1,990 research outputs found
Cooperation and Contagion in Web-Based, Networked Public Goods Experiments
A longstanding idea in the literature on human cooperation is that
cooperation should be reinforced when conditional cooperators are more likely
to interact. In the context of social networks, this idea implies that
cooperation should fare better in highly clustered networks such as cliques
than in networks with low clustering such as random networks. To test this
hypothesis, we conducted a series of web-based experiments, in which 24
individuals played a local public goods game arranged on one of five network
topologies that varied between disconnected cliques and a random regular graph.
In contrast with previous theoretical work, we found that network topology had
no significant effect on average contributions. This result implies either that
individuals are not conditional cooperators, or else that cooperation does not
benefit from positive reinforcement between connected neighbors. We then tested
both of these possibilities in two subsequent series of experiments in which
artificial seed players were introduced, making either full or zero
contributions. First, we found that although players did generally behave like
conditional cooperators, they were as likely to decrease their contributions in
response to low contributing neighbors as they were to increase their
contributions in response to high contributing neighbors. Second, we found that
positive effects of cooperation were contagious only to direct neighbors in the
network. In total we report on 113 human subjects experiments, highlighting the
speed, flexibility, and cost-effectiveness of web-based experiments over those
conducted in physical labs
Design of Randomized Experiments in Networks
Over the last decade, the emergence of pervasive online and digitally enabled environments has created a rich source of detailed data on human behavior. Yet, the promise of big data has recently come under fire for its inability to separate correlation from causation-to derive actionable insights and yield effective policies. Fortunately, the same online platforms on which we interact on a day-to-day basis permit experimentation at large scales, ushering in a new movement toward big experiments. Randomized controlled trials are the heart of the scientific method and when designed correctly provide clean causal inferences that are robust and reproducible. However, the realization that our world is highly connected and that behavioral and economic outcomes at the individual and population level depend upon this connectivity challenges the very principles of experimental design. The proper design and analysis of experiments in networks is, therefore, critically important. In this work, we categorize and review the emerging strategies to design and analyze experiments in networks and discuss their strengths and weaknesses
Reach and speed of judgment propagation in the laboratory
In recent years, a large body of research has demonstrated that judgments and
behaviors can propagate from person to person. Phenomena as diverse as
political mobilization, health practices, altruism, and emotional states
exhibit similar dynamics of social contagion. The precise mechanisms of
judgment propagation are not well understood, however, because it is difficult
to control for confounding factors such as homophily or dynamic network
structures. We introduce a novel experimental design that renders possible the
stringent study of judgment propagation. In this design, experimental chains of
individuals can revise their initial judgment in a visual perception task after
observing a predecessor's judgment. The positioning of a very good performer at
the top of a chain created a performance gap, which triggered waves of judgment
propagation down the chain. We evaluated the dynamics of judgment propagation
experimentally. Despite strong social influence within pairs of individuals,
the reach of judgment propagation across a chain rarely exceeded a social
distance of three to four degrees of separation. Furthermore, computer
simulations showed that the speed of judgment propagation decayed exponentially
with the social distance from the source. We show that information distortion
and the overweighting of other people's errors are two individual-level
mechanisms hindering judgment propagation at the scale of the chain. Our
results contribute to the understanding of social contagion processes, and our
experimental method offers numerous new opportunities to study judgment
propagation in the laboratory
Emergence of communities and diversity in social networks
Communities are common in complex networks and play a significant role in the functioning of social, biological, economic,
and technological systems. Despite widespread interest in detecting community structures in complex networks and exploring the
effect of communities on collective dynamics, a deep understanding of the emergence and prevalence of communities in social
networks is still lacking. Addressing this fundamental problem
is of paramount importance in understanding, predicting, and
controlling a variety of collective behaviors in society. An elusive question is how communities with common internal properties arise in social networks with great individual diversity. Here,
we answer this question using the ultimatum game, which has
been a paradigm for characterizing altruism and fairness. We
experimentally show that stable local communities with different
internal agreements emerge spontaneously and induce social
diversity into networks, which is in sharp contrast to populations with random interactions. Diverse communities and social
norms come from the interaction between responders with inherent heterogeneous demands and rational proposers via local connections, where the former eventually become the community
leaders. This result indicates that networks are significant in the
emergence and stabilization of communities and social diversity.
Our experimental results also provide valuable information about
strategies for developing network models and theories of evolutionary games and social dynamics.This work was supported by the National Nature Science Foundation of China under Grants 61573064, 71631002, 71401037, and 11301032; the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities and Beijing Nova Programme; and the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (Individual Discovery Grant). The Boston University work was supported by NSF Grants PHY-1505000, CMMI-1125290, and CHE- 1213217, and by Defense Threat Reduction Agency Grant HDTRA1-14-1-0017, and Department of Energy Contract DE-AC07-05Id14517. (61573064 - National Nature Science Foundation of China; 71631002 - National Nature Science Foundation of China; 71401037 - National Nature Science Foundation of China; 11301032 - National Nature Science Foundation of China; Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities and Beijing Nova Programme; Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (Individual Discovery Grant); PHY-1505000 - NSF; CMMI-1125290 - NSF; CHE-1213217 - NSF; HDTRA1-14-1-0017 - Defense Threat Reduction Agency; DE-AC07-05Id14517 - Department of Energy)Published versio
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Networks in the laboratory
The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Networks represents the frontier of research into how and why networks they form, how they influence behavior, how they help govern outcomes in an interactive world, and how they shape collective ..
Leaders should not be conformists in evolutionary social dilemmas
The most common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that players should
adopt a strategy that warrants the highest payoff. However, recent studies
indicate that the spatial selection for cooperation is enhanced if an
appropriate fraction of the population chooses the most common rather than the
most profitable strategy within the interaction range. Such conformity might be
due to herding instincts or crowd behavior in humans and social animals. In a
heterogeneous population where individuals differ in their degree, collective
influence, or other traits, an unanswered question remains who should conform.
Selecting conformists randomly is the simplest choice, but it is neither a
realistic nor the optimal one. We show that, regardless of the source of
heterogeneity and game parametrization, socially the most favorable outcomes
emerge if the masses conform. On the other hand, forcing leaders to conform
significantly hinders the constructive interplay between heterogeneity and
coordination, leading to evolutionary outcomes that are worse still than if
conformists were chosen randomly. We conclude that leaders must be able to
create a following for network reciprocity to be optimally augmented by
conformity. In the opposite case, when leaders are castrated and made to
follow, the failure of coordination impairs the evolution of cooperation.Comment: 7 two-column pages, 4 figures; accepted for publication in Scientific
Reports [related work available at arXiv:1412.4113
Network Structure, Efficiency, and Performance in WikiProjects
The internet has enabled collaborations at a scale never before possible, but
the best practices for organizing such large collaborations are still not
clear. Wikipedia is a visible and successful example of such a collaboration
which might offer insight into what makes large-scale, decentralized
collaborations successful. We analyze the relationship between the structural
properties of WikiProject coeditor networks and the performance and efficiency
of those projects. We confirm the existence of an overall
performance-efficiency trade-off, while observing that some projects are higher
than others in both performance and efficiency, suggesting the existence
factors correlating positively with both. Namely, we find an association
between low-degree coeditor networks and both high performance and high
efficiency. We also confirm results seen in previous numerical and small-scale
lab studies: higher performance with less skewed node distributions, and higher
performance with shorter path lengths. We use agent-based models to explore
possible mechanisms for degree-dependent performance and efficiency. We present
a novel local-majority learning strategy designed to satisfy properties of
real-world collaborations. The local-majority strategy as well as a localized
conformity-based strategy both show degree-dependent performance and
efficiency, but in opposite directions, suggesting that these factors depend on
both network structure and learning strategy. Our results suggest possible
benefits to decentralized collaborations made of smaller, more tightly-knit
teams, and that these benefits may be modulated by the particular learning
strategies in use.Comment: 11 pages, 5 figures, to appear in ICWSM 201
Collaboration in Social Networks
The very notion of social network implies that linked individuals interact
repeatedly with each other. This allows them not only to learn successful
strategies and adapt to them, but also to condition their own behavior on the
behavior of others, in a strategic forward looking manner. Game theory of
repeated games shows that these circumstances are conducive to the emergence of
collaboration in simple games of two players. We investigate the extension of
this concept to the case where players are engaged in a local contribution game
and show that rationality and credibility of threats identify a class of Nash
equilibria -- that we call "collaborative equilibria" -- that have a precise
interpretation in terms of sub-graphs of the social network. For large network
games, the number of such equilibria is exponentially large in the number of
players. When incentives to defect are small, equilibria are supported by local
structures whereas when incentives exceed a threshold they acquire a non-local
nature, which requires a "critical mass" of more than a given fraction of the
players to collaborate. Therefore, when incentives are high, an individual
deviation typically causes the collapse of collaboration across the whole
system. At the same time, higher incentives to defect typically support
equilibria with a higher density of collaborators. The resulting picture
conforms with several results in sociology and in the experimental literature
on game theory, such as the prevalence of collaboration in denser groups and in
the structural hubs of sparse networks
Clustered Networks Protect Cooperation Against Catastrophic Collapse
Assuming a society of conditional cooperators (or moody conditional cooperators), this computational study proposes a new perspective on the structural advantage of social network clustering. Previous work focused on how clustered structure might encourage initial outbreaks of cooperation or defend against invasion by a few defectors. Instead, we explore the ability of a societal structure to retain cooperative norms in the face of widespread disturbances. Such disturbances may abstractly describe hardships like famine and economic recession, or the random spatial placement of a substantial numbers of pure defectors (or round-1 defectors) among a spatially-structured population of players in a laboratory game, etc.
As links in tightly-clustered societies are reallocated to distant contacts, we observe that a society becomes increasingly susceptible to catastrophic cascades of defection: mutually-beneficial cooperative norms can be destroyed completely by modest shocks of defection. In contrast, networks with higher clustering coefficients can withstand larger shocks of defection before being forced to catastrophically-low levels of cooperation. We observe a remarkably-linear protective effect of clustering coefficient that becomes active above a critical level of clustering. Notably, both the critical level and the slope of this dependence is higher for decision-rule parameterizations that correspond to higher costs of cooperation. Our modeling framework provides a simple way to reinterpret the counter-intuitive and widely-cited human experiments of Suri and Watts (2011) while also affirming the classical intuition that network clustering and higher levels of cooperation should be positively associated
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