Learning alters theta-nested gamma oscillations in inferotemporal cortex

How coupled brain rhythms influence cortical information processing to support learning is unresolved. Local field potential and neuronal activity recordings from 64- electrode arrays in sheep inferotemporal cortex showed that visual discrimination learning increased the amplitude of theta oscillations during stimulus presentation. Coupling between theta and gamma oscillations, the theta/gamma ratio and the regularity of theta phase were also increased, but not neuronal firing rates. A neural network model with fast and slow inhibitory interneurons was developed which generated theta nested gamma. By increasing N-methyl-D-aspartate receptor sensitivity similar learning-evoked changes could be produced. The model revealed that altered theta nested gamma could potentiate downstream neuron responses by temporal desynchronization of excitatory neuron output independent of changes in overall firing frequency. This learning-associated desynchronization was also exhibited by inferotemporal cortex neurons. Changes in theta nested gamma may therefore facilitate learning-associated potentiation by temporal modulation of neuronal firing

The Structure of Sensorimotor Explanation

The sensorimotor theory of vision and visual consciousness is often described as a radical alternative to the computational and connectionist orthodoxy in the study of visual perception. However, it is far from clear whether the theory represents a significant departure from orthodox approaches or whether it is an enrichment of it. In this study, I tackle this issue by focusing on the explanatory structure of the sensorimotor theory. I argue that the standard formulation of the theory subscribes to the same theses of the dynamical hypothesis and that it affords covering-law explanations. This however exposes the theory to the mere description worry and generates a puzzle about the role of representations. I then argue that the sensorimotor theory is compatible with a mechanistic framework, and show how this can overcome the mere description worry and solve the problem of the explanatory role of representations. By doing so, it will be shown that the theory should be understood as an enrichment of the orthodoxy, rather than an alternative

Brief targeted memory reactivation during the awake state enhances memory stability and benefits the weakest memories.

Reactivation of representations corresponding to recent experience is thought to be a critical mechanism supporting long-term memory stabilization. Targeted memory reactivation, or the re-exposure of recently learned cues, seeks to induce reactivation and has been shown to benefit later memory when it takes place during sleep. However, despite recent evidence for endogenous reactivation during post-encoding awake periods, less work has addressed whether awake targeted memory reactivation modulates memory. Here, we found that brief (50 ms) visual stimulus re-exposure during a repetitive foil task enhanced the stability of cued versus uncued associations in memory. The extent of external or task-oriented attention prior to re-exposure was inversely related to cueing benefits, suggesting that an internally-orientated state may be most permissible to reactivation. Critically, cueing-related memory benefits were greatest in participants without explicit recognition of cued items and remained reliable when only considering associations not recognized as cued, suggesting that explicit cue-triggered retrieval processes did not drive cueing benefits. Cueing benefits were strongest for associations and participants with the poorest initial learning. These findings expand our knowledge of the conditions under which targeted memory reactivation can benefit memory, and in doing so, support the notion that reactivation during awake time periods improves memory stabilization

The Role of Synaptic Tagging and Capture for Memory Dynamics in Spiking Neural Networks

Memory serves to process and store information about experiences such that this information can be used in future situations. The transfer from transient storage into long-term memory, which retains information for hours, days, and even years, is called consolidation. In brains, information is primarily stored via alteration of synapses, so-called synaptic plasticity. While these changes are at first in a transient early phase, they can be transferred to a late phase, meaning that they become stabilized over the course of several hours. This stabilization has been explained by so-called synaptic tagging and capture (STC) mechanisms. To store and recall memory representations, emergent dynamics arise from the synaptic structure of recurrent networks of neurons. This happens through so-called cell assemblies, which feature particularly strong synapses. It has been proposed that the stabilization of such cell assemblies by STC corresponds to so-called synaptic consolidation, which is observed in humans and other animals in the first hours after acquiring a new memory. The exact connection between the physiological mechanisms of STC and memory consolidation remains, however, unclear. It is equally unknown which influence STC mechanisms exert on further cognitive functions that guide behavior. On timescales of minutes to hours (that means, the timescales of STC) such functions include memory improvement, modification of memories, interference and enhancement of similar memories, and transient priming of certain memories. Thus, diverse memory dynamics may be linked to STC, which can be investigated by employing theoretical methods based on experimental data from the neuronal and the behavioral level. In this thesis, we present a theoretical model of STC-based memory consolidation in recurrent networks of spiking neurons, which are particularly suited to reproduce biologically realistic dynamics. Furthermore, we combine the STC mechanisms with calcium dynamics, which have been found to guide the major processes of early-phase synaptic plasticity in vivo. In three included research articles as well as additional sections, we develop this model and investigate how it can account for a variety of behavioral effects. We find that the model enables the robust implementation of the cognitive memory functions mentioned above. The main steps to this are: 1. demonstrating the formation, consolidation, and improvement of memories represented by cell assemblies, 2. showing that neuromodulator-dependent STC can retroactively control whether information is stored in a temporal or rate-based neural code, and 3. examining interaction of multiple cell assemblies with transient and attractor dynamics in different organizational paradigms. In summary, we demonstrate several ways by which STC controls the late-phase synaptic structure of cell assemblies. Linking these structures to functional dynamics, we show that our STC-based model implements functionality that can be related to long-term memory. Thereby, we provide a basis for the mechanistic explanation of various neuropsychological effects.2021-09-0

Action guidance is not enough, representations need correspondence too: A plea for a two-factor theory of representation

The aim of this article is to critically examine what I call Action-Centric Theories of Representation (ACToRs). I include in this category theories of representation that (1) reject construing representation in terms of a relation that holds between representation itself (the representational vehicle) and what is represented, and instead (2) try to bring the function that representations play for cognitive systems to the center stage. Roughly speaking, according to proponents of ACToRs, what makes a representation (that is, what is constitutive of it being a representation) is its being functionally involved in preselecting or guiding the actions of cognitive systems. I intend to argue that while definitely valuable, ACToRs are underconstrained and thus not entirely satisfying, since there exist structures that would count as representations according to ACToRs, but which do not play functional roles that could be nontrivially or in an explanatorily valuable way classified as representing something for a cognitive system. I outline a remedy for this theoretical situation by postulating that a fully satisfying theory of representation in cognitive science should have two factors; i.e., it should combine the pragmatic, action-oriented aspect present in ACToRs with an element that emphasizes the importance of the relation holding between a representational vehicle and what is represented

Gliotransmission of D-serine promotes thirst-directed behaviors in Drosophila

Thirst emerges from a range of cellular changes that ultimately motivate an animal to consume water. Although thirst-responsive neuronal signals have been reported, the full complement of brain responses is unclear. Here, we identify molecular and cellular adaptations in the brain using single-cell sequencing of water-deprived Drosophila. Water deficiency primarily altered the glial transcriptome. Screening the regulated genes revealed astrocytic expression of the astray-encoded phosphoserine phosphatase to bi-directionally regulate water consumption. Astray synthesizes the gliotransmitter D-serine, and vesicular release from astrocytes is required for drinking. Moreover, dietary D-serine rescues aay-dependent drinking deficits while facilitating water consumption and expression of water-seeking memory. D-serine action requires binding to neuronal NMDA-type glutamate receptors. Fly astrocytes contribute processes to tripartite synapses, and the proportion of astrocytes that are themselves activated by glutamate increases with water deprivation. We propose that thirst elevates astrocytic D-serine release, which awakens quiescent glutamatergic circuits to enhance water procurement

Consciosusness in Cognitive Architectures. A Principled Analysis of RCS, Soar and ACT-R

This report analyses the aplicability of the principles of consciousness developed in the ASys project to three of the most relevant cognitive architectures. This is done in relation to their aplicability to build integrated control systems and studying their support for general mechanisms of real-time consciousness.\ud To analyse these architectures the ASys Framework is employed. This is a conceptual framework based on an extension for cognitive autonomous systems of the General Systems Theory (GST).\ud A general qualitative evaluation criteria for cognitive architectures is established based upon: a) requirements for a cognitive architecture, b) the theoretical framework based on the GST and c) core design principles for integrated cognitive conscious control systems

Body models in humans, animals, and robots: mechanisms and plasticity

Humans and animals excel in combining information from multiple sensory modalities, controlling their complex bodies, adapting to growth, failures, or using tools. These capabilities are also highly desirable in robots. They are displayed by machines to some extent - yet, as is so often the case, the artificial creatures are lagging behind. The key foundation is an internal representation of the body that the agent - human, animal, or robot - has developed. In the biological realm, evidence has been accumulated by diverse disciplines giving rise to the concepts of body image, body schema, and others. In robotics, a model of the robot is an indispensable component that enables to control the machine. In this article I compare the character of body representations in biology with their robotic counterparts and relate that to the differences in performance that we observe. I put forth a number of axes regarding the nature of such body models: fixed vs. plastic, amodal vs. modal, explicit vs. implicit, serial vs. parallel, modular vs. holistic, and centralized vs. distributed. An interesting trend emerges: on many of the axes, there is a sequence from robot body models, over body image, body schema, to the body representation in lower animals like the octopus. In some sense, robots have a lot in common with Ian Waterman - "the man who lost his body" - in that they rely on an explicit, veridical body model (body image taken to the extreme) and lack any implicit, multimodal representation (like the body schema) of their bodies. I will then detail how robots can inform the biological sciences dealing with body representations and finally, I will study which of the features of the "body in the brain" should be transferred to robots, giving rise to more adaptive and resilient, self-calibrating machines.Comment: 27 pages, 8 figure

Predictive coding and representationalism

According to the predictive coding theory of cognition (PCT), brains are predictive machines that use perception and action to minimize prediction error, i.e. the discrepancy between bottom–up, externally-generated sensory signals and top–down, internally-generated sensory predictions. Many consider PCT to have an explanatory scope that is unparalleled in contemporary cognitive science and see in it a framework that could potentially provide us with a unified account of cognition. It is also commonly assumed that PCT is a representational theory of sorts, in the sense that it postulates that our cognitive contact with the world is mediated by internal representations. However, the exact sense in which PCT is representational remains unclear; neither is it clear that it deserves such status—that is, whether it really invokes structures that are truly and nontrivially representational in nature. In the present article, I argue that the representational pretensions of PCT are completely justified. This is because the theory postulates cognitive structures—namely action-guiding, detachable, structural models that afford representational error detection—that play genuinely representational functions within the cognitive system