104 research outputs found

    Crypto accelerators for power-efficient and realtime on-chip implementation of secure algorithms

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    The demand for data exchange is ever growing. Internet of Things (IoT), industry 4.0, smart city and next-generation interconnected vehicles are some examples of scenarios in which a high volume of nodes share data across networks. Hence, the data protection plays a fundamental aspect to avoid disclosure or manipulation of sensitive information and disruption of services, particularly in safety critical applications. On the other hand, also the compute power at disposal of possible attackers and hackers is growing, and next-future post-quantum capabilities will require the usage of longer keys, certificates and digital signatures, to preserve the security level offered by cryptographic functions. This will affect not only the amount of exchange data, but also the computational resources to secure data, increasing processing time, latencies and power consumption, and lowering data rates. In this work, we investigate different implementation strategies to overcome such performance limitations. This work provides a comparison among pure software approach (both on 32b and 64b processors) and hardware-based solutions we developed for FPGA and ASIC System-on-Chip platforms, for the most common symmetric-key and public-key cryptographic algorithms. The proposed hardware accelerators feature one order of magnitude higher throughput (and lower latency) and more than two orders lower power consumption than their software counterparts. A highly configurable cryptographic suite is proposed that can be customized according to the application requirements and thus able to increase as much as possible the efficiency in terms of energy per enciphered bits per secon

    Efficient Implementation on Low-Cost SoC-FPGAs of TLSv1.2 Protocol with ECC_AES Support for Secure IoT Coordinators

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    Security management for IoT applications is a critical research field, especially when taking into account the performance variation over the very different IoT devices. In this paper, we present high-performance client/server coordinators on low-cost SoC-FPGA devices for secure IoT data collection. Security is ensured by using the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol based on the TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 cipher suite. The hardware architecture of the proposed coordinators is based on SW/HW co-design, implementing within the hardware accelerator core Elliptic Curve Scalar Multiplication (ECSM), which is the core operation of Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems (ECC). Meanwhile, the control of the overall TLS scheme is performed in software by an ARM Cortex-A9 microprocessor. In fact, the implementation of the ECC accelerator core around an ARM microprocessor allows not only the improvement of ECSM execution but also the performance enhancement of the overall cryptosystem. The integration of the ARM processor enables to exploit the possibility of embedded Linux features for high system flexibility. As a result, the proposed ECC accelerator requires limited area, with only 3395 LUTs on the Zynq device used to perform high-speed, 233-bit ECSMs in 413 µs, with a 50 MHz clock. Moreover, the generation of a 384-bit TLS handshake secret key between client and server coordinators requires 67.5 ms on a low cost Zynq 7Z007S device

    Elliptic Curve Cryptography on Modern Processor Architectures

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    Abstract Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) has been adopted by the US National Security Agency (NSA) in Suite "B" as part of its "Cryptographic Modernisation Program ". Additionally, it has been favoured by an entire host of mobile devices due to its superior performance characteristics. ECC is also the building block on which the exciting field of pairing/identity based cryptography is based. This widespread use means that there is potentially a lot to be gained by researching efficient implementations on modern processors such as IBM's Cell Broadband Engine and Philip's next generation smart card cores. ECC operations can be thought of as a pyramid of building blocks, from instructions on a core, modular operations on a finite field, point addition & doubling, elliptic curve scalar multiplication to application level protocols. In this thesis we examine an implementation of these components for ECC focusing on a range of optimising techniques for the Cell's SPU and the MIPS smart card. We show significant performance improvements that can be achieved through of adoption of EC

    CacheZoom: How SGX Amplifies The Power of Cache Attacks

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    In modern computing environments, hardware resources are commonly shared, and parallel computation is widely used. Parallel tasks can cause privacy and security problems if proper isolation is not enforced. Intel proposed SGX to create a trusted execution environment within the processor. SGX relies on the hardware, and claims runtime protection even if the OS and other software components are malicious. However, SGX disregards side-channel attacks. We introduce a powerful cache side-channel attack that provides system adversaries a high resolution channel. Our attack tool named CacheZoom is able to virtually track all memory accesses of SGX enclaves with high spatial and temporal precision. As proof of concept, we demonstrate AES key recovery attacks on commonly used implementations including those that were believed to be resistant in previous scenarios. Our results show that SGX cannot protect critical data sensitive computations, and efficient AES key recovery is possible in a practical environment. In contrast to previous works which require hundreds of measurements, this is the first cache side-channel attack on a real system that can recover AES keys with a minimal number of measurements. We can successfully recover AES keys from T-Table based implementations with as few as ten measurements.Comment: Accepted at Conference on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES '17

    Cross-core Microarchitectural Attacks and Countermeasures

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    In the last decade, multi-threaded systems and resource sharing have brought a number of technologies that facilitate our daily tasks in a way we never imagined. Among others, cloud computing has emerged to offer us powerful computational resources without having to physically acquire and install them, while smartphones have almost acquired the same importance desktop computers had a decade ago. This has only been possible thanks to the ever evolving performance optimization improvements made to modern microarchitectures that efficiently manage concurrent usage of hardware resources. One of the aforementioned optimizations is the usage of shared Last Level Caches (LLCs) to balance different CPU core loads and to maintain coherency between shared memory blocks utilized by different cores. The latter for instance has enabled concurrent execution of several processes in low RAM devices such as smartphones. Although efficient hardware resource sharing has become the de-facto model for several modern technologies, it also poses a major concern with respect to security. Some of the concurrently executed co-resident processes might in fact be malicious and try to take advantage of hardware proximity. New technologies usually claim to be secure by implementing sandboxing techniques and executing processes in isolated software environments, called Virtual Machines (VMs). However, the design of these isolated environments aims at preventing pure software- based attacks and usually does not consider hardware leakages. In fact, the malicious utilization of hardware resources as covert channels might have severe consequences to the privacy of the customers. Our work demonstrates that malicious customers of such technologies can utilize the LLC as the covert channel to obtain sensitive information from a co-resident victim. We show that the LLC is an attractive resource to be targeted by attackers, as it offers high resolution and, unlike previous microarchitectural attacks, does not require core-colocation. Particularly concerning are the cases in which cryptography is compromised, as it is the main component of every security solution. In this sense, the presented work does not only introduce three attack variants that can be applicable in different scenarios, but also demonstrates the ability to recover cryptographic keys (e.g. AES and RSA) and TLS session messages across VMs, bypassing sandboxing techniques. Finally, two countermeasures to prevent microarchitectural attacks in general and LLC attacks in particular from retrieving fine- grain information are presented. Unlike previously proposed countermeasures, ours do not add permanent overheads in the system but can be utilized as preemptive defenses. The first identifies leakages in cryptographic software that can potentially lead to key extraction, and thus, can be utilized by cryptographic code designers to ensure the sanity of their libraries before deployment. The second detects microarchitectural attacks embedded into innocent-looking binaries, preventing them from being posted in official application repositories that usually have the full trust of the customer

    A Flexible Crypto-system Based upon the REDEFINE Polymorphic ASIC Architecture

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    The highest levels of security can be achieved through the use of more than one type of cryptographic algorithm for each security function. In this paper, the REDEFINE polymorphic architecture is presented as an architecture framework that can optimally support a varied set of crypto algorithms without losing high performance. The presented solution is capable of accelerating the advanced encryption standard (AES) and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) cryptographic protocols, while still supporting different flavors of these algorithms as well as different underlying finite field sizes. The compelling feature of this cryptosystem is the ability to provide acceleration support for new field sizes as well as new (possibly proprietary) cryptographic algorithms decided upon after the cryptosystem is deployed.Defence Science Journal, 2012, 62(1), pp.25-31, DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.14429/dsj.62.143

    IXIAM: ISA EXtension for Integrated Accelerator Management

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    During the last few years, hardware accelerators have been gaining popularity thanks to their ability to achieve higher performance and efficiency than classic general-purpose solutions. They are fundamentally shaping the current generations of Systems-on-Chip (SoCs), which are becoming increasingly heterogeneous. However, despite their widespread use, a standard, general solution to manage them while providing speed and consistency has not yet been found. Common methodologies rely on OS mediation and a mix of user-space and kernel-space drivers, which can be inefficient, especially for fine-grained tasks. This paper addresses these sources of inefficiencies by proposing an ISA eXtension for Integrated Accelerator Management (IXIAM), a cost-effective HW-SW framework to control a wide variety of accelerators in a standard way, and directly from the cores. The proposed instructions include reservation, work offloading, data transfer, and synchronization. They can be wrapped in a high-level software API or even integrated into a compiler. IXIAM features also a user-space interrupt mechanism to signal events directly to the user process. We implement it as a RISC-V extension in the gem5 simulator and demonstrate detailed support for complex accelerators, as well as the ability to specify sequences of memory transfers and computations directly from the ISA and with significantly lower overhead than driver-based schemes. IXIAM provides a performance advantage that is more evident for small and medium workloads, reaching around 90x in the best case. This way, we enlarge the set of workloads that would benefit from hardware acceleration

    Physical Fault Injection and Side-Channel Attacks on Mobile Devices:A Comprehensive Analysis

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    Today's mobile devices contain densely packaged system-on-chips (SoCs) with multi-core, high-frequency CPUs and complex pipelines. In parallel, sophisticated SoC-assisted security mechanisms have become commonplace for protecting device data, such as trusted execution environments, full-disk and file-based encryption. Both advancements have dramatically complicated the use of conventional physical attacks, requiring the development of specialised attacks. In this survey, we consolidate recent developments in physical fault injections and side-channel attacks on modern mobile devices. In total, we comprehensively survey over 50 fault injection and side-channel attack papers published between 2009-2021. We evaluate the prevailing methods, compare existing attacks using a common set of criteria, identify several challenges and shortcomings, and suggest future directions of research
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