13,547 research outputs found

    The Dynamics of Sex Ratio Evolution: From the Gene Perspective to Multilevel Selection

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    The new dynamical game theoretic model of sex ratio evolution emphasizes the role of males as passive carriers of sex ratio genes. This shows inconsistency between population genetic models of sex ratio evolution and classical strategic models. In this work a novel technique of change of coordinates will be applied to the new model. This will reveal new aspects of the modelled phenomenon which cannot be shown or proven in the original formulation. The underlying goal is to describe the dynamics of selection of particular genes in the entire population, instead of in the same sex subpopulation, as in the previous paper and earlier population genetics approaches. This allows for analytical derivation of the unbiased strategic model from the model with rigorous non-simplified genetics. In effect, an alternative system of replicator equations is derived. It contains two subsystems: the first describes changes in gene frequencies (this is an alternative unbiased formalization of the Fisher-Dusing argument), whereas the second describes changes in the sex ratios in subpopulations of carriers of genes for each strategy. An intriguing analytical result of this work is that fitness of a gene depends on the current sex ratio in the subpopulation of its carriers, not on the encoded individual strategy. Thus, the argument of the gene fitness function is not constant but is determined by the trajectory of the sex ratio among carriers of that gene. This aspect of the modelled phenomenon cannot be revealed by the static analysis. Dynamics of the sex ratio among gene carriers is driven by a dynamic "tug of war" between female carriers expressing the encoded strategic trait value and random partners of male carriers expressing the average population strategy (a primary sex ratio). This mechanism can be called "double level selection". Therefore, gene interest perspective leads to multi-level selection.Comment: 3 figure

    Different perceptions of social dilemmas: Evolutionary multigames in structured populations

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    Motivated by the fact that the same social dilemma can be perceived differently by different players, we here study evolutionary multigames in structured populations. While the core game is the weak prisoner's dilemma, a fraction of the population adopts either a positive or a negative value of the sucker's payoff, thus playing either the traditional prisoner's dilemma or the snowdrift game. We show that the higher the fraction of the population adopting a different payoff matrix, the more the evolution of cooperation is promoted. The microscopic mechanism responsible for this outcome is unique to structured populations, and it is due to the payoff heterogeneity, which spontaneously introduces strong cooperative leaders that give rise to an asymmetric strategy imitation flow in favor of cooperation. We demonstrate that the reported evolutionary outcomes are robust against variations of the interaction network, and they also remain valid if players are allowed to vary which game they play over time. These results corroborate existing evidence in favor of heterogeneity-enhanced network reciprocity, and they reveal how different perceptions of social dilemmas may contribute to their resolution.Comment: 7 two-column pages, 5 figures; accepted for publication in Physical Review

    Oscillatory dynamics in evolutionary games are suppressed by heterogeneous adaptation rates of players

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    Game dynamics in which three or more strategies are cyclically competitive, as represented by the rock-scissors-paper game, have attracted practical and theoretical interests. In evolutionary dynamics, cyclic competition results in oscillatory dynamics of densities of individual strategists. In finite-size populations, it is known that oscillations blow up until all but one strategies are eradicated if without mutation. In the present paper, we formalize replicator dynamics with players that have different adaptation rates. We show analytically and numerically that the heterogeneous adaptation rate suppresses the oscillation amplitude. In social dilemma games with cyclically competing strategies and homogeneous adaptation rates, altruistic strategies are often relatively weak and cannot survive in finite-size populations. In such situations, heterogeneous adaptation rates save coexistence of different strategies and hence promote altruism. When one strategy dominates the others without cyclic competition, fast adaptors earn more than slow adaptors. When not, mixture of fast and slow adaptors stabilizes population dynamics, and slow adaptation does not imply inefficiency for a player.Comment: 4 figure

    Discovery of mating in the major African livestock pathogen Trypanosoma congolense

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    The protozoan parasite, Trypanosoma congolense, is one of the most economically important pathogens of livestock in Africa and, through its impact on cattle health and productivity, has a significant effect on human health and well being. Despite the importance of this parasite our knowledge of some of the fundamental biological processes is limited. For example, it is unknown whether mating takes place. In this paper we have taken a population genetics based approach to address this question. The availability of genome sequence of the parasite allowed us to identify polymorphic microsatellite markers, which were used to genotype T. congolense isolates from livestock in a discrete geographical area of The Gambia. The data showed a high level of diversity with a large number of distinct genotypes, but a deficit in heterozygotes. Further analysis identified cryptic genetic subdivision into four sub-populations. In one of these, parasite genotypic diversity could only be explained by the occurrence of frequent mating in T. congolense. These data are completely inconsistent with previous suggestions that the parasite expands asexually in the absence of mating. The discovery of mating in this species of trypanosome has significant consequences for the spread of critical traits, such as drug resistance, as well as for fundamental aspects of the biology and epidemiology of this neglected but economically important pathogen

    Improved sampling of the pareto-front in multiobjective genetic optimizations by steady-state evolution: a Pareto converging genetic algorithm

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    Previous work on multiobjective genetic algorithms has been focused on preventing genetic drift and the issue of convergence has been given little attention. In this paper, we present a simple steady-state strategy, Pareto Converging Genetic Algorithm (PCGA), which naturally samples the solution space and ensures population advancement towards the Pareto-front. PCGA eliminates the need for sharing/niching and thus minimizes heuristically chosen parameters and procedures. A systematic approach based on histograms of rank is introduced for assessing convergence to the Pareto-front, which, by definition, is unknown in most real search problems. We argue that there is always a certain inheritance of genetic material belonging to a population, and there is unlikely to be any significant gain beyond some point; a stopping criterion where terminating the computation is suggested. For further encouraging diversity and competition, a nonmigrating island model may optionally be used; this approach is particularly suited to many difficult (real-world) problems, which have a tendency to get stuck at (unknown) local minima. Results on three benchmark problems are presented and compared with those of earlier approaches. PCGA is found to produce diverse sampling of the Pareto-front without niching and with significantly less computational effort
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