International Law and Chemical, Biological, Radio-Nuclear (CBRN) Events

This book explores the interplay between International Law and Chemical, Biological, Radio-Nuclear (CBRN) risks. An all-hazards approach is adopted to cover events of intentional, accidental and natural origin, and international obligations are presented according to the phases of the emergency management cycle, including prevention, preparedness, response and recovery

Strategic Studies

John Ferris examines the Revolution in Military Affairs with regard to how The Biggest Force Multiplier?: Knowledge, Information and Warfare in the 21st Century affected discussions on military policy and the knowledge available to armed forces, thus shaping the nature of war.In Calculating Costs: A Critical Assessment of Verification Costs for a Fissile Material Cutoff (a regime discussed at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Switzerland, in 1995), George MacLean and James Keeley examine the often overlooked financial aspects affecting the viability of a treaty crucial to the process of nuclear disarmament and arms control.  Their article examines the estimated costs of verifiying the cutoff, including analuyses of configurations of the cutoff itself, and the varying verification systems that may be implemented.Gavin Cameron's article, WMD Terrorism: No Longer of Question of If, but When? considers the likelihood of terrorists using chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons after 9/11.  He argues that massive conventional weapons remain a more realistic threat, in part owing to the difficulties of acquiring and using CBRN weapons.  Past uses or attempted uses of such weapons by terrorists and the tactical choices made by the9/11 attackers are considered, and the effect of the attack on other groups' tactical choices in the future is then analyszed

DRONE DELIVERY OF CBNRECy – DEW WEAPONS Emerging Threats of Mini-Weapons of Mass Destruction and Disruption (WMDD)

Drone Delivery of CBNRECy – DEW Weapons: Emerging Threats of Mini-Weapons of Mass Destruction and Disruption (WMDD) is our sixth textbook in a series covering the world of UASs and UUVs. Our textbook takes on a whole new purview for UAS / CUAS/ UUV (drones) – how they can be used to deploy Weapons of Mass Destruction and Deception against CBRNE and civilian targets of opportunity. We are concerned with the future use of these inexpensive devices and their availability to maleficent actors. Our work suggests that UASs in air and underwater UUVs will be the future of military and civilian terrorist operations. UAS / UUVs can deliver a huge punch for a low investment and minimize human casualties.https://newprairiepress.org/ebooks/1046/thumbnail.jp

Biothreat and policy pathways: influences upon current bioterrorism policies in the UK

The threat of terrorism, and in particular the threat of terrorists using biological weapons, has grown since the early 1990s, over the decade the assessment and perception of threat escalated despite an absence of biological weapons use. This research explores policy responses to the threat from bioterrorism in the UK between 1990 and 2005. A case study approach is used to examine the emergence and rise of the bioterrorism threat, and the institutional arrangement in place to confront that threat. The dissertation further investigates the construction of the threat narrative. The policy area of bioterrorism is obscured by secrecy. Therefore, this dissertation looks towards policy responses to pandemic influenza, and uses responses to pandemic influenza as a heuristic device to illustrate the difficulties of risk assessment and the accompanying institutional complexity. The study posits that traditional, academic risk assessment methodologies do not appear to have as large an influence as the narratives. Furthermore, the prevailing conceptualisation of the bioterrorism threat is the product of the confluence of three threat narratives. These narratives have become entangled and subsequently embedded in the institutional response. Moreover, a number of events have influenced and shaped the threat narrative of bioterrorism. First, a change in perception (sarin, 1995); then a jolt to the political and institutional structures (September 11, 2001); and finally, further bombings and plots have augmented the threat narrative (Madrid & London). This study is positioned at the intersection of policy studies and risk assessment, contributing to an understanding of the formation of institutional threat perception

Security and defence research in the European Union: a landscape review

This landscape report describes the state of play of the European Union’s policies and activities in security and defence and the EU-funded research aimed at supporting them, with an exclusive focus on intentional harm. It is organised around several thematic building blocks under the umbrella of the three core priorities defined in the European agenda on security. The report reviews the current main risks and threats but also those that may emerge within the next 5 years, the policy and operational means developed to combat them, the main active stakeholders and the EU legislation in force. In this context, a short history of EU research on security and defence is presented, followed by an inventory of relevant research and development projects funded under the Horizon 2020 framework programme during the period 2014-2018. The specific contributions of the Joint Research Centre to security research are also highlighted. Finally, future avenues for security and defence research and development are discussed. Please note that the executive summary of this landscape report has been published simultaneously as a companion document.JRC.E.7-Knowledge for Security and Migratio

The influence of weapons of mass destruction on international security in the second decade of the 21st century

W artykule przedstawiono przyczyny, dla których w ciągu obecnej dekady nastąpił znaczący wzrost zagrożenia bronią masowego rażenia. Pomimo wieloletnich wysiłków społeczności międzynarodowej broni tej nie udało się wyeliminować ani znacząco ograniczyć jej arsenałów czy też wykluczyć możliwość jej budowy lub transferu. Wzrosło natomiast znaczenie broni masowego rażenia, zwłaszcza jądrowej, jako czynnika siły w stosunkach międzynarodowych. Tendencja ta prawdopodobnie utrzyma się w dającej się przewidzieć przyszłości. Dlatego też podczas opracowywania artykułu skoncentrowano się na wyjaśnieniu mechanizmów tego procesu i jego powiązań z wieloma innymi wydarzeniami i faktami mającymi wpływ na bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe. Należy tu podkreślić szczególne znaczenie, jakie przypisano roli precyzyjnego szacowania ryzyka stwarzanego przez broń masowego rażenia i określeniu jego hierarchii. Ponadto przedstawiono formy i metody działania państw i organizacji międzynarodowych w zakresie zapobiegania proliferacji (w ramach traktatów rozbrojeniowych i forów nieformalnych) oraz dokonano oceny ich efektywności.The article outlines reasons for the significant increase of the hazard posed by weapons of mass destruction in the current decade. Despite the international community’s efforts made throughout the years, it has not been possible to eliminate them, significantly lower their arsenal or prevent their building or transfer. What has increased is the importance of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear ones, as a force factor in international relations. This tendency will probably continue in the foreseeable future. Therefore, the article focuses on explaining the mechanisms of this process and its connections with numerous events and facts influencing international security. Special significance is ascribed to a precise estimation of the risk posed by weapons of mass destruction and determination of its hierarchy. Moreover, the article presents the forms and methods of the activities undertaken by countries and international organisations regarding the prevention of proliferation (via disarmament treaties and informal forums) and assesses their effectiveness

Army Officer Corps Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) Foundation Gaps Place Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Operations at Risk – Part 1

This is the first of three articles from the authors describing the risk to Joint Operations incurred by an Army that is vulnerable to the STEM challenges faced in a great power competition involving CWMD operations. In this article, we describe the problem. In articles two and three of the series, we will elaborate on the problem utilizing the Joint Publication 3-0 as our guide and recommend solutions to address this gap

Derivation of a methodology to compare C,B and R detection capability in urban events

Many comparisons have been made between Chemical detectors (C), between Biological (B) detectors, and between Radiological detectors (R), providing insights to the best C, B and R equipment for a given purpose. However, no comparison has been made between C, B and R systems to appraise how C, B and R detectors perform against each other and where capability gaps lie. The dissertation generates a method to achieve an inter-comparison between C, B and R detection capabilities and identifies where to invest resources to achieve a more effective overall CBR detection architecture. The inter-comparison methodology is based on an operational analysis tool (SMARTS). The overall CBR detection architecture is illustrated through detect to warn and detect to treat mechanisms across the timeline of a realistic scenario. The scenario has been created to be non-prejudicial to C, B or R incidents, deconstructed into four frames to accommodate SMARTS. The most suitable deconstruction is into early warning, personnel security screening, initial response and definitive identification frames. The most suitable detector Key Performance Characteristics (KPCs) are identified for each frame. SMARTS is performed by analysing the current performance of the C, B and R detection systems drawn from the literature and the target requirements determined by defensible logic. The desire to improve each capability from its current state to target requirement is subjectively determined by the author. A sensitivity analysis is applied to mitigate the effect of a limited pool of opinion. Applying the methodology to published CBR detection capability data and the author’s appraisal of the target requirement reveals that B detection requires the greatest development and R the least, and that detection in the security screening and initial response frames falls short of capability compared to early warning and definitive identification frames. Selectivity is a challenge across a broad range of frames and agents. This work provides a methodology that is modular and transparent so that it can be repopulated should new data or alternative perception arises