Application of Game Theory in Describing Efficacy of Decision Making in Sportsman\u27s Tactical Performance in Team Sports

A mathematical method of decision-making in which a competitive or cooperative situation is analyzed to determine the optimal course of action for an interested “player” is often called game theory. Game theory has very broad application in different sciences. Team sports tactical performance is considered from the aspects of data processing theory and the phenomenon of selective attention, as well as from the game theory. Team sports tactical performance is an asymmetric, sequential (of imperfect information), non-zero-sum game. In decision making, predictability in team sports is in fact bargaining, and the player has to use a mixed strategy for choosing option with highest expected utility. Player could choose a trembling hand equilibrium, to eliminate imperfect equilibrium. Strategic dominance concept can explain that a player could choose strategy which dominates between other possible strategies, and/or could be led by “team reasoning”, too. In this article, the level of predictability of the most frequent tactical performance of one player in a team sport game is considered, reflecting outcomes both for the same team’s tactical performance (co-players in one player’s team), as well as for the opponent team’s tactical performance. Four different possible situations during team sport competition could lead to considering utilities of one player’s specific decisions

No Grice: Computers that Lie, Deceive and Conceal

In the future our daily life interactions with other people, with computers, robots and smart environments will be recorded and interpreted by computers or embedded intelligence in environments, furniture, robots, displays, and wearables. These sensors record our activities, our behavior, and our interactions. Fusion of such information and reasoning about such information makes it possible, using computational models of human behavior and activities, to provide context- and person-aware interpretations of human behavior and activities, including determination of attitudes, moods, and emotions. Sensors include cameras, microphones, eye trackers, position and proximity sensors, tactile or smell sensors, et cetera. Sensors can be embedded in an environment, but they can also move around, for example, if they are part of a mobile social robot or if they are part of devices we carry around or are embedded in our clothes or body. \ud \ud Our daily life behavior and daily life interactions are recorded and interpreted. How can we use such environments and how can such environments use us? Do we always want to cooperate with these environments; do these environments always want to cooperate with us? In this paper we argue that there are many reasons that users or rather human partners of these environments do want to keep information about their intentions and their emotions hidden from these smart environments. On the other hand, their artificial interaction partner may have similar reasons to not give away all information they have or to treat their human partner as an opponent rather than someone that has to be supported by smart technology.\ud \ud This will be elaborated in this paper. We will survey examples of human-computer interactions where there is not necessarily a goal to be explicit about intentions and feelings. In subsequent sections we will look at (1) the computer as a conversational partner, (2) the computer as a butler or diary companion, (3) the computer as a teacher or a trainer, acting in a virtual training environment (a serious game), (4) sports applications (that are not necessarily different from serious game or education environments), and games and entertainment applications

Some comparative economics of the organization of sports: competition and regulation in north American vs. European professional team sports leagues

This article contends that a new research avenue is open to comparative economics which is the economic comparison between American (closed) and European (open) professional team sports leagues. It starts with sketching the major institutional differences between the two leagues systems. Then it surveys the American modelling of competitive balance in these sports leagues that objects pro-competitive balance regulation as being non Walrasian when (American) teams are profit maximising. A next step is to cover how the Walrasian model has been adapted to European open leagues and their regulation of win maximising clubs under a hard budget constraint. Such approach has recently been outdated by models where win maximising clubs operate with a flexible supply of talent in a non cooperative game, given the globalization of the labour market for sporting talent (namely after the Bosman case). Finally, the article ploughs into a new research path advocating for a disequilibrium model where clubs would have a "soft" budget constraint rooted in their weak governance, and empirically tests a vicious circle between TV rights revenues and wages in French football that may explain the aforementioned disequilibrium.sports economics, comparative economics, economic organisation, governance, sports leagues, Walrasian model, Nash equilibrium, competitive balance, regulation, soft budget constraint, TV rights, wages, profit maximising, win maximising

Complementary cooperation, minimal winning coalitions, and power indices

We introduce a new simple game, which is referred to as the complementary weighted multiple majority game (C-WMMG for short). C-WMMG models a basic cooperation rule, the complementary cooperation rule, and can be taken as a sister model of the famous weighted majority game (WMG for short). In this paper, we concentrate on the two dimensional C-WMMG. An interesting property of this case is that there are at most $n+1$ minimal winning coalitions (MWC for short), and they can be enumerated in time $O(n\log n)$, where $n$ is the number of players. This property guarantees that the two dimensional C-WMMG is more handleable than WMG. In particular, we prove that the main power indices, i.e. the Shapley-Shubik index, the Penrose-Banzhaf index, the Holler-Packel index, and the Deegan-Packel index, are all polynomially computable. To make a comparison with WMG, we know that it may have exponentially many MWCs, and none of the four power indices is polynomially computable (unless P=NP). Still for the two dimensional case, we show that local monotonicity holds for all of the four power indices. In WMG, this property is possessed by the Shapley-Shubik index and the Penrose-Banzhaf index, but not by the Holler-Packel index or the Deegan-Packel index. Since our model fits very well the cooperation and competition in team sports, we hope that it can be potentially applied in measuring the values of players in team sports, say help people give more objective ranking of NBA players and select MVPs, and consequently bring new insights into contest theory and the more general field of sports economics. It may also provide some interesting enlightenments into the design of non-additive voting mechanisms. Last but not least, the threshold version of C-WMMG is a generalization of WMG, and natural variants of it are closely related with the famous airport game and the stable marriage/roommates problem.Comment: 60 page

Organizational Differences between U.S. Major Leagues and European Leagues: Implications for Salary Caps

This paper outlines and compares the organizational structure of major sports leagues, explores the reasoning behind their formation, and derives implications for salary caps in European football. To understand why sports leagues have developed a specific organizational structure, one must take the economic peculiarities of team sports leagues into consideration. For this purpose, we analyze the production process and illuminate its major peculiarities. For example, we present the difference between economic competition and competition on the pitch and discuss the consequences of this distinction for an attractive final product. Furthermore, we show that a hold-up problem exists between the two stages of the production process and demonstrate how these problems are overcome by the organizational structure chosen by sports leagues. We also outline the differences between the U.S. major leagues and European leagues and document recent developments in that context. Finally, based on this comparative institutional analysis, we derive implications for the introduction of salary caps into European football.Sports leagues, organization, salary cap, hold-up problem

A comparison of the average prekernel and the prekernel

We propose positive and normative foundations for the average prekernel of NTU games, and compare them with the existing ones for the prekernel. In our non-cooperative analysis, the average prekernel is approximated by the set of equilibrium payoffs of a game where each player faces the possibility of bargaining at random against any other player. In the cooperative analysis, we characterize the average prekernel as the unique solution that satisfies a set of Nash-like axioms for two-person games, and versions of average consistency and its converse for multilateral setting

Contest Theory and its Applications in Sports

This paper outlines how the theory of contests is applied to professional team sports leagues. In the first part, we present the traditional Tullock contest and explain some basic properties of the equilibrium. We will then extend this static contest to a two-period model in order to analyze dynamic aspects of contests. In the second part, we will present applications of contest theory in sports. In particular, we will show how the Tullock framework is applied to models of team sports leagues. For this purpose, we will first explain the value creation process in team sports leagues and show how club revenues are related to the contest success function. Then, we present some basic modeling issues; for instance, we show how the assumption of flexible vs. fixed talent supply depends on the league under consideration and how it influences the equilibria. Furthermore, we explicate the effect of revenue sharing on competitive balance in the different models. Then we address the relationship between competitive balance and social welfare. Finally, we illustrate why many clubs tend to "overinvest" in playing talent in many team sports leagues.Contest theory, Tullock contest, sports leagues, competitive balance, revenue sharing, social welfare, overinvestment

Revenue Sharing in Sports Leagues: The Effects on Talent Distribution and Competitive Balance

This paper uses a three-stage model of non-cooperative and cooperative bargaining in a free agent market to analyze the effect of revenue sharing on the decision of teams to sign a free agent. We argue that in all subgame perfect Nash equilibria, the team with the highest reservation price will get the player. We argue that revenue sharing will not alter the outcome of the game unless the proportion taken from high revenue teams is sufficiently high. We also argue that a revenue sharing system that rewards quality low-revenue teams can alter the outcome of the game while requiring a lower proportion to be taken from high revenue teams. We also argue that the revenue sharing systems can improve competitive balance by redistributing pivotal marginal players among teams.competitive balance, revenue sharing, sports labor markets, free agency