Myopic Versus Farsighted Behaviors in a Low-Carbon Supply Chain with Reference Emission Effects

The increased carbon emissions cause relatively climate deterioration and attract more attention of governments, consumers, and enterprises to the low-carbon manufacturing. This paper considers a dynamic supply chain, which is composed of a manufacturer and a retailer, in the presence of the cap-and-trade regulation and the consumers’ reference emission effects. To investigate the manufacturer’s behavior choice and its impacts on the emission reduction and pricing strategies together with the profits of both the channel members, we develop a Stackelberg differential game model in which the manufacturer acts in both myopic and farsighted manners. By comparing the equilibrium strategies, it can be found that the farsighted manufacturer always prefers to keep a lower level of emission reduction. When the emission permit price is relatively high, the wholesale/retail price is lower if the manufacturer is myopic and hence benefits consumers. In addition, there exists a dilemma that the manufacturer is willing to act in a farsighted manner but the retailer looks forward to a partnership with the myopic manufacturer. For a relatively high price of emission permit, adopting myopic strategies results in a better performance of the whole supply chain

Coordination mechanism of dual-channel supply chains considering retailer innovation inputs

In response to the online channels established by manufacturers, physical retailers are starting to offer innovative services, which will intensify conflicts between manufacturers and retailers. Considering that the conflict will affect the operation efficiency and sustainable development of the supply chain, the coordination mechanism of a dual-channel supply chain has been established. In this study, we construct the Stackelberg game model based on consumer utility theory to analyze the complex mechanism of retailers' innovation input level affecting supply chain operation and design the double coordination mechanism. The results show that: (1) an optimal combination of wholesale prices, retail prices and innovation input levels can optimize the operational efficiency of the supply chain, (2) Noncooperation among channel members affects the retailer's product pricing, decreases the market share of the physical channel and increases the market demand of manufacturers, (3) The dual coordination mechanism can alleviate channel conflicts, which can improve the operational efficiency of the supply chain. This study provides several insights on the theory of organizational coordination and sustainable development in conflicts of dual-channel supply chains

Supply chain collaboration and sustainable development goals (SDGs). Teamwork makes achieving SDGs dream work

The global push towards sustainable development has led to an upsurge in academic literature at the juncture of supply chain collaboration (SCC) and sustainability. The present paper aims to map this growing literature to understand how SCC can contribute to the achievement of broader Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Via a systematic review of literature (SLR), the paper maps key themes at the intersection of SCC and sustainable development. Relying on nine key themes, the study presents novel insights into the domain of SCC for sustainable development. The results of the SLR reveal that collaborative innovation, collaborative process and product development are key mechanisms driving SCC. However, the extant literature has not devoted much attention to the effectiveness of SCC mechanisms or their performance. Further, the current study posits that more effective SCC strategies can boost the sustainable operational performance of the supply chain (SC) by enhancing capacity building and resource utilisation. Based on the contingency approach, this study offers a novel framework linking SCC to SDGs. The study thus has the potential to help managers and practitioners identify strategic fields of action for achieving SDGs.publishedVersionPaid open acces

Supply chain collaboration and sustainable development goals (SDGs). Teamwork makes achieving SDGs dream work

The global push towards sustainable development has led to an upsurge in academic literature at the juncture of supply chain collaboration (SCC) and sustainability. The present paper aims to map this growing literature to understand how SCC can contribute to the achievement of broader Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Via a systematic review of literature (SLR), the paper maps key themes at the intersection of SCC and sustainable development. Relying on nine key themes, the study presents novel insights into the domain of SCC for sustainable development. The results of the SLR reveal that collaborative innovation, collaborative process and product development are key mechanisms driving SCC. However, the extant literature has not devoted much attention to the effectiveness of SCC mechanisms or their performance. Further, the current study posits that more effective SCC strategies can boost the sustainable operational performance of the supply chain (SC) by enhancing capacity building and resource utilisation. Based on the contingency approach, this study offers a novel framework linking SCC to SDGs. The study thus has the potential to help managers and practitioners identify strategic fields of action for achieving SDGs.publishedVersio

Cost-sharing contract design in a low-carbon service supply chain

This paper investigates a service supply chain (SC) consisting of a service provider (SP) who is in charge of carbon emission reduction and service, and a service integrator (SI) who is responsible for low-carbon advertising, considering corporate social responsibility (CSR). Given that SP shares SI’s advertising cost, SI may have three types of cost sharing decisions, namely, not sharing any cost of SP (contract PA), sharing SP’s emission reduction cost (contract PAIE), or sharing SP’s service cost (contract PAIS). We establish three differential game models to explore the optimal decisions, and identify the conditions under which SP and SI would provide positive participation rates. Our findings demonstrate that consumers’ low-carbon preference, and chain members’ marginal profits and CSR behaviors significantly influence the optimal solutions. Furthermore, we indicate that two-way contracts (contracts PAIE and PAIS) could benefit the entire service SC and its members. Specifically, SI prefers contract PAIE when SP’s service cost efficiency is lower, whereas he would rather choose contract PAIS under a higher one. More importantly, contracts PAIS and PAIE would be the potential equilibrium contract when SI has a relatively high marginal profit. When it is sufficiently low, contracts PAIE and PA would be the possible equilibrium contract

Game-theoretic analysis to examine how government subsidy policies affect a closed-loop supply chain decision

The pros and cons of government subsidy policies in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) setting on optimal pricing, investment decisions in improving product quality, and used product collection under social welfare (SW) optimization goal have not been examined comprehensively. This study compares the outcomes of three government policies under manufacturer-Stackelberg (MS) and retailer-Stackelberg (RS), namely (i) direct subsidy to the consumer, (ii) subsidy to the manufacturer to stimulate used product collection, and (iii) subsidy to the manufacturer to improve product quality. Results demonstrate that the greening level, used product collection, and SW are always higher under the RS game, but the rate of a subsidy granted by the government is always higher under the MS game. Profits for the CLSC members and SW are always higher if the government provides a subsidy directly to the consumer, but productivity of investment in the perspective of the manufacturer or government are less. In a second policy, the government organizations grant a subsidy to the manufacturer to stimulate used product collection, but it does not necessarily yield the desired outcome compared to others. In a third policy, the manufacturer receives a subsidy on a research and development (R&D) investment, but it yields a sub-optimal greening level. This study reveals that the outcomes of subsidy policies can bring benefit to consumers and add a degree of complication for CLSC members; government organizations need to inspect carefully among attributes, mainly product type, power of CLSC members, and investment efficiency for the manufacturer, before implementing any subsidy policies so that it can lead to an environmentally and economically viable outcome

Study on Emission Reduction Strategies of Dual-Channel Supply Chain Considering Green Finance

As a weapon for economic development, green finance plays an important supporting and promoting role in the economic recovery and transformation of enterprises in the post-epidemic era. By constructing a dual-channel supply chain model, this paper considers two situations in which manufacturers participate in carbon trading and green finance loans, and uses Stackelberg game to study the impact of different situations on participants’ profits and emission reduction decisions. The results show that: under the carbon trading mechanism, the carbon emission reduction level of the manufacturer is inversely proportional to the relevant price, and the demand and profit of the two channels increase with the increase in emission reduction; when carbon trading and green financial loans are carried out at the same time, participants have lower profits, but with the increase in emission reductions, it is still a growing trend