16 research outputs found

    Variational Inequality Approach to Stochastic Nash Equilibrium Problems with an Application to Cournot Oligopoly

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    In this note we investigate stochastic Nash equilibrium problems by means of monotone variational inequalities in probabilistic Lebesgue spaces. We apply our approach to a class of oligopolistic market equilibrium problems where the data are known through their probability distributions.Comment: 19 pages, 2 table

    Stable numerical methodology for variational inequalities with application in quantitative finance and computational mechanics

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    Coercivity is a characteristic property of the bilinear term in a weak form of a partial differential equation in both infinite space and the corresponding finite space utilized by a numerical scheme. This concept implies \textit{stability} and \textit{well-posedness} of the weak form in both the exact solution and the numerical solution. In fact, the loss of this property especially in finite dimension cases leads to instability of the numerical scheme. This phenomenon occurs in three major families of problems consisting of advection-diffusion equation with dominant advection term, elastic analysis of very thin beams, and associated plasticity and non-associated plasticity problems. There are two main paths to overcome the loss of coercivity, first manipulating and stabilizing a weak form to ensure that the discrete weak form is coercive, second using an automatically stable method to estimate the solution space such as the Discontinuous Petrov Galerkin (DPG) method in which the optimal test space is attained during the design of the method in such a way that the scheme keeps the coercivity inherently. In this dissertation, A stable numerical method for the aforementioned problems is proposed. A stabilized finite element method for the problem of migration risk problem which belongs to the family of the advection-diffusion problems is designed and thoroughly analyzed. Moreover, DPG method is exploited for a wide range of valuing option problems under the black-Scholes model including vanilla options, American options, Asian options, double knock barrier options where they all belong to family of advection-diffusion problem, and elastic analysis of Timoshenko beam theory. Besides, The problem of American option pricing, migration risk, and plasticity problems can be categorized as a free boundary value problem which has their extra complexity, and optimization theory and variational inequality are the main tools to study these families of the problems. Thus, an overview of the classic definition of variational inequalities and different tools and methods to study analytically and numerically this family of problems is provided and a novel adjoint sensitivity analysis of variational inequalities is proposed

    A fixed-point policy-iteration-type algorithm for symmetric nonzero-sum stochastic impulse control games

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    Nonzero-sum stochastic differential games with impulse controls offer a realistic and far-reaching modelling framework for applications within finance, energy markets, and other areas, but the difficulty in solving such problems has hindered their proliferation. Semi-analytical approaches make strong assumptions pertaining to very particular cases. To the author’s best knowledge, the only numerical method in the literature is the heuristic one we put forward in Aïd et al (ESAIM Proc Surv 65:27–45, 2019) to solve an underlying system of quasi-variational inequalities. Focusing on symmetric games, this paper presents a simpler, more precise and efficient fixed-point policy-iteration-type algorithm which removes the strong dependence on the initial guess and the relaxation scheme of the previous method. A rigorous convergence analysis is undertaken with natural assumptions on the players strategies, which admit graph-theoretic interpretations in the context of weakly chained diagonally dominant matrices. A novel provably convergent single-player impulse control solver is also provided. The main algorithm is used to compute with high precision equilibrium payoffs and Nash equilibria of otherwise very challenging problems, and even some which go beyond the scope of the currently available theory

    On the analysis of stochastic optimization and variational inequality problems

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    Uncertainty has a tremendous impact on decision making. The more connected we get, it seems, the more sources of uncertainty we unfold. For example, uncertainty in the parameters of price and cost functions in power, transportation, communication and financial systems have stemmed from the way these networked systems operate and also how they interact with one another. Uncertainty influences the design, regulation and decisions of participants in several engineered systems like the financial markets, electricity markets, commodity markets, wired and wireless networks, all of which are ubiquitous. This poses many interesting questions in areas of understanding uncertainty (modeling) and dealing with uncertainty (decision making). This dissertation focuses on answering a set of fundamental questions that pertain to dealing with uncertainty arising in three major problem classes: [(1)] Convex Nash games; [(2)] Variational inequality problems and complementarity problems; [(3)] Hierarchical risk management problems in financial networks. Accordingly, this dissertation considers the analysis of a broad class of stochastic optimization and variational inequality problems complicated by uncertainty and nonsmoothness of objective functions. Nash games and variational inequalities have assumed practical relevance in industry and business settings because they are natural models for many real-world applications. Nash games arise naturally in modeling a range of equilibrium problems in power markets, communication networks, market-based allocation of resources etc. where as variational inequality problems allow for modeling frictional contact problems, traffic equilibrium problems etc. Incorporating uncertainty into convex Nash games leads us to stochastic Nash games. Despite the relevance of stochastic generalizations of Nash games and variational inequalities, answering fundamental questions regarding existence of equilibria in stochastic regimes has proved to be a challenge. Amongst other reasons, the main challenge arises from the nonlinearity arising from the presence of the expectation operator. Despite the rich literature in deterministic settings, direct application of deterministic results to stochastic regimes is not straightforward. The first part of this dissertation explores such fundamental questions in stochastic Nash games and variational inequality problems. Instead of directly using the deterministic results, by leveraging Lebesgue convergence theorems we are able to develop a tractable framework for analyzing problems in stochastic regimes over a continuous probability space. The benefit of this approach is that the framework does not rely on evaluation of the expectation operator to provide existence guarantees, thus making it amenable to tractable use. We extend the above framework to incorporate nonsmoothness of payoff functions as well as allow for stochastic constraints in models, all of which are important in practical settings. The second part of this dissertation extends the above framework to generalizations of variational inequality problems and complementarity problems. In particular, we develop a set of almost-sure sufficiency conditions for stochastic variational inequality problems with single-valued and multi-valued mappings. We extend these statements to quasi-variational regimes as well as to stochastic complementarity problems. The applicability of these results is demonstrated in analysis of risk-averse stochastic Nash games used in Nash-Cournot production distribution models in power markets by recasting the problem as a stochastic quasi-variational inequality problem and in Nash-Cournot games with piecewise smooth price functions by modeling this problem as a stochastic complementarity problem. The third part of this dissertation pertains to hierarchical problems in financial risk management. In the financial industry, risk has been traditionally managed by the imposition of value-at-risk or VaR constraints on portfolio risk exposure. Motivated by recent events in the financial industry, we examine the role that risk-seeking traders play in the accumulation of large and possibly infinite risk. We proceed to show that when traders employ a conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) metric, much can be said by studying the interaction between value at risk (VaR) (a non-coherent risk measure) and conditional value at risk CVaR (a coherent risk measure based on VaR). Resolving this question requires characterizing the optimal value of the associated stochastic, and possibly nonconvex, optimization problem, often a challenging problem. Our study makes two sets of contributions. First, under general asset distributions on a compact support, traders accumulate finite risk with magnitude of the order of the upper bound of this support. Second, when the supports are unbounded, under relatively mild assumptions, such traders can take on an unbounded amount of risk despite abiding by this VaR threshold. In short, VaR thresholds may be inadequate in guarding against financial ruin

    Applications of Stochastic Control in Energy Real Options and Market Illiquidity

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    We present three interesting applications of stochastic control in finance. The first is a real option model that considers the optimal entry into and subsequent operation of a biofuel production facility. We derive the associated Hamilton Jacobi Bellman (HJB) equation for the entry and operating decisions along with the econometric analysis of the stochastic price inputs. We follow with a Monte Carlo analysis of the risk profile for the facility. The second application expands on the analysis of the biofuel facility to account for the associated regulatory and taxation uncertainty experienced by players in the renewables and energy industries. A federal biofuel production subsidy per gallon has been available to producers for many years but the subsidy price level has changed repeatedly. We model this uncertain price as a jump process. We present and solve the HJB equations for the associated multidimensional jump diffusion problem which also addresses the model uncertainty pervasive in real option problems such as these. The novel real option framework we present has many applications for industry practitioners and policy makers dealing with country risk or regulatory uncertainty---which is a very real problem in our current global environment. Our final application (which, although apparently different from the first two applications, uses the same tools) addresses the problem of producing reliable bid-ask spreads for derivatives in illiquid markets. We focus on the hedging of over the counter (OTC) equity derivatives where the underlying assets realistically have transaction costs and possible illiquidity which standard finance models such as Black-Scholes neglect. We present a model for hedging under market impact (such as bid-ask spreads, order book depth, liquidity) using temporary and permanent equity price impact functions and derive the associated HJB equations for the problem. This model transitions from continuous to impulse trading (control) with the introduction of fixed trading costs. We then price and hedge via the economically sound framework of utility indifference pricing. The problem of hedging under liquidity impact is an on-going concern of market makers following the Global Financial Crisis

    Optimal market making under partial information and numerical methods for impulse control games with applications

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    The topics treated in this thesis are inherently two-fold. The first part considers the problem of a market maker who wants to optimally set bid/ask quotes over a finite time horizon, to maximize her expected utility. The intensities of the orders she receives depend not only on the spreads she quotes, but also on unobservable factors modelled by a hidden Markov chain. This stochastic control problem under partial information is solved by means of stochastic filtering, control and piecewise-deterministic Markov processes theory. The value function is characterized as the unique continuous viscosity solution of its dynamic programming equation. Afterwards, the analogous full information problem is solved and results are compared numerically through a concrete example. The optimal full information spreads are shown to be biased when the exact market regime is unknown, as the market maker needs to adjust for additional regime uncertainty in terms of P&L sensitivity and observable order ow volatility. The second part deals with numerically solving nonzero-sum stochastic differential games with impulse controls. These offer a realistic and far-reaching modelling framework for applications within finance, energy markets and other areas, but the diffculty in solving such problems has hindered their proliferation. Semi-analytical approaches make strong assumptions pertaining very particular cases. To the author's best knowledge, there are no numerical methods available in the literature. A policy-iteration-type solver is proposed to solve an underlying system of quasi-variational inequalities, and it is validated numerically with reassuring results. In particular, it is observed that the algorithm does not enjoy global convergence and a heuristic methodology is proposed to construct initial guesses. Eventually, the focus is put on games with a symmetric structure and a substantially improved version of the former algorithm is put forward. A rigorous convergence analysis is undertaken with natural assumptions on the players strategies, which admit graph-theoretic interpretations in the context of weakly chained diagonally dominant matrices. A provably convergent single-player impulse control solver, often outperforming classical policy iteration, is also provided. The main algorithm is used to compute with high precision equilibrium payoffs and Nash equilibria of otherwise too challenging problems, and even some for which results go beyond the scope of all the currently available theory
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