License prices for financially constrained firms

It is often alleged that high auction prices inhibit service deployment. We investigate this claim under the extreme case of financially constrained bidders. If demand is just slightly elastic, auctions maximize consumer surplus if consumer surplus is a convex function of quantity (a common assumption), or if consumer surplus is concave and the proportion of expenditure spent on deployment is greater than one over the elasticity of demand. The latter condition appears to be true for most of the large telecom auctions in the US and Europe. Thus, even if high auction prices inhibit service deployment, auctions appear to be optimal from the consumers’ point of view

License Prices for Financially Constrained Firms

It is often alleged that high auction prices inhibit service deployment. We investigate this claim under the extreme case of financially constrained bidders. If demand is just slightly elastic, auctions maximize consumer surplus if consumer surplus is a convex function of quantity (a common assumption), or if consumer surplus is concave and the proportion of expenditure spent on deployment is greater than one over the elasticity of demand. The latter condition appears to be true for most of the large telecom auctions in the US and Europe. Thus, even if high auction prices inhibit service deployment, auctions appear to be optimal from the consumers' point of view.

Techno-Economic Analysis of 5G Deployment Scenarios involving Massive MIMO HetNets over mmWave: A Case Study on the US State of Texas

The fifth generation (5G) of mobile services envisages network heterogeneity, cell densification, and high spectral efficiency using Massive MIMO, operating at millimeter-wave frequencies. Accurately assessing the potential of financial returns for such a complex network poses to operators unique challenges including techno-economic analysis leading to the identification of decision variables most sensitive to the profitability parameters. Attempting to demystify their concerns, we evaluate the profitability potential for realistic 5G deployment scenarios over 28 GHz frequency in the State of Texas. Interestingly, we discover that the total cost of ownership for 5G network is about one-third of that for 4G LTE-Advanced (LTE-A) deployment, yielding estimated returns amounting to $482.14 million for the period 2020-2030. The sensitivity analyses predict profitability in 70% of the cases of 5G, against LTE-A. For operators, the crucial levers having the maximum impact on profitability are decisions pertaining to the spectrum acquisition and the pricing of services

3G - chance for take-off in mobile

It became clear early on that UMTS, also known as 3G (third-generation mobile phone systems), would be a key technology for profitable markets of the future. However UMTS technology offers some major advantages that can be demonstrated under laboratory conditions but which it will not be possible to use fully in the mass market in the medium term. There is a need for services that emphasise the specific advantages of mobile phones and complement conventional wired services. Business models stand a particular chance of success if network operator, content providers and manufacturers of terminals coordinate the steps they take. In summary it may be said, that it is not certain that UMTS will be a success in m-business, but there is a strong chance.ICT, mobile telephony, UMTS

Valuation of 3G spectrum license in India: A real option approach

India is about to enter a new technological phase as far as mobile technology is concerned. After almost a decade of existence, Third Generation (3G) mobile technology will be rolled out in India. The licenses for the same were auctioned in April – May 2010 and 3G licenses were allocated to the winners in September 2010. Nine private telecom operators entered the bidding for the license and eventually seven won the licenses. The bidding was intense and eventually the aggregate fees of the license as received by the government were almost twice the expected amount. In the backdrop of experience of 3G auction winners in UK and Germany who paid huge sums to acquire the 3G licenses and later lost their market capitalization as the markets perceived that the price paid for the license was more than the actual value of the license, analysts in India were concerned if the operators had paid too much for the licenses. In this report aggregate value of the 3G licenses is calculated using both traditional discounted cash flow approach and real options approach. We find that the rollout of 3G services gives an internal rate of return of 14.2%over the life of the license. If we assume an internal rate of return of 15% for the telecom operators then the aggregate license value comes out to be INR 594 Billion which is 12% lower than what the operators have paid to acquire the license. We also found out that the value of the license as calculated from the real options methodology is INR 798 Billion which is 17.8% higher than the aggregate value paid by the operators. Hence we see that DCF valuation suggests that the licenses were overvalued while Real Options methodology suggests that the licenses were undervalued. The report discusses the reasons for differences between real option valuation and DCF valuation of the license, the possible challenges that the 3Goperators might face in the short to long term and what are the key enablers for the growth of3G services if they want to extract the maximum mileage out of the 3G technology. The report recommends that in future while allocating telecom licenses or licenses in sectors where high and irreversible investment is required and there is a scope for the licensees to invest in phases or in modules, the government should consider real options methodology for setting the price of the license., or the base price of the licenses in case the government decides to follow an auction methodology3G spectrum, mobile technology, valuation, real options, DCF

Explaining the lack of dynamics in the diffusion of small stationary fuel cells

Using the reaction of hydrogen with oxygen to water in order to produce electricity and heat, promises a high electrical efficiency even in small devices which can be installed close to the consumer. This approach seems to be an impressive idea to contribute to a viable future energy supply under the restrictions of climate change policy. Major reasons currently hampering the diffusion of such technologies for house energy supply in Germany are analysed in this paper. The barriers revealed, include high production costs as well as economic and legal obstacles for installing the devices so that they can be operated in competition to central power plants, beside others in tenancies.fuel cell, diffusion processes, valuation of environmental effects, technological innovation

Emove

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and EconomicsEMOVE – Innovative Technologies, Ltd. is a young Portuguese Technological start-up competing in the alternative energy generation sector through its innovative concept of electrical production: the ESG (Electric Spherical Generator - International Patent pending) - a unique generator that absorbs all movements and oscillations, converting them into electrical energy. Due to the versatility of this disruptive device, EMOVE nowadays in its organization hub contain several sub-brands in progress, being aim of this report the development and implementation of EMOVE Nano and its product innovation – nanoCharenvi – within the emerging portable power market. By reducing the ESG into such a nano-sized scale and incorporating this nano-electrical mechanical system(NEMS) with portable regular batteries, EMOVE Nano proposes itself to introduce the electronics market into a new power era, where future portable handsets no longer will require the old fashion wall power outlet. In fact EMOVE Nano’s ambition is to empower people using their own daily body motion and consequently have their mobile devices generating power anytime anywhere. Portable Power Market as an emerging arena presents itself as a very business attractive segment, giving a special attention within this report to the Mobile Phones and Portable Music Players Markets, where nanoCharenvi solution offers higher adoption rates and profitability. Being cumulative evaluated in more than US $200 billion and still without any existing competitor leader, portable applications power gap rapidly entered in EMOVE’s market entering race. Forecasted to penetrate the market in 2014, EMOVE Nano aims to develop a strong joint venture with a major handset manufacturer as Nokia, reaching the break-even of the initial investment of € 1.25M in 2.5 years

Large Scale Deployment of Renewables for Electricity Generation

Comparisons of resource assessments suggest resource constraints are not an obstacle to the large-scale deployment of renewable energy technologies. Economic analysis identifies barriers to the adoption of renewable energy sources resulting from market structure, competition in an uneven playing field and various non-market place barriers. However, even if these barriers are removed, the problem of ‘technology lock-out’ remains. The key policy response is strategic deployment coupled with increased R&D support to accelerate the pace of improvement through market experience. The paper suggests significant contributions from various technologies, but does not assess their optimal or maximal market share

A non-cooperative game approach for RAN and spectrum sharing in mobile radio networks

Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) are nowadays forced to continuously invest in their network infrastructure to keep up with the increasing bandwidth demand and traffic load coming from mobile users. In this context, MNOs have to face the strategic problem of whether to invest on their own or deploy shared networks. We address here the problem of Radio Access Network (RAN) and spectrum sharing in 4G mobile networks. Namely, we consider the case in which multiple MNOs are planning to deploy small cell Base Stations to improve their current network infrastructure; the deployment investment may be shared with other MNOs, thus giving rise to shared RANs. The RAN and spectrum sharing problem is formalized as a Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem, where the strategy of each MNO in the game is twofold: selecting a coalition (whom to cooperate) and the fraction of the coalition cost to pay, with the goal of maximizing the individual return on investment. The proposed approach is leveraged to characterize the stable coalitions and their respective cost division policies for various network and economic conditions

European leadership in 5G. CEPS Special Report, December 2016

Prepared by Policy Department A at the request of the European Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE), this report examines the concept for 5G, how it might fit in the future telecommunications landscape, the state of play in R&D in the EU and globally, the possible business models and the role of standards and spectrum policy, to assess the EU’s strategic position