112 research outputs found
Solutions for cooperative games with and without transferable utility
When individuals generate benefits from their cooperation, allocation problems may occur regarding how much of the benefit from the cooperation each individual should take. In many economic situations, defining the contribution of each individual in a fair way is essential. This thesis is on cooperative game theory, a mathematical tool that models and analyses cooperative situations between individuals. Throughout the monograph, allocation rules that are based on the contributions of individuals are studied. The first two parts of this thesis are on the class of transferable utility games, in which benefits from cooperation can be freely transferred between agents. In the first part, allocation rules when the cooperation between agents is restricted by a communication structure are studied. A chapter of this part gives a new characterization of a known allocation rule. In the next chapter, allocation rules are investigated for the class of games in which the underlying communication structure is represented by a circle. The second part of this thesis introduces a new type of restriction on cooperation between players, called quasi-building system, which covers many known structures. The third part of this thesis deals with situations in which benefits from cooperation are not transferable between individuals. This part focuses on when an allocation rule based on contributions of individuals leads to an economically satisfying result
The Nucleolus, the Kernel, and the Bargaining Set: An Update
One of David Schmeidlerâs many important contributions in his distinguished career was the introduction of the nucleolus, one of the central single-valued solution concepts in cooperative game theory. This paper is an updated survey on the nucleolus and its two related supersolutions, i.e., the kernel and the bargaining set. As a first approach to these concepts, we refer the reader to the great survey by Maschler (1992); see also the relevant chapters in Peleg and Sudholter (2003). Building on the notes of four lectures on the nucleolus and the kernel delivered by one of the authors at the Hebrew University of
Jerusalem in 1999, we have updated Maschlerâs survey by adding more recent contributions to the literature. Following a similar structure, we have also added a new section that covers the bargaining set.
The nucleolus has a number of desirable properties, including nonemptiness, uniqueness, core selection, and consistency. The first way to understand it is based on an egalitarian principle among coalitions. However, by going over the axioms that characterize it, what comes across as important is its connection with coalitional stability, as formalized in the notion of the core. Indeed, if one likes a single-valued version of core stability that always yields a prediction, one should consider the nucleolus as a recommendation. The kernel, which contains the nucleolus, is based on the idea of âbilateral equilibriumâ for every pair of players. And the bargaining set, which contains the
kernel, checks for the credibility of objections coming from coalitions. In this paper, section 2 presents preliminaries, section 3 is devoted to the nucleolus, section 4 to the kernel, and section 5 to the bargaining set.Iñarra acknowledges research support from the Spanish Government grant ECO2015-67519-P, and
Shimomura from Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A)18H03641 and (C)19K01558
Cooperative game theory and its application to natural, environmental, and water resource issues : 3. application to water resources
This paper reviews various applications of cooperative game theory (CGT) to issues of water resources. With an increase in the competition over various water resources, the incidents of disputes have been in the center of allocation agreements. The paper reviews the cases of various water uses, such as multi-objective water projects, irrigation, groundwater, hydropower, urban water supply, wastewater, and transboundary water disputes. In addition to providing examples of cooperative solutions to allocation problems, the conclusion from this review suggests that cooperation over scarce water resources is possible under a variety of physical conditions and institutional arrangements. In particular, the various approaches for cost sharing and for allocation of physical water infrastructure and flow can serve as a basis for stable and efficient agreement, such that long-term investments in water projects are profitable and sustainable. The latter point is especially important, given recent developments in water policy in various countries and regional institutions such as the European Union (Water Framework Directive), calling for full cost recovery of investments and operation and maintenance in water projects. The CGT approaches discussed and demonstrated in this paper can provide a solid basis for finding possible and stable cost-sharing arrangements.Town Water Supply and Sanitation,Environmental Economics&Policies,Water Supply and Sanitation Governance and Institutions,Water Supply and Systems,Water and Industry
Axiomatizations of the conjunctive permission value for games with permission structures
Game Theory;econometrics
Contributing or free-riding? Voluntary participation in a public good economy
We consider a (pure) public goods provision problem with voluntary participation in a quasi-linear economy. We propose a new hybrid solution concept, the free-riding-proof core (FRP-Core), which endogenously determines a contribution group, public goods provision level, and how to share the provision costs. The FRP-Core is always nonempty in public goods economies but does not usually achieve global efficiency. The FRP-Core has support from both cooperative and noncooperative games. In particular, it is equivalent to the set of perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibria (Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston, 1987) of a dynamic game with players' participation decisions followed by a common agency game of public goods provision. We illustrate various properties of the FRP-Core with an example. We also show that the equilibrium level of public goods shrinks to zero as the economy is replicated.Endogenous coalition formation, externalities, public good, perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, free riders, free-riding-proof core, lobbying, common agency game
Construir el diĂĄlogo cientĂfico en la MatemĂĄtica: la bĂșsqueda del equilibrio entre sĂmbolos y palabras en artĂculos de investigaciĂłn sobre TeorĂa de Juegos
MaestrĂa en InglĂ©s con OrientaciĂłn en LingĂŒĂstica AplicadaMost scientific communication is conducted in English, which may be a difficult task and a source of
obstacles for researchers whose primary language is not English (Bitchenera & Basturkmen, 2006;
Borlogan, 2009; Duff, 2010; Matsuda & Matsuda, 2010). As a matter of concern for language scholars, this
situation requires at least two actions: (1) the development of research focused on the problems faced by
researchers when writing in a foreign language, and (2) the design and implementation of pedagogical and
didactic programmes or services aimed at providing researchers with the tools to enhance their linguistic
and rhetorical skills. In both cases, the ultimate objective of these lines of action is to help researchers
integrate into and interact with their knowledge communities in an independent, active and successful way.
Considering those needs and the emerging interest in English as a lingua franca or as an international
language, many scholars have devoted to studying the features of writing and language use across the world
and across disciplines (Hyland, 2004; Matsuda & Matsuda, 2010; Mercado, 2010). However, few have
explored the case of Mathematics (Lemke, 2002; Morgan, 2008; OâHalloran, 2005; Schleppegrell, 2007),
and even fewer have investigated the discourse of scientific research articles (SRA) in this discipline (Graves
& Moghadassi, 2013, 2014). In view of this situation, investigation of the discourse of science in the field of
Mathematics (Game Theory - GT) as used in the Institute of Applied Mathematics (IMASL), at the National
University of San Luis (UNSL), becomes both an answer to local researchersâ needs and an attempt to
contribute to current research in writing, evaluative discourse and use of English as an international language
for the communication of science. Thus, the main objective of this work is to conduct a comparative
description between unpublished GT SRAs written in English by IMASL researchers and published GT
SRAs written in English by international authors, in terms of linguistic features used to build authorship and
authorial stance. The exploration of the genre is made from the perspective of the system of Appraisal
(Hood, 2010; Martin & White, 2005; White, 2000), with the aid of Corpus Linguistics (CL) tools (Cheng,
2012; Meyer, 2002; Tognini-Bonelli, 2001). The results of this research are expected to be useful for the
enhancement of knowledge of language professionals devoted to the teaching of writing as well as
translation, proofreading, editing and reviewing services. A further goal is to lay the foundations for the
production of didactic material which can potentially be incorporated into writing courses or professional
writing, translation, reviewing and proofreading training programmes.Fil: Lucero Arrua, Graciela Beatriz. Universidad Nacional de CĂłrdoba. Facultad de Lenguas; Argentina
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