How can philosophy of language help us navigate the political news cycle?

In this chapter, I try to answer the above question, and another question that it presupposes: can philosophy of language help us navigate the political news cycle? A reader can be sceptical of a positive answer to the latter question; after all, citizens, political theorists, and journalists seem to be capable of following current politics and its coverage in the news, and there is no reason to think that philosophy of language in particular should be capable of helping people make sense and respond to the news. I will illustrate the application of philosophy of language to three contrasting strategies of political propaganda: dogwhistles, meaning perversions, and bald-faced lies. I hope that these help us see that philosophy of language can be a good tool in diagnosing demagoguery, and in resisting it

From Dogwhistles to Bullhorns: Unveiling Coded Rhetoric with Language Models

Dogwhistles are coded expressions that simultaneously convey one meaning to a broad audience and a second one, often hateful or provocative, to a narrow in-group; they are deployed to evade both political repercussions and algorithmic content moderation. For example, in the sentence 'we need to end the cosmopolitan experiment,' the word 'cosmopolitan' likely means 'worldly' to many, but secretly means 'Jewish' to a select few. We present the first large-scale computational investigation of dogwhistles. We develop a typology of dogwhistles, curate the largest-to-date glossary of over 300 dogwhistles with rich contextual information and examples, and analyze their usage in historical U.S. politicians' speeches. We then assess whether a large language model (GPT-3) can identify dogwhistles and their meanings, and find that GPT-3's performance varies widely across types of dogwhistles and targeted groups. Finally, we show that harmful content containing dogwhistles avoids toxicity detection, highlighting online risks of such coded language. This work sheds light on the theoretical and applied importance of dogwhistles in both NLP and computational social science, and provides resources for future research in modeling dogwhistles and mitigating their online harms.Comment: ACL 2023, see https://dogwhistles.allen.ai/ for the glossary and other material

Dogwhistles: Persona and Ideology

A dogwhistle is a piece of language that sends one message to an out- group while at the same time sending a second (often taboo, controversial, or in- flammatory) message to an ingroup. We propose an analysis of dogwhistles in the setting of social meaning games that treats them as signaling the persona of the speaker, and in some circumstances enabling an enrichment of the conventional meaning of the expression through the connections of social personas and ideolo- gies, which we model formally. We show that this account improves over pitfalls encountered in other accounts (Henderson & McCready 2019b; Khoo 2017; Stanley 2015), which includes in some of our own previous work. We further show how this formal framework allows, not just a account of dogwhistles, but opens up a way to analyze a variety of sociopragmatic phenomena like unconscious bias and epistemic hypervigilance

Quasi-Dogwhistles: A Case Study of Creating Meaning

In 2017, a group of users on the website 4chan attempted to establish a new meaning of the common “OK” hand gesture. Claiming the sign meant “white power” the intention of this act was to trick left-leaning internet users and the media that an innocuous sign was racist, hence turning everyone unaware against them. A common narrative surrounding the situation was that the new meaning for the gesture as established by this group was a “hoax”. This situation serves as an interesting case study into understanding how we mean things by the use of signs. I will argue that the new meaning as established by the 4chan users is not a hoax. First, I will make a connection between signs like the OK gesture and dogwhistles. I will then label signs like the gesture “quasi-dogwhistles”. Then, I will argue against the new meaning being a hoax by appealing to an intentionalist theory of meaning. Intentionalism states we mean things by intending to change other’s psychological states and we change other’s psychological states by making them aware of our intention to do so. By appealing to the natural and non-natural meaning distinction as found in Grice’s introductory paper of intentionalism, I will demonstrate the multiple ways we can deny the fact that the quasi-dogwhistle’s meaning is a hoax. Finally, I will emphasize the roles natural and social meanings play in our understanding of public discourse

An account of overt intentional dogwhistling

Political communication in modern democratic societies often requires the speaker to address multiple audiences with heterogeneous values, interests and agendas. This creates an incentive for communication strategies that allow politicians to send, along with the explicit content of their speech, concealed messages that seek to secure the approval of certain groups without alienating the rest of the electorate. These strategies have been labeled dogwhistling in recent literature. In this article, we provide an analysis of overt intentional dogwhistling (OID). We recognize two main stages within the OIDs’ way of conveying a concealed message: the expression of a perspective together with the transmission of an accompanying positioning message vis-à-vis the OID targeted sub-audience, and the inferential extraction (by the target audience) of a set of cognitive and non-cognitive contents inferred on the basis of the former stage. Furthermore, we identify three linguistic mechanisms whereby these contents may be transmitted: conventional meaning, conversational implicature and perlocutionary inferencing. Hence, on our view OIDs are not a uniform category, as they may differ as to what extent the concealed content is speaker-meant, and thus actually communicated by the speaker.Fil: Lo Guercio, Nicolás Francisco. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Parque Centenario. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas. - Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas; ArgentinaFil: Caso, Ramiro. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Parque Centenario. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas. - Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentin

A _Simple Theory_ of Overt and Covert Dogwhistles

Politicians select their words meticulously, never losing sight of their ultimate communicative goal. Sometimes, their objective may be that of not being fully understood by a large portion of the audience. They can achieve this by means of dogwhistles; linguistic expressions that, in addition to their literal meaning, convey a concealed message to a specific sub-group of the audience. This paper focuses on the distinction between overt and covert dogwhistles introduced by J. Saul (2018). I argue that, even if the distinction successfully captures a genuine divide within the category of dogwhistles, the account proposed by Saul to explain the distinction is unsatisfactory. In response to this state of affairs, I illustrate how the distinction between overt and covert dogwhistle can be refined and illuminated by incorporating it into the 'Simple Theory' of dogwhistles advanced by J. Khoo (2017)

"Beasts in human form": How dangerous speech harms

Recent years have seen an upsurge of inflammatory speech around the world. Understanding the mechanisms that correlate speech with violence is a necessary step to explore the most effective forms of counterspeech. This paper starts with a review of the features of dangerous speech and ideology, as formulated by Jonathan Maynard and Susan Benesch. It then offers a conceptual framework to analyze some of the underlying linguistic mechanisms at play: derogatory language, code words, figleaves, and meaning perversions. It gives a hypothesis for assessing the moral responsibility of interlocutors in dangerous speech situations. The last section applies this framework to a case of demagogic discourse. The framework offered explains how public discourse has harmed social relations and institutions, and is an obstacle to rational resolutions to the political situation

Inferentialist semantics for lexicalized social meanings

This paper offers a general model of the semantics of lexicalized social meanings, i.e. semiotic properties of certain expressions in a socio-political context. Examples include slurs, problematically charged expressions such as inner city, as well as terms such as mother, which also carry implicit ideological associations. Insofar as their linguistic properties are concerned, social meanings can be construed as context-structuring devices: without introducing specific at-issue contents, they evoke background assumptions which shape the context of conversation. An inferentialist model of discourse is developed to account for this effect, in which the discursive significance of an utterance is defined as the set of inferences it licenses relative to a discursive context. A discursive context is a set of propositions that can serve as auxiliary premises in material inferences, together with a salience ranking that makes some of these propositions more readily available and therefore more relevant to determining discursive significance. Social meanings are defined as functions on discursive contexts that modify the salience ranking, increasing the salience of certain assumptions and stereotypes. As a result, they impact the discursive significance of utterances indirectly and independently of at-issue contents. They are also largely independent of speaker intentions in virtue of the ideological nature of discursive contexts

Racial Figleaves, the Shifting Boundaries of the Permissible, and the Rise of Donald Trump

The rise to power of Donald Trump has been shocking in many ways. One of these was that it disrupted the preexisting consensus that overt racism would be death to a national political campaign. In this paper, I argue that Trump made use of what I call "racial figleaves"—additional utterances that provide just enough cover to give reassurance to voters who are racially resentful but don't wish to see themselves as racist. These figleaves also, I argue, play a key role in shifting our norms about what counts as racist: they bring it about that something which would previously have been seen as revealing obvious racism is now seen as the sort of thing that a nonracist might say. This gives them tremendous power to corrupt not just our political discourse but our culture more broadly