Bochvar's Three-Valued Logic and Literal Paralogics: Their Lattice and Functional Equivalence

In the present paper, various features of the class of propositional literal paralogics are considered. Literal paralogics are logics in which the paraproperties such as paraconsistence, paracompleteness and paranormality, occur only at the level of literals; that is, formulas that are propositional letters or their iterated negations. We begin by analyzing Bochvar’s three-valued nonsense logic B3 , which includes two isomorphs of the propositional classical logic CPC. The combination of these two ‘strong’ isomorphs leads to the construction of two famous paralogics P1 and I1, which are functionally equivalent. Moreover, each of these logics is functionally equivalent to the fragment of logic B3 consisting of external formulas only. In conclusion, we structure a four-element lattice of three-valued paralogics with respect to the possession of paraproperties

Adding an Implication to Logics of Perfect Paradefinite Algebras

Perfect paradefinite algebras are De Morgan algebras expanded with a perfection (or classicality) operation. They form a variety that is term-equivalent to the variety of involutive Stone algebras. Their associated multiple-conclusion (Set-Set) and single-conclusion (Set-Fmla) order-preserving logics are non-algebraizable self-extensional logics of formal inconsistency and undeterminedness determined by a six-valued matrix, studied in depth by Gomes et al. (2022) from both the algebraic and the proof-theoretical perspectives. We continue hereby that study by investigating directions for conservatively expanding these logics with an implication connective (essentially, one that admits the deduction-detachment theorem). We first consider logics given by very simple and manageable non-deterministic semantics whose implication (in isolation) is classical. These, nevertheless, fail to be self-extensional. We then consider the implication realized by the relative pseudo-complement over the six-valued perfect paradefinite algebra. Our strategy is to expand such algebra with this connective and study the (self-extensional) Set-Set and Set-Fmla order-preserving logics, as well as the T-assertional logics of the variety induced by the new algebra. We provide axiomatizations for such new variety and for such logics, drawing parallels with the class of symmetric Heyting algebras and with Moisil's `symmetric modal logic'. For the Set-Set logic, in particular, the axiomatization we obtain is analytic. We close by studying interpolation properties for these logics and concluding that the new variety has the Maehara amalgamation property

One-variable fragments of first-order logics

The one-variable fragment of a first-order logic may be viewed as an "S5-like" modal logic, where the universal and existential quantifiers are replaced by box and diamond modalities, respectively. Axiomatizations of these modal logics have been obtained for special cases -- notably, the modal counterparts S5 and MIPC of the one-variable fragments of first-order classical logic and intuitionistic logic -- but a general approach, extending beyond first-order intermediate logics, has been lacking. To this end, a sufficient criterion is given in this paper for the one-variable fragment of a semantically-defined first-order logic -- spanning families of intermediate, substructural, many-valued, and modal logics -- to admit a natural axiomatization. More precisely, such an axiomatization is obtained for the one-variable fragment of any first-order logic based on a variety of algebraic structures with a lattice reduct that has the superamalgamation property, building on a generalized version of a functional representation theorem for monadic Heyting algebras due to Bezhanishvili and Harding. An alternative proof-theoretic strategy for obtaining such axiomatization results is also developed for first-order substructural logics that have a cut-free sequent calculus and admit a certain interpolation property.Comment: arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:2209.0856

First-order Goedel logics

First-order Goedel logics are a family of infinite-valued logics where the sets of truth values V are closed subsets of [0, 1] containing both 0 and 1. Different such sets V in general determine different Goedel logics G_V (sets of those formulas which evaluate to 1 in every interpretation into V). It is shown that G_V is axiomatizable iff V is finite, V is uncountable with 0 isolated in V, or every neighborhood of 0 in V is uncountable. Complete axiomatizations for each of these cases are given. The r.e. prenex, negation-free, and existential fragments of all first-order Goedel logics are also characterized.Comment: 37 page

The logical way of being true: Truth values and the ontological foundation of logic

In this paper I reject the normative interpretation of logic and give reasons for a realistic account based on the ontological treatment of logical values

Refutation Systems : An Overview and Some Applications to Philosophical Logics

Refutation systems are systems of formal, syntactic derivations, designed to derive the non-valid formulas or logical consequences of a given logic. Here we provide an overview with comprehensive references on the historical development of the theory of refutation systems and discuss some of their applications to philosophical logics

Deductive Systems in Traditional and Modern Logic

The book provides a contemporary view on different aspects of the deductive systems in various types of logics including term logics, propositional logics, logics of refutation, non-Fregean logics, higher order logics and arithmetic

Paraconsistent logics, conventionalism and ontology

Paraconsistent logics may be viewed as one of the last elements in a series of rapid developments in science in the 19th and early 20th c., triggered by the appearance of non-Euclidean geometries. The philosophy of conventionalism, which gave a metatheoretical framework to the basic changes involved, may also help in evaluating the truth import of (paraconsistent) logic and in determining its relation to ontology

De Finettian Logics of Indicative Conditionals Part II: Proof Theory and Algebraic Semantics

In Part I of this paper, we identified and compared various schemes for trivalent truth conditions for indicative conditionals, most notably the proposals by de Finetti (1936) and Reichenbach (1935, 1944) on the one hand, and by Cooper ( Inquiry , 11 , 295–320, 1968) and Cantwell ( Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic , 49 , 245–260, 2008) on the other. Here we provide the proof theory for the resulting logics and , using tableau calculi and sequent calculi, and proving soundness and completeness results. Then we turn to the algebraic semantics, where both logics have substantive limitations: allows for algebraic completeness, but not for the construction of a canonical model, while fails the construction of a Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra. With these results in mind, we draw up the balance and sketch future research projects