Los interlocking directorates en España: evolución, poder y consejeros independientes

Esta investigación explora la evolución de las redes sociales formadas por la conexión entre consejos de administración —relación interlocking directorates— de las empresas cotizadas españolas en el periodo 1999-2008, mostrándose como una nueva dimensión en el estudio del gobierno corporativo. Permite descubrir cómo se estructura el poder en la esfera económica, avanzar en la comprensión del papel desarrollado por el consejo de administración y ahondar en el rol de los consejeros independientes propiciados por los códigos de buen gobierno. Los resultados muestran cambios estructurales en la red, fragmentándose en mayor medida en los últimos años y con menores valores de densidad, características más propias de redes de países anglosajones. El análisis de centralidad evidencia un desplazamiento de las empresas del sector financiero a posiciones más periféricas, otorgando mayor protagonismo a empresas privadas del sector energético o de la construcción, intuyendo un cambio del modelo de banca a un modelo más anglosajón.Financiación recibida por parte del Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte a través del programa de Formación del Profesorado Universitario (FPU) y del Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad por el proyecto de investigación con referencia ECO2012-3255

Does lobbying of firms complement executive networks in determining executive compensation?

In this paper we predict and find that lobbying activities of firms can complement executive networks in determining executive compensation. Firm of all size, after considering market competition as a governance mechanism prefer to consider lobbying as a mean of networking along with the executive level networking to determine the executive compensation. The empirical implication of the study provides guidance to researchers who must consider lobbying along with executive networks in determining the executive compensation. The composite theoretical underpinning and the importance of information flow through lobbying activities of firms will be an important insight for the policy makers involved in determining executive compensation

An Introduction to Complex Networks in Climate Finance

In this perspective, we introduce recent research into the structure and function of complex investor networks supporting sustainability efforts. Using the case of solar, wind and hydro energy technologies, this perspective explores the complexity in low-carbon finance markets, defined as markets that direct capital flows towards low-carbon technologies, using network approaches to study their structure and dynamics. Investors are modeled as nodes which form a network or higher-order network connected by edges representing projects in which joint funding or security-related insurance was provided or other investment-related interaction occurred. We review the literature on investor networks generally, particularly in the case of complex networks, and address areas where these ideas were applied in this emerging field. The complex investor dynamics which emerge from the extant funding scenarios are not well understood. These dynamics have the potential to result in interesting non-linear behaviour, growth, and decline, which can be studied, explained and controlled using the tools of network science

Corporate Governance, Institutional Characteristics, And Director Networks In Malaysia

This study explores the structural relationship of director networks among boards of directors in publicly listed companies in Malaysia using social network analysis (SNA) techniques at both the director and company levels. This paper examines whether company corporate governance practices and institutional characteristics are associated with company network size and pattern. SNA performed using UCINET and NetDraw software shows that the directors and company in the networking are moderately connected. This suggests that there is a small group of directors or companies that are well-connected and well-positioned to exercise power, control, and influence over the network. This study also reveals the interconnectedness of board members and companies. The regression results also identify a group of the most well-connected and well-positioned directors and companies in Malaysia’s corporate governance environment. The results suggest that board size, board meeting, and duality are the corporate governance practices, which most influence company network size and pattern. The presence of a Bumiputera or politicallyconnected director is an institutional characteristic, which especially determines the network of a company

How Investors Survive in Crony Capitalism: A Case Study of OBI Pharma Inc. in Taiwan

The development of big data research methods and the information asymmetry problems in the financial market lead to the new issue of homo sociologicus, which has become a new way of thinking and has hoped to find the cause of asset pricing problem in the market. Crony capitalism is prevalent in the emerging and developing countries. It leads to wealth inequalities. Therefore, behavioral finance theory can help individual investors make investment decisions and help stock prices to reflect their true values. This study finds that the biotechnology industry does not exist an efficient market based on two OTC biotech companies, OBI Pharma and TaiMed Biologics, for the period 2015.11.23~2016.6.7. The results show that the technical analysis tested in this study can lead to trading profits and investors can increase their trading profits based on the mean reversion characteristic of company price differences

The value of social networks in financial markets

Social contacts influence decisions and economic outputs in a variety of contexts. Does social network matter also in financial markets? In this paper I investigate the effect of social networks on mutual funds performance by exploiting data on the education of U.S. fund managers. The results show that performance is better for fund managers with many social connections. Furthermore, positional advantages in the social network generate superior performance. This evidence suggests that social interaction and information spillovers have a positive and meaningful value for mutual funds

Out of Sight, Out of Mind:The Value of Political Connections in Social Networks

This paper investigates the impact of social-network connections to politicians on firm value. We focus on the networks of university classmates and alumni among directors of U.S. public firms and congressmen. Using the Regression Discontinuity Design based on close elections from 2000 to 2008, we identify that a director’s connection to an elected congressman causes a Weighted Average Treatment Effect on Cumulative Abnormal Returns of -2.65% surrounding the election date. The effect is robust and consistent through various specifications, parametric and nonparametric, with different outcome measures and social network definitions, and across many subsamples. We find evidence to support the hypothesis that firms benefit more when connected politicians remain in state politics than when they move to federal office. Overall, our study identifies the value of political connections through social networks and uncovers its variation across different states and between state and federal political environments.Social network; political connection; close election; regression discontinuity design; firm value.

Network Connections in REIT Markets

Relationships play a central role across the spectrum of real estate transactions. Whether negotiating prices, securing funding, or acquiring permits, knowing the right people provides multiple channels to facilitate deal making. To better understand the role of relationships in real estate markets, we examine how the connectedness of REIT directors is associated with deal making, growth, and profitability. We find strong evidence that REIT connections are positively associated with both deal making and accounting based measures of profitability, however, those relations do not translate into better market returns or higher valuations. One explanation of these somewhat contradictory results is that connections also increase firm risk. Preliminary support for this conjecture is found through our examination of each firm’s implied cost of equity capital. Specifically, we find increasing connectedness is associated with a higher cost of equity capital. Thus, connections appear to offer both advantages and disadvantages to REIT managers and shareholders

Debt, information asymmetry and bankers on board

We provide evidence that the presence of bankers in the board of directors reduce information asymmetry between credit markets and firms. We show that the impact of the presence of bankers on leverage is driven by firms with low level of debt. This effect is amplified the more connected the bankers are to the corporate world. Additionally the results are more pronounced for less transparent firms. Our findings suggest that the connectedness of bankers play a key role in reducing information asymmetry.N/