Computational Grounded Cognition: A New Alliance between Grounded Cognition and Computational Modeling

Grounded theories assume that there is no central module for cognition. According to this view, all cognitive phenomena, including those considered the province of amodal cognition such as reasoning, numeric, and language processing, are ultimately grounded in (and emerge from) a variety of bodily, affective, perceptual, and motor processes. The development and expression of cognition is constrained by the embodiment of cognitive agents and various contextual factors (physical and social) in which they are immersed. The grounded framework has received numerous empirical confirmations. Still, there are very few explicit computational models that implement grounding in sensory, motor and affective processes as intrinsic to cognition, and demonstrate that grounded theories can mechanistically implement higher cognitive abilities. We propose a new alliance between grounded cognition and computational modeling toward a novel multidisciplinary enterprise: Computational Grounded Cognition. We clarify the defining features of this novel approach and emphasize the importance of using the methodology of Cognitive Robotics, which permits simultaneous consideration of multiple aspects of grounding, embodiment, and situatedness, showing how they constrain the development and expression of cognition

Affordances, Adaptive Tool Use and Grounded Cognition

addendum: [OA] owner: teslar timestamp: 2011.03.2

Cognitive conflict is an example of action-grounded cognition.

The aim of the present work was to show that cognitive conflict, an issue that has been widely studied within the boundaries of the classical cognitive approach, is a clear example of higher order cognition tied to perception and action. Examples of how the cognitive conflict arising from spatial correspondence tasks is highly grounded in body attributes and in environmental/situational factors are provided. Spatial performance is strongly modulated by handedness, prior experience and by social factors. In addition, in two experiments empirical findings are reported showing that the spatial correspondence effect is a function of the location of the dynamic event even when target location is in the opposite position. These results point to the notion that spatial performance is refractory from the intervention of higher order cognition

Introduction to the Special Topic Embodied and Grounded Cognition

Introduction: In the last 10–15 years, the embodied and grounded (E and G) cognition approach has become widespread in all fields related to cognitive (neuro) science, and a lot of evidence has been collected. The approach proposes that cognitive activity is grounded in sensory–motor processes and situated in specific contexts and situations. This special topic had two aims: first, give an idea of the field in its broadness. Second, focus on some challenges for E and G theories. The first important challenge is to account for understanding abstract concepts and words. Evidence on the representation of concrete concepts is compelling, whereas evidence on abstract concepts is still scarce and limited to restricted domains. A second important challenge concerns the role of computational models. E and G theories of cognition need to formulate more precise hypotheses, and models help to constrain and specify in more detail the predictions and the claims advanced

The role of simulations in consumer experiences and behavior: insights from the grounded cognition theory of desire

What are the mechanisms by which extrinsic and environmental cues affect consumer experiences, desires, and choices? Based on the recent grounded cognition theory of desire, we argue that consumption and reward simulations constitute a central mechanism in these phenomena. Specifically, we argue that appetitive stimuli, such as specific product cues, can activate simulations of consuming and enjoying the respective products, based on previous learning experiences. These consumption and reward simulations can lead to motivated behavior, and can be modulated by state and trait individual differences, situational factors, and product-extrinsic cues. We outline the role of simulations within the grounded theory of desire, offering a theoretical framework for understanding motivational processes in consumer behavior. Then we illustrate the theory with behavioral, physiological, and neuroimaging findings on simulations in appetitive behavior and sensory marketing. Finally, we outline important issues for further research and applications for stimulating healthy, prosocial, and sustainable consumer choices

On staying grounded and avoiding Quixotic dead ends

The 15 articles in this special issue on The Representation of Concepts illustrate the rich variety of theoretical positions and supporting research that characterize the area. Although much agreement exists among contributors, much disagreement exists as well, especially about the roles of grounding and abstraction in conceptual processing. I first review theoretical approaches raised in these articles that I believe are Quixotic dead ends, namely, approaches that are principled and inspired but likely to fail. In the process, I review various theories of amodal symbols, their distortions of grounded theories, and fallacies in the evidence used to support them. Incorporating further contributions across articles, I then sketch a theoretical approach that I believe is likely to be successful, which includes grounding, abstraction, flexibility, explaining classic conceptual phenomena, and making contact with real-world situations. This account further proposes that (1) a key element of grounding is neural reuse, (2) abstraction takes the forms of multimodal compression, distilled abstraction, and distributed linguistic representation (but not amodal symbols), and (3) flexible context-dependent representations are a hallmark of conceptual processing

An efficient coding approach to the debate on grounded cognition

The debate between the amodal and the grounded views of cognition seems to be stuck. Their only substantial disagreement is about the vehicle or format of concepts. Amodal theorists reject the grounded claim that concepts are couched in the same modality-specific format as representations in sensory systems. The problem is that there is no clear characterization of (modal or amodal) format or its neural correlate. In order to make the disagreement empirically meaningful and move forward in the discussion we need a neurocognitive criterion for representational format. I argue that efficient coding models in computational neuroscience can be used to characterize modal codes: These are codes which satisfy special informational demands imposed by sensory tasks. Additionally, I examine recent studies on neural coding and argue that although they do not provide conclusive evidence for either the grounded or the amodal views, they can be used to determine what predictions these approaches can make and what experimental and theoretical developments would be required to settle the debate

Sensory marketing, embodiment, and grounded cognition: A review and introduction

There has been a recent swell of interest in marketing as well as psychology pertaining to the role of sensory experiences in judgment and decision making. Within marketing, the field of sensory marketing has developed which explores the role of the senses in consumer behavior. In psychology, the dominant computer metaphor of information processing has been challenged by researchers demonstrating various manners in which mental activity is grounded in sensory experience. These findings are arduous to explain using the amodal model of the human mind. In this introduction, we first delineate key assumptions of the information processing paradigm and then discuss some of the key conceptual challenges posed by the research generally appearing under the titles of embodiment, grounded cognition, or sensory marketing. We then address the use of bodily feelings as a source of information; next, we turn to the role of context sensitive perception, imagery, and simulation in consumer behavior, and finally discuss the role of metaphors. Through this discourse, we note the contributions to the present special issue as applicable.Peer Reviewedhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/141359/1/jcpy159.pd

An efficient coding approach to the debate on grounded cognition

The debate between the amodal and the grounded views of cognition seems to be stuck. Their only substantial disagreement is about the vehicle or format of concepts. Amodal theorists reject the grounded claim that concepts are couched in the same modality-specific format as representations in sensory systems. The problem is that there is no clear characterization of (modal or amodal) format or its neural correlate. In order to make the disagreement empirically meaningful and move forward in the discussion we need a neurocognitive criterion for representational format. I argue that efficient coding models in computational neuroscience can be used to characterize modal codes: These are codes which satisfy special informational demands imposed by sensory tasks. Additionally, I examine recent studies on neural coding and argue that although they do not provide conclusive evidence for either the grounded or the amodal views, they can be used to determine what predictions these approaches can make and what experimental and theoretical developments would be required to settle the debate

The Mechanics of Embodiment: A Dialogue on Embodiment and Computational Modeling

Embodied theories are increasingly challenging traditional views of cognition by arguing that conceptual representations that constitute our knowledge are grounded in sensory and motor experiences, and processed at this sensorimotor level, rather than being represented and processed abstractly in an amodal conceptual system. Given the established empirical foundation, and the relatively underspecified theories to date, many researchers are extremely interested in embodied cognition but are clamouring for more mechanistic implementations. What is needed at this stage is a push toward explicit computational models that implement sensory-motor grounding as intrinsic to cognitive processes. In this article, six authors from varying backgrounds and approaches address issues concerning the construction of embodied computational models, and illustrate what they view as the critical current and next steps toward mechanistic theories of embodiment. The first part has the form of a dialogue between two fictional characters: Ernest, the �experimenter�, and Mary, the �computational modeller�. The dialogue consists of an interactive sequence of questions, requests for clarification, challenges, and (tentative) answers, and touches the most important aspects of grounded theories that should inform computational modeling and, conversely, the impact that computational modeling could have on embodied theories. The second part of the article discusses the most important open challenges for embodied computational modelling