, 1 Dutch); 3
rescue ships (U.K.)

MERCHANT SHIPS

Alcoa Ranger (U.S.) (sunk)
Azerbaijan (Soviet)
Bellingham (U.S.)
Benjamin Harrison (U.S.)
Bolton Castle (U.K.) (sunk)
Carlton (U.S.) (sunk)
Christopher Newport (U.S.) (sunk)
Daniel Morgan (U.S.) (sunk)
Donbass (Soviet)
Earlston (U.K.) (sunk)
El Capitan (Panamanian) (sunk)
Empire Byron (U.K.) (sunk)
Empire Tide (U.K.)
Exford (U.S.) (returned to Reykjavík)
Fairfield City (U.S.) (sunk)
Hartlebury (U.K.) (sunk)
Honomu (U.S.) (sunk)
Hoosier (U.S.) (sunk)
Ironclad (U.S.)
John Witherspoon (U.S.) (sunk)
Navarino (U.K.) (sunk)
Ocean Freedom (U.K.)
Olopana (U.S.) (sunk)
Pan Atlantic (U.S.) (sunk)
Pan Kraft (U.S.) (sunk)
Paulus Potter (Dutch) (sunk)
Peter Kerr (U.S.) (sunk)
Richard Bland (U.S.) (returned to Reykjavík)
River Afton (U.K.) (sunk)
Samuel Chase (U.S.)
Silver Sword (U.S.)
Troubador (Panamanian)
Washington (U.S.) (sunk)
West Gotomska (U.S.)
William Hooper (U.S.) (sunk)
Winston-Salem (U.S.)

RESCUE SHIPS (U.K.)

Rathlin
Zaafaran (sunk)
Zamalek

CONVOY SCREEN

(Commander John E. Broome, RN, in *Keppel*)

LONG-RANGE ESCORTS

6 destroyers: *Fury*, *Keppel*, *Leamington*, *Ledbury*, *Offa*, *Wilton*
 2 submarines: *P614*, *P615*

A/S SCREEN

4 corvettes: *Dianella*, *Lotus*, *Poppy*; *La Malouine* (Free French)
 4 A/S trawlers: *Ayrshire*, *Lord Austin*, *Lord Middleton*, *Northern Gem*

2 auxiliary AA vessels: *Palomares*, *Pozarica*
 4 minesweepers: *Bramble*, *Britomart*, *Leda*, *Salamander*

SUPPLY GROUP—FORCE Q

2 fleet oilers: *Grey Ranger* (damaged by ice on 28 June; replaced by *Aldersdale*), *Aldersdale* (sunk)
 1 fleet oiler: *Gray* (for QP13)
 1 destroyer: *Douglas*

CRUISER COVERING FORCE—CRUISER SQUADRON 1 (CS 1)

(Rear Admiral Louis K. Hamilton, RN, in *London*)

4 heavy cruisers
 2 British: *London*, *Norfolk*
 2 U.S.: *Tuscaloosa* (CA 37), *Wichita* (CA 45)
 3 destroyers
 1 British: *Somali*
 2 U.S.: *Rowan* (DD 405), *Wainwright* (DD 419)

BATTLE FLEET

(Admiral Sir John Tovey, CINC Home Fleet, in *Duke of York*)

2 battleships
 1 British: *Duke of York*
 1 U.S.: *Washington* (BB 56) (Rear Admiral R. C. Giffen—TF 39)
 1 aircraft carrier: *Victorious* (Vice Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser)
 1 heavy cruiser: *Cumberland*
 1 light cruiser: *Nigeria*
 12 destroyers
 10 British: *Ashanti*, *Blankney*, *Escapade*, *Faulknor*, *Marne*, *Martin*,
 Middleton, *Onslaught*, *Onslow*, *Wheatland*
 2 U.S.: *Mayrant* (DD 402), *Rhind* (DD 404)

SUBMARINES

8 British: *Sahib* (P212), *Sea Wolf* (47S), *Sturgeon* (73S), *Tribune* (N76),
Trident, *Unrivalled* (P45), *Unshaken* (P54), *Ursula* (N59)
 1 Free French: *Minerve*
 5 Soviet

Sources: Naval Staff, *The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys*, p. 57; Dowding, "Report of Convoy from Iceland to Time of 'Scatter,' 4th July"; Commanding Officer to the Chief of Naval Operations, "War Diary U.S.S. *Washington*, for Period from July 1, 1942, to July 31, 1942," folder BB 56 Washington War Diary—with Home Fleet, box 1554, Wasatch to Washington, RG 38, Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Records Relating to Naval Activity during World War II, NARA; Harriman (NAVCOM LONDON) to OPNAV, 2148/29TM (29 June 1942).

submarines operating north of latitude 51 degrees N were informed that the main German units might operate from near the longitude of Bear Island to the southward of their patrol lines prior to attacking the PQ and QP convoys. Ice conditions might force the convoy to pass south of Bear Island. Hence, it was of utmost importance for the submarines to maintain accurate positions, particularly with regard to their latitude.¹²⁵ Five Soviet submarines patrolled the area north of Ingøy Island.¹²⁶

Admiral Hamilton, in his operation order issued 25 June 1942, assumed that the Germans would be sufficiently tempted by PQ17 and QP13 to send their heavy ships to sea. After all, two enemy pocket battleships and some destroyers had been moved to more northerly ports in Norway, and more aircraft had been

sent north as well. Hamilton assumed that the enemy units most likely to be encountered would be *Tirpitz*, *Lützow*, *Admiral Hipper*, and *Admiral Scheer*, plus some ten destroyers. Because of respective speeds, the most likely combinations would be *Tirpitz* with *Admiral Hipper* and *Lützow* with *Admiral Scheer*.¹²⁷

In Hamilton's words, CS 1's primary objective was to get PQ17 to Russia. A slightly less important objective was to bring the enemy heavy ships into action with the Battle Fleet and Cruiser Covering Force. To increase the chances of the latter action occurring, PQ17 would probably be turned back after reaching the approximate longitude of 10 degrees E, and then turned eastward again. The hope was to lure the German ships farther from their bases or keep them longer at sea within Allied submarine zones.¹²⁸

The Battle Fleet would begin covering an area in the vicinity of latitude 71 degrees N, longitude 0 degrees E by the afternoon of the sixth day (D+6) and remain until D+8, not proceeding north of latitude 72°30' N.¹²⁹ The Cruiser Covering Force would leave Seydisfjord on the morning of D+5 to reach its covering area at latitude 73 degrees N, longitude 4 degrees E at about noon on D+6. It would remain in the area until D+8, or longer if circumstances dictated. Hamilton's intent was to avoid being drawn within close range of the enemy's shore-based aircraft or submarine concentration.¹³⁰

In support of the operation, Allied planners envisaged the use of a dummy convoy (Operation E.S.) aimed at deceiving the Germans into believing that an attack on Norway was imminent. Hence, a group of five ships of the 1st Mining Squadron plus four colliers escorted by two cruisers (*Sirius*, *Curacao*), five destroyers, and some trawlers would sail out of Scapa Flow in the Orkneys.¹³¹ This group would sortie several days prior to the departure of Convoy PQ17. It would pass west of the Shetlands and steer as far as latitude 61°30' N and longitude 1 degree E, hoping to be seen and reported by enemy aircraft before it turned back toward Scapa Flow. In addition, this plan envisaged bombing targets in southern Norway, thereby reinforcing the perception that the dummy convoy was heading there.¹³²

In June 1942, arrangements were made with the Soviets to deploy a few PBV-2 Catalina aircraft (No. 210 Squadron) to Arkhangelsk for reconnoitering the sea area between Altafjord and Convoy PQ17 on 1–3 July as the ships moved eastward; but the resulting patrol encountered nothing remarkable.¹³³

Rear Admiral Geoffrey J. A. Miles, head of the British military mission to Moscow, informed the Admiralty on 16 June that the people's commissar (minister) of the navy, Admiral Nikolay Kuznetsov, promised that all Soviet resources would be concentrated on convoy protection. Kuznetsov had not been satisfied with the Soviet air effort for Convoy PQ16, but was optimistic about better results in the future. He promised to talk to the Defense Committee again to get more

long-range fighters. In addition, in the future, some bombers, instead of being used to bomb aerodromes, might be used to help long-range fighters. As many long-range Hurricane fighters as possible would be sent to the air base at Ponoy before Convoy PQ17's arrival.¹³⁴

GERMAN PLANS

German plans for the employment of heavy surface ships against a PQ convoy were based on several "appreciations" (staff studies) prepared by various naval commands during the winter and spring of 1941–42. As was the custom in the Kriegsmarine (and in the German Wehrmacht in general), the highest command echelon, Naval Group Command North, issued an "operational instruction" (*operative Weisung*), while the subordinate commanders issued "operation orders" (*Operationbefehle*). The Kriegsmarine and the Luftwaffe prepared their separate operational plans for the attack on Convoy PQ17. However, each plan envisaged close cooperation with the other service.

On 4 June 1942, Admiral Carls issued his operational instruction for employing the Trondheim and Narvik groups (designated the 1st and 2nd Combat Groups, respectively) against the next enemy PQ convoy. The picture, as the instruction anticipated it, was as follows. Because the Allies ran the PQ/QP convoys at fourteen-to-fifteen-day intervals, the next convoy was expected in the Jan Mayen area on 20 June. Generally, the PQ convoys sailed in column formation, with four to five merchant ships in each column. The screen usually consisted of one cruiser in the midsection and three to four destroyers some 5,500 yards ahead of the convoy. Individual destroyers and any other escorts secured the convoy's flanks. The previous enemy convoy had sailed close to the flock ice boundary. A heavy security group that included a carrier had been positioned eastward of the Jan Mayen–Faeroes area.¹³⁵

The operational instruction of 4 June established two chains of command, one for the first phase (deployment of the combat groups to their "jumping-off" positions) and another for the second phase (deployment from the jumping-off positions to the attacking positions). In the first phase, Naval Group Command North at Sengwarden would exercise operational control of the Trondheim group, while the fleet commander in *Tirpitz* would exercise tactical control. For the Narvik group, operational control would be in the hands of Admiral Arctic on board the S-boat mother ship *Tanga*, while tactical command and control would be exercised by the commander of cruisers in *Lützow*.¹³⁶ In the second phase of the operation, overall operational control over both surface forces and U-boats would be in the hands of Commander, Naval Group Command North. Admiral Arctic would retain operational control of the S-boats in the Kola Peninsula area.

After the forces were assembled, tactical command and control would rest in the hands of the fleet commander. The headquarters of Admiral Arctic would serve as radio repeater for the U-boats. Direct control of the U-boats by the fleet commander was not envisaged.¹³⁷

The operational instruction of 4 June specified the composition of the Trondheim and Narvik combat groups for the pending operation. The Trondheim group would consist of *Tirpitz*, *Admiral Hipper*, two destroyers, and three torpedo boats. The Narvik group would consist of *Lütow*, *Admiral Scheer*, and six destroyers. Besides the Trondheim and Narvik combat groups, Admiral Carls envisaged employing three U-boats northeast of Jan Mayen by 10 June. Their mission was to obtain early contact with the next PQ convoy and its heavy covering forces. Additional U-boat groups would be deployed in the area between Jan Mayen and Bear Islands.¹³⁸

Operationally, RÖSSELSPRUNG was simple in concept but difficult in execution. Almost everything depended on a timely and covert joining of the two combat groups, followed by their unobserved movement toward the anticipated position of Convoy PQ17 (see map 3). Specifically, the Trondheim group would move to its jumping-off position of Gimsøystraumen in Vestfjord; at the same time, the Narvik group, directed by Commanding Admiral Arctic, would move to its jumping-off position at the northern exit of Altafjord, in the skerries (rocky islets) of Sørøya. Both groups were to be ready to sortie within twenty-four hours after leaving their bases for their jumping-off positions. Destroyers and torpedo boats would be fully refueled. After the joining of the two combat groups, the torpedo boats would be refueled at Altafjord and remain there in a three-hour ready-for-sortie status. The destroyers' short radius of action imposed limits on their speed during the operation.¹³⁹ The danger of torpedoes was posed by not only the enemy surface forces and aircraft but also submarines; the latter had been used to screen the previous PQ convoy. On a signal from Commander, Naval Group Command North, both groups would sortie from their respective jumping-off positions so as to arrive at a meeting point determined by Commander, Naval Group Command North.¹⁴⁰ Breaking off the action, if necessary, either would be ordered by Commander, Naval Group Command North or would result from an independent decision of the fleet commander.¹⁴¹

The situation would require massing German forces rapidly and keeping the duration of the operation short. The primary mission was the quick destruction of the enemy's merchant ships. However, the heavy surface ships could merely neutralize the enemy cargo ships; their actual sinking should be left to the U-boats and Luftwaffe. Among the enemy ships, sinking the tankers would be especially important. It also would be desirable to capture several enemy ships.

Attacking the convoy, not the enemy heavy covering group, was the primary mission of *Tirpitz* and *Admiral Hipper*.¹⁴²

The enemy convoy would be detected by establishing U-boat patrolling lines. After the U-boats detected the PQ convoy, the Luftwaffe would be responsible for maintaining continuous contact. The Luftwaffe would also search for the enemy heavy group in the area of the Shetlands–Faeroes–Iceland–Jan Mayen line. If the Allied heavy covering group was not detected, it would be critically important to reconnoiter the sea area some 250 nm around the enemy convoy. The Luftwaffe was also tasked with reconnoitering the areas of Reykjavík, Scapa Flow, and the Firths of Forth and Moray in Scotland.¹⁴³

On the day the combat groups sortied from Trondheim and Narvik, the Luftwaffe would reconnoiter the quadrant of offshore waters up to two hundred nautical miles from the coast running northeastward from latitude 62 degrees N to the longitude of North Cape. On the day of departure from the jumping-off positions, the Luftwaffe would reconnoiter the truncated strip of waters two hundred nautical miles offshore from the latitude of the southern tip of Lofoten to the longitude of North Cape.¹⁴⁴

In accordance with the führer's instruction of 14 March 1942, Naval Group Command North requested that the 5th Air Fleet assign three squadrons of Focke-Wolfe (FW) 200 Condor long-range reconnaissance aircraft, four squadrons of Blohm & Voss (BV) 138s, and several Kettes (three-plane "chains") of bombers and Junkers (Ju) 88 fighter-bombers for air reconnaissance.¹⁴⁵ However, the 5th Air Fleet informed Naval Group Command North on 19 June that its request could not be fulfilled. In the 5th Air Fleet's view, the attack on Convoy PQ16 in late May 1942 had clearly showed that the Luftwaffe itself was capable of inflicting heavy losses on enemy convoys (aircraft had sunk seven ships, U-boats only one), but that the prerequisite for doing so was not to weaken the 5th Air Fleet's already inadequate forces by assigning them other tasks.¹⁴⁶

On 14 June, Admiral Schniewind, the fleet commander, issued a six-and-one-half-page operation order entitled "Employment of Fleet Forces in the Northern Area against a PQ Convoy." The mission was simple: an "attack on Convoy PQ17."¹⁴⁷ In keeping with the overall operational instruction, Schniewind's operation order divided fleet forces into three elements: the Trondheim group, the Narvik group, and the U-boats (see sidebar, "German Order of Battle"). The Trondheim group consisted of *Tirpitz*, *Admiral Hipper* (with the fleet commander embarked), and five destroyers (in contrast to the two destroyers envisaged in Carls's operational instruction). The Narvik group had *Lützow*, *Admiral Scheer*, and six destroyers. Three U-boats were stationed northeast of Iceland beginning on 10 June. Other available U-boats, "probably three to four," would be in the

GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE

(F = flagship)

1ST COMBAT GROUP (I KAMPFGRUPPE) (TRONDHEIM)1 battleship: *Tirpitz* (F)1 heavy cruiser: *Admiral Hipper*

5 destroyers:

5th Destroyer Flotilla: Z-14 (F) *Friedrich Ihn*, Z-4 *Richard Beitzen*6th Destroyer Flotilla: Z-20 (F) *Karl Galster*, Z-10 *Hans Lody*, Z-6
Theodor Riedel

2 torpedo boats: T-7, T-15

2ND COMBAT GROUP (II KAMPFGRUPPE) (NARVIK)1 pocket battleship: *Lützow*1 heavy cruiser: *Admiral Scheer***8TH DESTROYER FLOTILLA**

5 destroyers: Z-28 (F), Z-24, Z-27, Z-29, Z-30

1 oiler: *Dithmarschen*

9 U-boats: U-88, U-251, U-255, U-334, U-355, U-376, U-456, U-457, U-703

5TH AIR FLEET, LUFTWAFFE

103 Ju 88 bombers

42 He 111 torpedo bombers

15 He 115 torpedo bombers (on floats)

30 Ju 87 dive-bombers

74 reconnaissance aircraft (including FW 200 Condors and BV 138s)

Sources: Flottenchef/B.d.S., "Operationsbefehl. Einsatz der Flottenstreitkräfte im Nordraum gegen einen PQ-Geleitzug," p. 6; translation of the final report on operation (Attack on PQ17) submitted by Admiral Carls (Gruppe Nord) on the 12.7.1942 "Final Report on PQ17," p. 234; Admiral Norway, B. Nr. Gkdos. 295 AI Chefs, 8 January 1942, "Die militärische Lage Norwegen," p. 30; Irving, *The Destruction of Convoy PQ.17*, p. 40.

attacking position between Jan Mayen and Bear Islands. Any other U-boats available later would be stationed off Bear Island. At the time the operation order was issued, there were only two destroyers in Trondheim (*Ihn* and *Lody*); four other destroyers were to be transferred from Germany to Norway within the next few days. There were also two or three torpedo boats in Trondheim to serve as escorts for the Trondheim group.¹⁴⁸ In the skerries area of Vestfjord and in other coastal waters, the Germans would deploy minesweepers and submarine chasers. The U-boats would follow a route through Andfjord. One former fishing steamer (*Schiff 31*) would be employed to escort the U-boats.¹⁴⁹

Upon issuance of a coded signal from Naval Group Command North, the fleet forces would sail out to their jumping-off points: 1st Combat Group from Trondheim to Gimsøystraumen-Vestfjord; 2nd Combat Group from Narvik to the northern entrance of Altafjord (the area of the skerries off Sørøya). Each group was to be at its jumping-off position and combat-ready within twenty-four hours after leaving its home base.¹⁵⁰ About five hours prior to the sortie of the combat groups, Air Leader Lofoten and Air Leader North (East) would conduct reconnaissance in the quadrant encompassed by latitude 68 degrees N and longitude

25 degrees E, up to two hundred nautical miles off the coast. Within the effective range of the Luftwaffe's fighter aircraft, close air support would be provided during all phases of the operation.¹⁵¹

Admiral Schniewind reiterated that the operational situation would require quick massing and concentrated employment of forces, leading to quick destruction of the enemy. The primary objective was destruction of the enemy's merchant ships; the convoy's screening ships were to be attacked only if they threatened the accomplishment of the operational objective. The main objective would be accomplished faster and more effectively if the U-boats and the Luftwaffe provided reliable reconnaissance. The most favorable conditions for the attack would be in the sea area east of Bear Island, between longitudes 20 degrees and 30 degrees E.¹⁵²

In his intent (*Absicht*), Admiral Schniewind directed that suppression of the strongest enemy force would be the responsibility of the 1st Combat Group. As soon as Convoy PQ17 was detected and located, the combat groups would take up their stations. Yet this should be carried out as late as possible, so as to reduce the time available for the enemy to react.¹⁵³ The enemy should be attacked on the bow sectors and from the east; the enemy was to be encircled only when his combat power was broken up.¹⁵⁴ If the enemy's close screen consisted of no more than two cruisers, the attack could be conducted from two directions from the outset; this would result in quicker destruction of the convoy.¹⁵⁵

Schniewind stressed that an engagement with superior enemy forces should be avoided. The operation should be executed quickly so as to be completed before an enemy force composed of battleships and carriers, and presumably located in the Faeroes-Iceland area, would have any opportunity to intervene. The operation could be canceled by the fleet commander or by order of Naval Group Command North.¹⁵⁶ If enemy heavy forces were encountered during the attack on the convoy, the action should continue only as long as the conditions for success were favorable.¹⁵⁷

On 2 June, Admiral Schmudt (Admiral Arctic) issued his operation order for redeployment of the pocket battleship group from Narvik to Altafjord. In addition to *Lütow*, *Admiral Scheer*, and the six destroyers, the Narvik combat group included the 6th S-boat Flotilla (seven S-boats) plus one supply ship.¹⁵⁸ Close air support of the Narvik group through its arrival in Altafjord would be provided by Luftwaffe fighters based in Bardufoss and Altengaard (near Altafjord). Air reconnaissance would be aimed primarily at detecting enemy carriers in the sea quadrant between latitude 67 degrees N and longitude 26 degrees E, up to two hundred nautical miles off the Norwegian coast. Higher-density reconnaissance would be conducted between latitudes 69 degrees and 79 degrees N and

longitudes 14 degrees and 19 degrees E. Air reconnaissance would be conducted during the entire time of the redeployment of the Narvik group.¹⁵⁹

On 11 June, Admiral Schmundt directed three U-boats, organized into the *Eisteufel* (“Ice Devil”) group, to take up patrol positions in the Denmark Strait to watch for the first sign of PQ17. These U-boats’ primary mission was detecting and then tracking the enemy convoy. Surface ships of destroyer size and larger could be attacked only when positively identified as hostile. In any uncertain situation, such as thick weather, all attacks on enemy warships were prohibited. The German ships were also directed not to attack enemy submarines, but otherwise “to act as though submarines they meet are hostile.”¹⁶⁰

The 5th Air Fleet issued an operational order for its forces on 14 June. In general, the Luftwaffe was responsible for air reconnaissance and the close support of naval forces. The subordinate commanders were directed to use all their available forces in attacking the PQ convoy.¹⁶¹ Upon executing the order for Operation RÖSSELSPRUNG, Luftwaffe aircraft would be employed in a three-hundred-nautical-mile-wide strip off the Norwegian coast. Specific area responsibilities were as follows: Air Leader North (West) from latitude 62 degrees N to a line crossing from the southern tip of the Lofoten area to the southwestern tip of Jan Mayen Island; Air Leader Lofoten from a line touching the southern tip of the Lofoten area to a line connecting North Cape to the southern tip of Spitsbergen; Air Leader North (East) from the line from North Cape to the southern tip of Spitsbergen to longitude 30 degrees E.¹⁶²

Air Leader North (West) was responsible for providing cover for the Trondheim group, while Air Leader Lofoten would provide cover for the Narvik group.¹⁶³ Fighter protection would be organized by the commander of fighters, Norway, in cooperation with the fleet commander at Trondheim, and Air Leader Lofoten in cooperation with the commander of cruisers.¹⁶⁴ After the PQ convoy crossed longitude 5 degrees E, Air Leader Lofoten would be responsible for the sea area to three hundred nautical miles off the Norwegian coast from a line connecting the southern tip of Lofoten and the southwestern tip of Jan Mayen to a line connecting the southern tip of Spitsbergen and North Cape. Air Leader North (West) would be responsible for the sea area west and southwest of the Lofoten–Jan Mayen line (see map 4).¹⁶⁵

In the meantime, discussion at a meeting between Admiral Raeder and Hitler on 6 June focused on operations in the Arctic. Hitler was informed about the pending operation in which *Tirpitz* was envisaged to participate. His agreement was lukewarm at best, but he did not reject the idea. Hitler was unclear about the form in which the operation would be conducted, but felt it should not be a risky undertaking for heavy ships in any case. After the meeting, Raeder directed

Admiral Krancke, OKM's liaison to the führer's headquarters, to explain to the führer once again that the SKL placed great importance on the operation, but that it would require sufficient Luftwaffe air cover; it could not be successful otherwise.¹⁶⁶

Hitler formally approved the plan for RÖSSELSPRUNG on 9 June. However, Raeder failed to respond forcefully to Hitler's remark that he now saw "great danger for heavy ships by the (enemy) aircraft carrier." This meant that the enemy carrier must be located prior to the attack on the convoy and eliminated as a threat to German heavy ships. The SKL was allowed to move the Trondheim group to Altafjord, but then had to await orders to attack. Such orders could come only following Hitler's approval. Raeder's failure to act energetically—to confront Hitler and get him to lift his restrictions on the employment of the heavy ships—was the key element in the ultimate failure of RÖSSELSPRUNG, notwithstanding the German forces' overall success against Convoy PQ17.¹⁶⁷

EXECUTION

Convoy PQ17, now consisting of thirty-six ships plus one rescue ship, sailed from Hvalfjord at 1600 on 27 June.¹⁶⁸ (See maps 4 and 5.) It proceeded at six knots. The next day the convoy encountered heavy fog and ice floes in the Denmark Strait. One merchant vessel ran aground and an oiler was so heavily damaged by ice that it had to return. Several other ships suffered slight damage from ice.¹⁶⁹


The Home Fleet's Battle Force sailed from Scapa Flow on 29 June. It followed a course northward so as to provide support to both the PQ17 and QP13 convoys.¹⁷⁰ Convoy PQ17 was fully formed at 1200 on 30 June when the long-range escort force (six destroyers, four corvettes, two auxiliary AA ships, and two submarines) under Commander Broome plus two rescue ships joined the convoy.¹⁷¹ The convoy was then some one hundred miles southwest of Jan Mayen Island.¹⁷² The next day, the Cruiser Covering Force sailed from Seydisfjord.¹⁷³

Operation E.S.'s dummy convoy sailed on 29 June. It carried out its movement eastward toward the Norwegian coast on 30 June and 1 July. However, the Germans' reconnaissance aircraft did not observe it, and hence they did not react at all.¹⁷⁴ The entire deception plan was a failure.

At 1640 on 30 June, Luftwaffe aircraft detected westbound Convoy QP13, consisting of thirty-nine ships and ten escorts, some two hundred nautical miles north of North Cape. However, because of heavy fog, the aircraft were unable to maintain contact.¹⁷⁵ At 1050 on 1 July, Convoy QP13 was sighted by *U-88* some 250 nm northeast of Jan Mayen, but was not attacked.¹⁷⁶

At 1615 on 1 July, *U-255* was the first to detect Convoy PQ17. The reported position of the convoy was some sixty nautical miles east of Jan Mayen. *U-255* reported that the convoy consisted of thirty-eight steamers and ten to twelve

**MAP 5
MOVEMENTS OF REMNANTS OF CONVOY PQ17, 4–17 JULY 1942**



destroyers and other escort vessels. The convoy’s speed was estimated at eight knots; B-Dienst later confirmed this.¹⁷⁷

At noon on 1 July, the British first noted German shadowing aircraft over Convoy PQ17. The weather was calm. All the Allied destroyers had been refueled. The convoy was then some two hundred miles west of Bear Island.¹⁷⁸ The PQ17 and QP13 convoys passed each other at latitude 73 degrees N, longitude

3 degrees E, at a distance of some ten miles, on the afternoon of 1 July.¹⁷⁹ The Cruiser Covering Force overtook Convoy PQ17 and sailed parallel to it some forty miles north, so as to avoid German detection.¹⁸⁰

In the meantime, Bletchley Park learned that the Luftwaffe had detected Convoy PQ17.¹⁸¹ The OIC began to decrypt special intelligence traffic, extending from noon on 1 July to noon on 2 July. The OIC learned that the Narvik group had arrived at Altafjord that morning. It also knew that *Tirpitz* had sortied from Trondheim the previous night. This was confirmed by a British aircraft. Yet *Tirpitz* was not actually located by air reconnaissance that day.¹⁸²

On 2 July, one fleet tanker and one destroyer left the convoy to join westbound Convoy QP13. On the evening of the same day, Convoy PQ17 ran into fog, which persisted until the forenoon of 3 July. Bad weather prevented Allied aircraft from reconnoitering the Norwegian ports for several days.¹⁸³

Despite the failure to detect the Allies' heavy surface ship group, Admiral Carls believed that the pending German operation, including the incorporation of heavy surface forces, was fully justified. Deployment of the German ships would start after the enemy PQ convoy crossed longitude 5 degrees E, anticipated by the evening of 2 July.¹⁸⁴ Hence, in the forenoon of 2 July, Naval Group Command North requested that 1./SKL issue "execute" orders for the operation. This request was approved, and signals were sent at 1257 on 2 July. At 1200, the Trondheim group received an order to be in three-hour readiness.¹⁸⁵ On the basis of reports from *U-266*, Admiral Arctic decided to keep four U-boats in continuous contact with the convoy. By 1400 on 2 July, a patrol line of six U-boats was established halfway between Jan Mayen and Bear Islands.¹⁸⁶

As planned, the Trondheim group sortied at 2000 on 2 July for Gimsøystraumen, and four hours later the Narvik group left for Altafjord.¹⁸⁷ *Lützw* ran aground in the Tjeldsund after it left Ofotfjord and did not take part in the operation thereafter. Likewise, three destroyers (*Lody*, *Riedel*, and *Galster*) of the Trondheim group touched ground in Gimsøystraumen and returned to Trondheim the next day.¹⁸⁸ The Germans believed (wrongly, as it turned out) that the enemy did not notice the deployment of the Trondheim and Narvik groups.¹⁸⁹

About midnight on 2/3 July, the U-boats and aircraft lost contact with Convoy PQ17.¹⁹⁰ At 0700 on 3 July, the convoy changed course to due east to pass Bear Island, entering the Barents Sea. The Admiralty reported that the ice boundary was farther north than had been anticipated. Hence, Admiral Hamilton suggested to Commander Broome that he change to a more northward course. Yet Broome did not entirely accept that suggestion, because he was more anxious to make progress eastward.¹⁹¹ He changed the convoy's course only slightly northward (to 021).¹⁹²

At 1600, Admiral Carls asked for a decision regarding RÖSSELSPRUNG. He shared his intent to deploy the *Tirpitz* group to Altafjord with Raeder and the SKL. Afterward, Admiral Krancke was directed to transmit Raeder's approval of Carls's intent to Hitler. At the same time he was instructed to explain to Hitler that movement of the *Tirpitz* group to Altafjord was only a preliminary redeployment, and did not constitute execution of Operation RÖSSELSPRUNG. In a message sent at 1720, Carls ordered Schniewind to carry out the redeployment.¹⁹³ By deploying the *Tirpitz* group to Altafjord, only a few hours would be lost if Hitler's approval for the larger operation came before midday on 4 July.¹⁹⁴

In the early morning of 3 July, the Admiralty informed CINC Home Fleet that a PBY-2 Catalina seaplane, backed by one B-24 Liberator heavy bomber if necessary, would patrol the area between latitude 71°30' N, longitude 19°10' E and latitude 71°55' N, longitude 23°40' E from 1530 on 3 July to 0300 on 5 July. This patrol was intended to cover the approaches from Altafjord to the convoy's route. Aircraft from Sullom Voe would conduct some additional searches westward of Lofoten. The plan also included having five Catalinas available at Arkhangelsk to provide searches for the convoy's passage after it crossed longitude 35 degrees E.¹⁹⁵

At 0130, PQ17 changed course to 091. It sailed into an area full of heavy ice growlers.¹⁹⁶ At 0415, Luftwaffe aircraft detected Convoy PQ17 some eighty nautical miles northeast of Bear Island, equidistant from that island and Spitsbergen.¹⁹⁷

At 0450, Convoy PQ17 suffered its first loss when a single enemy aircraft torpedoed the American merchantman *Christopher Newport* of seven thousand gross registered tons (in German documents, Bruttoregister-tonnen, or BRT).¹⁹⁸

During the day on 4 July, German aircraft maintained contact with PQ17, with only short interruptions caused by bad weather.¹⁹⁹ As of 1700, the Germans still did not have definite information regarding the presence of an enemy heavy covering group with—probably—one battleship, two to three cruisers, and three destroyers, reported as of 1352 as being northeast of Convoy PQ17 and sailing on a southeasterly course.²⁰⁰ At 1745, Admiral Carls reported to the SKL that the area north of latitude 71 degrees N was not continuously observed. The 1st and 2nd Combat Groups were in a three-hour readiness status at Altafjord. Admiral Carls believed that, because of the situation, Operation RÖSSELSPRUNG should be launched no later than 1700 on 5 July.²⁰¹

In the meantime, at about 1230, the Admiralty gave Hamilton permission to sail east of longitude 25 degrees E should the situation require it. However, the Admiralty had no intelligence that justified changing Tovey's plans. So Tovey qualified the Admiralty's message by directing Hamilton that "once the convoy is east of 25° E or earlier at your discretion, you are to leave the Barents Sea unless assured by Admiralty that *Tirpitz* cannot be met."²⁰² At 1520, Hamilton signaled that he would stay with the convoy until the enemy surface situation had been

clarified, but certainly no later than 1200 on 5 July.²⁰³ These messages sent by the Admiralty marked the beginning of increased interference by Admiral Pound in the decisions and actions of his subordinate commanders during the operation, including bypassing Admiral Tovey to send messages directly to Tovey's subordinate Hamilton.²⁰⁴

During the afternoon of 4 July, British aircraft reported that *Tirpitz* and *Admiral Hipper* had left Trondheim. Admiral Tovey's force was then some 180–200 miles northwest of Bear Island. That position was within the mutually supporting distance for aircraft from the carrier *Victorious* to respond in case of enemy attack on Convoy PQ17.²⁰⁵ At 1640, Hamilton ordered the convoy to change course from 090 to 045 to open distance from the enemy airfield at Banak to four hundred miles.²⁰⁶

That afternoon, Bletchley Park asserted that, although there was no verification via photographic reconnaissance, it was "tolerably certain" that *Admiral Scheer* and *Lützow* had been in Altafjord since 1400 on 3 July (when it became known they had left Trondheim). By the afternoon of 4 July, all four German heavy ships might have been at sea heading toward the convoy.²⁰⁷

At 1809, Admiral Hamilton replied to the Admiralty that he intended to withdraw to the westward of Convoy PQ17 at about 2200 on 4 July, upon completing the refueling of his destroyers.²⁰⁸ Another message from the Admiralty, received about 1839, informed Hamilton that further information might be available shortly, and directed him to remain with the convoy "pending further instruction."²⁰⁹ At that time, Hamilton's force was some ten to twenty miles ahead of the convoy.²¹⁰ Some 350 miles away from the Cruiser Covering Force, the Battle Fleet was in a hovering position southwest of Spitsbergen.²¹¹

Over the course of the day, the weather north of Bear Island steadily improved; however, the cloud ceiling was low (300–500 meters), making it easier for the enemy aircraft to attack the convoy.²¹² The first attack with a few bombers came at 1930, but scored no hits. Luftwaffe aircraft carried out a series of more deadly attacks during the evening of 4 July. At about 2020, approximately twenty-three Heinkel (He) 111 torpedo bombers attacked the convoy. They torpedoed three ships; two had to be sunk, while one was damaged but was able to continue the voyage. Four enemy planes were shot down.²¹³ Convoy PQ17 came out of the heavy Luftwaffe air attacks remarkably well—its antiair defense proved very effective.²¹⁴

At 2325, Bletchley Park sent the Admiralty an intercepted message: "Most Secret Source (Ultra): 1. Germans located westbound convoy from Russia on North Cape meridian P.M. yesterday July 2nd and have since lost in fog. 2. Eastbound convoy is expected to be sighted shortly and will be attacked in accordance with plan; 3. Warships are expected to move from Trondheim and Narvik (? 36) hours

before convoy reaches meridian 5 deg E. Main attack to be concentrated during passage between 15th and 30th meridian; 4. U-boats already on station close to Arctic. A two repeat A two.” (A2 was the level of reliability of this part of the report.)²¹⁵

Decision to Scatter the Convoy

In the evening on 4 July, Admiral Pound personally went to Bletchley Park to get a close look at the stream of decrypted messages.²¹⁶ The OIC received good news at about 1900: that the code “break-in” had been accomplished, so the decrypts for the twenty-four hours that had ended at noon that day could be expected very shortly.²¹⁷ At 1918, Bletchley sent a message to Tovey that the German “CINC of the Fleet in *Tirpitz* arrived to Alta(fjord) 0900/4. Destroyers and torpedo boats complete with fuel at once. (Admiral) *Scheer* was already present at Alta(fjord) [so were *Hipper* and *Lützow*]. At 1623/3 two U-boats were informed their main task was to shadow convoy.”²¹⁸ Commander Norman Denning of the OIC wanted to add to this message regarding *Tirpitz*’s arrival in Altafjord that morning and the directive to the destroyers and torpedo boats to refuel that the evidence indicated that *Tirpitz* was still at Altafjord. However, after some discussion with Admiral Pound, Denning’s added text was deleted from the message before it was sent at 1918.²¹⁹

It was not known how long refueling the destroyers would take. Although expected, receipt of the information about the German ships’ arrival in Altafjord further reinforced the view that a move against the convoy, in accordance with the original plan, was imminent, if not already under way.²²⁰ But Denning was not convinced the German ships had sailed out of Altafjord. He was supported in his view by his superior, Jock Clayton, the deputy director of the Intelligence Centre. (Clayton was a rear admiral on the retired list, but had been brought back onto active service as a captain.) Further support came from Harry Hinsley, the German traffic analyst at Bletchley. For Denning, the absence of any signal from Naval Group Command North to *Tirpitz* was an indicator that the heavy ships were still at Altafjord. The comparison was to *Tirpitz*’s foray against Convoy PQ12 in March. There also were no reports from the British submarines. However, Pound gave Denning no opportunity to explain his reasons; he instead asked direct questions, and expected to receive short, factual answers. Among several other questions, Pound asked Denning whether he *knew* that *Tirpitz* was not out to sea.²²¹ Denning responded that, on the basis of the experience of the German sortie against Convoy PQ12, the Germans would not risk *Tirpitz* if it might be in danger from the “Home Fleet, particularly its aircraft carriers.”²²² He also tried to reassure Pound that “if *Tirpitz* has put out to sea you can be sure that we should have known very shortly afterward within four to six hours.”²²³

Denning also pointed to several “negative” indicators that *Tirpitz* was not at sea. For example, Bletchley Park knew that the Germans had sighted CS 1 but had reported erroneously that it included a battleship. That would indicate a larger force, and therefore the Germans would decide not to send *Tirpitz* to sea. Bletchley had found no evidence the Germans had detected the heavy covering force. Another piece of evidence that *Tirpitz* was not out to sea was that the Germans did not warn their U-boats to stay clear of the convoy. Neither had the German wireless telegraphy (W/T) traffic since noon shown any extraordinary activity. The British and Russian submarines off North Cape had reported no sightings. Collectively, all these “negatives” were a good indication that *Tirpitz* was still at Altafjord.²²⁴

Nonetheless, to Admiral Pound’s question, “Can you assure me that *Tirpitz* is still at anchor in Altafjord?” Denning responded, “No. I shall have information only after the *Tirpitz* has left.”²²⁵ On this question, in fact, hung the entire future of Convoy PQ17. Yet Denning was not in a position to give the desired assurance.²²⁶ Pound then asked, “Can you at least tell me whether *Tirpitz* is ready to go to sea?” To this Denning responded, “I can at least say that she will not leave in the next few hours. If she were on the point of sailing, the destroyer escort would have preceded her and made an antisubmarine sweep. They have not been reported by our submarines patrolling the Altafjord.”²²⁷

A stream of decrypts began to reach the OIC at 2000. However, they provided no new “positive” information bearing on Admiral Pound’s question. By then, Clayton was due to attend a staff meeting at 2030 convened by Pound.²²⁸ (Coincidentally, that meeting was held just when Convoy PQ17 was repelling enemy air attacks.)²²⁹ At 2031, a decrypt timed 1130 on 4 July was received at the OIC. It confirmed that *Tirpitz* had not left Altafjord as of noon on 4 July. This signal was included in the summarized ULTRA message timed 2110. It had informed the U-boats that no German surface ships were then in their operating area, and that the British heavy ships, if encountered, should be their main targets. However, this information did not change the situation, because an assumption had already been made that the destroyers and torpedo boats accompanying *Tirpitz* would not have completed refueling until about noon on 4 July.²³⁰

At the 2030 meeting, Admiral Pound and his staff opined that the enemy attack could occur any time after 0200 on 5 July; if that happened, Admiral Hamilton’s cruisers would be destroyed. They also (falsely) believed that the more widely merchant ships were dispersed, the better their chance of escape; once the alarm was given, the enemy would wish to spend no more time than necessary in the vicinity to pick off some ships. However, an eight-knot convoy might require a lot of time to disperse over a large area. The air and U-boat attacks had already started and were certain to continue.²³¹

When Clayton returned to the OIC at about 2130, he informed his staff of Admiral Pound's view that the convoy had to be dispersed because *Tirpitz* had sailed and could reach the convoy by 0200 on 5 July. However, his staff disagreed with that assessment. They persuaded Clayton to go back to Admiral Pound and make the case that Admiral Tovey should be advised instead that *Tirpitz* had *not* sailed, and *would not* sail until the Germans obtained information on the strength of the Allied heavy covering force.²³² The naval section at Bletchley Park agreed with Denning's assessment that the weight of negative evidence suggested that *Tirpitz* was still at Altafjord. However, Clayton was unable to convince Admiral Pound, who had already made up his mind.²³³

The fate of Convoy PQ17 was decided by three short messages sent by the Admiralty. At 2111 on 4 July, Pound sent a signal to Hamilton (repeated to Tovey): "Cruiser force withdraw to westward at high speed." Pound sent another message directly to Broome (repeated to Hamilton) at 2123. It read: "Owing to threat from surface ships convoy is to disperse and proceed to Russian ports." This was followed by another at 2136: "My 2123/4th. Convoy is to scatter."²³⁴

At the time Admiral Pound made his decision, Convoy PQ17 was some 130 miles north-northeast of Bear Island; from North Cape, the convoy was almost due north (bearing 008) at a distance of about 240 miles.²³⁵ The Allied ships had some 450 miles before they would reach Novaya Zemlya. The Battle Force was then some 230 miles from the convoy and four hundred miles from the *Tirpitz* group. In other words, it was too far away from both the convoy and the enemy heavy ships.²³⁶

At 2215, Commander Broome passed the signal to scatter to the convoy commodore. The convoy was then at 75°55' N, 28°52' E. Broome, with his destroyers (other ships of the A/S screen remained with the convoy), steamed away to join Admiral Hamilton's force.²³⁷ Commodore Dowding sent a message to Broome: "Many thanks. Goodbye and good hunting"; Broome replied, "It's a grim business leaving you here."²³⁸

At 2230, Hamilton turned his force onto a westerly course, passing southward of the convoy—that is, between the convoy and the probable direction from which the enemy would approach. The visibility was extremely variable, with numerous fog patches. The Cruiser Covering Force, with the destroyers, withdrew westward at twenty-five knots.²³⁹

Both Hamilton and Broome were affected less by the content of Pound's three messages than by the quick succession in which they were sent. The cumulative effect of the three signals—especially since the last signal had a more urgent priority marking than the middle one—was to imply that danger was pressing on them.²⁴⁰ They believed an attack by *Tirpitz* was imminent. Commander Broome

never forgave himself for obeying the order to scatter the convoy.²⁴¹ (The third message's order to "scatter" the convoy was actually merely a technical amendment of the term "disperse" that had been used in the second signal; but Hamilton and Broome could not have known this. Later, the official Royal Navy history would explain the two terms in a footnote. "Disperse" meant ships should break formation and proceed at a convenient speed toward their destination, remaining for some hours in close proximity to each other. By contrast, the term "scatter" meant they should begin sailing on different bearings, in accordance with a scheme laid down in the convoy instructions.)²⁴²

Officially, the decision to scatter the convoy was later explained thus: Convoy PQ17 still had thirty ships intact. The combined threat of air and U-boat attacks was considerable. The convoy had reached a position beyond the effective range of the Battle Fleet, even if that force was put at risk to engage *Tirpitz* and the enemy's other heavy ships. In the Admiralty's view, if the convoy continued on its way, it would be harassed by enemy U-boats and aircraft. Any enemy heavy ships would most likely be encountered east of North Cape. The enemy would need no more than ten hours to reach the convoy, and could return to safety in less than that time. Hence, the decision was made to scatter the convoy, with the intention of minimizing the greater losses anticipated from a surface attack compared with those inflicted by U-boats and aircraft. But as it turned out, the convoy lost twenty ships after the signal to scatter was given, and only twelve ships reached Russian ports.²⁴³ This reasoning was faulty because of the proven effectiveness of Luftwaffe bombers and Kriegsmarine U-boats in attacking individual merchant ships. The threat of enemy aircraft to PQ17 could be neutralized only by having superior airpower in the area—unlikely to be provided by the Soviets.

This was only the second time an Allied convoy had received the order to scatter. In the first instance, Convoy HX84 (bound from Halifax to Liverpool) received such an order on 5 November 1940 when *Admiral Scheer* was about to attack it. However, there were significant differences: the area in which HX84's thirty-seven ships could disperse was much larger, and neither German aircraft nor U-boats were attacking the ships. The earlier convoy was also protected by only a single escort ship (*Jarvis Bay*). *Admiral Scheer* subsequently sank five ships, including the escort.²⁴⁴

The order to scatter Convoy PQ17 was given in glaring contravention of the "Atlantic Convoy Instructions and Orders" issued by Admiral Tovey in March 1942. They stipulated that in the face of enemy heavy ships, convoy escorts should remain in the vicinity to track and, if circumstances allowed, even to attack enemy surface ships. Tovey in his report noted that Convoy PQ17 had already completed more than half its voyage (when the decision to scatter was

issued, PQ17 was some eight hundred miles away from Arkhangelsk) yet had lost only three ships. In his view, the decision to scatter was premature—and disastrous.²⁴⁵

In a personal letter to Admiral Sir Percy Noble of the Western Approaches Command on 12 July 1942, Admiral Tovey placed responsibility for the destruction of Convoy PQ17 squarely on the Admiralty for “scattering of convoy unnecessarily early and . . . the appalling conditions of panic suggested by the signals they made.” He also sent an officer “down to the Admiralty to make clear to them what the reactions at sea were to the information passed out and to those three signals in particular.” Tovey also told the Admiralty on the phone that he considered it “wrong for the Admiralty to issue definite orders to the convoy and escort.” The Admiralty should “give them information by all means and, if they wish make a recommendation, but leave it to the fellow on the spot to decide the action to be taken.” The Admiralty’s response was that it “consider[ed] it putting an unfair responsibility on to an officer of Commander’s rank.”²⁴⁶ However, this did not absolve Admiral Pound from bypassing Admirals Tovey and Hamilton. Tovey also wrote that Hamilton was entirely responsible for the lack of action because he “failed completely to appreciate the altered situation due to his imagining that there was still a strong likelihood of his being brought to action by the *Tirpitz*.” Hamilton also believed that the best course of action would have entailed the destroyer escort operating together with his three destroyers as part of the screen for CS 1. Tovey stated in his letter, “I deeply regret this mistake of his [Hamilton’s] as there was not the slightest doubt that if the destroyers had returned to the convoy within a reasonable time they could have helped materially in its defence and in rescuing survivors.”²⁴⁷ Yet while the presence of destroyers obviously would have strengthened Convoy PQ17’s AA defenses, it was unlikely they would have reduced significantly the number of merchant ships sunk.

At 0115 on 5 July, Admiral Hamilton sent the following message to Commodore Dowding, addressing both the convoy’s merchant ships and the remaining escorts:

I know you will all be feeling as distressed as I am at having to leave that fine collection of ships to find their own way to harbor. The enemy under the cover of his shore-based aircraft has succeeded in concentrating a far superior force in this area. We were therefore ordered to withdraw. We are all sorry that the good work of the close escort could not be completed. I hope we shall all have a chance of settling this score with them soon.²⁴⁸

Hamilton was very much concerned about the effect the escort force’s apparent desertion of the merchant ships might have on morale. If he had known that the Admiralty had no more information regarding the enemy heavy units than

he himself possessed, he would have remained in a covering position until the convoy had widely dispersed.²⁴⁹ It was later claimed that Admiral Pound would not have made his fateful decision except for the presence of two U.S. cruisers; the U.S. ships were operating under British command for the first time, and he did not want to lose them.²⁵⁰

On 5 July, the weather in the operating area was variable, between four-tenths and fully overcast, with fog banks. Atmospheric disturbances interrupted radio traffic sporadically. Convoy PQ17 was continuously shadowed by Luftwaffe aircraft.²⁵¹

At 0238, Admiral Tovey received an ULTRA message that read: "1. It is not repeat not known if German heavy forces have sailed from Altenfjord [Altafjord], but they are unlikely to have done so before 1200/4th. 2. It appears that Germans may be in some confusion whether a battleship is in company with CS1. Germans do not repeat not appear to be aware of position of C-in-C Home Fleet."²⁵²

At 0322, the Admiralty sent a message to Admiral Miles in Moscow informing him that, on the basis of air reconnaissance,

enemy heavy units have moved from Trondheim to Narvik and believed to be using a base in Alta fjord area from which to operate against PQ17. British forces other than close escort for PQ17 have been withdrawn west of Bear Island and convoy ordered to scatter in approximate position 76 degs North 28 degs East at 2200B/4 to proceed to North Russia ports. British submarines are being moved from previous patrol positions to area between latitudes 73 degs and 72 degs N and longitudes 23 degs and 32 degs E. Catalina aircraft temporarily based in Arkhangelsk will carry out reconnaissance between positions 74 degs N 28 degs E and 73 degs N 32 degs E.

The Admiralty requested that Miles try to arrange with Soviet authorities for regular air reconnaissance of the Altafjord area, air attacks against enemy heavy units in harbor or at sea, and the bombing of enemy airfields, "which is of added importance with convoy scattered."²⁵³

At 1625, an ULTRA message was sent to Rear Admiral Richard Bevan, the senior British naval officer in north Russia, advising him to anticipate that "most likely time of enemy surface attack is now tonight 5/6 July or early hours of tomorrow 6th July." The "enemy may strike on 065 degs direction from North Cape. Submarine and Catalina aircraft might sight enemy. Request striking force may be at short notice from 2000 today 5th July."²⁵⁴

In the meantime, German air reconnaissance reported at 0655 the presence of the enemy force, composed of the aircraft carrier *Ark Royal*, one (possible) battleship, four heavy cruisers, eight destroyers, and two torpedo boats, proceeding on a westerly course at fifteen knots.²⁵⁵ This force was some five hundred miles away from the convoy, which had already scattered. For the Germans, this confirmed the accuracy of the aircraft report concerning the enemy cruiser force received

the previous afternoon (on 4 July) to the effect that no enemy heavy units were anywhere near the convoy. It was this report that enabled Admiral Raeder to get Hitler's final permission for the *Tirpitz* foray.²⁵⁶

During the forenoon of 5 July, the operational situation for the Germans was mixed. On the positive side, the convoy had been dissolved, probably because of the aerial and U-boat attacks. Most of the ships were still to be found within an area approximately sixty nautical miles on a side; however, the convoy's composition could not be precisely determined, because of the large size of this dispersal area.²⁵⁷ The Germans mistakenly believed that the enemy cruiser group had moved westward because it had lost a heavy cruiser. The heavy covering force was located well to the west of Bear Island, and was making full use of fog banks to disguise its location and makeup. The distance from this group to the convoy was 450 nm, and to North Cape also about 450 nm. This distance was sufficient that there would be minimal danger to the German forces if they approached the convoy unobserved and got the engagement over quickly. If the enemy heavy covering forces were spotted during the German forces' approach to the convoy, there would be sufficient time to turn away.²⁵⁸ In sum, the Allied heavy covering force was too far away to pose a threat to the 1st and 2nd Combat Groups moving to attack Convoy PQ17.²⁵⁹

General conditions for an attack by the German heavy ships on 5 July were less favorable than they had been on the previous day. The convoy was farther away—the area of combat would be eastward of North Cape. And during the withdrawal phase, the distance to the enemy heavy forces would be steadily reduced. But the risk was still bearable.²⁶⁰

Admiral Carls believed that (1) if any enemy battleships close to the convoy were damaged by U-boats and aircraft by 1200, he would be justified in carrying out the operation regardless of the presence of an enemy carrier; and (2) the carrier aircraft would have less of an impact if the convoy was attacked north of latitude 72 degrees N. The latest time for carrying out RÖSSELSPRUNG was 1300 on 5 July; otherwise, the attack would take place too close to the Russian coast.²⁶¹ Carls essentially requested that Admiral Raeder issue the code word for executing the operation, with no option to cancel those orders later (*Rückrufbefehle*). However, Raeder refused to do so, because of Hitler's precondition that the enemy carrier must be taken out of the equation first. This was communicated to Admiral Carls at 0915. Thus, everything depended on the quality of the air reconnaissance. The enemy was unwilling to operate its heavy covering group within the effective range of the Luftwaffe torpedo bombers and heavy bombers. According to Admiral Carls, the enemy carrier group had already been at sea on 1 July, and he doubted it could continue to operate for too long. It was possible

that the heavy covering group would be withdrawn to refuel and take up a waiting position. Therefore he did not believe the enemy carrier group would pose a threat to the German heavy ships.²⁶²

Hitler finally gave permission for the operation during the forenoon of 5 July. This was the latest favorable time for the attack on the convoy, before it entered Russian coastal waters. The code word for the execution was issued at 1137. At the same time, Naval Group Command North took over operational control of the U-boats operating in Arctic waters.²⁶³ Raeder communicated to Carls that the conditions for the execution of RÖSSELSPRUNG did exist unless the enemy carrier was detected or the German combat groups were detected by enemy aircraft. The führer's approval for the operation was transmitted to Admiral Carls at 1140. Forces that had been in one-hour combat readiness after 0900 were directed at 1052 to be in immediate readiness to sortie. At 1141, the combat groups received the requisite code word from Naval Group Command North. At 1230, Naval Group Command North took over control of the entire operation. It directed Admiral Schniewind to sortie by North Cape, passing Breisund and escorted by minesweepers.²⁶⁴

At 1700, the Soviet submarine *K21* reported (inaccurately) the presence of *Tirpitz*, *Admiral Scheer*, and eight destroyers at latitude 71°25' N, longitude 23°40' E, or some forty-five miles southwest of North Cape, sailing on a northeasterly course. The same submarine claimed to have hit *Tirpitz* with two torpedoes.²⁶⁵ However, British intelligence believed that, in view of subsequent sightings, these claims seemed "improbable."²⁶⁶ Despite the Soviet claims, *Tirpitz* had not in fact been hit; nevertheless, *K21*'s sighting report was of great value to Admiral Tovey.²⁶⁷

At 1816, Allied reconnaissance aircraft reported eleven ships at latitude 71°31' N, longitude 27°10' E on a northeasterly course at ten knots. The British submarine *Unshaken* (P54) shifted its original station farther east, and at 2029 it reported *Tirpitz* and *Admiral Hipper*, escorted by at least six destroyers, in latitude 71°30' N, longitude 28°40' E, steering course 060 at twenty-two knots.²⁶⁸

At 1700, the Germans received an important message, an interception of an Allied submarine sighting report of two battleships at latitude 71°25' N, longitude 23°40' E, sailing a northeasterly course. Along with the intercepted 1816 message, these reports left no doubt that the enemy had detected the German combat groups.²⁶⁹ Also, starting at 1945 the enemy systematically began to disrupt radio communications on all channels, making the transmission of orders difficult.²⁷⁰ A report from B-Dienst at 2006 indicated that enemy reconnaissance aircraft had sighted German combat groups in the North Cape area at 1700 and 1816.²⁷¹

RÖSSELSPRUNG Is Canceled

Naval Group Command North concluded at 2000 on 5 July that the enemy heavy group was in generally the same position as on 4 July. The enemy heavy cruisers were detected at 1745 on 5 July sailing a westerly course. This group was observed until 2110, when it disappeared in fog. The Germans assumed that the enemy heavy covering group would have to reduce distance from the German combat groups to about two hundred nautical miles to attack, but not less than that, because of the danger of attacks from Luftwaffe aircraft based in northern Norway. This meant that RÖSSELSPRUNG could only be carried out within the time window from 2000 on 5 July to 0200 next morning. Although the attack on PQ17 might have beneficial psychological effects for the Germans, its chances of success in attacking a now widely dispersed convoy were small. Hence, it was not worth justifying the risk of engaging an enemy carrier force.²⁷² Carls believed that once the enemy had sighted the German combat groups, the entire operation had to be aborted. A clash with the enemy heavy covering group must be avoided in any case; the possibility that the enemy carrier might cut off the combat groups' withdrawal was unacceptable.²⁷³

Raeder and Carls conferred by phone at 2035 and 2103. They agreed that, given where the enemy heavy covering group had been sighted, the enemy would be able to bring it to bear against the German combat groups during their return to base.²⁷⁴ On that basis, Raeder made the decision to abandon the entire operation; at 2132, Admiral Carls sent a message to Admiral Schniewind aborting RÖSSELSPRUNG.²⁷⁵ Schniewind was directed to sail with *Tirpitz*, *Admiral Scheer*, *Admiral Hipper*, and five destroyers for North Cape, and afterward through the "Inner Leads" (the channel between Norway's mainland and the outer island chain) to Vestfjord. Operational control of the U-boats was turned over to Admiral Arctic.²⁷⁶ *Lützow*, two destroyers, and the torpedo boats were directed to Trondheim, and were put under the control of Admiral Arctic.²⁷⁷

Raeder's decision was based on Hitler's view that Germany could not afford to put its few remaining heavy ships at risk. Because the Allied air reconnaissance had prematurely detected the German combat groups, it was highly possible that the *Tirpitz* group would be attacked by enemy carrier aircraft. Another factor in Raeder's decision was that the convoy had already widely dispersed, and the risk that would be entailed in employing the fleet forces would not be commensurate with the remaining mission elements—i.e., finishing off the enemy convoy would be better left to the U-boats and aircraft.²⁷⁸

At 2330 on 6 July, the Admiralty sent a message to Convoy PQ17's escorts stating that an "attack by enemy surface forces is probable in next few hours. Your primary duty is to avoid destruction to enable you to return to scene of attack and pick up survivors after enemy have retired."²⁷⁹ Shortly afterward, the Admiralty

radioed that, in case of attack by the enemy's surface ships, when it was clear "that enemy heavy ships have retired to westward, request you will arrange for a search for survivors by all available means including my Catalinas in north Russia not required for searching and shadowing enemy."²⁸⁰

At 1946, the Admiralty sent a message to the PQ17 escort that the "risk of attack by enemy surface vessels is now greatly lessened." The escort vessels were directed to return to pick up survivors.²⁸¹ Those unable to do so but in contact with several merchantmen should form them into a group and escort them to Yokanga "unless otherwise directed by S.B.N.O. North Russia [Rear Admiral Bevan]." Escorts short on fuel should proceed to Arkhangelsk, where they would be refueled. The two auxiliary AA ships should not run the risk of taking part in rescue operations, but instead should proceed without delay to Arkhangelsk.²⁸²

At 1040 on 6 July, Admiral Hamilton's force joined the Battle Fleet. The weather in the area was unfavorable for air reconnaissance. Tovey felt that nothing was to be gained by steering northeastward. Hence, Hamilton's cruisers and eight destroyers were detached to Seydisfjord at 1230 on 6 July. Shortly afterward, the Battle Fleet turned southward. All the ships reached their home bases on 8 July.²⁸³

In the meantime, the Germans continued their efforts to detect and attack what was left of Convoy PQ17. On the morning of 6 July, the convoy's remnants were dispersed east of longitude 40 degrees E and over a 300-by-60 km (186 × 37 miles) area. The U-boats at that point had no contact with the remnants of PQ17. They were directed instead by Admiral Arctic to search for enemy ships in the area between longitudes 42 degrees and 48 degrees E. Two U-boats returned to Narvik during the night of 6/7 July; two other boats were under way to Kirkenes, where they would arrive on the evening of 6 July.²⁸⁴

On 7 July, Commodore Dowding (who survived the sinking of his ship by a U-boat on 5 July) organized a convoy of five merchant ships plus one rescue ship at Matochkin Shar (Strait), Novaya Zemlya, to head for Arkhangelsk. They were accompanied by two auxiliary AA ships, three corvettes, three minesweepers, and three trawlers, all remnants of Convoy PQ17's escort force. They formed up and sailed out on the evening of 7 July.²⁸⁵

Admiral Bevan's plan was to send one British corvette to reinforce the escorts and bring the ships to Arkhangelsk by transiting close to the east coast of Novaya Zemlya, south of Kolguyev Island, and around Cape Kanin. Bevan also informed the Admiralty that "C. in C. White Sea [commander of the White Sea Flotilla] is requesting C. in C. Northern Fleet that additional cover may be provided by 3 Soviet Union destroyers. Catalina leaves for reconnaissance 1000 B 8th. 4 more Flying boats approaching Svyatoy Nos."²⁸⁶

The ensuing voyage was full of accidents. The ships encountered heavy fog and ran into a solid ice barrier south of Byelushya Bay, Novaya Zemlya (the British

had not known about the ice, but the Germans did). This forced several ships to head for Yokanga anchorage. Admiral Bevan was completely unaware that the remnants of PQ17 had left Matochkin Shar until some ships reported entering Yokanga. This was because the Soviet Northern Fleet failed to inform Bevan about the ships' departure. The Soviets also provided no information to Bevan about ice conditions.²⁸⁷

During the night of 8/9 July, German aircraft reconnoitered the area west of Novaya Zemlya, the Kanin Peninsula, other western waterways, the piers at Yokanga, the Murmansk–Leningrad railway, and airfields in the Byelomorsk area (Onega Bay).²⁸⁸ Because of heavy fog, they did not fly north of latitude 72 degrees N on 8 or 9 July. However, at 1151 on 9 July German aircraft reported the presence of a group of five enemy merchant vessels. Attacks by thirty-eight aircraft in two groups from 1st Group, 30th Air Wing (I./KG 30) at Banak followed. The Germans claimed that one seven-thousand-ton vessel and another of eight thousand tons were damaged. Because of fog at Banak upon the flyers' return, I./KG 30 was diverted to Petsamo, while II./KG 30 reached Banak.²⁸⁹

During the night of 9/10 July, some forty German bombers carried out a high-level attack against these ships for four hours, ending at 0230. The Luftwaffe received information on the convoy from U-boats operating in the area. Two Allied merchant ships were sunk, while four enemy aircraft were believed to be shot down. The surviving ships reached Arkhangelsk on 11 July.²⁹⁰ Also on 10 July, German aircraft attacked docking facilities and fuel tanks at Rost and airfields in the Murmansk area, and suppressed coastal batteries on the Rybachy Peninsula.²⁹¹

On 16 July, Commodore Dowding returned with three corvettes to organize another convoy from the remnants of PQ17 and bring it to Arkhangelsk. He arrived after a stormy voyage to Byelushya Bay on 19 July, where five merchant ships were at anchor plus two British trawlers and one Soviet icebreaker. Another merchant ship joined the convoy at Moller Bay, Novaya Zemlya, on the morning of 21 July. The convoy's defenses were reinforced by one auxiliary AA ship, one corvette, two minesweepers, and two Soviet destroyers on 22 July. Two days later, the convoy arrived in Arkhangelsk having suffered no losses.²⁹²

To sum up: between 2 and 10 July, the 5th Air Fleet employed 130 Ju 88s, forty-three He 111s (twenty aborted), and twenty-nine He 115s (six aborted) in attacking Convoy PQ17. In many cases, U-boats were able to sink heavily damaged ships initially hit by the Luftwaffe. The 5th Air Fleet stopped its attacks on Convoy PQ17 only when no further ships were sighted.²⁹³ German losses in these attacks were only five aircraft: one BV 138, two He 111s, one He 115, and one FW 200.²⁹⁴ In the aftermath of their attacks, the Germans grossly exaggerated their successes. Largely from B-Dienst radio intercepts, they claimed that between 4

and 11 July their aircraft and U-boats had sunk thirty-seven ships of 231,090 (actually 244,028) combined BRT.²⁹⁵ They claimed positive information that U-boats had sunk sixteen ships of 107,947 combined BRT, while the 5th Air Fleet had sunk twenty-one ships of 136,081 combined BRT.²⁹⁶

The true losses were heavy enough without exaggeration. The attacks by the Luftwaffe and the U-boats resulted in the destruction of twenty-two merchant ships (fourteen American) of Convoy PQ17's thirty-four that tried to get through (or 65 percent).²⁹⁷ The ships sunk carried 430 tanks, 210 aircraft, and 3,350 motor vehicles, plus 99,316 tons of other cargo.²⁹⁸

The almost total destruction of Convoy PQ17 had significant military, psychological, and political effects. In purely military terms, the Germans accomplished a major tactical objective. The decision of the British chiefs of staff on 13 July to recommend that convoys "should not be sent to Northern Russia in present circumstances" had a negative operational effect. The Royal Navy suffered a major loss of confidence regarding its ability to protect convoys to northern Russia.²⁹⁹ Churchill sent a telegram to Stalin on 17 July informing him that further convoys to northern Russia would be postponed. This, in turn, had major political and psychological consequences. Stalin became intensely suspicious about Churchill's true motives. He believed that Britain might seek a separate peace with Nazi Germany.³⁰⁰

CONCLUSION

The decision to send badly needed supplies to the Soviet Union was made purely for political and strategic reasons. Admirals Pound and Tovey were opposed to that decision. Their main concern seems to have been the lack of adequate forces to support such an effort, and the possibility of large losses in naval ships and personnel. (The Soviets, for whatever reasons, were either unable or unwilling to provide much support in defense of the Allied convoys.) The British admirals' concerns were well founded. Not only was the convoy route to northern Russia long, but it was also open to deadly attacks by the Luftwaffe and U-boats. The problem was compounded by the prevalence of bad weather and ice conditions, and the long daylight hours in summer. Yet in retrospect, the decision to help the Soviet Union was sound, and fully justified strategically. It played a critical role in the Soviet ability to withstand the German offensive on the eastern front in 1941-42.

The Allied operational command organization seemed fairly simple and straightforward. However, for some reason the Home Fleet's area of responsibility was not formally defined. The Home Fleet was the single largest British naval command available for keeping the Kriegsmarine in check. However, its forces were never adequate, because of competing demands from other theaters. In

fact, it was forced repeatedly to provide ships to other fleets. The Home Fleet was primarily composed of heavy surface ships and carriers; it lacked an adequate number of smaller ships suitable for convoying duties. That was why Western Approaches Command provided most of the A/S escorts for Allied convoys to northern Russia. The U.S. Navy also reinforced the Home Fleet by sending its newly formed TF 39.

The German operational command organization in Norway and the adjacent area was highly unsatisfactory. No multiservice command was established in that theater throughout the entire war. This meant that each service prepared and executed its own operational plans. An effective employment of naval forces and the Luftwaffe was almost entirely dependent on close cooperation among mid- and low-level commanders. For the Kriegsmarine, the problem was not made much easier by having the Fleet Command forces within the area of responsibility of Naval Group Command North. In addition, the headquarters of Naval Group Command North was located too far away from its subordinate commands in Norway. To make things worse, the Kriegsmarine had a penchant for making numerous changes, in both titles and the subordination relationships among the various forces. This was especially the case with the Fleet Command. Another major problem was the insufficient freedom of action allowed to subordinate naval commanders, the result of too-close supervision by higher commanders. This was especially the case in the relationship between Naval Group Command North and Admiral Arctic.

Both the Allies and the Germans, in preparing plans for and employing their respective forces in combat, were greatly dependent on having well-organized and effective intelligence apparatuses. British naval intelligence proved to be much more effective because of the superb abilities of the decoders at Bletchley Park, especially at decrypting German naval messages. Despite widely held beliefs to the contrary, this task was never easy, because the German codes were difficult to crack; there were many times when Bletchley and the OIC were in the dark about German intentions, plans, and movements. This was especially the case for a large part of 1942, during which Bletchley Park was unable to read coded messages to U-boats.

German Naval Intelligence was well organized and quite effective at providing naval commanders with fairly accurate and timely intelligence on the Allied OOB, convoys, and the losses inflicted by U-boats and the Luftwaffe. B-Dienst was especially effective at reading messages regarding the composition, departure dates, and routes of Allied convoys. This proved invaluable to the Kriegsmarine, and its U-boat arm in particular.

The Allies developed their plans for convoying to northern Russia over time. Although some changes in plans were made for each convoy, the pattern was

consistent. The fact was that the geography and ice conditions in the Barents Sea gave planners little or no choice in selecting routes and defense forces for each convoy. Admirals Pound and Tovey were strongly opposed to sending convoys during the summer months, when they were highly vulnerable to attacks by enemy aircraft and U-boats; yet they had to execute the decisions made by the British and U.S. governments. Purely political reasons dominated Allied planning for convoys to northern Russia.

The German plans for Operation RÖSSELSPRUNG were the result of numerous studies prepared by all the major naval commands in Norway concerning the possibility of employing heavy surface ships and U-boats in the Arctic. As usual in the German military, the operational-level command issued an operational instruction, while subordinate commanders issued operation orders. However, the lack of joint-force commanders resulted in the lack of a single plan for the employment of heavy surface ships, U-boats, and Luftwaffe aircraft.

The operational instruction issued by Naval Group Command North on 4 June envisaged employing both the Trondheim and Narvik groups of surface ships. A major flaw in the plan was the unnecessarily complicated command relationship under which the Trondheim group was subordinate to Naval Group Command North, while the Narvik group was under Admiral Arctic. Only during the second phase of the operation were both groups under the operational command of Naval Group Command North.

A major prerequisite for the success of RÖSSELSPRUNG was comprehensive air reconnaissance of the potential operating area, followed by the weakening of the enemy heavy covering force. This would have meant the 5th Air Fleet's acquiescence to the request by Naval Group Command North to assign more aircraft for reconnaissance—but the 5th Air Fleet simply refused to do so.

But perhaps the single greatest problem was Hitler's unwillingness to risk any heavy surface ship to attack enemy convoys. This risk aversion, in essence, precluded any effective employment of the German heavy surface ships based in Norway, most notably to prevent the Allies from running convoys to northern Russia. The German ships retained value only to the extent that they inhibited a possible enemy amphibious landing and invasion.

Convoy PQ17 went ahead as planned. Although detected and tracked by German U-boats and aircraft, it suffered almost no losses until the evening of 4 July. Admiral Pound's decision to "scatter" the convoy at that point was perhaps understandable, but cannot be considered sound. No convoy should be left to proceed independently without its direct and distant covers. If the convoy was faced with destruction by a superior force, it should have been directed to withdraw temporarily to a safer distance or return to a safe port. Admiral Pound also violated some of the basic principles of sound naval command and control by

directly interfering with and bypassing Admirals Tovey and Hamilton. Tovey's criticism of the Admiralty was fully justified. The higher commander should normally leave the subordinate commander sufficient freedom of action for him to exercise the initiative in the course of an operation.

Positioning of the Home Fleet's Battle Fleet in relation to Convoy PQ17 on 5 July was clearly unsound: it remained too far away to provide distant cover and support to the convoy, and also too far away to engage the enemy heavy surface group effectively.

Admiral Raeder's decision to cancel RÖSSELSPRUNG on the evening of 5 July was unavoidable because there was little to gain from using heavy surface ships to try to destroy the widely dispersed ships of (the former) Convoy PQ17. The time to employ those heavy surface ships was prior to 5 July. Yet doing so was clearly impossible, given the strictness of Hitler's conditions for employing *Tirpitz* and its ilk. Yet *Tirpitz's* presence in Altafjord and the ever-present possibility of its attacking PQ17 were the most important factors in the fateful decision to scatter Convoy PQ17, with the subsequent horrendous losses of Allied merchant ships from Luftwaffe and U-boat attacks.

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BOOK REVIEWS

PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES

Maritime Security Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea: Prospects and Challenges, by Kamal-Deen Ali. Leiden, Neth.: Brill, 2015. 372 pages.

In *Maritime Security Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea*, the legal adviser to the Ghana Navy, Commander Dr. Kamal-Deen Ali, argues that the world should pay attention to the maritime domain of West and Central Africa. The same argument can be made about his book, as Ali not only provides the most in-depth analysis of maritime security prospects and challenges in the Gulf of Guinea to date but offers conceptual frameworks for maritime security that are applicable around the world. Furthermore, the lessons that can be extracted from the Gulf of Guinea experience—both the problems of insecurity and the efforts to address them—can serve as helpful guidance for approaching similar challenges elsewhere. Notwithstanding the relative absence of credible literature on maritime security in West and Central Africa, this book exhibits the rigor of first-rate legal scholarship combined with the intimate knowledge gleaned from an insider's perspective, making it undoubtedly a seminal work on both the Gulf of Guinea specifically and maritime security in general.

Ali begins, rather helpfully, by exploring the meaning of several terms. First and foremost, he seeks to provide a working definition of the “Gulf of Guinea,” as the phrase has been used for years without any real consistency to describe the maritime region of West and Central Africa. Ultimately, the author expands the range of states included in this important region. At a minimum, Ali includes the twenty-five member states of the Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa, all of which are members of either the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) or the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). But he notes that Rwanda, which recently rejoined ECCAS, should not be included, as its strategic interests do not align with the maritime domain of West and Central Africa. On the other hand, he argues that Mauritania, which left ECOWAS in 2000 and is a member of the Arab Maghreb Union, should be included, as it is an important partner for maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea. This argument constitutes the first of many

novel contributions the book makes to the context-specific dynamics of maritime security in West and Central Africa.

Beyond defining the Gulf of Guinea, Ali makes a convincing case for the region's global strategic significance. The economic contribution of the region to the global energy, mineral, and agriculture markets makes the national security concerns of states in West and Central Africa concerns for the entire world. Even after the decline in the price of oil, Ali's case remains unimpeachable, as his arguments for the region's geostrategic relevance go far beyond oft-repeated statements about Nigerian oil in particular. With details about the region's contribution to the global supply of cotton, cacao, and fish, one need never mention oil to recognize the economic significance of the Gulf of Guinea. These arguments lend further weight to the examples and analyses of the main portions of the book, but the conceptual features of the book are perhaps its most significant academic feature.

In reviewing the literature on maritime security, Ali exposes some significant gaps, in both coverage of issues and existing conceptual frameworks. He begins his analysis by asking a few important questions: What is security? What is maritime security? And for whom is maritime security? In dissecting some of the existing works on maritime security, he comes to advocate a "human security" approach, but compiles elements from a number of different sources. He thus settles on maritime security as being a composite of societal security, environmental security, food security, and economic security. One could argue, therefore, that this

approach aligns maritime security more closely with development than defense.

Conceptually, Ali charts new territory on several fronts. First, his analysis of the theoretical underpinnings of security lead him to the conclusion that, although the literature is largely silent in doing so, the theoretical approaches to "security" in general can be applied to the maritime realm as well. He writes, "It is argued that since the ocean environment serves the political, economic, and strategic objectives of States, the dynamics that surround the pursuit of all interstate interests will similarly be reflected in the maritime realm." This notion of the activities, interests, and challenges of the maritime domain being interrelated with the broader national interests suggests that a state's maritime territory is a microcosm of the state itself. Thus maritime security cannot be severed from national interests—security, development, governance, etc.—and is, indeed, a fundamental component of them.

Ali's second departure from the literature involves taking an evolutionary approach to maritime security. By examining how maritime security has developed from being a matter merely of transportation security into a field posing integrated, multisectoral challenges today, he shows how the concept of maritime security has changed and broadened over time. Furthermore, he contends that states' maritime concerns are context specific rather than universal. Partly for this reason, he also asserts that there is no real consensus on the elements of maritime security, allowing for a wide conception of what is included. He seems to suggest that the best approach in the literature is in the 2008 UN secretary-general's Oceans

and the Law of the Sea report, which lists (section V[B]) the main maritime security threats as “piracy and armed robbery against ships”; “terrorist acts involving shipping, offshore installations and other maritime interests”; “[i]llicit trafficking in arms and weapons of mass destruction”; “illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances”; “[s]muggling and trafficking of persons by sea”; “[i]llegal, unreported and unregulated fishing”; and “intentional and unlawful damage to the marine environment.” He later assesses this set of threats, along with others, in the specific context of the Gulf of Guinea.

The third main departure is Ali’s novel framework for conceiving of maritime security. His framework, elaborated throughout the book, has three elements: (1) identifying the maritime security threat path; (2) applying the threat path to geopolitical and geostrategic features; and (3) implementing a three-layer, three-indicator approach. The maritime security threat path is a bit more than merely a list of generic or even specific maritime security threats. It examines both the activity and the effects of any given threat. This approach allows for the contextualization of the threats versus geopolitical or strategic priorities. The third element of the framework then concerns the approach to those threats, involving three layers—national capacity, regional cooperation, and global support—paired with three progress indicators—improved maritime governance, adequate legal frameworks, and an inclusive maritime security concept. While the book elaborates this conceptual approach in the Gulf of Guinea context, it is applicable globally. Further academic

work is therefore warranted, applying Ali’s conceptual framework to other contexts besides the Gulf of Guinea.

As significant as this book’s theoretical contribution may be to the academic literature on maritime security in general, the book’s contribution to the discourse on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea is impossible to express adequately. As a Ghanaian naval officer and legal adviser, Ali is able to delve into the subject matter in a way that few could. The majority of the book is dedicated to the region-specific analysis, and this is truly the heart of the work.

Given the resource constraints of West and Central Africa as well as the transnational nature of many of the threats, it is not surprising that cooperation is seen as the overarching answer to addressing maritime insecurity in the region. But the architecture of maritime security cooperation is still very much under construction. Ali meticulously dissects the challenges, internal and external, that plague the progress of effectively using cooperation as a means of countering threats. His personal familiarity with the processes afoot takes the chapters on both regional approaches and international partnerships beyond the capacity of normal academic scholarship. Indeed, one could not look up most of the information contained in these portions, further adding to the tremendous value of this volume.

Similarly, the legal analysis in this book would be difficult for any scholar outside the region to replicate. Ali’s access to national laws and regional legal frameworks as well as his detailed understanding of international maritime law affords him the opportunity to provide insight into both the legal developments and

challenges in the Gulf of Guinea. Indeed, the book may be viewed as a compendium of the existing legal regimes in the Gulf of Guinea. This legal landscape is important to understand as efforts proceed to combat maritime insecurity and enhance maritime governance through cooperation. The section on emerging jurisdictional issues and legal complexities is particularly significant, as it provides a helpful warning of problems that are likely to arise as the cooperative architecture continues to develop.

Naturally, one of the challenges of writing an analysis of real-world issues is that they do not remain constant. If one were to attempt to identify a criticism of the book, it is that it is already out of date on a few specific issues, although one hardly can blame that on the author. For example, the section on private security companies or private maritime security companies, if written today, likely would include a number of new issues as well as new accountability mechanisms. But the analysis and lessons that can be gleaned remain sound and important, even if additional facts exist that could enhance the discussion.

The book expressly arrives at five main conclusions: (1) Current processes for maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea do not address adequately the multiple security threats in the region. (2) Poor governance contributes significantly to maritime security threats in the Gulf of Guinea, but the current cooperative framework does not address the land-sea nexus of maritime security concerns. (3) The relevant legal framework for maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea is poorly developed, and this undermines the effectiveness of maritime security enforcement and regional and

international cooperation. (4) Prevailing regional cooperative processes lack coordination and have suffered several setbacks. (5) International support for maritime security cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea is inadequate, uncoordinated, and in some cases driven by national interests that affect its overall effectiveness.

These conclusions, as well as the analysis that led to them, serve as an invaluable aid in the ongoing effort to secure the maritime domain of West and Central Africa. This book is a must-read for maritime security scholars and anyone—from policy makers to industry leaders to students—working on maritime matters in the Gulf of Guinea.

IAN M. RALBY



Marie von Clausewitz: The Woman behind the Making of On War, by Vanya Eftimova Bellinger. Oxford Univ. Press, 2015. 312 pages. \$29.95.

One is tempted to ask why naval officers should be interested in reading a biography of the wife of the famous Prussian philosopher of war Carl von Clausewitz. In answer we might go to the words of Marie von Clausewitz herself, from her letter of dedication to Carl's unfinished masterpiece *On War*: "Readers will be rightly surprised that a woman should dare to write a preface for such a work as this. My friends will need no explanation. . . . Those who knew of our happy marriage and knew that we shared *everything*, not only joy and pain but also every occupation, every concern of daily life, will realize that a task of this kind could not occupy my beloved husband without at the same time becoming

thoroughly familiar to me” (preface to Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret [Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1986], p. 65 [emphasis in original]). In other words, to understand better *On War*’s hidden treasures, it helps to understand the formidable woman behind *On War*. We historians have this quaint notion that understanding the context for things helps one better understand the things themselves. For naval professionals, especially at the Naval War College, which owes so much to the Prusso-German intellectual tradition, to understand better the genesis of the greatest philosophy of war is no small thing. (Readers interested in evidence for this idea should consult Ronald H. Spector, *Professors of War: The Naval War College and the Development of the Naval Profession* [Honolulu, HI: Univ. Press of the Pacific, 2005; originally published by the Naval War College Press, 1977], pp. 14–17).

Additionally, Bellinger’s biography is the result of a fruitful collaboration with Donald Stoker, who has published a companion biography of Marie’s more-famous husband. Together they mined a treasure trove of recently uncovered correspondence between Carl and Marie held in Germany by the (now) famous couple’s descendants.

Marie von Clausewitz is more than just a biography of a woman married to an officer and military theorist; it covers the spectrum of relevant social, intellectual, military, political, and feminist history. It is truly a synthesis of all these forms, much like Peter Paret’s *Clausewitz and the State* (1976), which has held the field on the details of Clausewitz’s life and

times until now. As advertised, though, the book is centered on the life of his companion and lifelong love, Countess Marie von Brühl. With her formidable language skills, Bellinger does exceptional work in bringing the history, and even the prehistory, of the Brühl family to life.

Many surprises await the reader regarding Marie’s background and influence. For example, she was no “ordinary” Prussian countess, but rather a daughter of an imperial count of the Holy Roman Empire. As an imperial aristocrat, she frequented only the very highest social circles in Europe. Her friends and acquaintances were queens, princesses, and various types of grand duchesses—all themselves politically influential women, in an age when few women wielded such influence.

Marie’s elevated background raises the book’s first major question, which Bellinger poses in this way (p. 47): “How and why did a countess raised in the highest social circles ever allow herself to consider marrying a man with conspicuously less social standing?” Carl’s family had only a dubious claim to the “von”—which denoted nobility—in front of his name, he being a son of (at best) a very minor provincial official. Bellinger answers the question in this way (p. 8), and it tells one much about both Carl and Marie: “Indeed, from the very beginning of their romance, the couple determinedly defied the parochial attitudes of the time and strived to build a relationship if not equal in status, then at least equal in nature. . . . [I]t was Carl’s promise to treat her as an independent and free individual that made this formidable countess decide upon marriage with a man of lesser social standing.”

In other words, Carl and Marie managed to rise above the social norms of their times. Until now we have had only Carl's perspective, as it were—the one we read in *On War*. By telling the story of the collaboration between the two, Bellinger's book makes clear that the real political animal in the family was Marie, not Carl. Her influence can be judged by the fact that after Carl resigned his commission in the Prussian army and left for Russia to join its army—without the Prussian king's written permission—the king still acknowledged Marie, and even nodded to her at court functions. As for Carl, the king never forgave him completely; he did allow him to rejoin the Prussian army later, but never gave him a position of real influence. Again, this misfortune is our good fortune, since it probably allowed Carl the extra time, beyond that required for his minimal duties at the *Kriegsakademie* in Berlin, to write and rewrite his masterpiece.

One also learns that Marie was very active in supporting her husband's career, and developed friendships and corresponded independently of Carl with the great figures of the day, especially General August Neithardt von Gneisenau. Marie's mother, interestingly, was from the British middle class (a story in itself), and she taught Marie to speak English exceptionally well for a German aristocrat. This probably further cemented her relationship with Gneisenau, who also spoke English fluently. The two were so close that Marie, an accomplished painter, later executed one of the more famous existing portraits of Gneisenau.

Bellinger herself is married to a military service member. Because of that experience, as she writes about this military marriage she has an exceptional eye for the sorts of details that some academics

might miss. Her text is full of interesting insights and observations on the extraordinary couple, but also includes details that even sailors will recognize, such as the fact that Marie and Carl numbered all their letters when he was in the field so they could tell if some were missing. (The reviewer used this very technique with his spouse during his many cruises in the U.S. Navy.)

Readers looking for new insights on the Prussian perspective from inside the Prussian court during the Napoleonic Wars will be well rewarded, as will those interested in how little or how much Marie played a role in the genesis and writing of *On War*, the subject that occupies roughly the last quarter of the book. Addressing Marie's pivotal role in getting Carl's work published, Bellinger leaves little doubt that without Marie there might have been no *On War* for us to read today, nor any of Carl's other works. Ms. Bellinger's work reminds us that a human life is rarely a solo accomplishment, lived apart and distinct from other human beings. Rather, a relationship such as that of Marie and Carl von Clausewitz is an enterprise lived in collaboration with others of our kind—or in Marie's case, not her kind—especially those we love and who love us. Highly recommended for all audiences.

JOHN T. KUEHN



A Higher Standard: Leadership Strategies from America's First Female Four-Star General, by Ann Dunwoody. Boston: Da Capo, 2015. 288 pages. \$25.99 (Kindle \$14.99).

In this book, General Ann Dunwoody, USA (Ret.), traces her illustrious career from initial entry into the Women's

Army Corps in 1975 as a second lieutenant through her promotion to four-star general to her retirement in 2012 as the commander of the Army Materiel Command (AMC). Dunwoody came from an army family: her father was a veteran of both Korea and Vietnam and retired as a brigadier general; her brother was a West Point graduate; and a sister was one of the Army's first female helicopter pilots. Throughout her remarkable career, Ann Dunwoody blazed a trail with a lengthy list of "firsts":

- First female field-grade officer in the 82nd Airborne Division
- First female to command a battalion in the 82nd Airborne Division
- First female to command the Combined Arms Support Command
- First female in the U.S. military to achieve the rank of four-star general

Dunwoody's promotion to four-star general made front-page news across the country and brought instant recognition outside military circles. Yet Dunwoody remained well-grounded, with strong support from her family. She relates stories about her mother and father and the influence each played in her career. She also tells about her husband, Craig, and how important he was to her success. These stories really enable the reader to relate to her on a personal level. Dunwoody writes (p. 72): "Throughout my life I've met plenty of superheroes, but the strongest and most effective among them were the ones who were simply human and knew they weren't perfect."

The title of the book, *A Higher Standard*, is important to Dunwoody. "Those words became the foundation of my leadership philosophy and a central part of how I tried to live my life." Dunwoody explains that she consistently worked hard to maintain a higher standard for

both herself and whatever organization she led. After speaking to executives at Coca-Cola, Dunwoody related, "After managing nearly sixty-nine thousand employees, one thing is clear to me: there is a higher standard that provides the foundation upon which every effective leadership journey is built." We all could learn from her mantra.

This is truly a book about leadership, with each chapter showcasing important lessons and strategies applicable to leaders in any organization. Dunwoody highlights that "[t]his is not a manual about how to become a general, nor will I reveal a secret recipe for becoming a great leader." Her sincerity and passion for the Army team are evident. Chapter 2, "Wendell Would Be Proud—'Never Walk by a Mistake'"—chronicles her relationship, as a new second lieutenant platoon leader, with her platoon sergeant, Sergeant First Class Wendell Bowen. Dunwoody writes (p. 38): "Sergeant Bowen shared wisdom on many levels that guided me through every step of my military career." In this chapter, she discusses the important leadership lessons that young officers and new leaders in any company must learn. Dunwoody is a good storyteller, and the lessons she shares are easy for the reader to relate to. The leadership lessons are summarized in the postscript: "Leadership Strategies from an Army Life."

Another chapter, "Leader of Leaders—'Build Your Bench,'" enables Dunwoody to chronicle her work to promote and build the succession plan at AMC prior to her retirement. She relates (p. 223): "One of the most important jobs a senior leader has is to develop leaders or to 'build the bench.'" This is a critical lesson that many leaders never learn—to the detriment of the

organizations they lead. Countless leaders are often too involved in promoting themselves, and see developing subordinates as a sign of weakness.

The final chapter, “Afterthoughts—‘My Way to Continue the Conversation . . .,’” was initially confusing. It did not flow with the rest of the book; it seemed disjointed; it seemed to be made up of random thoughts about a variety of topics. I eventually realized that it was Dunwoody’s way of discussing and underscoring contemporary issues she believes are important.

During my almost thirty-year career in the U.S. Army, I was privileged to serve in the 10th Mountain Division with Ann Dunwoody. Her technical and tactical skills, along with her keen insight and caring attitude, made her a positive role model. It is fitting that she ends every talk with the phrase “In the end, we’re all just soldiers, but that’s the highest thing you could claim to be.” Dunwoody’s legacy in the Army and the larger U.S. military will impact generations of young Americans for years to come. This book showcases her exceptional talents as an army officer and leader. It is a must-read for leaders at all levels, in both the military and other organizations.

THOMAS J. GIBBONS



Lawfare: Law as a Weapon of War, by Orde F. Kittrie. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2016. 504 pages. \$29.95 (Kindle \$14.41).

In *Lawfare: Law as a Weapon of War*, legal scholar Orde F. Kittrie analyzes the increasing effectiveness of the use of law to achieve objectives that not long ago might have been achievable only using

force. In one of the first major works in English on the practice of lawfare, Kittrie has written an important book for lawyers, policy makers, and military strategists. Successful strategic performance requires an appreciation of the role of politics in war, and because law is an intensely political matter it is an integral part of the strategic operating environment. Kittrie’s highly readable *Lawfare* enhances our understanding of the growing strategic potential of law.

This book is at once a history of lawfare, a collection of representative case studies, and a resource for other researchers. The foreword by former CIA director R. James Woolsey Jr. is itself an interesting read, setting up Kittrie’s analysis with a description of the international legal arena as a sheriff-less “Wild West” exploited by various governments and nonstate actors. The author also describes his own foray into lawfare as a professor at Arizona State University, where his analysis of Iran’s dependence on external gasoline suppliers eventually led to the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Accountability and Divestment Act of 2010. Kittrie’s practical bent is evident throughout *Lawfare*, and he offers numerous suggestions for incorporating lawfare into U.S. national security strategy.

Among the strengths of *Lawfare* are the concepts provided in the first chapter that prepare the reader for the case studies that follow. Kittrie begins with a historical overview, tracing lawfare back to the seventeenth century, when Hugo Grotius used legal arguments to bolster Dutch maritime power. Kittrie’s section on the literature of lawfare provides a unique summary of the leading works in the field. Kittrie breaks down the practice of lawfare into two

categories: instrumental lawfare—the use of legal methods to achieve results typically sought from kinetic weapons; and compliance leverage disparity—the seeking of advantages over an opponent more disposed to comply with the law. Kittrie attributes the rise of lawfare to three factors: the increased number and reach of international laws and tribunals, the rise of nongovernmental organizations focused on the law of armed conflict, and the advance of globalization and economic interdependence.

Kittrie follows up his macro-level conceptual analysis with detailed case studies at the micro level that exemplify the prevalent trends in lawfare. His examples move from the battlefields of the Middle East through the courtrooms of New York to the doctrinal manuals of the Chinese military. The range of examples, all linked by the common theme of lawfare's increasing effectiveness, underscores how widespread and multifaceted the phenomenon has become.

Kittrie devotes four of his eight chapters to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which he describes (p. 197) as “the closest thing the world has to a lawfare laboratory.” For example, Israel's experience with maritime law in 2011 demonstrates how “offensive” lawfare can achieve a military objective without using force. In May 2010, Israeli forces intercepted a flotilla of ships from Turkey attempting to violate a blockade of the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip, killing nine people. A UN fact-finding mission subsequently criticized Israel for its handling of the incident. Faced with a similar flotilla preparing to leave Greece in June 2011, Israeli lawyers used legal measures to stop the ships from leaving port. Those measures included threatening legal

action against companies providing the ships with essential services such as maritime insurance. In letters to these companies, Israeli lawyers referenced the U.S. Supreme Court case of *Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project* (561 U.S. 1 [2010], 130 S.Ct. 2705) to argue that providing services to the flotilla was illegal because it supported terrorism. The letters proved persuasive. By rendering the ships unable to secure the necessary services to gain permission to leave their Greek ports, Israel succeeded in stopping the 2011 flotilla without firing a shot.

Kittrie devotes a chapter to China's innovative approach to lawfare. He explains how China systematically wages lawfare across the strategic operating environment, including maritime, aviation, and space lawfare, as well as lawfare in cyberspace. For example, Kittrie analyzes how China is using maritime law to justify denying access to the South China Sea for international navigation. China has developed a concept of lawfare it calls *falu zhan*, or “legal warfare,” as part of its military doctrine. Kittrie's case studies show how China incorporates lawfare into its strategy through a comprehensive approach coordinated across the Chinese government.

Unlike China, the United States has no similar comprehensive lawfare strategy. Kittrie describes how parts of the U.S. government nevertheless have employed legal techniques successfully to achieve strategic results, such as the U.S. Treasury's use of international financial laws against Iran. Some of the most effective U.S. lawfare has been the work of private-sector attorneys rather than U.S. government actions. Kittrie provides several examples of litigation that used the Antiterrorism Act

of 1990. A significant case was *Boim v. Holy Land Foundation*, in which attorneys working on behalf of the family of a U.S. victim of terrorism secured a judgment against Islamic fund-raising organizations, drying up a significant source of material support to Hamas.

Kittrie concludes with a compelling argument for a more creative and innovative integration of lawfare into U.S. strategy. As he observes (p. 96), the 2015 National Security Strategy identifies security challenges that are decentralized, transcend state borders, involve nonstate actors, and “cannot be neutralized using only deterrence or the United States’ traditional kinetic toolbox.” *Lawfare* underscores why strategists must have a practical understanding of the entire spectrum of factors affecting the strategic operating environment—informational, cultural, political, economic, social, and legal.

Kittrie understands that it is unrealistic to expect strategists and policy makers to be legal experts as well, so his conclusions include an analysis of the sources of “lawfare power” and recommendations for leveraging the skills of the U.S. legal community. To show how private-sector expertise can inform potential military uses of lawfare, Kittrie describes how Special Operations Command Pacific reached out to the University of Pennsylvania’s law school for research on foreign criminal laws that could be used to detain and prosecute foreign fighters supporting the Islamic State. In Kittrie’s assessment (p. 32), if the United States properly leverages its extensive legal expertise to support a national lawfare strategy, the “U.S. advantage in sophisticated legal weapons has the potential to be even greater than its advantage in sophisticated lethal weapons.”

Lawfare reminds us that lethal force is only one of many factors affecting outcomes in war. Kittrie points the way toward how legal factors can be used to achieve practical effects. Military officers and policy makers who read this book will be rewarded with a better understanding of the legal dynamics that are exerting an increasingly powerful influence on the legitimate use of violence.

KEVIN ROUSSEAU



Playing War: Wargaming and U.S. Navy Preparations for World War II, by John M. Lillard. Lincoln: Potomac Books, Univ. of Nebraska Press, 2016. 224 pages. \$39.95 (Kindle \$26.37).

With the Navy’s recent efforts to reinvigorate war gaming, there has been renewed interest in the interwar gaming conducted at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. In the *Naval War College Review, Proceedings*, and other maritime journals, war-gaming experts and enthusiasts alike have tried to characterize the nature and value of the Navy’s war games played between 1919 and 1941. John Lillard’s *Playing War: Wargaming and U.S. Navy Preparations for World War II* is the latest contribution to this resurgence. Seeking to provide a comprehensive study of the interwar games conducted at the College, Lillard intends to inform our understanding of the “navy’s transition” during this period. *Playing War* asserts (p. 8) that the Newport games were “transformational” and played a “central role . . . in preparing the navy for war.” For the most part, the author contributes to the history of that era, but does so with a work that would have benefited

from additional editing and more attention to detail in its historiography.

This book succeeds with its analysis of how the Newport war games evolved to reflect the emergence of new technologies and operational thinking for the Navy. Lillard organizes his analysis into three phases: early (1919–27); middle (1928–34); and late (1935–41). He focuses on one or two College classes within each of the phases, concentrating on those of significant figures such as Chester Nimitz, Thomas Hart, Harold Stark, Kelly Turner, Bull Halsey, and Robert Ghormley. The author is at his best when he analyzes the actual games played and describes the relevant insights recorded by the student-players or the gaming faculty, or both. For example, his section on Tactical Game 94 of 1923 describes how that game demonstrated the importance of reconnaissance and detection of the enemy's forces first. In his chapter on the middle phase, Lillard explains how the games explored the innovations of air and undersea warfare, pointing out that the players learned more about aviation than they did submarines. Lillard concedes that the College games were not innovative in themselves; instead he reinforces the idea that "they were a common playing field, a shared experience" for the men who would fight the next war at sea.

Playing War is a useful complement to Edward Miller's *War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991) and Albert Nofi's *To Train the Fleet for War: The U.S. Navy Fleet Problems, 1923–1940* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2010). Lillard's examination of the 1933 Van Auken report is particularly effective at showing the College's contributions to the evolution

of War Plan ORANGE and the fleet problems. Requested by College President Admiral Harris Laning and written by Captain Wilbur R. Van Auken, head of the newly created Research Department, the report summarized lessons learned from all the Blue-Orange games played between 1927 and 1933. The author notes that Van Auken's analysis of the Trans Pacific problem presaged the logistic challenges of the war and the advent of the four hundred destroyer escorts that emerged during the war. As War Plan ORANGE matured in the 1930s, so too did the war gaming, marked by the construction of Pringle Hall and its famously square-tiled gaming floor. Lillard succinctly chronicles Newport's war-gaming transformation throughout the book's narrative.

Readers familiar with the scholarship that examines the U.S. Navy between the two world wars will be distracted by Lillard's efforts to set his thesis apart from the other literature. *Playing War* looks and feels most similar to Michael Vlahos's *The Blue Sword: The Naval War College and the American Mission, 1919–1941* (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1980). Both of these works are short in length, and have appendices and tables that lay out the war games played by each class. Lillard's book focuses more directly on the games and the chronology of the College than Vlahos's monograph does. However, in attempting to separate his research from *The Blue Sword*, Lillard states (p. 10) that Vlahos "did not use wargame records from the Naval War College archives," which is not true. Making matters more confusing, Lillard continues to refer to Vlahos's text throughout the book. Later, Lillard asserts (p. 12) that John Hattendorf, coauthor of *Sailors and*

Scholars: The Centennial History of the U.S. Naval War College (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1984), is “a former professor of naval history” whose history of the College lacks “critical analysis.” At the time of publication, Hattendorf was and remains the Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History at the Naval War College, and is still recognized as the preeminent scholar on the history of the U.S. Navy at Newport.

In addition to these two notable errors, *Playing War* still reads like a dissertation in need of another round of editing. Chapter introductions and descriptions of the students are repeated several times and add little to the analysis presented. With the main body of the book ending at 137 pages, this work leaves the reader with the impression that there is still more to explore about the relationship between the interwar war games and how the U.S. Navy fought during the Second World War. While this imperfect volume has some merit, the definitive history of the Naval War College’s interwar war games remains to be written.

JON SCOTT LOGEL



Social Science Goes to War: The Human Terrain System in Iraq and Afghanistan, ed. Montgomery McFate and Janice H. Laurence. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2015. 320 pages. \$39.95 (Kindle \$22.99).

The twenty-first-century security environment has been characterized by numerous cross-cultural battle spaces, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. Army initiated the human terrain team (HTT) because it needed to address the impact of the human cultural dimension in the combat

operational environment. The HTT’s mission was to conduct research (in the social sciences and anthropology) and to advise military commanders about the unique cultural aspects of the local/regional population. In eleven chapters, McFate and Laurence have compiled an invaluable collection of experiences from the scientists involved. They afford us the opportunity to accompany these scientists on their journeys, as they share their perspectives with the military. We learn the value of embedding social scientists with military units and how important their knowledge and expertise are for military leaders to achieve an understanding of today’s complex, culturally diverse operational environments. In this way, social scientists can help military leaders make more-informed, and therefore better, decisions.

General David Petraeus (Ret.) states in the foreword that the “key terrain in irregular warfare is the human terrain.” He highlights the role social scientists played in shaping the cultural framework of the battle space and how they contributed to military leaders’ knowledge to ensure mission success. General Petraeus posits the notion that the military indeed may require even greater sociocultural knowledge to conduct future military operations.

Today’s military leaders are well trained in tactics, techniques, and procedures; however, the twenty-first-century battle space presents inherent difficulties for military leaders. One of their principal deficiencies is a lack of cross-cultural competence (C³). C³ is the ability to communicate effectively and appropriately with people of other cultures. As the number of multinational coalition military operations

continues to increase, military leaders will need to achieve C³ to be effective.

Military leaders must be prepared to adapt to a wide range of cultural, social, and political challenges in the operational environment. Education in cultural competency, cultural intelligence, and social intelligence plays a pivotal role in a military leader's ability to lead, build relationships based on trust, and develop unity of effort and command within complex, culturally diverse environments. A leader's ability to engage and communicate effectively requires that he or she understand the unique social and behavioral qualities of the local population. This capability is a requirement for successful negotiation and conflict management. Lack of it can mean the difference between success and failure.

This volume is a tribute to the knowledge and expertise of social scientists who served as members of HTTs. Their stories serve as evidence of their unique experiences, insights, and contributions toward achieving cultural understanding in combat zones in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan. It is worth noting that HTTs offered more than just cultural expertise. Rather, they made a considerable investment in developing relationships with local people and provided their military units with critical assessments about operating in and among members' host nations. This information was critical for military decision makers and those involved in counterinsurgency campaigns, so it was critical for the social scientists as soon as possible to build rapport and credibility with the local population, as well as with the military units to which they were assigned. Laurence and McFate invite us to share their experiences as we join each scientist on that journey.

For example, James Dorough-Lewis's chapter, "Investing in Uncertainty," provides a clear illustration of some of the challenges the social scientists faced in the HTTs. We learn about the need to delineate between social scientists and members of the Intelligence Community. This distinction is critical for social scientists as they attempt to establish relationships based on trust and credibility. Their research task is to assess and understand the cultural nuances and the cultural environment that may impact the overall military operation; in contrast, the intelligence analyst probes the environment for meaningful information that will be used to understand the operational environment. The social scientist seeks to understand each individual's cultural perspective and relationships among people living in the environment. Social scientists and anthropologists in the HTTs work with the local people to build relationships based on trust and to find ways to help local people continue with their daily lives. In one such example (p. 196), the Army had built a hospital to meet all the security requirements. However, Sunni women needing medical care preferred to travel to a hospital an hour away—rather than travel the path on which their husbands, sons, and brothers had lost their lives. Social scientists were able to communicate with these women and understand their cultural perspective, which they shared with the military team. This incident highlights the need to understand the culture, beliefs, and values of the local people when operating in a culturally diverse region. Social scientists provide a cultural lens toward the local people, examining and explaining how they perceive what is happening in their unique cultural point of view.

This book provides the perspectives and experiences of social scientists who, embedded with military teams, shared their knowledge and cultural expertise to help military leaders make informed decisions within culturally diverse environments. This volume will prove to be an invaluable resource for military leaders, as it highlights the importance and impact of understanding the role of cultural diversity in military operations. McFate and Laurence have performed a service to the military by providing a valuable resource for all military leaders to guide them in future military operations. In addition, this book applauds those scientists who were daring enough to join in the human terrain effort and share their experiences with us. The ability to achieve cultural competence must be viewed as a war-fighting imperative and as a prerequisite for all future military leaders. This volume is informative and inspiring—a must-read for all those interested in the cultural and human dimensions of multinational warfare. The detailed bibliography provides recommendations for further reading to enhance the reader's knowledge of this topic.

YVONNE R. MASAKOWSKI



Relentless Strike: The Secret History of Joint Special Operations Command, by Sean Naylor. New York: St. Martin's, 2015. 560 pages. \$29.99 (paperback \$17.99, Kindle \$14.99).

Once again, Sean Naylor has produced an authoritative and well-written book. *Relentless Strike* chronicles the history of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), America's top-tier special operations military unit. To the benefit

of history and the reader, and most likely to the consternation of the Pentagon, Naylor's knowledge of special operations and his extensive contacts reveal the temperaments and competencies of key individuals and the details of numerous clandestine missions and organizational capabilities. Many will condemn Naylor for revealing these secrets, but the fault is not with Naylor; it is with those who talked. The book also, perhaps unintentionally, exposes flaws in how the United States wages war, as well as the limitations of special operations.

The book begins by recounting the creation of JSOC after the failed Iranian hostage rescue operation in 1980. New threats to national security required a new military organization that had the resources and capabilities to respond quickly to crises and apply specialized military capabilities to rescue hostages, kill terrorists, and neutralize weapons of mass destruction. Naylor reminds us that senior military leaders opposed the new command, but the failure in Iran trumped parochial thinking. The second and more interesting part of the book addresses the expansion of JSOC as one result of the momentous impact of the 9/11 attacks.

From the beginning, JSOC had significant advantages over both conventional military organizations and nonaffiliated special operations units. The units placed under JSOC's direct control were the best-trained and best-resourced units in the military. Each of these units had its own sophisticated—and grueling—selection process. Remarkably, JSOC headquarters had nothing that mirrored such careful processes for selecting its staff. Also oddly, the Pentagon had no process for selecting a JSOC commander whose experience

and temperament matched the requirements of a national force. To be sure, some of JSOC's early commanders were excellent—but that was the exception. This deficiency became clear in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The 1980s and '90s were a period of steady growth in terms of structure, budget, and formalized relationships throughout the interagency world. JSOC was required to be ready to launch a task force within four hours for a variety of missions of national importance. Although specific mission requirements ultimately would dictate the task force's composition, significant mission "enablers" from inside the Defense Department and external to it always had to be on standby. It required dedication of a dozen Air Force transport aircraft to deploy the JSOC staff, operators, helicopters, ground-assault vehicles, and other necessary equipment for initial operations. This initial package often would encompass five hundred people, and more people and equipment frequently would follow. Additionally, being ready for every contingency required JSOC to have a comprehensive liaison network throughout many government agencies, especially the Intelligence Community. This formulaic approach to every mission resulted in a large task force being deployed for almost every problem. As a result, JSOC unintentionally undermined its ability to deploy clandestinely and remain agile. During this time frame, JSOC deployed to war alongside conventional forces in Panama and during Operation DESERT STORM. It also deployed in response to the hijacking of the Italian cruise ship *Achille Lauro*, which had eighteen Americans aboard, and to Somalia in 1993 in what would become the "Black

Hawk Down" debacle. Other, less-known operations took place as well. The results of JSOC's work before 9/11 were mixed, at best. While the quality of operators in JSOC's subordinate units was superb, the JSOC command and staff—and "Washington"—often underperformed. Some of these deficiencies would be addressed after 9/11. The 9/11 attacks produced a sense of vulnerability for Americans. They also created a need to respond quickly with force against those directly and indirectly responsible. No one was more frustrated by the military's inability to strike back quickly than Donald Rumsfeld, the Secretary of Defense. Rumsfeld looked to General Charles Holland, commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), for a plan. He was bitterly disappointed: Holland was unprepared, and therefore was reluctant to seize the opportunity to take the war to America's enemies. However, JSOC's reputation, built in part by its extensive liaison network in Washington and its sophisticated exercise program, now grabbed Rumsfeld's attention. JSOC easily was able to sell its unique capabilities to an anxious buyer. JSOC's boundless self-confidence would lead to an expanded role, because the administration in Washington desperately needed to go after Al Qaeda and its supporters. Although JSOC was a subordinate command of USSOCOM, General Holland was happy to stay on the sidelines. JSOC would become "almost an independent military force for Rumsfeld," under the command of Major General Dell Dailey. Everything seemed to be in place for JSOC to destroy those responsible for the 9/11 attacks. The leadership in Washington empowered JSOC to do whatever was necessary. The superbly

trained operators were anxious to make Bin Laden and his lieutenants pay with their lives for their actions. But, for the second time, a leadership deficiency on the part of a senior commander hampered JSOC. General Holland, and now Major General Dailey, both aviators, did not have what was necessary to unleash JSOC's special operations capabilities. Both were conservative, conventional thinkers unable to adapt to a new type of warfare. The triad necessary for successful action had two elements in hand—Washington sponsorship and competent operators—but still lacked a key element: a proper JSOC commander. Major General Stanley McChrystal would fix this shortcoming, and with gusto.

McChrystal commanded JSOC for almost five years, transforming it into a killing machine in Iraq, Afghanistan, and beyond. To McChrystal and many in Washington, JSOC was the “nation's main effort in the war on terror.” He was in charge of a global enterprise, but the enterprise needed better intelligence and a better scheme to respond rapidly to that intelligence. JSOC would expand its liaison network within the Intelligence Community and to other organizations operating in the region. Capturing and interrogating enemy operatives now would be preferred to killing them. JSOC began running agent networks as well as putting its own operators on the ground, even in places such as Benghazi, to develop situational awareness. JSOC also demanded extensive aerial reconnaissance assets. Likewise, war in the information age pushed JSOC to develop a cyber capability to hack into social media and cell phone communications. Then JSOC's subordinate units needed to retool to respond to the growing clarity about the disposition

of the enemy networks that the intelligence process was producing.

General McChrystal's force of personality fused all these disparate parts of the enormous intelligence apparatus together. Retooling Delta Force, the Rangers, and SEAL Team 6 was relatively easy; the troops instinctively knew they needed to operate in small teams and in unorthodox ways to defeat enemy networks. They welcomed McChrystal's aggressiveness and willingness to take risks. The war was an obsession for the JSOC commander. It became McChrystal's life, and he wanted his men to understand that the war, and nothing else, should be their life too. His single-minded determination was infectious to some and repellent to others. The JSOC commander had perfected a process that became known as F3EAD (“Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, Disseminate”), and the JSOC operations center was called the “Death Star.” “Strike to develop” intelligence became the task force catchphrase. McChrystal had perfected the F3EAD machine, and the process had become self-sustaining. Naylor claims that in the U.S. military's darkest days in Iraq, JSOC was the only American force achieving success. This depends on how you measure success, especially in light of the contemporary situation in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Under McChrystal's leadership, JSOC's operators efficiently and effectively found, fixed, and captured or killed high- and midvalue targets and anyone else they deemed appropriate. Often they fought their war disconnected from other U.S. and coalition forces that were fighting the same war. JSOC's size, an issue in the 1980s and 1990s, grew from about eight hundred to more than 2,300 in 2008, not including

a six-hundred-man JSOC intelligence brigade added in late 2008. JSOC demanded and received a disproportionate share of assets, including taking control of other military units not only when necessary but when convenient—to the dismay of commanders also charged with fighting the war. But JSOC did kill Zarqawi and Bin Laden and many, many other very bad people. Leaders in Washington declared, “JSOC is awesome.” Our enemies needed killing, and no military unit did it better than JSOC.

Naylor tells us that before 9/11 several key figures described JSOC as “a Ferrari in the garage.” General McChrystal, with the full support of leaders in Washington, took the Ferrari out of the garage and created a killing machine whose performance was unparalleled. Unfortunately, a discerning reader easily could conclude that the Ferrari actually was still on the same road as the rest of the U.S. military—and that road would lead to nowhere.

HY S. ROTHSTEIN



Ghost Fleet: A Novel of the Next World War, by P. W. Singer and August Cole. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2015. 416 pages. \$28 (paperback \$14.95, Kindle \$9.99).

No author today will argue with Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s perspective that any work of fiction requires the reader to engage in a willing suspension of disbelief. The wording of the concept is important because it goes beyond the idea of a reader just pushing the “I believe” button. The concept requires the reader to be an active participant: he or she must willingly enter a world

known to be false. It is the job of the author to maintain that world, to hold the reader suspended throughout the entire book, and to prevent him or her from falling out of the fictional world with an ungraceful “whump.”

For the author of a techno-thriller, holding the reader suspended in this alternate reality requires even more finesse than for other types of fiction. The world of a techno-thriller is relatively close to the world in which the reader lives. Both the technology and the environment of the story are set in a future near enough that all the governmental and organizational structures, global and domestic relationships, and technical capabilities showcased in the story must be close enough to what the reader knows today to be believable.

This is the challenge P. W. Singer and August Cole set for themselves in *Ghost Fleet*. It is a herculean task. The international backdrop today is far different from that of the techno-thriller heyday of the 1980s and early 1990s. The U.S. cultural setting of *Red Storm Rising*, published in 1986, was influenced by forty years of the Cold War. Dominated by baby boomers and gen Xers, the general population of the United States during that time had limited access to international news and perspectives, had grown up with the threat of nuclear war, and had been indoctrinated with the ideological vilification of Communism. Today the cultural backdrop for the U.S. population is as mixed and varied as the people themselves. International news and perspectives are available to anyone, quite literally at the touch of a finger; the threat of nuclear war has been replaced with a threat of terrorism; and ideological vilification

revolves around extremist religious groups rather than nation-states.

This techno-thriller, then, with its hegemonic China overtaking the United States, feels slightly unbalanced, as if it is not settled on a firm foundation. It was only during the last decade that a majority of Americans came to consider China a player on the international stage, and those Americans who view China as a threat (with the exception of the U.S. Navy, perhaps) represent both a smaller percentage and an even newer phenomenon. In fact, the American perspective of our relationship with China over the past ten years probably can be described best as bipolar, or maybe schizophrenic; but historically China has not been considered existentially threatening, and still is not commonly considered so today. Whump.

That means the story Pete Singer and August Cole create has to be strong enough to overcome each cultural inconsistency that unceremoniously dumps us out of our suspended disbelief. Unfortunately, the one-dimensional and stereotyped portrayal of the military family in the story is representative of the rest of the characters in the book. Whump. China's "Directorate" is a calculating, unfeeling behemoth. The Russian character is a vodka-swilling spy. The insurgent is a femme fatale. Whump, whump, whump. It may be an editor's dream to have characters do exactly what we presume they would do, but as a story line it does not carry enough of a thrill to make the reader want to stay engaged. Rather than incorporating strong, motivating factors (including irrational ones) that would make erratic actions plausible and add interest and depth to the story, the

characters act exactly as their stereotypes suggest they should—and the results of their actions are predictable.

The strongest element of the book is the technologies the authors choose to include. While the overuse of nomenclature feels clunky for all but those who collect technical classifications like Boy Scout badges, the authors do not reach too far into the realm of science fiction to build their arsenal of weapons, chemicals, and drugs. There is enough linkage to existing technologies and medical trends to make the future employment of these more-advanced programs feel realistic. Even so, they all fit into a too-predictable, no-surprise-here mold. There are even a few moments when the story feels like a propaganda piece for the Navy's existing *Zumwalt*-class destroyer or railgun programs. Whump, and whump again.

All of which raises the question, who is the audience P. W. Singer and August Cole are trying to reach? If it is the military, we do not need to read four hundred pages to tell us what we already know. China's versions of the concepts of antiaccess/area-denial and air-sea battle have brought plenty of visibility to the future risk China represents, even for those who have not been watching the Pacific for years. If the book is intended for a civilian population that no longer shares the common cultural backdrop that existed during the Cold War, it feels like just another fearmongering piece written by another advocate for a bigger defense budget. If it is a plea for the administration to sit up and take notice of China as a threat, it does not do a good enough job of explaining why all the elements of U.S. national power supposedly are completely defunct.

Perhaps all of this is what makes the book unique, though. While the plot follows the typical path of a techno-thriller, where an aggressive move by a “bad guy” forces a “good guy” to join in a fight of epic proportions, the discomfort the reader feels at the end is real, despite all the fully anticipated and stereotyped characters, plots, and technologies.

But that is not so much thrilling as it is troubling. The disturbing question that lurks in the background and permeates the plot like an insidious, deadly gas is, how effective is the United States when it comes to using the diplomatic and informational elements of national power in the international arena? This might have been the true heart of the story. Surrounded by layers of protective muscle in military might and economic strength, have the diplomatic and informational elements of U.S. national power aged and atrophied beyond the size of the body they inhabit? Without the diplomatic and informational elements, can the government still operate on just the military and economic elements? The idea is unexplored, but *Ghost Fleet*, with a plot that takes Lady Liberty’s sword and purse away right from the start, leaves readers suspended in a disbelief completely different from the one they thought they were entering.

CONNIE FRIZZELL



In All Respects Ready: Australia’s Navy in World War One, by David Stevens. Melbourne, Austral.: Oxford Univ. Press, 2014. 320 pages. \$59.95.

Writing a definitive history of any major conflict from a single nation’s perspective can be an exacting task—and, in

the case of the First World War at sea, a thankless one too, when compared with the far better known and better reported situation on land. This notwithstanding, it is hard to imagine a more timely and well-balanced book. David Stevens, as the Royal Australian Navy’s historian, was perhaps in a perfect position to take on this project, but this should in no way diminish what he has achieved. His extensive and far-reaching research has produced a work that, while entertaining and readable, has sufficient gravitas to ensure it will become the definitive work on the subject. This title will appeal to all audiences; historians will revel in the wealth of archival material and private diaries, but this book is far more appealing than a mere record of historical fact. Anyone who has been to sea and experienced life on board ship, in particular a warship, will appreciate the insights from someone so obviously well versed in this area. Drawing heavily on his own seagoing background, Stevens presents an engaging narrative that gets to the very heart of the unique human experience that is life at sea.

In many ways, then, this book represents the best of both possible approaches to a history of this type: the broad and analytical, which sweeps over the major maritime events of the time, giving the work its much-needed context; and the intensely personal, employing many passages from diaries, letters, and reports that together illustrate the rich variety of naval life from the deck plates to the wardroom. To this end, each chapter ends with a short biography of an important or interesting figure from the preceding pages, which both enriches and helps to consolidate this comprehensive coverage. The book also triumphs in another aspect: by not

overlooking the very real administrative challenges the young navy faced in trying to establish itself simultaneously with the moment of its supreme test: a world war at sea. Thus, interspersed with coverage of all the important actions at sea is a discussion of the myriad supporting activities necessary to develop a navy with global reach: the establishment of bases and supply lines; the use of native labor; the issues of pay and benefits; the challenges of recruiting and training; right down to health concerns and the treatment of offenders and deserters—it is all there. Even the boredom of the long and often fruitless patrols in search of contraband and intelligence, so much a feature of the war at sea and yet rarely reported on, is reproduced faithfully in an engaging manner.

In the end, one is left to marvel at the foresight of those who, all those years

ago, came up with the “fleet unit” idea, as a way for the British dominions to contribute to the naval defense of the global economic system—something that should still resonate today, in this new era of naval cooperation. Australia alone among them persevered with it, and as a result was propelled within a few short years into the companionship of those nations with true global reach at sea. This is an important book because, above all else, it is a lasting testament to the character of the Australian sailor. The hurdles were enormous, but the Australians, it seems, always rose to the challenges, overcoming them with ease under the most trying of circumstances—and with an alacrity and charm that has endeared them to all.

ANGUS ROSS

OUR REVIEWERS

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from the Society for Military History in 2011. His latest book, published by Praeger for the two hundredth anniversary of the battle of Waterloo, is *Napoleonic Warfare: The Operational Art of the Great Campaigns* (2015).

Jon Scott Logel is an associate professor at the Naval War College. He conducts applied research in the War Gaming Department and teaches Ulysses S. Grant and the Profession of Arms. He is the author of the forthcoming *Designing Gotham: West Point Engineers and the Rise of Modern New York, 1817–1898*.

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Dr. Ian Ralby is an adjunct professor of maritime law and security at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. He has extensive experience in international and maritime law, and is considered an expert on both the regulation and oversight of private security companies, and on maritime security. He holds a BA and an MA from the University of Maryland, Baltimore County, a JD from William and Mary Law School, and an MPhil and PhD from the University of Cambridge.

Angus Ross is a retired Royal Navy officer, and a graduate of, and professor of joint military operations at, the Naval War College. He received a second MA from Providence College and is currently pursuing PhD studies, looking at naval transformation prior to the First World War. His recent published works include articles in this journal and others on the dilemma facing both the Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy in the wake of the *Dreadnought* revolution.

Hy S. Rothstein is a senior lecturer, Department of Defense Analysis, and a member of the Center on Terrorism and Irregular Warfare at the Naval Postgraduate School. He has a PhD in international relations from the Fletcher School, Tufts University. His research has focused on unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency, psychological warfare, and military deception. He is the author of *Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare* (2006).

Kevin Rousseau is a student at the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies. He is a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel and a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, the Defense Intelligence College, the George Mason University School of Law, and the Naval War College Command and Staff distance education program.

IN MY VIEW

SECURING NATO'S WEAKEST FLANK

Sir:

I read the Winter 2016 article by Jonathan Altman, entitled “Russian A2/AD in the Eastern Mediterranean: A Growing Risk,” and I would like to highlight the urgency of securing NATO’s southern flank. NATO needs a stronger presence in the Mediterranean to monitor activities and prevent attacks on its members.

U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson has stated that there is no plan to bolster scarce U.S. naval resources in the eastern Mediterranean. This means NATO must adapt by increasing its presence on its southern flank and boosting the military power of existing members to deter aggression in the region. Greece is one member nation that could increase its involvement, thereby strengthening NATO’s capabilities.

Greece is a key geopolitical point for NATO because it forms the alliance’s southern tip, and its large eastern border is exposed to conflicts that unfold in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Athens is a trusted and capable ally. Even though the country is facing financial difficulties, it is one of only five NATO members that meet the alliance goal of spending two percent of gross domestic product on defense, having consistently surpassed the minimum as far back as 1988.

While the United States has forward-deployed destroyers in Rota, Spain, Washington should consider permanently basing an aircraft carrier, destroyers, and amphibious ships at Souda Bay on the Greek island of Crete. These forces could counter crises, provide more stability, and reinforce allies’ perceptions of American might. Crete is closer than Rota to where threats are likely to unfold: in the Middle East and North Africa. A Congressional Budget Office report states that basing more ships and crews abroad will boost overseas operations on a smaller budget.

NATO currently has twelve of its sixteen E-3 airborne warning and control system radar planes operating primarily out of the NATO air base in Geilenkirchen,

Germany. This limits the availability of airborne surveillance and command, control, and communications functions for tactical and air-defense forces. Having Global Hawks at Souda Bay could boost NATO's real-time intelligence in theater, and a combat search-and-rescue capability on Crete could provide for quick responses across Europe, Africa, and the Levant. Military personnel deployed at Souda Bay also would be able to further their educations and skill sets by participating in training and educational activities nearby at the NATO Missile Firing Installation, the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Center, and other facilities on the island.

When the U.S. embassy in Benghazi, Libya, was under attack in 2012, the U.S. military was unable to respond for hours. American lives could have been saved if the United States had sent aircraft from its Souda Bay naval base—it is located only 750 miles from Libya. In the aftermath of that attack, a Marine antiterrorism detachment was added at Souda Bay to provide a quick-response capability in the region.

Using Souda Bay better is a sound idea, as it is located very close to key danger areas. Athens, Washington, and NATO should identify more opportunities to work together synergistically and protect peace and commerce in the Mediterranean Sea.

CONSTANCE BAROUDOS

Vice President, Lexington Institute

RESPONSE TO STEVEN WILLS'S "THE EFFECT OF THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT OF 1986 ON NAVAL STRATEGY, 1987–1994": SOME MISSING PIECES

Sir:

Steven Wills provided a very thought-provoking article in the Spring 2016 *Naval War College Review* concerning the Navy's loss of strategy-making authority owing to the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act (G-N) and the subsequent deterioration of the Navy's corporate ability to craft strategy, because of its inability to generate a corps of officers with repeated tours in strategy-making billets.

However, G-N was not the only factor at work. A missing piece in Wills's article is the recognition that necessity is not only the mother of invention; it is the genesis of strategy. That is, the 1990s featured the lack of a compelling strategic problem that needed to be solved. Without such a problem, attempting to craft global strategy is akin to trying to clap with one hand. The 1980s Maritime Strategy was a solution to a strategic problem that arose in the 1970s. At the time, the Soviet Navy had significantly expanded and the U.S. Navy came to the realization (in part through war gaming at the Naval War College [NWC]) that a global war with the Soviet Union might not go nuclear automatically. Simply shepherding reinforcement shipping across the Atlantic was not enough; the Navy had to find a way to take the offensive and help alleviate pressure on the NATO central front. This created a need for a global conventional naval strategy. Although the decade of the '90s had its share of turbulence, the Navy could fall back on its well-oiled tactical doctrine to deal with the challenges of the period.

However, it was a time of force reductions and competition among the services for a share of the shrinking defense budget. What became critical for the Navy was effective budget justification—the forte of N8. Thus, although N3/N5 was starved of experienced strategists such as Captains Swartz, Harris, and Diamond, N8 was populated by top-notch analysts such as Captain Arthur “Trip” Barber. In this environment, N8 became dominant and insulated from N3/N5.

It appeared that in 2006 there was an incipient revival of the capability under the leadership of Vice Admiral John Morgan as N3/N5 during Admiral Mike Mullen's reign as Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). A major reason for this was that Admiral Mullen had a global strategic problem to solve. The 9/11 attacks generated a new global, maritime, strategic problem: how to prevent terrorists from using the seas to mount attacks on the U.S. homeland and those of our allies. The key to solving it was establishing a global partnership for maritime security—a challenge that was both larger than the perspectives of the regional unified combatant commanders and beyond the ken or interest of the Joint Staff.

Not having an in-place strategic apparatus to solve the problem, Admiral Mullen did two things: he turned to NWC, and he established a small, ad hoc task force inside N51 composed of sharp, relatively junior officers. As the strategy project developed, NWC faculty would conduct a program of research, gaming, and outreach to create the underlying logic of a new strategy, and the N51 team would articulate that logic by drafting a strategy document. The product of this collaboration was the 2007 “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” (CS21). This document was not itself the strategy, which was essentially to court foreign navies in a way that would secure their cooperation, but it was decisive in making the strategy work. It catalyzed widespread global naval cooperation that did indeed go a long way toward solving Admiral Mullen's strategic problem.

Concurrently with attempting to solve the strategic problem at hand, Vice Admiral Morgan also tried to establish an institutionalized strategy process within the office of the CNO (OPNAV). The process involved a formalized flow of events—meetings, reviews, games, etc.—that crossed directorate boundaries and also drew in external parties such as NWC. An instruction was drafted, but it was never signed; in this writer's view, it foundered because of opposition from N8, which stood to lose its dominance, and Vice Admiral Morgan's retirement.

In 2012, shortly after becoming CNO, Admiral Greenert requested a "refresh" of CS21. Such a project was certainly warranted, as global geopolitical conditions had significantly changed from 2007. However, still lacking any viable strategy-making apparatus, he turned once more to NWC for assistance. However, this time, rather than a full research and analysis project, the refresh was supposed to employ a rather short-fused drafting process, producing something within a couple of months. NWC complied and duly produced a draft.

However, with no focused strategy team in place, and with the new and politically charged concept of air-sea battle ricocheting around the Pentagon, the draft got put on the back burner. The lack of a well-defined strategy problem at the time also contributed to inhibiting the creation of a new document. China and Russia were clearly becoming threats, but the exact nature of a global naval strategic problem was not yet clear. Admiral Greenert over the next two years substituted his mantra of "warfighting first, operate forward, be ready" for a new strategy document. Within OPNAV, strategy development fell prey to endless redrafting. Finally, after several years of such activity, the Navy produced a "refresh" of CS21.

However, its relationship to the 2007 document was in name only, the new so-called CS21R being (in this writer's view) essentially a pleading document aimed at Congress for a larger Navy. To the extent that the Navy's strategic problem in 2014 was a shrinking fleet owing to the Budget Control Act (sequestration), the new document could be seen as supporting a strategy of influencing Congress. However, it was not produced by a cadre of experienced strategists, nor was it the product of a formal and disciplined institutional process.

The new CNO, Admiral John Richardson, has inherited a more clearly defined and compelling strategic problem of global proportions that will require of the Navy discerning strategic analysis. While the global maritime security problem the 2007 CS21 addressed is, at least for the time being, apparently under control, the growth of increasingly assertive Chinese and Russian naval power along with a dire budget crunch at home poses a global naval strategic problem of unprecedented scope and complexity. Not only must the Navy reengineer its forces and doctrine to deal with such new threats as antiship ballistic missiles; it must also find a way to maintain effective presence in three or more widely separated areas

of the Eurasian littoral to fight terrorism, support allies, and assemble a global naval partnership against major-power expansionism.

Admiral Richardson has promulgated a guidance document entitled “A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority.” It is not a strategy in the traditional sense, but it establishes a set of criteria and lines of effort for the Navy to work toward. The key concept embedded in it is fleet design. Given the restrictions on the Navy’s authority (and ability) to craft actual strategies in the manner of the 1980s Maritime Strategy that Wills discusses, work on fleet design appears to be an appropriate avenue of strategic analysis.

In the early 2000s, the threat of terrorists supporting another 9/11-style attack on the United States via maritime smuggling created the need for a particular kind of naval strategy. Today, the combination of factors just mentioned poses another global strategic naval problem that needs to be solved. For various reasons, neither N8 nor N3/N5 is capable of solving it on its own. The CNO needs to strengthen the strategy-development capabilities of the Navy Staff. This would include establishing a mechanism whereby N3/N5 and N8 would work more synergistically, bringing the right officers into those directorates and lengthening tours there, especially for leadership. In addition, he must create an effective collaboration with a range of outside organizations, most directly NWC and the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS).

The Navy is also working to produce a new cadre of strategists. Both NWC and NPS have developed new, more-extensive programs to provide an educational foundation for officers specializing in strategy. Whether this will bear fruit in the future is uncertain, the strictures of G-N still being in place. If Wills is right (and I believe he is), without the ability to detail officers to multiple tours in a well-established strategy office, this education will go for naught. The CNO also disestablished the Strategic Studies Group, a move that has generated quite a bit of discussion among naval cognoscenti. I am not privy to his reasons, but I would guess that he is looking to put some other mechanism in place that can generate robust thinking about fleet design.

A second missing piece that Wills touches on but does not develop is the structure of the Unified Command Plan. In addition to the current strategic challenges just mentioned, any new Navy strategy will have to contend with two other effects of G-N: the many joint area of responsibility (AOR) boundaries that have been drawn in the water, and the joint process of global force distribution.

In World War II, Admiral Ernest King, as both CNO and commander in chief, had wide latitude for changing the longitude of U.S. naval forces; he could, within the general strategic guidelines of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, move Navy forces between the Atlantic and Pacific theaters, and, within the Pacific theater,

allocate forces between MacArthur and Nimitz. For King, the world ocean was a unified theater of war.

Today there is no naval officer with such authority. The Navy's precious few ships are allocated via a joint consensus process whose inherent logic seems to be to oil the squeakiest regional wheel. This does not allow easily for the application of a global naval strategy. At best, the CNO can bring the logic of a global naval strategy—if he has one—to the meeting. Second, since the world ocean is fragmented by joint AORs, the ability of modern naval forces to synchronize fluidly across hemispheric swaths of ocean—an emerging operational necessity—is compromised. These obstacles to the efficient and strategic application of American sea power in peace and war are not likely to be removed by legislation. Therefore a new Navy strategy—a new fleet design—will have to account for them in some way.

Wills is right in everything he says, and he presents a good piece of history, of which modern-day officers of all ranks should be aware. However, as discussed here, there is more to the story, whose plot continues to unfold. It now falls to Admiral Richardson to resurrect somehow the Navy's ability to develop and execute a new form of global naval strategy.

ROBERT C. RUBEL

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REFLECTIONS ON READING

Professor John E. Jackson of the Naval War College is the Program Manager for the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program.

[W]e must keep uppermost in mind that leadership remains our most important task.

ADMIRAL ARLEIGH BURKE, JANUARY 1959

In January 2013, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) released the Navy Leader Development Strategy (NLDS), which outlines the key elements of professional development for all sailors, from E-1 to O-10. This top-level emphasis echoes the sentiment of former CNO Admiral Arleigh Burke, as quoted above. The strategy defines a career-long Navy Leader Development Continuum that integrates four core elements: experience, education, training, and personal development. Since its launch, the NLDS has been embraced widely as a clear and concise tool that individuals and commands can use to help craft development paths tailored to their specific needs. In January 2016, CNO Admiral John Richardson maintained the momentum by calling on all hands to “strengthen and broaden leadership development programs to renew and reinforce the Navy Team’s dedication to the naval profession.”

The NLDS identifies personal development as one of the four core elements of leader development, and recommends that all sailors engage in professional reading to improve their knowledge of Navy traditions, roles, and missions. The CNO Professional Reading Program has purchased and distributed leadership-relevant books throughout the fleet, including the following (several of which were profiled separately in previous “Reflections on Reading” Columns):

- *A Sailor’s History of the U.S. Navy*, by Lieutenant Commander Thomas J. Cutler, USN (Ret.), speaks eloquently about the value of studying the past to illuminate the future and the importance of understanding the heritage of one’s chosen profession. Award-winning author Cutler provides a series of interesting and informative vignettes about the honor, courage, and commitment of our Navy’s remarkable sailors. In the preface he argues that,

regardless of how busy sailors may become in dealing with the pressing issues of the day, they are well served by finding some time to consider the path that led them to their current situations, and that a knowledge of history often shows that the solution to today's problems may have roots in the past.

- *In the Shadow of Greatness*, by Naval Academy graduates Joshua Welle, John Ennis, Katherine Kranz, and Graham Plaster, is a fascinating book that provides a glimpse into the lives of some members of the post-9/11 generation of warriors. The stories drawn from the Naval Academy class of 2002 are representative of an entire generation of sailors and officers who volunteered for service with the knowledge that they would serve in combat. Each story provides a glimpse into the lives of modern-day military officers who faced unique challenges, yet succeeded.
- *Navigating the Seven Seas*, by retired master chief Melvin G. Williams Sr. and Vice Admiral Melvin G. Williams Jr., showcases important leadership lessons from the first African American father and son to have served at the top in the U.S. Navy. In addition to the engaging biographical content of the book, the authors identify what they call “the Seven Cs of Leadership”: *character, courage, competence, commitment, caring, community, and communicating*. Each quality is explained through vivid examples that will help guide all sailors to successful lives and Navy careers.
- *Leading with the Heart: Coach K's Successful Strategies for Basketball, Business, and Life*, by Mike Krzyzewski and Donald T. Phillips, provides entertaining and informative lessons on how to build a culture of success. Duke University basketball coach Mike “Coach K” Krzyzewski's story is a great example of living the American dream through hard work and dedication. The son of working-class Polish immigrants, Krzyzewski earned a scholarship to the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, where he first played and later coached basketball. His secrets to success are communication, trust, collective responsibility, caring, and pride. The parallels to a military leader's challenges, such as building teams, dealing with high organizational turnover rates, and overcoming defeat, are readily apparent.
- *The Trident: The Forging and Reforging of a Navy SEAL Leader*, by Jason Redman and John Bruning, tells the story of Lieutenant Redman's odyssey as a Navy SEAL and wounded warrior. His experiences as an enlisted man who rose through the ranks and earned a commission demonstrate the inspiring courage, dedication, and commitment he showed throughout his career. Redman received severe wounds in a firefight in Iraq, then earned national attention when he posted a sign on his hospital door at Bethesda warning all

who entered not to feel sorry for him because of his wounds. In his introduction to the book, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates writes, “This story, though, is not just about a SEAL on the Iraqi battlefield, but a SEAL at war with himself and his ultimate victory. I believe his story will inspire the reader, just as it did me.”

There is no single path toward leadership excellence, but reading about the successes and challenges of other leaders can help shape your personal leadership style. Former president Harry Truman put it best: “Not all readers are leaders, but all leaders are readers!”

JOHN E. JACKSON