What matters to older people with assisted living needs? A phenomenological analysis of the use and non-use of telehealth and telecare

Telehealth and telecare research has been dominated by efficacy trials. The field lacks a sophisticated theorisation of [a] what matters to older people with assisted living needs; [b] how illness affects people's capacity to use technologies; and [c] the materiality of assistive technologies. We sought to develop a phenomenologically and socio-materially informed theoretical model of assistive technology use. Forty people aged 60–98 (recruited via NHS, social care and third sector) were visited at home several times in 2011–13. Using ethnographic methods, we built a detailed picture of participants' lives, illness experiences and use (or non-use) of technologies. Data were analysed phenomenologically, drawing on the work of Heidegger, and contextualised using a structuration approach with reference to Bourdieu's notions of habitus and field. We found that participants' needs were diverse and unique. Each had multiple, mutually reinforcing impairments (e.g. tremor and visual loss and stiff hands) that were steadily worsening, culturally framed and bound up with the prospect of decline and death. They managed these conditions subjectively and experientially, appropriating or adapting technologies so as to enhance their capacity to sense and act on their world. Installed assistive technologies met few participants' needs; some devices had been abandoned and a few deliberately disabled. Successful technology arrangements were often characterised by ‘bricolage’ (pragmatic customisation, combining new with legacy devices) by the participant or someone who knew and cared about them. With few exceptions, the current generation of so-called ‘assisted living technologies’ does not assist people to live with illness. To overcome this irony, technology providers need to move beyond the goal of representing technology users informationally (e.g. as biometric data) to providing flexible components from which individuals and their carers can ‘think with things’ to improve the situated, lived experience of multi-morbidity. A radical revision of assistive technology design policy may be needed

Reve\{a,i\}ling the risks: a phenomenology of information security

In information security research, perceived security usually has a negative meaning, when it is used in contrast to actual security. From a phenomenological perspective, however, perceived security is all we have. In this paper, we develop a phenomenological account of information security, where we distinguish between revealed and reveiled security instead. Linking these notions with the concepts of confidence and trust, we are able to give a phenomenological explanation of the electronic voting controversy in the Netherlands

Posthumanist Education

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The nature of the artificial: augmenting Negrottian artificiality with neo-Whiteheadian naturality

In this paper, a theory of the artificial recently proposed by Negrotti (1999a, 1999b, 2001a, 2001b) is critically examined. First, a brief overview of this theory is presented. It is then argued that despite the merits of this scheme, principal of which are the self-evident simplicity of its conceptual foundations, its internal consistency (or theoretical coherence), and its possible overall correctness, it is, nonetheless, incomplete. This incompleteness is shown to arise as a direct consequence of the explicit affirmation of a number of problematic metaphysical assumptions about the nature (as essence or what-ness) of nature (as 'other' to the artificial). An attempt at resolving the problem of incompleteness by augmenting the Negrottian theory of artificiality with an alternative conception of nature (as 'other') grounded in Whiteheadian panexperientialism is made. It is shown that although panexperientialism provides an adequate framework for the conceptualisation of naturality, it does not provide a corresponding framework for artificiality, principally because it fails to adequately characterise the nature (as essence) of artifacts. In order to address this latter problem, it is argued that conventional Whiteheadian panexperientialism must be supplemented with a phenomenological account of artificing that describes the ontologically distinct manner in which artifacts come to be. An attempt at formulating such a 'neo-Whiteheadian' account grounded in the metaphysical thinking of Ladrière, Lee, and others is made. In closing, some implications of this alternative Whiteheadian conception of naturality and the attendant neo-Whiteheadian account of artifactuality for the project of "strong" artificiality (that is, the attempt to artifactually replicate natural phenomena) are briefly considered

Towards a Philosophy of Woodworking: Re-embracing Community and Quality Craftsmanship in Contemporary America

Since the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth-century, humanity has appropriated the natural world for its uses, and only recently have we begun to understand the consequences of our actions. This misuse of the natural world has manifested itself thoroughly in all industries, including the woodworking field. To counteract this problem, I investigate its Cartesian philosophical underpinnings and propose a solution based upon the interconnected philosophy of the German Existentialist Martin Heidegger. Equipped with both the philosophy of Heidegger and concepts from the Deep Ecology movement (which insists upon the intrinsic value of all life on earth), I work to reformulate how woodworkers and tradesmen approach their craft. Before attempting this, however, I delve into a parallel field – that of organic agriculture – to investigate similarities in practical development. After a review of past woodworking philosophies, I develop six key concepts as well as a practical way forward for the woodworking community (based upon successes already witnessed in the organic movement). To conclude, I provide examples of how some aspects of this philosophy are already taking hold: most notably in vocational programs and small woodworking communities throughout our nation and the world

Environmental education: creative place-making in Papua New Guinea

This paper addresses how experience of environment may be an important stimulant in the creative process through which appropriate architectural place may be made. We will argue that with a better understanding of their own reactions in and to environments architectural students may be more sensitive to the effects of their architectural gestures on others. Accepting that such depth experiences are mirrored in archetypal forms and patterns in indigenous architectures, we will use as a case study the education of architects and the creation of architecture in Papua New Guinea [PNG]. We argue that an appropriate architecture, responsive to the locale of PNG, offers the antithesis of the often inappropriate internationalised architecture

Philosophical Hermeneutics and the Ethical Function of Architecture

Karsten Harries’ book, The Ethical Function of Architecture, raises the question of how architecture can be interpretive of and for our time. Part of Harries’ pursuit of this question is done in dialogue with the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, whose evocatively expressed ontology of building and dwelling recovered, in philosophical and poetic terms, the power of buildings to symbolize and interpret the most fundamental truths of being and human existence. The present essay identifies contributions to this hermeneutic and ontological approach to architecture drawn from the philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer, emphasizing Gadamer’s notions of play (Spiel), symbol, and the relation of the present to the past. While Gadamer expanded upon Heidegger’s hermeneutic, he also diverged from Heidegger in ways that mitigate some of the difficulties that Harries and others have found with Heidegger’s archaism, rural romanticism, and singularity of philosophical focus

How Could We Drink up the Sea? From Technological Nihilism to Dwelling in the Anthropocene

Humans face wide ranging and global challenges in the Anthropocene, the most prominent of which is anthropogenic climate change. One initial pivot towards sustainability, particularly in my home country of the United States, has been to rely heavily on technological innovation powered most obviously by engineers. Using the climate activist Greta Thunberg’s speech at the 2018 United Nations Climate Change Conference as my inspiration, I try to show how some of the technology based solutions only entrench what I call the “Bestance” mentality, that is, a fundamental stance or orientation toward the natural world in the Anthropocene wherein all entities show up as mere resources. Upon showing the various ways in which traditional ethical approaches and environmental philosophical approaches have proved unhelpful in navigating the challenges of the Anthropocene, I try to demonstrat e how a Heideggerian ecophenomenological approach can help us not only understand how the world appears to many of us in the Anthropocene, but also what a more graceful way of being might look like in Heidegger’s concept of “dwelling.” Using specific examp les of current technologies pervasively normalized in the United States, including hydraulic fracturing, horizontal drilling, desalination, and artificial nitrogen based fertilization, I use Heidegger’s philosophical concepts to show how the land, sea, and air can show up as Bestand in the Anthropocene, that is, mere materials on hand to be manipulated in order to serve human interests. I then utilize HeideggerHeidegger’s notion of dwelling as a useful concept to guide a more graceful way of living in which we respe ct the way in which things unfold on their own terms using examples similarly embedded in the land, sea and air

Beyond Instrumentalism: Exploring the Affordance Construal of Technology in Heidegger

Current philosophies of technology derived from and inspired by Heidegger’s—exemplified by Postphenomenology and Critical Constructivism—have favored a focus on technological design issues; succumbing consequently; to an instrumental view of technology. This favored focus had contributed to an obliviousness to technology’s inherent dangers which are precisely immune from technological design modifications. Exploring the construal of technology as affordances; this paper offers a contrasting reading of Heidegger’s technology as embedded and embodied dispositions for specific possibilities for being and doing. Consequently; it argues for a more viable alternative to the often-implicit instrumentalist and artefactual view of technologies that frequently undergird prevalent empirical inquiries on how to design technologies and on how to improve our use of technology. Specifically; the paper argues for the employment of an affordance construal to explain technological phenomena. Opposed to instrumentalism; the affordance construal of technology has the advantage of adopting Heidegger’s relational ontology in viewing technology; hereby eschewing the prevalent reductionist view of technologies as artefacts and instruments. In addition; such an account objects to the uncritical and triumphalist reception of any and all technological innovation and invention; typified by many transhumanist/posthumanist positions