21,403 research outputs found
Cooperation, Norms, and Revolutions: A Unified Game-Theoretical Approach
Cooperation is of utmost importance to society as a whole, but is often
challenged by individual self-interests. While game theory has studied this
problem extensively, there is little work on interactions within and across
groups with different preferences or beliefs. Yet, people from different social
or cultural backgrounds often meet and interact. This can yield conflict, since
behavior that is considered cooperative by one population might be perceived as
non-cooperative from the viewpoint of another.
To understand the dynamics and outcome of the competitive interactions within
and between groups, we study game-dynamical replicator equations for multiple
populations with incompatible interests and different power (be this due to
different population sizes, material resources, social capital, or other
factors). These equations allow us to address various important questions: For
example, can cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma be promoted, when two
interacting groups have different preferences? Under what conditions can costly
punishment, or other mechanisms, foster the evolution of norms? When does
cooperation fail, leading to antagonistic behavior, conflict, or even
revolutions? And what incentives are needed to reach peaceful agreements
between groups with conflicting interests?
Our detailed quantitative analysis reveals a large variety of interesting
results, which are relevant for society, law and economics, and have
implications for the evolution of language and culture as well
The Evolution of Social Contracts
Influential thinkers such as Young, Sugden, Binmore, and Skyrms have developed game-theoretic accounts of the emergence, persistence and evolution of social contracts. Social contracts are sets of commonly understood rules that govern cooperative social interaction within societies. These naturalistic accounts provide us with valuable and important insights into the foundations of human societies. However, current naturalistic theories focus mainly on how social contracts solve coordination problems in which the interests of the individual participants are aligned, not competition problems in which individual interests compete with group interests. In response, I set out to build on those theories and provide a comprehensive naturalistic account of the emergence, persistence and evolution of social contracts. My central claim is that social contracts have culturally evolved to solve cooperation problems, which include both coordination and competition problems. I argue that solutions to coordination problems emerge from “within-group” dynamics, while solutions to competition problems result largely from “between-group” dynamics
Critical behavior in an evolutionary Ultimatum Game
Experimental studies have shown the ubiquity of altruistic behavior in human
societies. The social structure is a fundamental ingredient to understand the
degree of altruism displayed by the members of a society, in contrast to
individual-based features, like for example age or gender, which have been
shown not to be relevant to determine the level of altruistic behavior. We
explore an evolutionary model aiming to delve how altruistic behavior is
affected by social structure. We investigate the dynamics of interacting
individuals playing the Ultimatum Game with their neighbors given by a social
network of interaction. We show that a population self-organizes in a critical
state where the degree of altruism depends on the topology characterizing the
social structure. In general, individuals offering large shares but in turn
accepting large shares, are removed from the population. In heterogeneous
social networks, individuals offering intermediate shares are strongly selected
in contrast to random homogeneous networks where a broad range of offers, below
a critical one, is similarly present in the population.Comment: 13 pages, 7 figure
Cooperation, collective action, and the archeology of large-scale societies
Archeologists investigating the emergence of large-scale societies in the past have renewed interest in examining the dynamics of cooperation as a means of understanding societal change and organizational variability within human groups over time. Unlike earlier approaches to these issues, which used models designated voluntaristic or managerial, contemporary research articulates more explicitly with frameworks for cooperation and collective action used in other fields, thereby facilitating empirical testing through better definition of the costs, benefits, and social mechanisms associated with success or failure in coordinated group action. Current scholarship is nevertheless bifurcated along lines of epistemology and scale, which is understandable but problematic for forging a broader, more transdisciplinary field of cooperation studies. Here, we point to some areas of potential overlap by reviewing archeological research that places the dynamics of social cooperation and competition in the foreground of the emergence of large-scale societies, which we define as those having larger populations, greater concentrations of political power, and higher degrees of social inequality. We focus on key issues involving the communal-resource management of subsistence and other economic goods, as well as the revenue flows that undergird political institutions. Drawing on archeological cases from across the globe, with greater detail from our area of expertise in Mesoamerica, we offer suggestions for strengthening analytical methods and generating more transdisciplinary research programs that address human societies across scalar and temporal spectra
Emergence and resilience of cooperation in the spatial Prisoner's Dilemma via a reward mechanism
We study the problem of the emergence of cooperation in the spatial
Prisoner's Dilemma. The pioneering work by Nowak and May showed that large
initial populations of cooperators can survive and sustain cooperation in a
square lattice with imitate-the-best evolutionary dynamics. We revisit this
problem in a cost-benefit formulation suitable for a number of biological
applications. We show that if a fixed-amount reward is established for
cooperators to share, a single cooperator can invade a population of defectors
and form structures that are resilient to re-invasion even if the reward
mechanism is turned off. We discuss analytically the case of the invasion by a
single cooperator and present agent-based simulations for small initial
fractions of cooperators. Large cooperation levels, in the sustainability
range, are found. In the conclusions we discuss possible applications of this
model as well as its connections with other mechanisms proposed to promote the
emergence of cooperation
Wisdom of groups promotes cooperation in evolutionary social dilemmas
Whether or not to change strategy depends not only on the personal success of
each individual, but also on the success of others. Using this as motivation,
we study the evolution of cooperation in games that describe social dilemmas,
where the propensity to adopt a different strategy depends both on individual
fitness as well as on the strategies of neighbors. Regardless of whether the
evolutionary process is governed by pairwise or group interactions, we show
that plugging into the "wisdom of groups" strongly promotes cooperative
behavior. The more the wider knowledge is taken into account the more the
evolution of defectors is impaired. We explain this by revealing a dynamically
decelerated invasion process, by means of which interfaces separating different
domains remain smooth and defectors therefore become unable to efficiently
invade cooperators. This in turn invigorates spatial reciprocity and
establishes decentralized decision making as very beneficial for resolving
social dilemmas.Comment: 8 two-column pages, 7 figures; accepted for publication in Scientific
Report
Evolutionary games on multilayer networks: A colloquium
Networks form the backbone of many complex systems, ranging from the Internet
to human societies. Accordingly, not only is the range of our interactions
limited and thus best described and modeled by networks, it is also a fact that
the networks that are an integral part of such models are often interdependent
or even interconnected. Networks of networks or multilayer networks are
therefore a more apt description of social systems. This colloquium is devoted
to evolutionary games on multilayer networks, and in particular to the
evolution of cooperation as one of the main pillars of modern human societies.
We first give an overview of the most significant conceptual differences
between single-layer and multilayer networks, and we provide basic definitions
and a classification of the most commonly used terms. Subsequently, we review
fascinating and counterintuitive evolutionary outcomes that emerge due to
different types of interdependencies between otherwise independent populations.
The focus is on coupling through the utilities of players, through the flow of
information, as well as through the popularity of different strategies on
different network layers. The colloquium highlights the importance of pattern
formation and collective behavior for the promotion of cooperation under
adverse conditions, as well as the synergies between network science and
evolutionary game theory.Comment: 14 two-column pages, 8 figures; accepted for publication in European
Physical Journal
Antisocial pool rewarding does not deter public cooperation
Rewarding cooperation is in many ways expected behaviour from social players.
However, strategies that promote antisocial behaviour are also surprisingly
common, not just in human societies, but also among eusocial insects and
bacteria. Examples include sanctioning of individuals who behave prosocially,
or rewarding of freeriders who do not contribute to collective enterprises. We
therefore study the public goods game with antisocial and prosocial pool
rewarding in order to determine the potential negative consequences on the
effectiveness of positive incentives to promote cooperation. Contrary to a
naive expectation, we show that the ability of defectors to distribute rewards
to their like does not deter public cooperation as long as cooperators are able
to do the same. Even in the presence of antisocial rewarding the spatial
selection for cooperation in evolutionary social dilemmas is enhanced. Since
the administration of rewards to either strategy requires a considerable degree
of aggregation, cooperators can enjoy the benefits of their prosocial
contributions as well as the corresponding rewards. Defectors when aggregated,
on the other hand, can enjoy antisocial rewards, but due to their lack of
contributions to the public good they ultimately succumb to their inherent
inability to secure a sustainable future. Strategies that facilitate the
aggregation of akin players, even if they seek to promote antisocial behaviour,
thus always enhance the long-term benefits of cooperation.Comment: 9 two-column pages, 5 figures; accepted for publication in
Proceedings of the Royal Society
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