Leader-follower Game in VMI System with Limited Production Capacity Considering Wholesale and Retail Prices

VMI (Vendor Managed Inventory) is a widely used cooperative inventory policy in supply chains in which each enterprise has its autonomy in pricing. This paper discusses a leader-follower Stackelberg game in a VMI supply chain where the manufacturer, as a leader, produces a single product with a limited production capacity and delivers it at a wholesale price to multiple different retailers, as the followers, who then sell the product in dispersed and independent markets at retail prices. An algorithm is then developed to determine the equilibrium of the Stackelberg game. Finally, a numerical study is conducted to understand the influence of the Stackelberg equilibrium and market related parameters on the profits of the manufacturer and its retailers. Through the numerical example, our research demonstrates that: (a) the market related parameters have significant influence on the manufacturer’ and its retailers’ profits; (b) a retailer’s profit may not be necessarily lowered when it is charged with a higher inventory cost by the manufacturer; (c) the equilibrium of the Stackelberg equilibrium benefits the manufacturer.Stackelberg Game;Supply Chain;Vendor Managed Inventory

Strategic Inventories in a Supply Chain with Vertical Control and Downstream Cournot Competition

Strategic Inventory (SI) has been an area of increased interest in theoretical supply chain literature recently. Most of the work so far however, has only considered a supply chain without downstream competition between retailers. Competition is ubiquitous in most market situations, hence, interactions between SI and retailer competition merits study as a first step in bringing the conversations and insights from this stream of literature to the real world. We present here a two-period and a three-period model of one manufacturer supplying an identical product to two retailers who form a Cournot duopoly. We also study a Commitment contract, where the manufacturer commits to all the selling seasons’ wholesale prices at the beginning of the 1st period. Commitment contracts have been shown previously to eliminate SI carriage over two selling seasons in the absence of retailer competition. We aim to deduce if this type of contract has the same effect in the presence of downstream competition. We determine closed-form Nash Equilibrium decision variable values for each of these models using game-theoretic modeling, a price-dependent linear demand function, and backward induction. We find that, the introduction of downstream Cournot duopoly competition leads to lower profits for both the manufacturer and retailer. This holds, whether the number of selling season is two or three. Consumer Surplus is also uniformly lower under retailer competition, compared to a downstream monopoly supply chain. When we try to deduce the effect of SI carriage under Cournot duopoly competition, by comparing an SC with Cournot duopoly competition and SI allowed between periods, to a similar SC with a Cournot duopoly downstream and a static, repeating, one-shot game in each period, with no SI carried – we find again that manufacturer and retailer profits are both lower when SI carriage is allowed. This holds whether the number of selling seasons is two or three. Consumer Surplus is also lower uniformly over both two and three selling seasons. Under a Commitment contract, over two selling seasons, the manufacturer ends up with an advantage, making a higher profit with downstream retailer competition, than compared to supplying to a monopoly downstream under the same contract. The retailers, while competing as a Cournot duopoly, are not able to use the relative advantage that comes from a Commitment contract to make a higher profit, as they are, when the downstream is a single retailer monopoly. The consumer also is disadvantaged by the introduction of downstream Cournot competition under a Commitment contract. When we compare a manufacturer supplying to a Cournot duopoly downstream of retailers, with, and without a Commitment contract (dynamic ordering), we see that the manufacturer and consumer benefit under a Commitment contract, making higher profits, but the retailer is at a disadvantage. It would be an interesting extension of this work to generalize the results from two and three selling seasons, presented here, to the “n” period case. It would also be benefi-cial to run empirical studies in real-world supply chains to validate if and to what extent the insights developed by this kind of game-theoretic modeling hold in a real-world supply chain setting. Development of contracts that are more effective than a Commitment con-tract in coordinating this supply chain would be another possible area for further research

Impact of Back up Quantity Contract on Two-level Supply Chain: A Simulation Approach

In this new era of Supply chain coordination contracts are offered and accepted according to the varying need and specification of the industry and business in discussion. The contract variations arise according to the circumstances and adaptability by both manufacturer and retailer. An important challenge faced by the contracts being offered is the adaptability and robustness when demand observed is different from the forecast. Because of stochastic and uncertain demand, retailer faces lost sales and eventually loses revenue within the same horizon. This paper discusses a back up quantity contract for a single season in which retailer orders for one-shot inventory ordering. Manufacturer retains some part of the ordered inventory as backup and provides the units at first stage. If stock at retailer lags behind the demand, he gets the backup quantity otherwise he pays some agreed upon nominal price to manufacturer in case that inventory is not at all required. We assumed the case of single manufacturer and single retailer. If units are not required, the risk of holding inventory lies with manufacturer and salvaged at zero. The strategy is suitable for businesses having short seasonal products and high demand variability. We used Monte Carlo simulation for analyzing lost sales and supply chain profit scenario and used worst case distribution and normal distribution to validate the Pareto improving contractual relationship

Myopic Versus Farsighted Behaviors in a Low-Carbon Supply Chain with Reference Emission Effects

The increased carbon emissions cause relatively climate deterioration and attract more attention of governments, consumers, and enterprises to the low-carbon manufacturing. This paper considers a dynamic supply chain, which is composed of a manufacturer and a retailer, in the presence of the cap-and-trade regulation and the consumers’ reference emission effects. To investigate the manufacturer’s behavior choice and its impacts on the emission reduction and pricing strategies together with the profits of both the channel members, we develop a Stackelberg differential game model in which the manufacturer acts in both myopic and farsighted manners. By comparing the equilibrium strategies, it can be found that the farsighted manufacturer always prefers to keep a lower level of emission reduction. When the emission permit price is relatively high, the wholesale/retail price is lower if the manufacturer is myopic and hence benefits consumers. In addition, there exists a dilemma that the manufacturer is willing to act in a farsighted manner but the retailer looks forward to a partnership with the myopic manufacturer. For a relatively high price of emission permit, adopting myopic strategies results in a better performance of the whole supply chain

Vertical Restraints Facilitating Horizontal Collusion: ‘Stretching’ Agreements in a Comparative Approach

This article discusses the approaches of the European Union (EU) and of the United States (US) to the notions of agreement and concerted practice applied to horizontal collusive consequences of vertical restraints. It concludes that networks of vertical restraints blur the differences between vertical and horizontal agreements; therefore, both options of attack are available for enforcers in the EU and the US context. If the analysed vertical restraints are adopted in parallel by agreement, they should be deemed illegal as long as they restrict competition producing collusive consequences. In the absence of explicit coordination to adopt the practice, I suggest first looking for a stretched concept of horizontal agreement or a broadly interpreted concept of concerted practice, including unilateral ‘communication’ that intentionally reduces uncertainty. Even when the analysed practices are adopted individually and not by all firms, they can represent a commitment to focal points, observable by market players, thus amounting to communication of intent. If that is not possible, I propose that an analysis of market power, incentives, coercion and induction should guide the finding of an illegal vertical agreement and ground the analysis of the consequences. The agreement/concerted practice path is an appropriate, feasible and coherent way to deal with vertical restraints facilitating horizontal tacit coordination, but that does not exclude alternative effective enforcement mechanisms

Questioning the relentless shift to offshore manufacturing

The last 20 years has seen a relentless shift to offshore manufacturing as retailers chase ever-lower labor costs. The results of this strategy can now be evaluated and we propose that some adjustments are in order. We analyze the case of a North American apparel manufacturer (Griffin Manufacturing, Inc.) that has successfully emerged from a period of major change with a strong and strategic position in the apparel supply chain. This case study documents Griffin’s survival through evolution in capabilities, technology, and especially attitude. The Griffin case study suggests that keeping a portion of the manufacturing onshore at an agile, quick response factory is cost effective: it increases sales and improves margins. However, the new relationship between the parties is much more complex and requires commitment on both sides

Leader-follower Game in VMI System with Limited Production Capacity Considering Wholesale and Retail Prices

VMI (Vendor Managed Inventory) is a widely used cooperative inventory policy in supply chains in which each enterprise has its autonomy in pricing. This paper discusses a leader-follower Stackelberg game in a VMI supply chain where the manufacturer, as a leader, produces a single product with a limited production capacity and delivers it at a wholesale price to multiple different retailers, as the followers, who then sell the product in dispersed and independent markets at retail prices. An algorithm is then developed to determine the equilibrium of the Stackelberg game. Finally, a numerical study is conducted to understand the influence of the Stackelberg equilibrium and market related parameters on the profits of the manufacturer and its retailers. Through the numerical example, our research demonstrates that: (a) the market related parameters have significant influence on the manufacturer’ and its retailers’ profits; (b) a retailer’s profit ma

Coordinating supply chains via advance-order discounts, minimum order quantities, and delegations

This is the final version. Available from the publisher via the DOI in this record.To avoid inventory risks, manufacturers often place rush orders with suppliers only after they receive firm orders from their customers (retailers). Rush orders are costly to both parties because the supplier incurs higher production costs. We consider a situation where the supplier's production cost is reduced if the manufacturer can place some of its order in advance. In addition to the rush order contract with a pre-established price, we examine whether the supplier should offer advance-order discounts to encourage the manufacturer to place a portion of its order in advance, even though the manufacturer incurs some inventory risk. While the advance-order discount contract is Pareto-improving, our analysis shows that the discount contract cannot coordinate the supply chain. However, if the supplier imposes a pre-specified minimum order quantity requirement as a qualifier for the manufacturer to receive the advance-order discount, then such a combined contract can coordinate the supply chain. Furthermore, the combined contract enables the supplier to attain the first-best solution. We also explore a delegation contract that either party could propose. Under this contract, the manufacturer delegates the ordering and salvaging activities to the supplier in return for a discounted price on all units procured. We find the delegation contract coordinates the supply chain and is Pareto-improving. We extend our analysis to a setting where the suppliers capacity is limited for advance production but unlimited for rush orders. Our structural results obtained for the one-supplier-one-manufacturer case continue to hold when we have two manufacturers.UCLACardiff University's Executive Boar

Evaluation of sales and operations planning in a process industry

Cette thèse porte sur la planification des ventes et des opérations (S±&OP) dans une chaîne d'approvisionnements axée sur la demande. L'objectif de la S±&OP, dans un tel contexte, est de tirer profit de l'alignement de la demande des clients avec la capacité de la chaîne d'approvisionnement par la coordination de la planification des ventes, de la production, de la distribution et de l'approvisionnement. Un tel processus de planification exige une collaboration multifonctionnelle profonde ainsi que l'intégration de la planification. Le but étant d'anticiper l'impact des décisions de vente sur les performances de la chaîne logistique , alors que l'influence de la dynamique des marchés est prise en compte pour les décisions concernant la production, la distribution et l'approvisionnement. La recherche a été menée dans un environnement logistique manufacturier multi-site et multi-produit, avec un approvisionnement et des ventes régis par des contrats ou le marché. Cette thèse examine deux approches de S±&OP et fournit un support à la décision pour l'implantation de ces méthodes dans une chaîne logistique multi-site de fabrication sur commande. Dans cette thèse, une planification traditionnelle des ventes et de la production basée sur la S±feOP et une planification S±fcOP plus avancée de la chaîne logistique sont tout d'abord caractérisées. Dans le système de chaîne logistique manufacturière multi-site, nous définissons la S±&OP traditionnelle comme un système dans lequel la planification des ventes et de la production est effectuée conjointement et centralement, tandis que la planification de la distribution et de l'approvisionnement est effectuée séparément et localement à chaque emplacement. D'autre part, la S±fcOP avancée de la chaîne logistique consiste en la planification des ventes, de la production, de la distribution et de l'approvisionnement d'une chaîne d'approvisionnement effectuée conjointement et centralement. Basés sur cette classification, des modèles de programmation en nombres entiers et des modèles de simulation sur un horizon roulant sont développés, représentant, respectivement, les approches de S±&OP traditionnelle et avancée, et également, une planification découplée traditionnelle, dans laquelle la planification des ventes est effectuée centralement et la planification de la production, la distribution et l'approvisionnement est effectuée séparément et localement par les unités d'affaires. La validation des modèles et l'évaluation pré-implantation sont effectuées à l'aide d'un cas industriel réel utilisant les données d'une compagnie de panneaux de lamelles orientées. Les résultats obtenus démontrent que les deux méthodes de S±feOP (traditionnelle et avancée) offrent une performance significativement supérieure à celle de la planification découplée, avec des bénéfices prévus supérieurs de 3,5% et 4,5%, respectivement. Les résultats sont très sensibles aux conditions de marché. Lorsque les prix du marché descendent ou que la demande augmente, de plus grands bénéfices peuvent être réalisés. Dans le cadre de cette recherche, les décisions de vente impliquent des ventes régies par des contrats et le marché. Les décisions de contrat non optimales affectent non seulement les revenus, mais également la performance manufacturière et logistique et les décisions de contrats d'approvisionnement en matière première. Le grand défi est de concevoir et d'offrir les bonnes politiques de contrat aux bons clients de sorte que la satisfaction des clients soit garantie et que l'attribution de la capacité de la compagnie soit optimisée. Également, il faut choisir les bons contrats des bons fournisseurs, de sorte que les approvisionnements en matière première soient garantis et que les objectifs financiers de la compagnie soient atteints. Dans cette thèse, un modèle coordonné d'aide à la décision pour les contrats e développé afin de fournir une aide à l'intégration de la conception de contrats, de l'attribution de capacité et des décisions de contrats d'approvisionnement pour une chaîne logistique multi-site à trois niveaux. En utilisant la programmation stochastique à deux étapes avec recours, les incertitudes liées à l'environnement et au système sont anticipées et des décisions robustes peuvent être obtenues. Les résultats informatiques montrent que l'approche de modélisation proposée fournit des solutions de contrats plus réalistes et plus robustes, avec une performance prévue supérieure d'environ 12% aux solutions fournies par un modèle déterministe

Buyer Financing in Pull Supply Chains: Zero-Interest Early Payment or In-House Factoring?

This study investigates the efficacy of zero-interest early payment financing (alternatively referred to as early payment) and positive-interest in-house factoring financing in a pull supply chain with a capital-constrained manufacturer selling a product through a capital-abundant retailer. Early payment is the prepayment of a wholesale cost to the manufacturer, whereas in-house factoring is a loan service provided to the manufacturer by a branch financing firm of the same retailer. We find that the retailer prefers early payment financing to bank financing when the manufacturer’s production cost is low. If the retailer instead offers positive-interest in-house factoring financing to the manufacturer, then the financing equilibrium domain enlarges as compared to bank financing. Interestingly, early payment financing can outplay positive-interest in-house factoring financing if the production cost is considerably low; otherwise, vice versa. When the production cost is big enough, the retailer will not provide either early payment or in-house factoring. Furthermore, our main qualitative result sustains with an identical wholesale price across all three financing schemes and the financing equilibrium domain of early payment shrinks as demand variability grows