The Insight of Empiricism. In Defense of a Hypothetical, but Propositional Given

In this paper, I defend a hypothetical but propositional given as the fundamental insight of empiricis

A syntactical comparison between pair sentential calculus PSC and Gupta\u27s definitional calculus Cn

In this paper we will compare two logical systems PSC and Cn with a syntactical point of view. Because both notions of the pair-sentence with stage number in PSC and Gupta\u27s sentence-definition with revision stage number in Cn are very similar, and both can deal with paradoxical sentences like a simple Liar sentence. His system was defined as a predicate calculus, but here we will introduce the propositional version of Cn for the comparison, and we had the following results: (1) C0 is a sublogic of PSC, or PSC is an extension of C0 under the two translations tC and tP. Similarly, PSCn is an extension of Cn. (2) If we extend the systems C0 and Cn by adding three properties: exchangeability, transitivity and relativity of revision indices, then two logics C0 and PSC (also Cn and PSCn) are syntactically equivalent. (3) We can calculate a cycle number of each pair sentence in PSC, but not in C0. (4) PSC can deal with multiple pair sentences, but difficult to deal with such multiple defnitions in Cn

Toward 'Perfect Collections of Properties': Locke on the Constitution of Substantial Sorts

Locke's claims about the "inadequacy" of substance-ideas can only be understood once it is recognized that the "sort" represented by such an idea is not wholly determined by the idea's descriptive content. The key to his compromise between classificatory conventionalism and essentialism is his injunction to "perfect" the abstract ideas that serve as "nominal essences." This injunction promotes the pursuit of collections of perceptible qualities that approach ever closer to singling out things that possess some shared explanatory-level constitution. It is in view of this norm regulating natural-historical inquiry that a substance-idea represents a sort for which some such constitution serves as the "real essence," i.e. as that on which all the sort's characteristic "properties" depend

Some syntactical and semantical properties for pair sentential calculus PSC

This paper is an extended version of my talk in the Conference of Non-Classical Logics 2016. In this paper we will introduce a system that rejects the principle of identity "A is A", one of the third Aristotelian principles for thinking. The proposed system allows to deal with paradoxical sentences, like a Liar sentence "A is not A". We present both an axiomatic system and an adequate semantics for it

The Formation of British Land Revenue Policy in the Ceded and Conquered Provinces of Northern India, 1801-1833.

British land revenue policy in the Ceded and Conquered Provinces, has five distinct phases, and a chapter is devoted to each. Chapter One examines the early years of the policy (1801-07) when the Bengal influence was dominant. At this stage, an insignificant awareness of the local situation existed. Despite the shortcomings of the early arrangements, a beginning was made in resolving the deplorable state of affairs inherited from former rulers. Chapter Two (1807-15) analyses the reasons for the rejection of the permanent settlement announced in the early years. During this period the influence of the Home Authorities was decisive. As an alternative to the permanent settlement, a periodical settlement based on Adam Smith's ideas, was proposed by the Court of Directors. Chapter Three (1813-22) shows the emergence of the new plan of settlement. This plan was developed in Bengal, although the influence of the Home Authorities was behind it. Chapter Four (1822-33) explains the arrangements epitomised in Regulation VII of 1822 and examines the failure of settlements under it. In the Fifth Chapter, the revision of policy which was finalised in 1833, is examined. This had become necessary in consequence of the failure of Regulation VII of 1822. The arrangement of 1833 was essentially the contribution of Lord William Bentinck. The present work is primarily based on a study of the unpublished records of the East India Company and the private papers of several administrators of British India

Physics Avoidance & Cooperative Semantics: Inferentialism and Mark Wilson’s Engagement with Naturalism Qua Applied Mathematics

Mark Wilson argues that the standard categorizations of "Theory T thinking"— logic-centered conceptions of scientific organization (canonized via logical empiricists in the mid-twentieth century)—dampens the understanding and appreciation of those strategic subtleties working within science. By "Theory T thinking," we mean to describe the simplistic methodology in which mathematical science allegedly supplies ‘processes’ that parallel nature's own in a tidily isomorphic fashion, wherein "Theory T’s" feigned rigor and methodological dogmas advance inadequate discrimination that fails to distinguish between explanatory structures that are architecturally distinct. One of Wilson's main goals is to reverse such premature exclusions and, thus, early on Wilson returns to John Locke's original physical concerns regarding material science and the congeries of descriptive concern insofar as capturing varied phenomena (i.e., cohesion, elasticity, fracture, and the transmission of coherent work) encountered amongst ordinary solids like wood and steel are concerned. Of course, Wilson methodologically updates such a purview by appealing to multiscalar techniques of modern computing, drawing from Robert Batterman's work on the greediness of scales and Jim Woodward's insights on causation

Properties

Panorama aggiornato delle principali teorie filosofiche su propriet\ue0 e relazioni intese come universal

Ordinary Empirical Judgments and our Scientific Knowledge: An Extension of Reformed Empiricism to the Philosophy of Science

This essay examines the relationship between ordinary empirical judgments and our scientific worldviews. It is concerned with how ordinary judgments (and the primitive frameworks in which they are formulated) might be usefully integrated into an account of epistemological progress, both of our personal views and scientific theories, such that the sciences (especially modern theories of space and time) can reasonably be thought as being informed by, and evolving out of, at least some of the various pre-scientific views they have replaced. We examine our normal perceptual judgments of magnitude, position, orientation, and displacement in the hope of uncovering the logical, conceptual, and empirical relations that exist between such judgments (as well as the views of the world they presuppose) and our sophisticated understandings of space, time, and motion in physical theory. This research contends that experience and a rich type of conceptual analysis—one that examines the presuppositions that make possible the application of concepts in empirical contexts—together provide the framework within which a rational account of such relations can be proposed. The project thus defends a form of empiricism, but one distinct from classical forms (be they British empiricism, Russellian empiricism, or logical empiricism)—rather a slightly modified version of Anil Gupta’s “Reformed Empiricism”. This empiricism is capable of avoiding the logical excesses and errors of earlier forms, whilst providing an account of how a set of basic empiricist principles might be extended from their context in general epistemology to recalcitrant problems in the philosophy of science, such as the problem of our formal knowledge, the problem of the communicability of observation, and the rationality of theoretical progress. Such an extension offers a comprehensive account both of our ordinary and scientific knowledge