Efficiency and complexity of price competition among single-product vendors

Motivated by recent progress on pricing in the AI literature, we study marketplaces that contain multiple vendors offering identical or similar products and unit-demand buyers with different valuations on these vendors. The objective of each vendor is to set the price of its product to a fixed value so that its profit is maximized. The profit depends on the vendor's price itself and the total volume of buyers that find the particular price more attractive than the price of the vendor's competitors. We model the behavior of buyers and vendors as a two-stage full-information game and study a series of questions related to the existence, efficiency (price of anarchy) and computational complexity of equilibria in this game. To overcome situations where equilibria do not exist or exist but are highly inefficient, we consider the scenario where some of the vendors are subsidized in order to keep prices low and buyers highly satisfied

The Oracle/PeopleSoft Case: Unilateral Effects, Simulation Models and Econometrics in Contemporary Merger Control

An increasingly important part of contemporary merger control both in the US and the EU is unilateral effects analysis, particularly with regard to oligopolistic mergers. In practice, this requires econometric analyses of past market data and, above all, the construction of simulation models in order to quantify the price effects in each specific case. The review of the merger between the software firms Oracle and PeopleSoft in 2003/04 has been the most important instance of parallel application of these sophisticated economic tools by the EU and US authorities so far. This makes an in-depth study of the case going from the controversial issue of market definition to the specificities of the competitive assessment worthwhile. Therefore, we highlight certain similarities as well as (minor) differences between the EU and US proceedings. Interestingly, despite serious initial concerns the transaction was not blocked nor even required to be modified in the two jurisdictions. We derive a number of interesting insights and, in particular, point out problems and lessons associated with the use of sophisticated economic tools in contemporary merger control. In addition to case-specific factors, the major insights encompass the continued relevance of market definition, the need to accompany predictive economic evidence with compatible reasoning and the benefits of including the economics of dynamic and evolutionary competition.Merger control, unilateral effects, econometric analysis, simulation models, market definition

The Oracle/PeopleSoft case: unilateral effects, simulation models and econometrics in contemporary merger control

An increasingly important part of contemporary merger control both in the US and the EU is unilateral effects analysis, particularly with regard to oligopolistic mergers. In practice, this requires econometric analyses of past market data and, above all, the construction of simulation models in order to quantify the price effects in each specific case. The review of the merger between the software firms Oracle and PeopleSoft in 2003/04 has been the most important instance of parallel application of these sophisticated economic tools by the EU and US authorities so far. This makes an in-depth study of the case going from the controversial issue of market definition to the specificities of the competitive assessment worthwhile. Therefore, we highlight certain similarities as well as (minor) differences between the EU and US proceedings. Interestingly, despite serious initial concerns the transaction was not blocked nor even required to be modified in the any of the two jurisdictions. We derive a number of interesting insights and, in particular, point out problems and lessons associated with the use of sophisticated economic tools in contemporary merger control. In addition to case-specific factors, the major insights encompass the continued relevance of market definition, the need to accompany predictive economic evidence with compatible reasoning and the benefits of including the economics of dynamic and evolutionary competition. --Merger control,unilateral effects,econometric analysis,simulation models,market definition

Integrated game-theory modelling for multi enterprise-wide coordination and collaboration under uncertain competitive environment

In this work, an integrated Game Theory (GT) approach is developed for the coordination of multi-enterprise Supply Chains (SCs) in a competitive uncertain environment. The conflicting goals of the different participants are solved through coordination contracts using a non-cooperative non-zero-sum Stackelberg game under the leadership of the manufacturer. The Stackelberg payoff matrix is built under the nominal conditions, and then evaluated under different probable uncertain scenarios using a Monte-Carlo simulation. The competition between the Stackelberg game players and the third parties is solved through a Nash Equilibrium game. A novel way to analyze the game outcome is proposed based on a win–win Stackelberg set of “Pareto-frontiers”. The benefits of the resulting MINLP tactical models are illustrated by a case study with different vendors around a client SC. The results show that the coordinated decisions lead to higher expected payoffs compared to the standalone case, while also leading to uncertainty reduction.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

Meter Scoping Study

This report presents a summary of metering technology and cost information from past studies in an attempt to identify key barriers to more widespread implementation

Supplier switching and outsourcing

We examine supplier switching decisions using a unique database that tracks firms (credit unions) and their suppliers (data processing vendors); the data are in a panel, allowing us to track supplier switching decisions at a new level of detail. We focus on two sets of relationships. First, we estimate a model that relates supplier choices and switching to a variety of buyer- and supplier-specific characteristics. Second, we examine how> switching depends on the vendor relationships that credit unions choose: one is a partial form of outsourcing while the other is more complete. This allows us to estimate how supplier switching interacts with organizational form.Credit unions ; Contracting out