Application of Investment Appraisal Techniques by Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) Operators in the Tamale Metropolis, Ghana

The small and medium enterprise (SME) sector deficiency in adherence to best operational practices has been discovered to be one of the major causes of investment failures and the dwindling growth in productivity of the sector. Among these best operational practices that the SME sector is asserted to be deficient in practice is investment appraisal to predict investment profitability and success. Nevertheless, there are divergent findings of existing research works on whether SME operators practice investment appraisals or not. This research therefore examined the application of the basic Investment Appraisal Techniques (IATs) by SME operators in the Tamale Metropolis. The descriptive and referential research design technique was used. The simple random sampling technique was also used to collect data from 400 SME operators with the use of structured questionnaires. The data gathered was analysed with the use of SPSS tool to perform multinomial regression and Chi-square Test (X2) analysis. The research found that SME operators in the Tamale Metropolis had significant knowledge in the various basic IATs. There was also a significant application level of the IATs by the SME operators. Although the SME operators demonstrated significant knowledge and application level in the various IATs, it was discovered that they did not use the theoretical mathematical formulae of the IATs in appraising their investments. It was also discovered that operator’s knowledge in an IAT had insignificant influence on its’ application by the operator. The choice of the IATs by the SME operators was found to be significantly influenced by the SME Operator’s gender, educational level and risk behaviour and the investment size and the business or industry type. However, regulation or legal requirement was found to have insignificant influence on the choice of IATs by the SME operators. Keywords: Investment Appraisal Techniques, discounted cash flow techniques, non-discounted cash flow techniques, Accounting Rate of Return, Capital Asset Pricing Model, Cost Benefit Analysis, Discounted Cash Flow, Expected Rate of Return, Internal Rate of Return, Net Present Value, Payback Period, Profitability Index, Return on Capital Employed, Value-at-Risk. DOI: 10.7176/JESD/10-14-02 Publication date:July 31st 201

Orçamento público e político : relações institucionais sob o contexto da Emenda Constitucional do orçamento impositivo

Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade, Departamento de Economia, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Ciências Econômicas, 2020.A atual estratégia de execução orçamentária brasileira tem provido desconexão entre esta e seu planejamento, prejudicando sua função de atuar como plano de desenvolvimento macroeconômico para o país. Tal característica advém da posição de vantagem do Poder Executivo com relação ao Legislativo no que concerne à elaboração do orçamento e ao papel secundário do parlamento no processo. No ano de 2015, com o intuito de balencear essa relação, foi aprovada a Emenda Constitucional nº 86, que obriga o Poder Executivo a executar as emendas parlamentares individuais ao orçamento. Este estudo busca investigar se a promulgação da referida emenda causou impacto na relação entre os Poderes Executivo e Legislativo, sendo realmente capaz ou não de promover alguma emancipação deste último no processo de elaboração e execução do orçamento. Foram utilizados na análise dados relativos aos valores das emendas individuais e aos votos dos deputados federais nos anos de 2012 a 2017. Os resultados obtidos sugerem uma relação entre as emendas individuais ao orçaento e o apoio ao governo antes da promulgação da modificação constitucional e a diminuição desta relação após sua entrada em vigor. Todavia, a despeito de ser possível observar alguma alteração na forma de votar dos parlamentares, não se pode afirmar que essa mudança de comportamento é consequência da Emenda Constitucional nº 86/2015.The current Brazilian budgeting strategy has provided disconnection between its execution and planning, damaging the nation macroeconomic development function of public budget by itself. This issue comes from the advantage position in which the Executive Branch finds itself in relation to the Legislative one, regarding the elaboration of the public budget and the secondary role of the parliament in the process. In 2015, in order to balance this relationship, Constitutional Amendment nº 86 was approved, which obliges the Executive Branch to execute individual parliamentary amendments to the budget. This study seeks to investigate whether the enactment of the said amendment had an impact on the relationship between the Executive and Legislative branches, being really able or not to set the latter free from constraints in the budget preparation and execution process. Data concerning the values of individual amendments and the votes of federal deputies in the years of 2012 to 2017 were used in the analysis. The results suggest a relation between the individual budget amendments and government support before the enactment of the constitutional modification and the decrease of this relationship then. However, despite being possible to observe some change in the way parliamentarians vote, it cannot be said that this behavior shift is a consequence of Constitutional Amendment nº 86/2015

Efficiency of flexible budgetary institutions

Which budgetary institutions result in efficient provision of public goods? We analyze a model with two parties bargaining over the allocation to a public good each period. Parties place different values on the public good, and these values may change over time. We focus on budgetary institutions that determine the rules governing feasible allocations to mandatory and discretionary spending programs. Mandatory spending is enacted by law and remains in effect until changed, and thus induces an endogenous status quo, whereas discretionary spending is a periodic appropriation that is not allocated if no new agreement is reached. We show that discretionary only and mandatory only institutions typically lead to dynamic inefficiency and that mandatory only institutions can even lead to static inefficiency. By introducing appropriate flexibility in mandatory programs, we obtain static and dynamic efficiency. This flexibility is provided by an endogenous choice of mandatory and discretionary programs, sunset provisions and state-contingent mandatory programs in increasingly complex environments.Peer reviewe