Heterogeneous Facility Location without Money

The study of the facility location problem in the presence of self-interested agents has recently emerged as the benchmark problem in the research on mechanism design without money. In the setting studied in the literature so far, agents are single-parameter in that their type is a single number encoding their position on a real line. We here initiate a more realistic model for several real-life scenarios. Specifically, we propose and analyze heterogeneous facility location without money, a novel model wherein: (i) we have multiple heterogeneous (i.e., serving different purposes) facilities, (ii) agents' locations are disclosed to the mechanism and (iii) agents bid for the set of facilities they are interested in (as opposed to bidding for their position on the network). We study the heterogeneous facility location problem under two different objective functions, namely: social cost (i.e., sum of all agents' costs) and maximum cost. For either objective function, we study the approximation ratio of both deterministic and randomized truthful algorithms under the simplifying assumption that the underlying network topology is a line. For the social cost objective function, we devise an (n-1)-approximate deterministic truthful mechanism and prove a constant approximation lower bound. Furthermore, we devise an optimal and truthful (in expectation) randomized algorithm. As regards the maximum cost objective function, we propose a 3-approximate deterministic strategyproof algorithm, and prove a 3/2 approximation lower bound for deterministic strategyproof mechanisms. Furthermore, we propose a 3/2-approximate randomized strategyproof algorithm and prove a 4/3 approximation lower bound for randomized strategyproof algorithms

Effect of a Health Shock on Working Hours and Health Care Usage: The role of Financial Inclusion

This study explores the role of financial inclusion in the mitigation of the effects of a health shock at the household level. To that end, we examine empirically the effect of financial inclusion on household working hours and health care utilization, using round six of the Ghana Living Standard Survey data. We find that a health shock does decrease household working hours and increase the likelihood of health care utilization. This suggests that households in Ghana are not able to fully insure themselves against a health shock. However, we find that, faced with a health shock, households who are financially excluded see their working hours reduce more than those who enjoy full financial inclusion. Also, financial inclusion increases the likelihood of health care utilization when households experience a health shock. We find evidence that loan acquisition (borrowing) is one of the main mechanisms by which households can insure themselves against a health shock. Generally, our findings support the financial inclusion agenda of policymakers in Ghana and many other countries. Thus, efforts to ensure full financial inclusion will increase the probability of households using the financial sector as a means of insulating themselves against the effects of health shocks.JEL Classification Codes: O12, I10, G21, J22http://www.grips.ac.jp/list/jp/facultyinfo/leon_gonzalez_roberto

Partial Verification as a Substitute for Money

Recent work shows that we can use partial verification instead of money to implement truthful mechanisms. In this paper we develop tools to answer the following question. Given an allocation rule that can be made truthful with payments, what is the minimal verification needed to make it truthful without them? Our techniques leverage the geometric relationship between the type space and the set of possible allocations.Comment: Extended Version of 'Partial Verification as a Substitute for Money', AAAI 201

Sustaining a federation of future internet experimental facilities

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On Truthful Constrained Heterogeneous Facility Location with Max-Variant Cost

We consider a problem where agents have private positions on a line, and public approval preferences over two facilities, and their cost is the maximum distance from their approved facilities. The goal is to decide the facility locations to minimize the total and the max cost, while incentivizing the agents to be truthful. We design a strategyproof mechanism that is simultaneously $11$- and $5$-approximate for these two objective functions, thus improving the previously best-known bounds of $2n+1$ and $9$

Standing facilities and interbank borrowing: evidence from the Federal Reserve’s new discount window

Standing facilities are designed to place an upper bound on the rates at which financial institutions lend to one another overnight, reducing the volatility of the overnight interest rate, typically the rate targeted by central banks. However, improper design of the facility might decrease a bank’s incentive to participate actively in the interbank market. Thus, the mere availability of central bank provided credit may lead to its use being more than what would be expected based on the characteristics of the interbank market. ; By contrast, however, banks may perceive a stigma from using such facilities, and thus borrow less than what one might expect, thereby reducing the facilities’ effectiveness at reducing interest rate volatility. We develop a model demonstrating these two alternative implications of a standing facility. Empirical predictions of the model are then tested using data from the Federal Reserve’s new primary credit facility and the US federal funds market. A comparison of data from before and after recent changes to the discount window suggests continued reluctance to borrow from the Fed.Discount window ; Federal funds market (United States)