Contributions to the Metamathematics of Arithmetic: Fixed Points, Independence, and Flexibility

This thesis concerns the incompleteness phenomenon of first-order arithmetic: no consistent, r.e. theory T can prove every true arithmetical sentence. The first incompleteness result is due to Gödel; classic generalisations are due to Rosser, Feferman, Mostowski, and Kripke. All these results can be proved using self-referential statements in the form of provable fixed points. Chapter 3 studies sets of fixed points; the main result is that disjoint such sets are creative. Hierarchical generalisations are considered, as well as the algebraic properties of a certain collection of bounded sets of fixed points. Chapter 4 is a systematic study of independent and flexible formulae, and variations thereof, with a focus on gauging the amount of induction needed to prove their existence. Hierarchical generalisations of classic results are given by adapting a method of Kripke’s. Chapter 5 deals with end-extensions of models of fragments of arithmetic, and their relation to flexible formulae. Chapter 6 gives Orey-Hájek-like characterisations of partial conservativity over different kinds of theories. Of particular note is a characterisation of partial conservativity over IΣ₁. Chapter 7 investigates the possibility to generalise the notion of flexibility in the spirit of Feferman’s theorem on the ‘interpretability of inconsistency’. Partial results are given by using Solovay functions to extend a recent theorem of Woodin

Interactive Realizability and the elimination of Skolem functions in Peano Arithmetic

We present a new syntactical proof that first-order Peano Arithmetic with Skolem axioms is conservative over Peano Arithmetic alone for arithmetical formulas. This result - which shows that the Excluded Middle principle can be used to eliminate Skolem functions - has been previously proved by other techniques, among them the epsilon substitution method and forcing. In our proof, we employ Interactive Realizability, a computational semantics for Peano Arithmetic which extends Kreisel's modified realizability to the classical case.Comment: In Proceedings CL&C 2012, arXiv:1210.289

Computational reverse mathematics and foundational analysis

Reverse mathematics studies which subsystems of second order arithmetic are equivalent to key theorems of ordinary, non-set-theoretic mathematics. The main philosophical application of reverse mathematics proposed thus far is foundational analysis, which explores the limits of different foundations for mathematics in a formally precise manner. This paper gives a detailed account of the motivations and methodology of foundational analysis, which have heretofore been largely left implicit in the practice. It then shows how this account can be fruitfully applied in the evaluation of major foundational approaches by a careful examination of two case studies: a partial realization of Hilbert's program due to Simpson [1988], and predicativism in the extended form due to Feferman and Sch\"{u}tte. Shore [2010, 2013] proposes that equivalences in reverse mathematics be proved in the same way as inequivalences, namely by considering only $\omega$-models of the systems in question. Shore refers to this approach as computational reverse mathematics. This paper shows that despite some attractive features, computational reverse mathematics is inappropriate for foundational analysis, for two major reasons. Firstly, the computable entailment relation employed in computational reverse mathematics does not preserve justification for the foundational programs above. Secondly, computable entailment is a $\Pi^1_1$ complete relation, and hence employing it commits one to theoretical resources which outstrip those available within any foundational approach that is proof-theoretically weaker than $\Pi^1_1\text{-}\mathsf{CA}_0$.Comment: Submitted. 41 page

Reflection using the derivability conditions

Reflection principles are a way to build non-conservative true extensions of a theory. However the application of a reflection principle needs a proof predicate, and the effort needed to provide this is so great as to be not really practical. We look at a possible way to avoid this effort by using, instead of a proof predicate, a predicate defined using only necessary `modal' properties. Surprisingly, we can produce powerful non-conservative extensions this way. But a reflection principle based on such a predicate is essentially weaker, and we also consider its limitations

Classical Predicative Logic-Enriched Type Theories

A logic-enriched type theory (LTT) is a type theory extended with a primitive mechanism for forming and proving propositions. We construct two LTTs, named LTTO and LTTO*, which we claim correspond closely to the classical predicative systems of second order arithmetic ACAO and ACA. We justify this claim by translating each second-order system into the corresponding LTT, and proving that these translations are conservative. This is part of an ongoing research project to investigate how LTTs may be used to formalise different approaches to the foundations of mathematics. The two LTTs we construct are subsystems of the logic-enriched type theory LTTW, which is intended to formalise the classical predicative foundation presented by Herman Weyl in his monograph Das Kontinuum. The system ACAO has also been claimed to correspond to Weyl's foundation. By casting ACAO and ACA as LTTs, we are able to compare them with LTTW. It is a consequence of the work in this paper that LTTW is strictly stronger than ACAO. The conservativity proof makes use of a novel technique for proving one LTT conservative over another, involving defining an interpretation of the stronger system out of the expressions of the weaker. This technique should be applicable in a wide variety of different cases outside the present work.Comment: 49 pages. Accepted for publication in special edition of Annals of Pure and Applied Logic on Computation in Classical Logic. v2: Minor mistakes correcte

Lewis meets Brouwer: constructive strict implication

C. I. Lewis invented modern modal logic as a theory of "strict implication". Over the classical propositional calculus one can as well work with the unary box connective. Intuitionistically, however, the strict implication has greater expressive power than the box and allows to make distinctions invisible in the ordinary syntax. In particular, the logic determined by the most popular semantics of intuitionistic K becomes a proper extension of the minimal normal logic of the binary connective. Even an extension of this minimal logic with the "strength" axiom, classically near-trivial, preserves the distinction between the binary and the unary setting. In fact, this distinction and the strong constructive strict implication itself has been also discovered by the functional programming community in their study of "arrows" as contrasted with "idioms". Our particular focus is on arithmetical interpretations of the intuitionistic strict implication in terms of preservativity in extensions of Heyting's Arithmetic.Comment: Our invited contribution to the collection "L.E.J. Brouwer, 50 years later