Financial Cryptography: Algorithmic Mechanisms for a Hedonic Game

A (or a group of) selling agent wants to allocate and sell a (or a set of) parcel of land optimally and fairly to a buying agent within the capacity constraint of the selling agent and budget constraint of the buying agent. This problem has been solved by combining the concept of algorithmic cooperative game theory and financial cryptography. This is an approach for a group of decision-making agents to reach a mutually beneficial agreement through compromise and stable matching of preference. The work presents a cooperative game and a set of algorithmic coordination mechanisms: SBSS, SBMS (for collective and non-collective bargaining in holdout problem) and MBSS. The game is characterized by a set of agents, inputs, strategic moves, revelation principle, payment function and outputs. The coordination mechanisms are designed based on domain planning, rational fair data exchange and compensation negotiation. These mechanisms preserve the privacy of strategic data through secure multi-party computation (SMC), more specifically solving Yao’s millionaire problem. The mechanisms are analyzed from the perspectives of revelation principle, computational intelligence and communication complexity. The communication complexity depends on the time constraint of the negotiating agents, their information state and the number of negotiation issues. The computational complexity depends on the valuation of pricing plan, compensation estimation and private comparison. It is a mixed strategy game; both sequential and simultaneous moves can be applied intelligently to search a neighborhood space of core solutions

Optimistic fair exchange

A fair exchange guarantees that a participant only reveals its items (such as signatures, payments, or data) if it receives the expected items in exchange. Efficient fair exchange requires a so-called third party, which is assumed to be correct. Optimistic fair exchange involves this third party only if needed, i.e., if the participants cheat or disagree. In Part I, we prove lower bounds on the message and time complexity of two particular instances of fair exchange in varying models, namely contract signing (fair exchange of two signatures under a contract) and certified mail (fair exchange of data for a receipt). We show that all given bounds are tight by describing provably time- and message-optimal protocols for all considered models and instances. In Part II, we have a closer look at formalizing the security of fair exchange. We introduce a new formal notion of security (including secrecy) for reactive distributed systems. We illustrate this new formalism by a specification of certified mail as an alternative to the traditional specification given in Part I. In Part III, we describe protocols for generic and optimistic fair exchange of arbitrary items. These protocols are embedded into the SEMPER Fair Exchange Layer, which is a central part of the SEMPER Framework for Secure Electronic Commerce.Ein Austausch ist fair, wenn eine Partei die angebotenen Güter, wie zum Beispiel digitale Signaturen, Zahlungen oder Daten, nur abgibt, wenn sie die erwarteten Güter im Tausch erhält. Ohne eine als korrekt angenommene dritte Partei, welche eine mit einem Notar vergleichbare Rolle übernimmt, ist fairer Austausch nicht effizient möglich. Ein fairer Austausch heißt optimistisch, falls diese dritte Partei nur in Problemfällen am Protokoll teilnimmt. In Teil I werden beweisbar zeit- und nachrichtenoptimale Protokolle für die Spezialfälle \u27;elektronische Vertragsunterzeichnung" (fairer Austausch zweier Signaturen; engl. contract signing) und \u27;elektronisches Einschreiben" (fairer Austausch von Daten gegen eine Quittung; engl. certified mail) von fairem Austausch vorgestellt. Teil II beschreibt einen neuen Integritäts- und Geheimhaltungsbegriff für reaktive Systeme. Dieser basiert auf einer Vergleichsrelation \u27;so sicher wie", welche die Sicherheit zweier Systeme vergleicht. Ein verteiltes, reaktives System wird dann als sicher bezeichnet, wenn es so sicher wie ein idealisiertes System (engl. trusted host) für diesen Dienst ist. Mit diesem Formalismus geben wir eine alternative Sicherheitsdefinition von \u27;elektronischem Einschreiben" an, deren Semantik im Gegensatz zu der in Teil I beschriebenen Definition nun unabhängig vom erbrachten Dienst ist. Teil III beschreibt ein Design und optimistische Protokolle für generischen fairen Austausch von zwei beliebigen Gütern und den darauf aufbauenden SEMPER Fair Exchange Layer. Dieser ist ein wesentlicher Baustein des SEMPER Framework for Secure Electronic Commerce

Fair Exchange with Guardian Angels

In this paper we propose a new probabilistic Fair Exchange Protocol which requires no central Trusted Third Party. Instead, it relies on a virtually distributed and decentralized Trusted Third Party which is formalized as a Guardian Angel: a kind of Observer e.g. a tamper proof security device. We thus introduce a network model with Pirates and Guardian Angels which is well suited for Ad Hoc networks. In this setting we reduce the Fair Exchange Problem to a Synchronization Problem in which honest parties need to eventually decide whether or not a protocol succeeded in a synchronous way through a hostile network which does not guaranty that sent messages will be eventually received. This problem can be of independent interest in order to add reliability of protocol termination in secure channels

Coprivacy : an introduction to the theory and applications of co-operative privacy

We introduce the novel concept of coprivacy or co-operative privacy to make privacy preservation attractive. A protocol is coprivate if the best option for a player to preserve her privacy is to help another player in preserving his privacy. Coprivacy makes an individual's privacy preservation a goal that rationally interests other individuals: it is a matter of helping oneself by helping someone else. We formally define coprivacy in terms of Nash equilibria. We then extend the concept to: i) general coprivacy, where a helping player's utility (i.e. interest) may include earning functionality and security in addition to privacy; ii) mixed coprivacy, where mixed strategies and mixed Nash equilibria are allowed with some restrictions; iii) correlated coprivacy, in which Nash equilibria are replaced by correlated equilibria. Coprivacy can be applied to any peer-to-peer (P2P) protocol. We illustrate coprivacy in P2P anonymous keyword search, in content privacy in social networks, in vehicular network communications and in controlled content distribution and digital oblivion enforcement

Optimistic fair exchange

A fair exchange guarantees that a participant only reveals its items (such as signatures, payments, or data) if it receives the expected items in exchange. Efficient fair exchange requires a so-called third party, which is assumed to be correct. Optimistic fair exchange involves this third party only if needed, i.e., if the participants cheat or disagree. In Part I, we prove lower bounds on the message and time complexity of two particular instances of fair exchange in varying models, namely contract signing (fair exchange of two signatures under a contract) and certified mail (fair exchange of data for a receipt). We show that all given bounds are tight by describing provably time- and message-optimal protocols for all considered models and instances. In Part II, we have a closer look at formalizing the security of fair exchange. We introduce a new formal notion of security (including secrecy) for reactive distributed systems. We illustrate this new formalism by a specification of certified mail as an alternative to the traditional specification given in Part I. In Part III, we describe protocols for generic and optimistic fair exchange of arbitrary items. These protocols are embedded into the SEMPER Fair Exchange Layer, which is a central part of the SEMPER Framework for Secure Electronic Commerce.Ein Austausch ist fair, wenn eine Partei die angebotenen Güter, wie zum Beispiel digitale Signaturen, Zahlungen oder Daten, nur abgibt, wenn sie die erwarteten Güter im Tausch erhält. Ohne eine als korrekt angenommene dritte Partei, welche eine mit einem Notar vergleichbare Rolle übernimmt, ist fairer Austausch nicht effizient möglich. Ein fairer Austausch heißt optimistisch, falls diese dritte Partei nur in Problemfällen am Protokoll teilnimmt. In Teil I werden beweisbar zeit- und nachrichtenoptimale Protokolle für die Spezialfälle ';elektronische Vertragsunterzeichnung" (fairer Austausch zweier Signaturen; engl. contract signing) und ';elektronisches Einschreiben" (fairer Austausch von Daten gegen eine Quittung; engl. certified mail) von fairem Austausch vorgestellt. Teil II beschreibt einen neuen Integritäts- und Geheimhaltungsbegriff für reaktive Systeme. Dieser basiert auf einer Vergleichsrelation ';so sicher wie", welche die Sicherheit zweier Systeme vergleicht. Ein verteiltes, reaktives System wird dann als sicher bezeichnet, wenn es so sicher wie ein idealisiertes System (engl. trusted host) für diesen Dienst ist. Mit diesem Formalismus geben wir eine alternative Sicherheitsdefinition von ';elektronischem Einschreiben" an, deren Semantik im Gegensatz zu der in Teil I beschriebenen Definition nun unabhängig vom erbrachten Dienst ist. Teil III beschreibt ein Design und optimistische Protokolle für generischen fairen Austausch von zwei beliebigen Gütern und den darauf aufbauenden SEMPER Fair Exchange Layer. Dieser ist ein wesentlicher Baustein des SEMPER Framework for Secure Electronic Commerce

Design and implementation of extensible middleware for non-repudiable interactions

PhD ThesisNon-repudiation is an aspect of security that is concerned with the creation of irrefutable audits of an interaction. Ensuring the audit is irrefutable and verifiable by a third party is not a trivial task. A lot of supporting infrastructure is required which adds large expense to the interaction. This infrastructure comprises, (i) a non-repudiation aware run-time environment, (ii) several purpose built trusted services and (iii) an appropriate non-repudiation protocol. This thesis presents design and implementation of such an infrastructure. The runtime environment makes use of several trusted services to achieve external verification of the audit trail. Non-repudiation is achieved by executing fair non-repudiation protocols. The Fairness property of the non-repudiation protocol allows a participant to protect their own interests by preventing any party from gaining an advantage by misbehaviour. The infrastructure has two novel aspects; extensibility and support for automated implementation of protocols. Extensibility is achieved by implementing the infrastructure in middleware and by presenting a large variety of non-repudiable business interaction patterns to the application (a non-repudiable interaction pattern is a higher level protocol composed from one or more non-repudiation protocols). The middleware is highly configurable allowing new non-repudiation protocols and interaction patterns to be easily added, without disrupting the application. This thesis presents a rigorous mechanism for automated implementation of non-repudiation protocols. This ensures that the protocol being executed is that which was intended and verified by the protocol designer. A family of non-repudiation protocols are taken and inspected. This inspection allows a set of generic finite state machines to be produced. These finite state machines can be used to maintain protocol state and manage the sending and receiving of appropriate protocol messages. A concrete implementation of the run-time environment and the protocol generation techniques is presented. This implementation is based on industry supported Web service standards and services.EPSRC, The Hewlett Packard Arjuna La

Fair electronic exchange using biometrics

Fair exchange between two parties can be defined as an instance of exchange such that either both parties obtain what they expected or neither one does. Protocols that facilitate such transactions are known as “fair exchange protocols”. We analyze one such protocol by Micali that demonstrates fair contract signing, where two parties exchange their commitments over an already negotiated contract. In this research we show that Micali’s protocol is not completely fair and demonstrate the possibilities for one party cheating by obtaining the other party’s commitment and not offer theirs. A revised version of this protocol by Bao provides superior fairness by handling the above mentioned weakness but fails to handle the possibility of a replay attack. Our proposed protocol improves on Bao’s protocol by addressing the weakness that leads to a replay attack. We also demonstrate a software implementation of our system which provides fair contract signing along with properties like user authentication achieved through the use of a fingerprint based authentication system and features like confidentiality, data-integrity and non-repudiation achieved through implementation of hybrid cryptography and digital signatures algorithms based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography

Security analysis of an e-commerce solution

The escalation in the number of people with access to the Internet has fuelled the growth of e-commerce transactions. In order to stimulate this growth in e-commerce, the adoption of new business models will be required. In this thesis, we propose the idea of bringing the multi-level marketing business model into the e-commerce world. For e-commerce applications to take advantage of the business potential in this business model, some challenging security problems need to be resolved. Our proposed protocol provides a method for fair exchange of valuable items between multiple-parties in accordance with the multi-level marketing business model. It also provides the required security services needed to increase the overall customers' trust in e-commerce, and hence increase the rate of committed online transactions. These security services include content assurance, confidentiality, fair exchange and non-repudiation. The above security services are usually attained through the use of cryptography. For example, digital rights management systems deliver e-goods in an encrypted format. As these e-goods are decrypted before being presented to the end user, cryptographic keys may appear in the memory which leaves it vulnerable to memory disclosure attacks. In the second part of this thesis, we investigate a set of memory disclosure attacks which may compromise the confidentiality of cryptographic keys. We demonstrate that the threat of these attacks is real by exposing the secret private keys of several cryptographic algorithms used by different cryptographic implementations of the Java Cryptographic Extension (JCE

On Fairness in Secure Computation

Secure computation is a fundamental problem in modern cryptography in which multiple parties join to compute a function of their private inputs without revealing anything beyond the output of the function. A series of very strong results in the 1980's demonstrated that any polynomial-time function can be computed while guaranteeing essentially every desired security property. The only exception is the fairness property, which states that no player should receive their output from the computation unless all players receive their output. While it was shown that fairness can be achieved whenever a majority of players are honest, it was also shown that fairness is impossible to achieve in general when half or more of the players are dishonest. Indeed, it was proven that even boolean XOR cannot be computed fairly by two parties The fairness property is both natural and important, and as such it was one of the first questions addressed in modern cryptography (in the context of signature exchange). One contribution of this thesis is to survey the many approaches that have been used to guarantee different notions of partial fairness. We then revisit the topic of fairness within a modern security framework for secure computation. We demonstrate that, despite the strong impossibility result mentioned above, certain interesting functions can be computed fairly, even when half (or more) of the parties are malicious. We also provide a new notion of partial fairness, demonstrate feasibility of achieving this notion for a large class of functions, and show impossibility for certain functions outside this class. We consider fairness in the presence of rational adversaries, and, finally, we further study the difficulty of achieving fairness by exploring how much external help is necessary for enabling fair secure computation

Middleware support for non-repudiable business-to-business interactions

The wide variety of services and resources available over the Internet presents new opportunities for organisations to collaborate to reach common goals. For example, business partners wish to access each other’s services and share information along the supply chain in order to compete more successfully in the delivery of goods or services to the ultimate customer. This can lead to the investment of significant resources by business partners in the resulting collaboration. In the context of such high value business-to-business (B2B) interactions it is desirable to regulate (monitor and control) the behaviour of business partners to ensure that they comply with agreements that govern their interactions. Achieving this regulation is challenging because, while wishing to collaborate, organisations remain autonomous and may not unguardedly trust each other. Two aspects must be addressed: (i) the need for high-level mechanisms to encode agreements (contracts) between the interacting parties such that they can be used for run-time monitoring and enforcement, and (ii) systematic support to monitor a given interaction for conformance with contract and to ensure accountability. This dissertation concerns the latter aspect — the definition, design and implementation of underlying middleware support for the regulation of B2B interactions. To this end, two non-repudiation services are identified — non-repudiable service invocation and non-repudiable information sharing. A flexible nonrepudiation protocol execution framework supports the delivery of the identified services. It is shown how the services can be used to regulate B2B interactions. The non-repudiation services provide for the accountability of the actions of participants; including the acknowledgement of actions, their run-time validation with respect to application-level constraints and logging for audit. The framework is realised in the context of interactions with and between components of a J2EE application server platform. However, the design is sufficiently flexible to apply to other common middleware platforms.EThOS - Electronic Theses Online ServiceGBUnited Kingdo