A Briefing on Metrics and Risks for Autonomous Decision-Making in Aerospace Applications

Significant technology advances will enable future aerospace systems to safely and reliably make decisions autonomously, or without human interaction. The decision-making may result in actions that enable an aircraft or spacecraft in an off-nominal state or with slightly degraded components to achieve mission performance and safety goals while reducing or avoiding damage to the aircraft or spacecraft. Some key technology enablers for autonomous decision-making include: a continuous state awareness through the maturation of the prognostics health management field, novel sensor development, and the considerable gains made in computation power and data processing bandwidth versus system size. Sophisticated algorithms and physics based models coupled with these technological advances allow reliable assessment of a system, subsystem, or components. Decisions that balance mission objectives and constraints with remaining useful life predictions can be made autonomously to maintain safety requirements, optimal performance, and ensure mission objectives. This autonomous approach to decision-making will come with new risks and benefits, some of which will be examined in this paper. To start, an account of previous work to categorize or quantify autonomy in aerospace systems will be presented. In addition, a survey of perceived risks in autonomous decision-making in the context of piloted aircraft and remotely piloted or completely autonomous unmanned autonomous systems (UAS) will be presented based on interviews that were conducted with individuals from industry, academia, and government

Unmanned Aerial Systems Research, Development, Education and Training at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University

With technological breakthroughs in miniaturized aircraft-related components, including but not limited to communications, computer systems and sensors and, state-of-the-art unmanned aerial systems (UAS) have become a reality. This fast growing industry is anticipating and responding to a myriad of societal applications that will provide either new or more cost effective solutions that previous technologies could not, or will replace activities that involved humans in flight with associated risks. Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University has a long history of aviation related research and education, and is heavily engaged in UAS activities. This document provides a summary of these activities. The document is divided into two parts. The first part provides a brief summary of each of the various activities while the second part lists the faculty associated with those activities. Within the first part of this document we have separated the UAS activities into two broad areas: Engineering and Applications. Each of these broad areas is then further broken down into six sub-areas, which are listed in the Table of Contents. The second part lists the faculty, sorted by campus (Daytona Beach---D, Prescott---P and Worldwide--W) associated with the UAS activities. The UAS activities and the corresponding faculty are cross-referenced. We have chosen to provide very short summaries of the UAS activities rather than lengthy descriptions. Should more information be desired, please contact me directly or alternatively visit our research web pages (http://research.erau.edu) and contact the appropriate faculty member directly

How to keep drivers engaged while supervising driving automation? A literature survey and categorization of six solution areas

This work aimed to organise recommendations for keeping people engaged during human supervision of driving automation, encouraging a safe and acceptable introduction of automated driving systems. First, heuristic knowledge of human factors, ergonomics, and psychological theory was used to propose solution areas to human supervisory control problems of sustained attention. Driving and non-driving research examples were drawn to substantiate the solution areas. Automotive manufacturers might (1) avoid this supervisory role altogether, (2) reduce it in objective ways or (3) alter its subjective experiences, (4) utilize conditioning learning principles such as with gamification and/or selection/training techniques, (5) support internal driver cognitive processes and mental models and/or (6) leverage externally situated information regarding relations between the driver, the driving task, and the driving environment. Second, a cross-domain literature survey of influential human-automation interaction research was conducted for how to keep engagement/attention in supervisory control. The solution areas (via numeric theme codes) were found to be reliably applied from independent rater categorisations of research recommendations. Areas (5) and (6) were addressed by around 70% or more of the studies, areas (2) and (4) in around 50% of the studies, and areas (3) and (1) in less than around 20% and 5%, respectively. The present contribution offers a guiding organisational framework towards improving human attention while supervising driving automation.submittedVersio

Cognitively Sensitive User Interface for Command and Control Applications

While there are broad guidelines for display or user interface design, creating effective human-computer interfaces for complex, dynamic systems control is challenging. Ad hoc approaches which consider the human as an afterthought are limiting. This research proposed a systematic approach to human / computer interface design that focuses on both the semantic and syntactic aspects of display design in the context of human-in-the-loop supervisory control of intelligent, autonomous multi-agent simulated unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). A systematic way to understand what needs to be displayed, how it should be displayed, and how the integrated system needs to be assessed is outlined through a combination of concepts from naturalistic decision making, semiotic analysis, and situational awareness literature. A new sprocket-based design was designed and evaluated in this research. For the practical designer, this research developed a systematic, iterative design process: design using cognitive sensitive principles, test the new interface in a laboratory situation; bring in subject matter experts to examine the interface in isolation; and finally, incorporate the resulting feedback into a full-size simulation. At each one of these steps, the operator, the engineer and the designer reexamined the results

The Effect of Pilot and Air Traffic Control Experiences & Automation Management Strategies on UAS Mission Task Performance

Unmanned aircraft are relied on now more than ever to save lives and support the troops in the recent Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The demands for UAS capabilities are rapidly increasing in the civilian sector. However, UAS operations will not be carried out in the NAS until safety concerns are alleviated. Among these concerns is determining the appropriate level of automation in conjunction with a suitable pilot who exhibits the necessary knowledge, skills, and abilities to safely operate these systems. This research examined two levels of automation: Management by Consent (MBC) and Management by Exception (MBE). User experiences were also analyzed in conjunction with both levels of automation while operating an unmanned aircraft simulator. The user experiences encompass three individual groups: Pilots, ATC, and Human Factors. Performance, workload, and situation awareness data were examined, but did not show any significant differences among the groups. Shortfalls and constraints are heavily examined to help pave the wave for future research

An operational manpower analysis of the RQ-8 Fire Scout Vertical Take-Off Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV)

In August of 2001 the Secretary of the Navy announced the Navy would expand the work and experimentation in unmanned vehicle systems. After the events of September 11 this was accelerated with the increased urgency to combat terrorism and asymmetric threats. The U.S. Navy is currently undergoing testing and evaluation of the Fire Scout Vertical Take-Off Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV) and its integration into the fleet. An in depth analysis of the Fire Scout's manpower requirements is necessary as part of total force integration. At the present time, the Navy only utilizes aviation ratings by requirement and assignment as unmanned aerial system operators, unlike the Army and Marine Corps. Therefore, the Littoral Combat Ship manpower requirements exceed the Navy's target of 25 persons for the combined RQ-8B and SH-60 air detachment. Analysis shows a possible remedy to this problem is to allow non-aviation ratings the opportunity to operate the Fire Scout. This change in policy and occupational standards would generate greater operational capability and personnel flexibility for this newly acquired air ship and surface platform. Specifically, occupational research showed the Aviation Administrationman (AZ) rating is no more qualified to operate a Fire Scout VTUAV than the Operations Specialist (OS) rating. In fact, it can be argued that an OS is better qualified according to occupational standards to operate the Fire Scout. Therefore, one of the recommendations of this research is to add Operational Specialist as a source rating to NECs 8363 and 8364 immediately.http://archive.org/details/anoperationalman109453208US Navy (USN) author.Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

Minotaurs, Not Centaurs:The Future of Manned-Unmanned Teaming

Contesting Paul Scharre’s influential vision of “centaur warfighting” and the idea that autonomous weapon systems will replace human warfighters, this article proposes that the manned-unmanned teams of the future are more likely to be minotaurs, teams of humans under the control, supervision, or command of artificial intelligence. It examines the likely composition of the future force and prompts a necessary conversation about the ethical issues raised by minotaur warfighting.</p

Minotaurs, Not Centaurs: The Future of Manned-Unmanned Teaming

Contesting Paul Scharre’s influential vision of “centaur warfighting” and the idea that autonomous weapon systems will replace human warfighters, this article proposes that the manned-unmanned teams of the future are more likely to be minotaurs, teams of humans under the control, supervision, or command of artificial intelligence. It examines the likely composition of the future force and prompts a necessary conversation about the ethical issues raised by minotaur warfighting

The Underpinnings of Workload in Unmanned Vehicle Systems

This paper identifies and characterizes factors that contribute to operator workload in unmanned vehicle systems. Our objective is to provide a basis for developing models of workload for use in design and operation of complex human-machine systems. In 1986, Hart developed a foundational conceptual model of workload, which formed the basis for arguably the most widely used workload measurement techniquethe NASA Task Load Index. Since that time, however, there have been many advances in models and factor identification as well as workload control measures. Additionally, there is a need to further inventory and describe factors that contribute to human workload in light of technological advances, including automation and autonomy. Thus, we propose a conceptual framework for the workload construct and present a taxonomy of factors that can contribute to operator workload. These factors, referred to as workload drivers, are associated with a variety of system elements including the environment, task, equipment and operator. In addition, we discuss how workload moderators, such as automation and interface design, can be manipulated in order to influence operator workload. We contend that workload drivers, workload moderators, and the interactions among drivers and moderators all need to be accounted for when building complex, human-machine systems

Supervising and controlling unmanned systems: a multi-phase study with subject matter experts

Proliferation in the use of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs) in civil and military operations has presented a multitude of human factors challenges; from how to bridge the gap between demand and availability of trained operators, to how to organize and present data in meaningful ways. Utilizing the Design Research Methodology (DRM), a series of closely related studies with subject matter experts (SMEs) demonstrate how the focus of research gradually shifted from “how many systems can a single operator control” to “how to distribute missions among operators and systems in an efficient way”. The first set of studies aimed to explore the modal number, i.e., how many systems can a single operator supervise and control. It was found that an experienced operator can supervise up to 15 UASs efficiently using moderate levels of automation, and control (mission and payload management) up to three systems. Once this limit was reached, a single operator's performance was compared to a team controlling the same number of systems. In general, teams led to better performances. Hence, shifting design efforts toward developing tools that support teamwork environments of multiple operators with multiple UASs (MOMU). In MOMU settings, when the tasks are similar or when areas of interest overlap, one operator seems to have an advantage over a team who needs to collaborate and coordinate. However, in all other cases, a team was advantageous over a single operator. Other findings and implications, as well as future directions for research are discussed