Defending vulnerable security protocols by means of attack interference in non-collaborative scenarios

In security protocol analysis, the traditional choice to consider a single Dolev–Yao attacker is supported by the fact that models with multiple collaborating Dolev–Yao attackers are reducible to models with one Dolev–Yao attacker. In this paper, we take a fundamentally different approach and investigate the case of multiple non-collaborating attackers. We formalize a framework for multi-attacker scenarios and show, through a detailed case study, that concurrent competitive attacks can interfere with each other. It is then possible to exploit interference to provide a form of defense to vulnerable protocols

Non-collaborative Attackers and How and Where to Defend Flawed Security Protocols (Extended Version)

Security protocols are often found to be flawed after their deployment. We present an approach that aims at the neutralization or mitigation of the attacks to flawed protocols: it avoids the complete dismissal of the interested protocol and allows honest agents to continue to use it until a corrected version is released. Our approach is based on the knowledge of the network topology, which we model as a graph, and on the consequent possibility of creating an interference to an ongoing attack of a Dolev-Yao attacker, by means of non-collaboration actuated by ad-hoc benign attackers that play the role of network guardians. Such guardians, positioned in strategical points of the network, have the task of monitoring the messages in transit and discovering at runtime, through particular types of inference, whether an attack is ongoing, interrupting the run of the protocol in the positive case. We study not only how but also where we can attempt to defend flawed security protocols: we investigate the different network topologies that make security protocol defense feasible and illustrate our approach by means of concrete examples.Comment: 29 page

A Survey on Wireless Security: Technical Challenges, Recent Advances and Future Trends

This paper examines the security vulnerabilities and threats imposed by the inherent open nature of wireless communications and to devise efficient defense mechanisms for improving the wireless network security. We first summarize the security requirements of wireless networks, including their authenticity, confidentiality, integrity and availability issues. Next, a comprehensive overview of security attacks encountered in wireless networks is presented in view of the network protocol architecture, where the potential security threats are discussed at each protocol layer. We also provide a survey of the existing security protocols and algorithms that are adopted in the existing wireless network standards, such as the Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, WiMAX, and the long-term evolution (LTE) systems. Then, we discuss the state-of-the-art in physical-layer security, which is an emerging technique of securing the open communications environment against eavesdropping attacks at the physical layer. We also introduce the family of various jamming attacks and their counter-measures, including the constant jammer, intermittent jammer, reactive jammer, adaptive jammer and intelligent jammer. Additionally, we discuss the integration of physical-layer security into existing authentication and cryptography mechanisms for further securing wireless networks. Finally, some technical challenges which remain unresolved at the time of writing are summarized and the future trends in wireless security are discussed.Comment: 36 pages. Accepted to Appear in Proceedings of the IEEE, 201

Byzantine Attack and Defense in Cognitive Radio Networks: A Survey

The Byzantine attack in cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS), also known as the spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) attack in the literature, is one of the key adversaries to the success of cognitive radio networks (CRNs). In the past couple of years, the research on the Byzantine attack and defense strategies has gained worldwide increasing attention. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive survey and tutorial on the recent advances in the Byzantine attack and defense for CSS in CRNs. Specifically, we first briefly present the preliminaries of CSS for general readers, including signal detection techniques, hypothesis testing, and data fusion. Second, we analyze the spear and shield relation between Byzantine attack and defense from three aspects: the vulnerability of CSS to attack, the obstacles in CSS to defense, and the games between attack and defense. Then, we propose a taxonomy of the existing Byzantine attack behaviors and elaborate on the corresponding attack parameters, which determine where, who, how, and when to launch attacks. Next, from the perspectives of homogeneous or heterogeneous scenarios, we classify the existing defense algorithms, and provide an in-depth tutorial on the state-of-the-art Byzantine defense schemes, commonly known as robust or secure CSS in the literature. Furthermore, we highlight the unsolved research challenges and depict the future research directions.Comment: Accepted by IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutoiral

Secure Routing in Wireless Mesh Networks

Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) have emerged as a promising concept to meet the challenges in next-generation networks such as providing flexible, adaptive, and reconfigurable architecture while offering cost-effective solutions to the service providers. Unlike traditional Wi-Fi networks, with each access point (AP) connected to the wired network, in WMNs only a subset of the APs are required to be connected to the wired network. The APs that are connected to the wired network are called the Internet gateways (IGWs), while the APs that do not have wired connections are called the mesh routers (MRs). The MRs are connected to the IGWs using multi-hop communication. The IGWs provide access to conventional clients and interconnect ad hoc, sensor, cellular, and other networks to the Internet. However, most of the existing routing protocols for WMNs are extensions of protocols originally designed for mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) and thus they perform sub-optimally. Moreover, most routing protocols for WMNs are designed without security issues in mind, where the nodes are all assumed to be honest. In practical deployment scenarios, this assumption does not hold. This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of security issues in WMNs and then particularly focuses on secure routing in these networks. First, it identifies security vulnerabilities in the medium access control (MAC) and the network layers. Various possibilities of compromising data confidentiality, data integrity, replay attacks and offline cryptanalysis are also discussed. Then various types of attacks in the MAC and the network layers are discussed. After enumerating the various types of attacks on the MAC and the network layer, the chapter briefly discusses on some of the preventive mechanisms for these attacks.Comment: 44 pages, 17 figures, 5 table

Spectrum Sensing and Security Challenges and Solutions: Contemporary Affirmation of the Recent Literature

Cognitive radio (CR) has been recently proposed as a promising technology to improve spectrum utilization by enabling secondary access to unused licensed bands. A prerequisite to this secondary access is having no interference to the primary system. This requirement makes spectrum sensing a key function in cognitive radio systems. Among common spectrum sensing techniques, energy detection is an engaging method due to its simplicity and efficiency. However, the major disadvantage of energy detection is the hidden node problem, in which the sensing node cannot distinguish between an idle and a deeply faded or shadowed band. Cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS) which uses a distributed detection model has been considered to overcome that problem. On other dimension of this cooperative spectrum sensing, this is vulnerable to sensing data falsification attacks due to the distributed nature of cooperative spectrum sensing. As the goal of a sensing data falsification attack is to cause an incorrect decision on the presence/absence of a PU signal, malicious or compromised SUs may intentionally distort the measured RSSs and share them with other SUs. Then, the effect of erroneous sensing results propagates to the entire CRN. This type of attacks can be easily launched since the openness of programmable software defined radio (SDR) devices makes it easy for (malicious or compromised) SUs to access low layer protocol stacks, such as PHY and MAC. However, detecting such attacks is challenging due to the lack of coordination between PUs and SUs, and unpredictability in wireless channel signal propagation, thus calling for efficient mechanisms to protect CRNs. Here in this paper we attempt to perform contemporary affirmation of the recent literature of benchmarking strategies that enable the trusted and secure cooperative spectrum sensing among Cognitive Radios

An Energy Aware and Secure MAC Protocol for Tackling Denial of Sleep Attacks in Wireless Sensor Networks

Wireless sensor networks which form part of the core for the Internet of Things consist of resource constrained sensors that are usually powered by batteries. Therefore, careful energy awareness is essential when working with these devices. Indeed,the introduction of security techniques such as authentication and encryption, to ensure confidentiality and integrity of data, can place higher energy load on the sensors. However, the absence of security protection c ould give room for energy drain attacks such as denial of sleep attacks which have a higher negative impact on the life span ( of the sensors than the presence of security features. This thesis, therefore, focuses on tackling denial of sleep attacks from two perspectives A security perspective and an energy efficiency perspective. The security perspective involves evaluating and ranking a number of security based techniques to curbing denial of sleep attacks. The energy efficiency perspective, on the other hand, involves exploring duty cycling and simulating three Media Access Control ( protocols Sensor MAC, Timeout MAC andTunableMAC under different network sizes and measuring different parameters such as the Received Signal Strength RSSI) and Link Quality Indicator ( Transmit power, throughput and energy efficiency Duty cycling happens to be one of the major techniques for conserving energy in wireless sensor networks and this research aims to answer questions with regards to the effect of duty cycles on the energy efficiency as well as the throughput of three duty cycle protocols Sensor MAC ( Timeout MAC ( and TunableMAC in addition to creating a novel MAC protocol that is also more resilient to denial of sleep a ttacks than existing protocols. The main contributions to knowledge from this thesis are the developed framework used for evaluation of existing denial of sleep attack solutions and the algorithms which fuel the other contribution to knowledge a newly developed protocol tested on the Castalia Simulator on the OMNET++ platform. The new protocol has been compared with existing protocols and has been found to have significant improvement in energy efficiency and also better resilience to denial of sleep at tacks Part of this research has been published Two conference publications in IEEE Explore and one workshop paper

Intelligent spectrum management techniques for wireless cognitive radio networks

PhD ThesisThis thesis addresses many of the unique spectrum management chal- lenges in CR networks for the rst time. These challenges have a vital e ect on the network performance and are particularly di cult to solve due to the unique characteristics of CR networks. Speci cally, this thesis proposes and investigates three intelligent spectrum management tech- niques for CR networks. The issues investigated in this thesis have a fundamental impact on the establishment, functionality and security of CR networks. First, an intelligent primary receiver-aware message exchange protocol for CR ad hoc networks is proposed. It considers the problem of alleviat- ing the interference collision risk to primary user communication, explic- itly to protect primary receivers that are not detected during spectrum sensing. The proposed protocol achieves a higher measure of safeguard- ing. A practical scenario is considered where no global network topology is known and no common control channel is assumed to exist. Second, a novel CR broadcast protocol (CRBP) to reliably disseminate the broadcast messages to all or most of the possible CR nodes in the network is proposed. The CRBP formulates the broadcast problem as a bipartite-graph problem. Thus, CRBP achieves a signi cant successful delivery ratio by connecting di erent local topologies, which is a unique feature in CR ad hoc networks. Finally, a new defence strategy to defend against spectrum sensing data falsi cation attacks in CR networks is proposed. In order to identify malicious users, the proposed scheme performs multiple veri cations of sensory data with the assistance of trusted nodes.Higher Committee For Education Devel- opment in Iraq (HCED-Iraq

Cyber-Physical Threat Intelligence for Critical Infrastructures Security

Modern critical infrastructures can be considered as large scale Cyber Physical Systems (CPS). Therefore, when designing, implementing, and operating systems for Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP), the boundaries between physical security and cybersecurity are blurred. Emerging systems for Critical Infrastructures Security and Protection must therefore consider integrated approaches that emphasize the interplay between cybersecurity and physical security techniques. Hence, there is a need for a new type of integrated security intelligence i.e., Cyber-Physical Threat Intelligence (CPTI). This book presents novel solutions for integrated Cyber-Physical Threat Intelligence for infrastructures in various sectors, such as Industrial Sites and Plants, Air Transport, Gas, Healthcare, and Finance. The solutions rely on novel methods and technologies, such as integrated modelling for cyber-physical systems, novel reliance indicators, and data driven approaches including BigData analytics and Artificial Intelligence (AI). Some of the presented approaches are sector agnostic i.e., applicable to different sectors with a fair customization effort. Nevertheless, the book presents also peculiar challenges of specific sectors and how they can be addressed. The presented solutions consider the European policy context for Security, Cyber security, and Critical Infrastructure protection, as laid out by the European Commission (EC) to support its Member States to protect and ensure the resilience of their critical infrastructures. Most of the co-authors and contributors are from European Research and Technology Organizations, as well as from European Critical Infrastructure Operators. Hence, the presented solutions respect the European approach to CIP, as reflected in the pillars of the European policy framework. The latter includes for example the Directive on security of network and information systems (NIS Directive), the Directive on protecting European Critical Infrastructures, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), and the Cybersecurity Act Regulation. The sector specific solutions that are described in the book have been developed and validated in the scope of several European Commission (EC) co-funded projects on Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP), which focus on the listed sectors. Overall, the book illustrates a rich set of systems, technologies, and applications that critical infrastructure operators could consult to shape their future strategies. It also provides a catalogue of CPTI case studies in different sectors, which could be useful for security consultants and practitioners as well

Survey and Systematization of Secure Device Pairing

Secure Device Pairing (SDP) schemes have been developed to facilitate secure communications among smart devices, both personal mobile devices and Internet of Things (IoT) devices. Comparison and assessment of SDP schemes is troublesome, because each scheme makes different assumptions about out-of-band channels and adversary models, and are driven by their particular use-cases. A conceptual model that facilitates meaningful comparison among SDP schemes is missing. We provide such a model. In this article, we survey and analyze a wide range of SDP schemes that are described in the literature, including a number that have been adopted as standards. A system model and consistent terminology for SDP schemes are built on the foundation of this survey, which are then used to classify existing SDP schemes into a taxonomy that, for the first time, enables their meaningful comparison and analysis.The existing SDP schemes are analyzed using this model, revealing common systemic security weaknesses among the surveyed SDP schemes that should become priority areas for future SDP research, such as improving the integration of privacy requirements into the design of SDP schemes. Our results allow SDP scheme designers to create schemes that are more easily comparable with one another, and to assist the prevention of persisting the weaknesses common to the current generation of SDP schemes.Comment: 34 pages, 5 figures, 3 tables, accepted at IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials 2017 (Volume: PP, Issue: 99