Noncontextuality with Marginal Selectivity in Reconstructing Mental Architectures

We present a general theory of series-parallel mental architectures with selectively influenced stochastically non-independent components. A mental architecture is a hypothetical network of processes aimed at performing a task, of which we only observe the overall time it takes under variable parameters of the task. It is usually assumed that the network contains several processes selectively influenced by different experimental factors, and then the question is asked as to how these processes are arranged within the network, e.g., whether they are concurrent or sequential. One way of doing this is to consider the distribution functions for the overall processing time and compute certain linear combinations thereof (interaction contrasts). The theory of selective influences in psychology can be viewed as a special application of the interdisciplinary theory of (non)contextuality having its origins and main applications in quantum theory. In particular, lack of contextuality is equivalent to the existence of a "hidden" random entity of which all the random variables in play are functions. Consequently, for any given value of this common random entity, the processing times and their compositions (minima, maxima, or sums) become deterministic quantities. These quantities, in turn, can be treated as random variables with (shifted) Heaviside distribution functions, for which one can easily compute various linear combinations across different treatments, including interaction contrasts. This mathematical fact leads to a simple method, more general than the previously used ones, to investigate and characterize the interaction contrast for different types of series-parallel architectures.Comment: published in Frontiers in Psychology: Cognition 1:12 doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00735 (special issue "Quantum Structures in Cognitive and Social Science"

The Knowledge Level in Cognitive Architectures: Current Limitations and Possible Developments

In this paper we identify and characterize an analysis of two problematic aspects affecting the representational level of cognitive architectures (CAs), namely: the limited size and the homogeneous typology of the encoded and processed knowledge. We argue that such aspects may constitute not only a technological problem that, in our opinion, should be addressed in order to build articial agents able to exhibit intelligent behaviours in general scenarios, but also an epistemological one, since they limit the plausibility of the comparison of the CAs' knowledge representation and processing mechanisms with those executed by humans in their everyday activities. In the final part of the paper further directions of research will be explored, trying to address current limitations and future challenges

Cognitive architectures as Lakatosian research programmes: two case studies

Cognitive architectures - task-general theories of the structure and function of the complete cognitive system - are sometimes argued to be more akin to frameworks or belief systems than scientific theories. The argument stems from the apparent non-falsifiability of existing cognitive architectures. Newell was aware of this criticism and argued that architectures should be viewed not as theories subject to Popperian falsification, but rather as Lakatosian research programs based on cumulative growth. Newell's argument is undermined because he failed to demonstrate that the development of Soar, his own candidate architecture, adhered to Lakatosian principles. This paper presents detailed case studies of the development of two cognitive architectures, Soar and ACT-R, from a Lakatosian perspective. It is demonstrated that both are broadly Lakatosian, but that in both cases there have been theoretical progressions that, according to Lakatosian criteria, are pseudo-scientific. Thus, Newell's defense of Soar as a scientific rather than pseudo-scientific theory is not supported in practice. The ACT series of architectures has fewer pseudo-scientific progressions than Soar, but it too is vulnerable to accusations of pseudo-science. From this analysis, it is argued that successive versions of theories of the human cognitive architecture must explicitly address five questions to maintain scientific credibility

Evaluation of Cognitive Architectures for Cyber-Physical Production Systems

Cyber-physical production systems (CPPS) integrate physical and computational resources due to increasingly available sensors and processing power. This enables the usage of data, to create additional benefit, such as condition monitoring or optimization. These capabilities can lead to cognition, such that the system is able to adapt independently to changing circumstances by learning from additional sensors information. Developing a reference architecture for the design of CPPS and standardization of machines and software interfaces is crucial to enable compatibility of data usage between different machine models and vendors. This paper analysis existing reference architecture regarding their cognitive abilities, based on requirements that are derived from three different use cases. The results from the evaluation of the reference architectures, which include two instances that stem from the field of cognitive science, reveal a gap in the applicability of the architectures regarding the generalizability and the level of abstraction. While reference architectures from the field of automation are suitable to address use case specific requirements, and do not address the general requirements, especially w.r.t. adaptability, the examples from the field of cognitive science are well usable to reach a high level of adaption and cognition. It is desirable to merge advantages of both classes of architectures to address challenges in the field of CPPS in Industrie 4.0

Consciosusness in Cognitive Architectures. A Principled Analysis of RCS, Soar and ACT-R

This report analyses the aplicability of the principles of consciousness developed in the ASys project to three of the most relevant cognitive architectures. This is done in relation to their aplicability to build integrated control systems and studying their support for general mechanisms of real-time consciousness.\ud To analyse these architectures the ASys Framework is employed. This is a conceptual framework based on an extension for cognitive autonomous systems of the General Systems Theory (GST).\ud A general qualitative evaluation criteria for cognitive architectures is established based upon: a) requirements for a cognitive architecture, b) the theoretical framework based on the GST and c) core design principles for integrated cognitive conscious control systems

The role of falsification in the development of cognitive architectures: insights from a Lakatosian analysis

It has been suggested that the enterprise of developing mechanistic theories of the human cognitive architecture is flawed because the theories produced are not directly falsifiable. Newell attempted to sidestep this criticism by arguing for a Lakatosian model of scientific progress in which cognitive architectures should be understood as theories that develop over time. However, Newell’s own candidate cognitive architecture adhered only loosely to Lakatosian principles. This paper reconsiders the role of falsification and the potential utility of Lakatosian principles in the development of cognitive architectures. It is argued that a lack of direct falsifiability need not undermine the scientific development of a cognitive architecture if broadly Lakatosian principles are adopted. Moreover, it is demonstrated that the Lakatosian concepts of positive and negative heuristics for theory development and of general heuristic power offer methods for guiding the development of an architecture and for evaluating the contribution and potential of an architecture’s research program

The challenge of complexity for cognitive systems

Complex cognition addresses research on (a) high-level cognitive processes – mainly problem solving, reasoning, and decision making – and their interaction with more basic processes such as perception, learning, motivation and emotion and (b) cognitive processes which take place in a complex, typically dynamic, environment. Our focus is on AI systems and cognitive models dealing with complexity and on psychological findings which can inspire or challenge cognitive systems research. In this overview we first motivate why we have to go beyond models for rather simple cognitive processes and reductionist experiments. Afterwards, we give a characterization of complexity from our perspective. We introduce the triad of cognitive science methods – analytical, empirical, and engineering methods – which in our opinion have all to be utilized to tackle complex cognition. Afterwards we highlight three aspects of complex cognition – complex problem solving, dynamic decision making, and learning of concepts, skills and strategies. We conclude with some reflections about and challenges for future research

The Mechanics of Embodiment: A Dialogue on Embodiment and Computational Modeling

Embodied theories are increasingly challenging traditional views of cognition by arguing that conceptual representations that constitute our knowledge are grounded in sensory and motor experiences, and processed at this sensorimotor level, rather than being represented and processed abstractly in an amodal conceptual system. Given the established empirical foundation, and the relatively underspecified theories to date, many researchers are extremely interested in embodied cognition but are clamouring for more mechanistic implementations. What is needed at this stage is a push toward explicit computational models that implement sensory-motor grounding as intrinsic to cognitive processes. In this article, six authors from varying backgrounds and approaches address issues concerning the construction of embodied computational models, and illustrate what they view as the critical current and next steps toward mechanistic theories of embodiment. The first part has the form of a dialogue between two fictional characters: Ernest, the �experimenter�, and Mary, the �computational modeller�. The dialogue consists of an interactive sequence of questions, requests for clarification, challenges, and (tentative) answers, and touches the most important aspects of grounded theories that should inform computational modeling and, conversely, the impact that computational modeling could have on embodied theories. The second part of the article discusses the most important open challenges for embodied computational modelling

A New Constructivist AI: From Manual Methods to Self-Constructive Systems

The development of artificial intelligence (AI) systems has to date been largely one of manual labor. This constructionist approach to AI has resulted in systems with limited-domain application and severe performance brittleness. No AI architecture to date incorporates, in a single system, the many features that make natural intelligence general-purpose, including system-wide attention, analogy-making, system-wide learning, and various other complex transversal functions. Going beyond current AI systems will require significantly more complex system architecture than attempted to date. The heavy reliance on direct human specification and intervention in constructionist AI brings severe theoretical and practical limitations to any system built that way. One way to address the challenge of artificial general intelligence (AGI) is replacing a top-down architectural design approach with methods that allow the system to manage its own growth. This calls for a fundamental shift from hand-crafting to self-organizing architectures and self-generated code – what we call a constructivist AI approach, in reference to the self-constructive principles on which it must be based. Methodologies employed for constructivist AI will be very different from today’s software development methods; instead of relying on direct design of mental functions and their implementation in a cog- nitive architecture, they must address the principles – the “seeds” – from which a cognitive architecture can automatically grow. In this paper I describe the argument in detail and examine some of the implications of this impending paradigm shift