Giving voice to jazz singers’ experiences of flow in improvisation

Jazz instrumentalists’ experiences of improvisation have informed psychological research on a range of topics including flow in improvisation, yet there is scant evidence of jazz singers’ improvising experiences. Using Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA), this study investigated the experiences of three professional Australian jazz singers who improvise extensively in their performance practice: How do these singers experience improvisation? IPA of semi-structured interviews with the singers resulted in two superordinate themes which both related to the flow state: 1) singers experienced flow when improvisation “went well”; 2) singers experienced flow as meaningful—flow provided singers with both the freedom to express the self and the opportunity to contribute to something beyond the self. These findings reveal a new context for flow experiences. Implications for vocal jazz education and practice are discussed

Consciousness as Inner Sensation: Crusius and Kant

What is it that makes a mental state conscious? Recent commentators have proposed that for Kant, consciousness results from differentiation: A mental state is conscious insofar as it is distinguished, by means of our conceptual capacities, from other states and/or things. I argue instead that Kant’s conception of state consciousness is sensory: A mental state is conscious insofar as it is accompanied by an inner sensation. Interpreting state consciousness as inner sensation reveals an underappreciated influence of Crusius on Kant’s view, solves some long-standing puzzles concerning Kant’s difficult doctrine of self-affection, and sheds light on his theory of inner experience

MAST: Mental Ambidexterity in Strategic Thinking

There are two fundamental ways to think about what strategy is. The first one is strategy as a plan of action for reaching one or several goals. The second one is strategy as discipline, a formalized body of knowledge. The latter can be understood as the set of governing ideas that guide managers in the identification of opportunities for value creation and the realization of that value. In the present article, we argue that these ideas tend to fall into two main paradigms, which come with two metaphors about managers: managers as commanders and managers as designers. We further argue that these represent two fundamental ways of thinking, which in turn become ways of ‘seeing’ and even feeling. Is one better than the other? We suggest that is not the right question to ask. Rather it is important to appreciate that these are worldviews that affect how we interpret our day-to-day reality and our ability to see opportunities. We introduce the notion of Mental Ambidexterity in Strategic Thinking (MAST) and define it as the ability to hold both views of the world—that of the commander and that of the designer— and play with them simultaneously, rather than focusing solely on one and rejecting the other. MAST is an individual level capability; it is a flexible, non-ideological and fluid mode of cognition. At the core, it is characterized by switching flexibility back and forth between rational decisionmaking among alternatives, and creation of new alternatives, between what is and what could be. We illustrate three principles – i) intellectual humility, ii) contingent thinking and iii) poke into ambiguity – that act as catalysts for individuals to develop MAST capabilities

Machine art or machine artists? Dennett, Danto, and the expressive stance

As art produced by autonomous machines becomes increasingly common, and as such machines grow increasingly sophisticated, we risk a confusion between art produced by a person but mediated by a machine, and art produced by what might be legitimately considered a machine artist. This distinction will be examined here. In particular, my argument seeks to close a gap between, on one hand, a philosophically grounded theory of art and, on the other hand, theories concerned with behavior, intentionality, expression, and creativity in natural and artificial agents. This latter set of theories in some cases addresses creative behavior in relation to visual art, music, and literature, in the frequently overlapping contexts of philosophy of mind, artificial intelligence, and cognitive science. However, research in these areas does not typically address problems in the philosophy of art as a central line of inquiry. Similarly, the philosophy of art does not typically address issues pertaining to artificial agents

Organizational time: a dialectical view

We present twelve propositions constituting a contribution to a contingency view of time in organizations and synthesize apparently opposite perspectives of time. To articulate them, we relate the planning, action and improvisation strategic orientations to the dependent, independent and interdependent perspectives of the environment. Then, we relate these strategic orientations related to approaches to the problems of scheduling, synchronization and time allocation. Action strategies rely on event time to handle scheduling, use entrainment to synchronize with their environment and view time as linear. Planning strategies use even time to handle scheduling, impose their internal pacing upon the environment and view time as cyclic. Improvisation strategies use even-event time to handle scheduling, synchronize via internal-external pacing and hold a spiral view of time. Our argument strengthens the case for a more deliberate approach to time in organizations and favors a dialectical view of organizational phenomena.action, contingency, dialectics, improvisation, planning, synthesis, time

Jazz Improvisation, the Body, and the Ordinary

What is one doing when one improvises music, as one does in jazz? There are two sorts of account prominent in jazz literature. The traditional answer is that one is organizing sound materials in the only way they can be organized if they are to be musical. This implies that jazz solos are to be interpreted with the procedures of written music in mind. A second, more controversial answer is offered in David Sudnow's pioneering account of the phenomenology of improvisation, Ways of the Hand. Sudnow claims that learning to improvise at the piano is concerned centrally with copying the bodily ways of one's mentors and finding how one's instructable hands and the keyboard come to answer to one another, so that "to define jazz ... is to describe the body's ways." But despite its greater sensitivity over the traditional account, Sudnow's account is flawed both as a description of how improvisatory skill is acquired and as a model for describing the interest of jazz. My critique of Sudnow compares his account to Augustine's account of learning language, and finds that Wittgenstein's criticisms of Augustine extend to Sudnow. I offer a third approach to understanding improvised music, one which treats the procedures of improvisation as derived from, and importantly at play in, our everyday actions

Interfacing the Network: An Embedded Approach to Network Instrument Creation

This paper discusses the design, construction, and development of a multi-site collaborative instrument, The Loop, developed by the JacksOn4 collective during 2009-10 and formally presented in Oslo at the arts.on.wires and NIME conferences in 2011. The development of this instrument is primarily a reaction to historical network performance that either attempts to present traditional acoustic practice in a distributed format or utilises the network as a conduit to shuttle acoustic and performance data amongst participant nodes. In both scenarios the network is an integral and indispensible part of the performance, however, the network is not perceived as an instrument, per se. The Loop is an attempt to create a single, distributed hybrid instrument retaining traditionally acoustic interfaces and resonant bodies that are mediated by the network. The embedding of the network into the body of the instrument raises many practical and theoretical discussions, which are explored in this paper through a reflection upon the notion of the distributed instrument and the way in which its design impacts the behaviour of the participants (performers and audiences); the mediation of musical expression across networks; the bi-directional relationship between instrument and design; as well as how the instrument assists in the realisation of the creators’ compositional and artistic goals

The Metaphysics of Improvisation

In The Metaphysics of Improvisation, I criticize wrongheaded metaphysical views of, and theories about, improvisation, and put forward a cogent metaphysical theory of improvisation, which includes action theory, an analysis of the relevant genetic and aesthetic properties, and ontology (work-hood). The dissertation has two Parts. Part I is a survey of the history of many improvisational practices, and of the concept of improvisation. Here I delineate, sketch, and sort out the often vague boundaries between improvising and non-improvising within many art forms and genres, including music, dance, theatre, motion pictures, painting, and literature. In addition, I discuss the concept of non-artistic improvisation in various contexts. I attempt to portray an accurate picture of how improvisation functions, or does not function, in various art forms and genres. Part II addresses metaphysical issues in, and problems and questions of, improvisation in the arts. I argue that that continuum and genus-species models are the most cogent ways to understand the action-types of improvising and composing and their relations. I demonstrate that these models are substantiated by an informed investigation and phenomenology of improvisational practice, action theory conceptual analysis, cognitive neuroscience studies and experiments, cognitive psychology studies and models, and some theories of creativity. In addition, I provide a constraint based taxonomy for classifying improvisations that is compatible with, and supports, the continuum model. Next, I address epistemological and ontological issues involving the genetic properties of improvisations, and the properties improvisatory, and as if improvised. Finally, I show that arguments against treating, or classifying, improvisations as works are weak or erroneous, and by focusing on music, I provide a correct ontological theory of work-hood for artistic improvisations

Cognition and improvisation: some implications for live coding

This paper explores the perception that live coding is a “real-time” improvisatory activity. It posits the notion that because live coding requires less complex motor skills than instrumental improvisation it may be less susceptible to the influence of mechanical modes of musical expression. This hypothesis will explore the concept of goal states, models of memory and the function of reflexes and reactions as a means of mapping this territory and will provide a framework to understand the various perceptual domains with which a coder engages during a live extemporised performance. This exploration will engage in a comparative discourse relating live coding to instrumental improvisation, as a point of departure for the understanding of cognitive functioning in this rapidly developing performance paradigm

Interactive intelligence: behaviour-based AI, musical HCI and the Turing Test

The field of behaviour-based artificial intelligence (AI), with its roots in the robotics research of Rodney Brooks, is not predominantly tied to linguistic interaction in the sense of the classic Turing test (or, "imitation game"). Yet, it is worth noting, both are centred on a behavioural model of intelligence. Similarly, there is no intrinsic connection between musical AI and the language-based Turing test, though there have been many attempts to forge connections between them. Nonetheless, there are aspects of musical AI and the Turing test that can be considered in the context of non-language-based interactive environments–-in particular, when dealing with real-time musical AI, especially interactive improvisation software. This paper draws out the threads of intentional agency and human indistinguishability from Turing’s original 1950 characterisation of AI. On the basis of this distinction, it considers different approaches to musical AI. In doing so, it highlights possibilities for non-hierarchical interplay between human and computer agents