Pure Nash Equilibria in Concurrent Deterministic Games

We study pure-strategy Nash equilibria in multi-player concurrent deterministic games, for a variety of preference relations. We provide a novel construction, called the suspect game, which transforms a multi-player concurrent game into a two-player turn-based game which turns Nash equilibria into winning strategies (for some objective that depends on the preference relations of the players in the original game). We use that transformation to design algorithms for computing Nash equilibria in finite games, which in most cases have optimal worst-case complexity, for large classes of preference relations. This includes the purely qualitative framework, where each player has a single omega-regular objective that she wants to satisfy, but also the larger class of semi-quantitative objectives, where each player has several omega-regular objectives equipped with a preorder (for instance, a player may want to satisfy all her objectives, or to maximise the number of objectives that she achieves.)Comment: 72 page

Games on graphs with a public signal monitoring

We study pure Nash equilibria in games on graphs with an imperfect monitoring based on a public signal. In such games, deviations and players responsible for those deviations can be hard to detect and track. We propose a generic epistemic game abstraction, which conveniently allows to represent the knowledge of the players about these deviations, and give a characterization of Nash equilibria in terms of winning strategies in the abstraction. We then use the abstraction to develop algorithms for some payoff functions.Comment: 28 page

The Complexity of Nash Equilibria in Limit-Average Games

We study the computational complexity of Nash equilibria in concurrent games with limit-average objectives. In particular, we prove that the existence of a Nash equilibrium in randomised strategies is undecidable, while the existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is decidable, even if we put a constraint on the payoff of the equilibrium. Our undecidability result holds even for a restricted class of concurrent games, where nonzero rewards occur only on terminal states. Moreover, we show that the constrained existence problem is undecidable not only for concurrent games but for turn-based games with the same restriction on rewards. Finally, we prove that the constrained existence problem for Nash equilibria in (pure or randomised) stationary strategies is decidable and analyse its complexity.Comment: 34 page

Thin Games with Symmetry and Concurrent Hyland-Ong Games

We build a cartesian closed category, called Cho, based on event structures. It allows an interpretation of higher-order stateful concurrent programs that is refined and precise: on the one hand it is conservative with respect to standard Hyland-Ong games when interpreting purely functional programs as innocent strategies, while on the other hand it is much more expressive. The interpretation of programs constructs compositionally a representation of their execution that exhibits causal dependencies and remembers the points of non-deterministic branching.The construction is in two stages. First, we build a compact closed category Tcg. It is a variant of Rideau and Winskel's category CG, with the difference that games and strategies in Tcg are equipped with symmetry to express that certain events are essentially the same. This is analogous to the underlying category of AJM games enriching simple games with an equivalence relations on plays. Building on this category, we construct the cartesian closed category Cho as having as objects the standard arenas of Hyland-Ong games, with strategies, represented by certain events structures, playing on games with symmetry obtained as expanded forms of these arenas.To illustrate and give an operational light on these constructions, we interpret (a close variant of) Idealized Parallel Algol in Cho

Solving Stochastic B\"uchi Games on Infinite Arenas with a Finite Attractor

We consider games played on an infinite probabilistic arena where the first player aims at satisfying generalized B\"uchi objectives almost surely, i.e., with probability one. We provide a fixpoint characterization of the winning sets and associated winning strategies in the case where the arena satisfies the finite-attractor property. From this we directly deduce the decidability of these games on probabilistic lossy channel systems.Comment: In Proceedings QAPL 2013, arXiv:1306.241

Games with Delays. A Frankenstein Approach

We investigate infinite games on finite graphs where the information flow is perturbed by nondeterministic signalling delays. It is known that such perturbations make synthesis problems virtually unsolvable, in the general case. On the classical model where signals are attached to states, tractable cases are rare and difficult to identify. Here, we propose a model where signals are detached from control states, and we identify a subclass on which equilibrium outcomes can be preserved, even if signals are delivered with a delay that is finitely bounded. To offset the perturbation, our solution procedure combines responses from a collection of virtual plays following an equilibrium strategy in the instant- signalling game to synthesise, in a Frankenstein manner, an equivalent equilibrium strategy for the delayed-signalling game