Deception and self-awareness

This paper presents a study conducted for the Shades of Grey EPSRC research project (EP/H02302X/1), which aims to develop a suite of interventions for identifying terrorist activities. The study investigated the body movements demonstrated by participants while waiting to be interviewed, in one of two conditions: preparing to lie or preparing to tell the truth. The effect of self-awareness was also investigated, with half of the participants sitting in front of a full length mirror during the waiting period. The other half faced a blank wall. A significant interaction was found for the duration of hand/arm movements between the deception and self-awareness conditions (F=4.335, df=1;76, p<0.05). Without a mirror, participants expecting to lie spent less time moving their hands than those expecting to tell the truth; the opposite was seen in the presence of a mirror. This finding indicates a new research area worth further investigation

Theory of Mind and Deception Ability

Social based strategies such as deception may require a theory of mind. Individuals with developmental disorders have deficits in deception that may be related to deficits in ToM. Individuals in the general population may have similar deficits. Participants were asked to rate the believability of videotaped actors. We found an inverse relationship between autistic and schizotypal tendencies and deception detection. Increased self-awareness scores were related to increased confidence when determining the believability of an actor. Results suggest deception detection is related to both self-awareness and Theory of mind

The effects of self-awareness on body movement indicators of the intention to deceive

A study was conducted to investigate the body movements of participants waiting to be interviewed in one of two conditions: preparing to answer questions truthfully or preparing to lie. The effects of increased self-awareness were also investigated, with half of the participants facing a mirror; the other half facing a blank wall. Analysis of covertly obtained video footage showed a significant interaction for the duration of hand/arm movements between deception level and self-awareness. Without a mirror, participants expecting to lie spent less time moving their hands than those expecting to tell the truth; the opposite was seen in the presence of a mirror. Participants expecting to lie also had higher levels of anxiety and thought that they were left waiting for less time than those expecting to tell the truth. These findings led to the identification of further research areas with the potential to support deception detection in security applications

Tennesse Williams\u27 Web of Deception in The Glass Menagerie, A Streetcar Named Desire and Cat on a Hot Tin Roof

While many themes appear in Tennessee Williams’ The Glass Menagerie, A Streetcar Named Desire and Cat on a Hot Tin Roof, the theme of deception emerges as one of the most prominent. To determine exactly how deceit impacts the lives of the characters in each play, an analysis of deception from both a psychological and philosophical standpoint is given. Based on the findings of this analysis, Williams effectively employs three general categories of deception in his plays, including deception with self-awareness, deception of others requiring deception of the self and self-deception regardless of another’s presence. Williams also implements one of the most popular forms of deception among humans—lying, which can be classified within each of the three broad categories, depending upon the situation. After exploring the different forms of deception used within his works, an obvious progression of deception develops. Not only do the incidences of lies and deception increase, but the harmfulness and seriousness of the consequences intensifies as well. Ultimately, Williams’ three plays prove that the use of deception leads to destruction

Conceptual Mimetic Engulfment And its Relation to the Christian Linguistic Enterprise

Mimetics is the study of the ways in which we mimic others as a form of development. Mimetic engulfment is the state of imitating another undeliberately. In this paper, I quickly explore a number of types of mimesis that we find ourselves in, distinguishing between the medium, currency, and response to an engulfment. I focus primarily on what I term doxastic conceptual engulfment and its linguistic component: a type of mimesis that deals with our self-ascription of certain concepts via the unique ways we talk in different social contexts. I then explore the repercussions of this type of mimesis on the church, concluding that the Christian linguistic enterprise is particularly susceptible to certain forms of self-deception. I argue that while engulfment in a uniquely Christian way of talking is unavoidable and the resulting self-deception is not intrinsically bad, widespread self-deception throughout the church has negative moral side-effects. I borrow Bruce Wilshire’s terminology and claim that an acute awareness of our relative ascendancy (a sort of who-engulfs-whom-and-why) within our community is the best way to ensure that our mimetic engulfment is benign. However, our mimetic engulfment undermines our ability to recognize relative ascendency, thus leading to rampant self-deception. I conclude that the only way to break this cycle is what I term unbendingness. The unbending individual is one who is able to recognize when others are engulfed in her and challenges those around her in a way that opens their eyes to their self-deceptive tendencies. This awareness allows one to break from the engulfment or gain an appreciation for the relative ascendency in the community, both of which eliminate self-deception

A Philosophical Analysis of Sartre’s Critique of Freud’s Depth-psychological Account of Self-Deception

This essay addresses the notion of self-deception as articulated by Sigmund Freud and Jean-Paul Sartre. More specifically, it provides an analysis of Sartre’s critique of Freud’s depth-psychological account of self-deception. I critically examine his theory of bad faith as an account of self-deception. Sartre’s main objection to the depthpsychological explanation of Freud’s account of self-deception rests on his argument that for self-deception to occur there needs to be conscious awareness of the coexistence of mutually incompatible beliefs, and that Freud had obscured this fact by splitting the self and with a mixture of jargon

A Philosophical Analysis of Sartre’s Critique of Freud’s Depth-psychological Account of Self-Deception

This essay addresses the notion of self-deception as articulated by Sigmund Freud and Jean-Paul Sartre. More specifically, it provides an analysis of Sartre’s critique of Freud’s depth-psychological account of self-deception. I critically examine his theory of bad faith as an account of self-deception. Sartre’s main objection to the depth-psychological explanation of Freud’s account of self-deception rests on his argument that for self-deception to occur there needs to be conscious awareness of the coexistence of mutually incompatible beliefs, and that Freud had obscured this fact by splitting the self and with a mixture of jargon

A COMPOSITE MODEL OF HETEROSEXUAL IDENTITY, SELF-DECEPTION AND LESBIAN, GAY, AND BISEXUAL (LGB) COUNSELING COMPETENCE: A MEDIATION MODEL

The study used structural equation modeling to test a correlational model of the relationship between heterosexual identity and LGB counseling competence, testing self- deception as a mediator. A proposed composite model of heterosexual identity was developed using recurrent themes extracted from conceptual models and qualitative research findings. These themes included sexual orientation identity, heterosexual privilege awareness, internalized affirmativeness, value conflict, and negativity. A sample of 207 heterosexual-identified graduate students in CACREP-accredited counseling programs participated in an online survey. Results of the measurement model for heterosexual identity indicated that the proposed model was a good fit to the data and that all paths were statistically significant. The measurement model for LGB counseling competence well fit the data, and all but one paths were statistically significant. Results of the structural model indicated a strong relationship between heterosexual identity and LGB counseling competence, with all paths statistically significant. However, no significant paths were identified between heterosexual identity and self-deception or between self-deception and LGB counseling competence. Thus, self-deception did not mediate the relationship between heterosexual identity and LGB counselor competence. Implications for counselor education and supervision are provided, highlighting the role of exploring heterosexual identity in the development of LGB counseling competence

Knowing More than We Can Tell: People Are Aware of their Biased Self-Perceptions

There is no question that biases exist in people’s self-perceptions of their personality. However, it is not known whether people are aware of these self-biases. In two studies: N = 130), I examined whether people have insight into their positive and negative self-biases across a range of traits. I predicted that self-biases result from self-deception: i.e., the intentional distortion of more realistic self-views), and as such, people should have some awareness of their self-biases. As predicted, people with positive biases: i.e., self-perceptions that are more positive than a reputation-based criterion measure) described themselves as positively biased, and people with overly negative self-views described themselves as negatively biased. These findings suggest that people may know more about themselves than they initially admit, and provide support for the existence of everyday self-deception in people’s views of their personality. Implications for the use of self-reports and the study of self-knowledge are discussed

The Role of Omission in Self-Deception

Whether or not a self-deceiver has the intention of deceiving themselves is a highly debated topic. According to intentionalist theories, the individual does intend to deceive themselves; according to revisionist theories, they deceive themselves without the direct intention to do so. Kevin Lynch provides a non-intentionalist, revisionist account of self-deception which holds that self-deception is due to biased systematic processing. What this amounts to is that, according to Lynch, self-deception occurs because the self-deceiver intentionally seeks favorable evidence and critically scrutinizes unfavorable evidence while at the same time they unintentionally omit to scrutinize favorable evidence and seek unfavorable evidence, forming a bias that the self-deceiver is unaware of (biased systematic processing). While this depicts many cases of self-deception, there are also circumstances where the self-deceiver intentionally avoids opposing and unwelcome evidence, intentionally ignoring it. Lynch recognizes this, but doesn’t include it within his model, vaguely stating that oftentimes people operate without such reflective awareness of their biases. Thus, my objective for this research was to uncover how intentional omissions fit within non-intentionalist, revisionist theories such as Lynch\u27s. I argue that cognitive dissonance theory and the belief-disconfirmation paradigm within it shed light on these intentional omissions. When people are confronted with evidence that contradicts pre-established beliefs, they may intentionally omit to scrutinize evidence for their belief, or intentionally omit to seek out evidence for the contradictory belief due to the discomfort of cognitive dissonance