Primate Numerical Competence: Contributions Toward Understanding Nonhuman Cognition

Nonhuman primates represent the most significant extant species for comparative studies of cognition, including such complex phenomena as numerical competence, among others. Studies of numerical skills in monkeys and apes have a long, though somewhat sparse history, although questions for current empirical studies remain of great interest to several fields, including comparative, developmental, and cognitive psychology; anthropology; ethology; and philosophy, to name a few. In addition to demonstrated similarities in complex information processing, empirical studies of a variety of potential cognitive limitations or constraints have provided insights into similarities and differences across the primate order, and continue to offer theoretical and pragmatic directions for future research. An historical overview of primate numerical studies is presented, as well as a summary of the 17-year research history, including recent findings, of the Comparative Cognition Project at The Ohio State University Chimpanzee Center. Overall, the archival literature on number-related skills and counting in nonhuman primates offers important implications for revising our thinking about comparative neuroanatomy, cross-species (human/ape) cognitive similarities and differences, and the evolution of cognition represented by the primate continuum

Primate sympatry shapes the evolution of their brain architecture

The main hypotheses on the evolution of animal cognition emphasise the role of conspecifics in affecting the socio-ecological environment shaping cognition. Yet, space is often simultaneously occupied by multiple species from the same ecological guild. These sympatric species can compete for food, which may thereby stimulate or hamper cognition. Considering brain size as a proxy for cognition, we tested whether species sympatry impacted the evolution of cognition in frugivorous primates. We first retraced the evolutionary history of sympatry between frugivorous primate lineages. We then fitted phylogenetic models of the evolution of the size of several brain regions in frugivorous primates, considering or not species sympatry. We found that the evolution of the whole brain or brain regions used in immediate information processing was best fitted with models not considering sympatry. By contrast, models considering species sympatry best predicted the evolution of brain regions related to long-term memory of interactions with the socio-ecological environment, with a decrease in their size the higher the sympatry. We speculate that species sympatry, by generating intense food depletion, might lead to an over-complexification of resource spatiotemporality that counteracts the benefits of high cognitive abilities and/or might drive niche partitioning and specialisation, thereby inducing lower brain region sizes. In addition, we reported that primate species in sympatry diversify more slowly. This comparative study suggests that species sympatry significantly contributes to shaping primate evolution

Elephant cognition in primate perspective

On many of the staple measures of comparative psychology, elephants show no obvious differences from other mammals, such as primates: discrimination learning, memory, spontaneous tool use, etc. However, a range of more naturalistic measures have recently suggested that elephant cognition may be rather different. Wild elephants sub-categorize humans into groups, independently making this classification on the basis of scent or colour. In number discrimination, elephants show no effects of absolute magnitude or relative size disparity in making number judgements. In the social realm, elephants show empathy into the problems faced by others, and give hints of special abilities in cooperation, vocal imitation and perhaps teaching. Field data suggest that the elephant’s vaunted reputation for memory may have a factual basis, in two ways. Elephants’ ability to remember large-scale space over long periods suggests good cognitive mapping skills. Elephants’ skill in keeping track of the current locations of many family members implies that working memory may be unusually developed, consistent with the laboratory finding that their quantity judgements do not show the usual magnitude effects.Publisher PDFPeer reviewe

Apes with a Moral Code? Primatology, Moral Sentimentalism, and the Evolution of Morality in The Planet of the Apes

This essay examines the recent Planet of the Apes films through the lens of recent research in primatology. The films lend imaginary support to primatologist Frans de Waal’s evolutionary moral sentimentalism; however, the movies also show that truly moral motions outstrip the cognitive capacities of the great apes. The abstract moral principles employed by the ape community in the movie require the ability to understand and apply a common underlying explanation to perceptually disparate situations; in contrast, recent research in comparative psychology demonstrates that the great apes lack this capacity. Since the capacity for abstraction is required on even the most basic version of moral sentimentalism—Shaun Nichols’ sentimental rules account—the lack of the capacity for abstraction reveals a qualitative distinction between primate social behavior and human morality

Rethinking Phylogeny and Ontogeny in Hominin Brain Evolution

Theories of hominin and human cognitive evolution have traditionally focused on the phylogeny of the human brain, and on comparisons of human and primate brains in relation to social or ecological variables. Far less attention has been paid to ontogenetic processes, despite the recognition that experience has a profound influence on adult cognition. In this paper we discuss the interplay between phylogeny and ontogeny by examining relationships between human brain size, developmental scheduling and cognition. The correlates of large brains include not only altered subsistence and life-history strategies to meet associated energetic costs, but also on macro- and micro-scale structural adaptations required to meet increased processing costs. This means that larger brains are of necessity more highly interconnected brains, with higher degrees of folding of the neocortex (gyrification) and higher ratios of myelinated connections between neurons (white matter) to neurons themselves (grey matter). Here we argue that the combination of these evolutionary trends underpins the complexity of human behaviour, as the neural circuits involved in cognitive mechanisms such as the mirror neuron system (the system governing motor emulation and imitation) and theory of mind (fundamental in social cognition) mature only slowly, and require considerable socially-scaffolded experience to develop to their full potential. These abilities are likely to be fundamental in characteristically human behaviours such as the cultural transmission of complex forms of tool manufacture and use, attested to in the archaeological record. Their elaborated modern human forms, we argue, are possible only in the context of the evolution of relatively slower trajectories of brain growth and hence longer periods during which the growing brain can be influenced by experience among modern humans relative to other primates. Here we review some of the differences in ontogenetic brain development between humans and other primates, and compare the rates and trajectories of neural development between ourselves and our closest living relatives the chimpanzees to suggest that the human pattern of expanded periods of growth coupled with slower trajectories of neural development is likely to have been of huge significance during hominin evolution. In addition, we discuss fossil and archaeological proxies which might allow the reconstruction of evolutionary patterns of development, suggesting that it is only post-Homo erectus and specifically among Homo heidelbergensis and Homo neanderthalensis populations that developmental patterns approximate those of modern humans, arguing for a similar – but not identical – role for socially-scaffolded learning of complex technical skills as among modern groups in these species

Stone tools and the linguistic capabilities of earlier hominids

The evolution of human manipulative abilities may be clearly linked to the evolution of speech motor control Both creativity and complexity in vocal and manipulative gestures may be closely linked to a single dimension of brain evolution — the evolution of absolute brain size. Inferring the linguistic capabilities of earlier hominids from their lithic artefacts, however, required us to take account of domain-specific constraints on manipulative skill In this article we report on a pilot flint-knapping experiment designed to identify such constraints ‘in action’

Nonhuman primates as models of hemispheric specialization

The present chapter concerns the issue of hemispheric specialization for perceptual and cognitive processes. In spite of a long-lasting view that only humans are lateralized (e.g., Warren, 1980), there is now strong documentation for anatomical lateralizations, functional lateralizations, or both in several animal taxa, including birds, rodents, and nonhuman primates (see Bradshaw & Rogers, 1993; Hellige, 1993). We selectively report demonstrations from studies of nonhuman primates. After a short review of the evidence for structural (anatomical) lateralization, we describe..

Functionally referential signals: a promising paradigm whose time has passed

Finding the evolutionary origins of human language in the communication systems of our closest living relatives has, for the last several decades, been a major goal of many in the field of animal communication generally and primate communication specifically.1–4 The so-called “functionally referential” signals have long been considered promising in this regard, with apparent parallels with the semantic communication that characterizes language. The once-prominent idea that functionally referential signals are word-like, in that they are arbitrary sounds that refer to phenomena external to the caller, has largely been abandoned.5 However, the idea that these signals may offer the strongest link between primate communication and human language remains widespread, primarily due to the fact the behavior of receivers indicates that such signals enable them to make very specific inferences about their physical or social environment. Here we review the concept of functional reference and discuss modern perspectives that indicate that, although the sophistication of receivers provides some continuity between nonhuman primate and human cognition, this continuity is not unique to functionally referential signals. In fact, because functionally referential signals are, by definition, produced only in specific contexts, receivers are less dependent on the integration of contextual cues with signal features to determine an appropriate response. The processing of functionally referential signals is therefore likely to entail simpler cognitive operations than does that of less context-specific signals. While studies of functional reference have been important in highlighting the relatively sophisticated processes that underlie receiver behavior, we believe that the continued focus on context-specific calls detracts from the potentially more complex processes underlying responses to more unspecific calls. In this sense, we argue that the concept of functional reference, while historically important for the field, has outlived its usefulness and become a red herring in the pursuit of the links between primate communication and human language

Comparative psychometrics: establishing what differs is central to understanding what evolves

Cognitive abilities cannot be measured directly. What we can measure is individual variation in task performance. In this paper, we first make the case for why we should be interested in mapping individual differences in task performance on to particular cognitive abilities: we suggest that it is crucial for examining the causes and consequences of variation both within and between species. As a case study, we examine whether multiple measures of inhibitory control for non-human animals do indeed produce correlated task performance; however, no clear pattern emerges that would support the notion of a common cognitive ability underpinning individual differences in performance. We advocate a psychometric approach involving a three-step programme to make theoretical and empirical progress: first, we need tasks that reveal signature limits in performance. Second, we need to assess the reliability of individual differences in task performance. Third, multi-trait multi-method test batteries will be instrumental in validating cognitive abilities. Together, these steps will help us to establish what varies between individuals that could impact their fitness and ultimately shape the course of the evolution of animal minds. Finally, we propose executive functions, including working memory, inhibitory control and attentional shifting, as a sensible starting point for this endeavour