The effects of belongingness on the Simultaneous Lightness Contrast: A virtual reality study

Simultaneous Lightness Contrast (SLC) is the phenomenon whereby a grey patch on a dark background appears lighter than an equal patch on a light background. Interestingly, the lightness difference between these patches undergoes substantial augmentation when the two backgrounds are patterned, thereby forming the articulated-SLC display. There are two main interpretations of these phenomena: The midlevel interpretation maintains that the visual system groups the luminance within a set of contiguous frameworks, whilst the high-level one claims that the visual system splits the luminance into separate overlapping layers corresponding to separate physical contributions. This research aimed to test these two interpretations by systematically manipulating the viewing distance and the horizontal distance between the backgrounds of both the articulated and plain SLC displays. An immersive 3D Virtual Reality system was employed to reproduce identical alignment and distances, as well as isolating participants from interfering luminance. Results showed that reducing the viewing distance resulted in increased contrast in both the plain- and articulated-SLC displays and that, increasing the horizontal distance between the backgrounds resulted in decreased contrast in the articulated condition but increased contrast in the plain condition. These results suggest that a comprehensive lightness theory should combine the two interpretations

Colour layering and colour constancy

Loosely put, colour constancy for example occurs when you experience a partly shadowed wall to be uniformly coloured, or experience your favourite shirt to be the same colour both with and without sunglasses on. Controversy ensues when one seeks to interpret ‘experience’ in these contexts, for evidence of a constant colour may be indicative a constant colour in the objective world, a judgement that a constant colour would be present were things thus and so, et cetera. My primary aim is to articulate a viable conception of Present Constancy, of what occurs when a constant colour is present in experience, despite the additional presence of some experienced colour variation (e.g., correlating to a change in illumination). My proposed conception involves experienced colour layering – experiencing one opaque colour through another transparent one – and in particular requires one of those experienced layers to remain constant while the other changes. The aim is not to propose this layering conception of colour constancy as the correct interpretation of all constancy cases, but rather to develop the conception enough to demonstrate how it could and plausibly should be applied to various cases, and the virtues it has over rivals. Its virtues include a seamless application to constancy cases involving variations in filters (e.g., sunglasses) and illuminants; its ability to accommodate experiences of partial colours and error-free interpretations of difficult cases; and its broad theoretical-neutrality, allowing it to be incorporated into numerous perceptual epistemologies and ontologies. If layered constancy is prevalent, as I suspect it is, then our experiential access to colours is critically nuanced: we have been plunged into a world of colour without being told that we will rarely, if ever, look to a location and experience just one of them

Engineering data compendium. Human perception and performance. User's guide

The concept underlying the Engineering Data Compendium was the product of a research and development program (Integrated Perceptual Information for Designers project) aimed at facilitating the application of basic research findings in human performance to the design and military crew systems. The principal objective was to develop a workable strategy for: (1) identifying and distilling information of potential value to system design from the existing research literature, and (2) presenting this technical information in a way that would aid its accessibility, interpretability, and applicability by systems designers. The present four volumes of the Engineering Data Compendium represent the first implementation of this strategy. This is the first volume, the User's Guide, containing a description of the program and instructions for its use

The science of color and color vision

A survey of color science and color vision

Perception of Lighting and Reflectance in Real and Synthetic Stimuli

The human visual system estimates the proportion of light reflected off of a surface despite variable lighting in a scene, a phenomenon known as lightness constancy. Classically, lightness constancy has been explained as a 'discounting' of the lighting intensity (Helmholtz, 1866), and this continues to be a common view today (e.g., Brainard & Maloney, 2011). However, Logvinenko and Maloney (2006) have made a radically different claim that the human visual system does not have any perceptual access to an estimation of lightness. The experiments described in Chapter 2 use a novel experimental paradigm to test this new theory proposed by Logvinenko and Maloney. We provide evidence against Logvinenko and Maloney's theory of lightness perception while adding to existing evidence that the visual system has good lightness constancy. In Chapter 3, we manipulate screen colour and texture cues to test the realism of computer-generated stimuli. We find that by matching the chromaticity of an LCD screen to the surrounding lighting and using a realistic texture, LCD screens can be made to appear similar to physical paper. Finally, Chapter 4 is an extension of the ideas from Chapter 3, in which the knowledge about how to adjust color and texture cues on an LCD monitor is applied to a lightness matching task. Here, the LCD screen is a small part of a larger physical setup. Additionally, levels of lightness constancy are compared across physical and simulated surfaces in the same novel experimental paradigm in Chapters 2 and 4. We find that physical and simulated surfaced elicit different levels of lightness constancy on the same task

Do Artists See Their Retinas?

Our perception starts with the image that falls on our retina and on this retinal image, distant objects are small and shadowed surfaces are dark. But this is not what we see. Visual constancies correct for distance so that, for example, a person approaching us does not appear to become a larger person. Interestingly, an artist, when rendering a scene realistically, must undo all these corrections, making distant objects again small. To determine whether years of art training and practice have conferred any specialized visual expertise, we compared the perceptual abilities of artists to those of non-artists in three tasks. We first asked them to adjust either the size or the brightness of a target to match it to a standard that was presented on a perspective grid or within a cast shadow. We instructed them to ignore the context, judging size, for example, by imagining the separation between their fingers if they were to pick up the test object from the display screen. In the third task, we tested the speed with which artists access visual representations. Subjects searched for an L-shape in contact with a circle; the target was an L-shape, but because of visual completion, it appeared to be a square occluded behind a circle, camouflaging the L-shape that is explicit on the retinal image. Surprisingly, artists were as affected by context as non-artists in all three tests. Moreover, artists took, on average, significantly more time to make their judgments, implying that they were doing their best to demonstrate the special skills that we, and they, believed they had acquired. Our data therefore support the proposal from Gombrich that artists do not have special perceptual expertise to undo the effects of constancies. Instead, once the context is present in their drawing, they need only compare the drawing to the scene to match the effect of constancies in both

Visual Processing in Rapid-Chase Systems: Image Processing, Attention, and Awareness

Visual stimuli can be classified so rapidly that their analysis may be based on a single sweep of feedforward processing through the visuomotor system. Behavioral criteria for feedforward processing can be evaluated in response priming tasks where speeded pointing or keypress responses are performed toward target stimuli which are preceded by prime stimuli. We apply this method to several classes of complex stimuli. (1) When participants classify natural images into animals or non-animals, the time course of their pointing responses indicates that prime and target signals remain strictly sequential throughout all processing stages, meeting stringent behavioral criteria for feedforward processing (rapid-chase criteria). (2) Such priming effects are boosted by selective visual attention for positions, shapes, and colors, in a way consistent with bottom-up enhancement of visuomotor processing, even when primes cannot be consciously identified. (3) Speeded processing of phobic images is observed in participants specifically fearful of spiders or snakes, suggesting enhancement of feedforward processing by long-term perceptual learning. (4) When the perceived brightness of primes in complex displays is altered by means of illumination or transparency illusions, priming effects in speeded keypress responses can systematically contradict subjective brightness judgments, such that one prime appears brighter than the other but activates motor responses as if it was darker. We propose that response priming captures the output of the first feedforward pass of visual signals through the visuomotor system, and that this output lacks some characteristic features of more elaborate, recurrent processing. This way, visuomotor measures may become dissociated from several aspects of conscious vision. We argue that “fast” visuomotor measures predominantly driven by feedforward processing should supplement “slow” psychophysical measures predominantly based on visual awareness

Colour Relations in Form

The orthodox monadic determination thesis holds that we represent colour relations by virtue of representing colours. Against this orthodoxy, I argue that it is possible to represent colour relations without representing any colours. I present a model of iconic perceptual content that allows for such primitive relational colour representation, and provide four empirical arguments in its support. I close by surveying alternative views of the relationship between monadic and relational colour representation