Tang, Fei

Yuan, Xigang

Zhang, Dalin

Zhang, Xiaoqing

English

In reverse green supply chain, the mixed collection channel strategy of green reman-ufacturer is analyzed by building a dynamic game model in which we consider that the green remanufacturer undertakes the environmental responsibility and the green collector shows strong fairness concern for the profit. We analyze the impact of the environmental responsibility level of the green remanufacturer, the preference coefficient of the green remanufacturer, the fairness concern coefficient of the green collector, and the coefficient of cross collection price on optimal decision and profit of the green remanufacturer. The result shows that (1) the green remanufacturer can further improve the collection price, so that it makes many more customers participate in the collection activity; (2) the green remanufacturer pays more attention to fulfill the environmental responsibility, which will increase the intensity of collection of the waste green product, and improve the collection price, as the old green product’s remanufacturing cost is lower than the production cost of the new product, and it can improve the green remanufacturer’s profits; (3) the green remanufacturer’s profit in the mixed collection channel is higher than those in online or offline collection channels.<br/

Green remanufacturer’s mixed collection channel strategy considering enterprise’s environmental responsibility and the fairness concern in reverse green supply chain

https://vbn.aau.dk/files/467271214/ijerph_18_03405.pdf

Green remanufacturer’s mixed collection channel strategy considering enterprise’s environmental responsibility and the fairness concern in reverse green supply chain

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