Revisiting the proof theory of Classical S4

In 1965 Dag Prawitz presented an extension of Gentzen-type systems of Natural Deduction to modal concepts of S4. Maria da Paz Medeiros showed in 2006 that the proof of normalisation for classical S4 does not hold and proposed a new proof of normalisation for a logically equivalent system, the system NS4. However two problems in the proof of the critical lemma used by Medeiros in her proof were pointed out by Yuuki Andou in 2009. This paper presents a proof of the critical lemma, resulting in a proof of normalisation for NS4.Revisitando a teoria da prova de S4 1965, Dag Prawitz apresentou uma extensão dos sistemas tipo-Gentzen de Dedução Natural para os conceitos modais de S4. Maria da Paz Medeiros mostrou em 2006 que a prova de normalização para o S4 clássico não estava correta e propôs uma nova prova de normalização para um sistema logicamente equivalente, o sistema NS4. No entanto, dois problemas na prova do lema crítico usado por Medeiros em sua prova foram apontados por Yuuki Andou em 2009. Este artigo apresenta uma nova prova do lema crítico e, consequentemente, uma prova de normalização para NS4.---Artigo em inglês

On computational interpretations of the modal logic S4. I. Cut elimination

A language of constructions for minimal logic is the $\lambda$-calculus, where cut-elimination is encoded as $\beta$-reduction. We examine corresponding languages for the minimal version of the modal logic S4, with notions of reduction that encodes cut-elimination for the corresponding sequent system. It turns out that a natural interpretation of the latter constructions is a $\lambda$-calculus extended by an idealized version of Lisp\u27s \verb/eval/ and \verb/quote/ constructs. In this first part, we analyze how cut-elimination works in the standard sequent system for minimal S4, and where problems arise. Bierman and De Paiva\u27s proposal is a natural language of constructions for this logic, but their calculus lacks a few rules that are essential to eliminate all cuts. The ${\lambda_{\rm S4}}$-calculus, namelyBierman and De Paiva\u27s proposal extended with all needed rules, is confluent. There is a polynomial-time algorithm to compute principal typings of given terms, or answer that the given terms are not typable. The typed ${\lambda_{\rm S4}}$-calculus terminates, and normal forms are exactly constructions for cut-free proofs. Finally, modulo some notion \sqeq of equivalence, there is a natural Curry-Howard style isomorphism between typed ${\lambda_{\rm S4}}$-terms and natural deduction proofs in minimal S4. However, the ${\lambda_{\rm S4}}$-calculus has a non-operational flavor, in that the extra rules include explicit garbage collection, contraction and exchange rules. We shall propose another language of constructions to repair this in Part II

Computational Aspects of Proofs in Modal Logic

Various modal logics seem well suited for developing models of knowledge, belief, time, change, causality, and other intensional concepts. Most such systems are related to the classical Lewis systems, and thereby have a substantial body of conventional proof theoretical results. However, most of the applied literature examines modal logics from a semantical point of view, rather than through proof theory. It appears arguments for validity are more clearly stated in terms of a semantical explanation, rather than a classical proof-theoretic one. We feel this is due to the inability of classical proof theories to adequately represent intensional aspects of modal semantics. This thesis develops proof theoretical methods which explicitly represent the underlying semantics of the modal formula in the proof. We initially develop a Gentzen style proof system which contains semantic information in the sequents. This system is, in turn, used to develop natural deduction proofs. Another semantic style proof representation, the modal expansion tree is developed. This structure can be used to derive either Gentzen style or Natural Deduction proofs. We then explore ways of automatically generating MET proofs, and prove sound and complete heuristics for that procedure. These results can be extended to most propositional system using a Kripke style semantics and a fist order theory of the possible worlds relation. Examples are presented for standard T, S4, and S5 systems, systems of knowledge and belief, and common knowledge. A computer program which implements the theory is briefly examined in the appendix

Revisiting the proof theory of Classical S4

In 1965 Dag Prawitz presented an extension of Gentzen-type systems of Natural Deduction to modal concepts of S4. Maria da Paz Medeiros showed in 2006 that the proof of normalisation for classical S4 does not hold and proposed a new proof of normalisation for a logically equivalent system, the system NS4. However two problems in the proof of the critical lemma used by Medeiros in her proof were pointed out by Yuuki Andou in 2009. This paper presents a proof of the critical lemma, resulting in a proof of normalisation for NS4

Dual-Context Calculi for Modal Logic

We present natural deduction systems and associated modal lambda calculi for the necessity fragments of the normal modal logics K, T, K4, GL and S4. These systems are in the dual-context style: they feature two distinct zones of assumptions, one of which can be thought as modal, and the other as intuitionistic. We show that these calculi have their roots in in sequent calculi. We then investigate their metatheory, equip them with a confluent and strongly normalizing notion of reduction, and show that they coincide with the usual Hilbert systems up to provability. Finally, we investigate a categorical semantics which interprets the modality as a product-preserving functor.Comment: Full version of article previously presented at LICS 2017 (see arXiv:1602.04860v4 or doi: 10.1109/LICS.2017.8005089

Propositional Logics Complexity and the Sub-Formula Property

In 1979 Richard Statman proved, using proof-theory, that the purely implicational fragment of Intuitionistic Logic (M-imply) is PSPACE-complete. He showed a polynomially bounded translation from full Intuitionistic Propositional Logic into its implicational fragment. By the PSPACE-completeness of S4, proved by Ladner, and the Goedel translation from S4 into Intuitionistic Logic, the PSPACE- completeness of M-imply is drawn. The sub-formula principle for a deductive system for a logic L states that whenever F1,...,Fk proves A, there is a proof in which each formula occurrence is either a sub-formula of A or of some of Fi. In this work we extend Statman result and show that any propositional (possibly modal) structural logic satisfying a particular formulation of the sub-formula principle is in PSPACE. If the logic includes the minimal purely implicational logic then it is PSPACE-complete. As a consequence, EXPTIME-complete propositional logics, such as PDL and the common-knowledge epistemic logic with at least 2 agents satisfy this particular sub-formula principle, if and only if, PSPACE=EXPTIME. We also show how our technique can be used to prove that any finitely many-valued logic has the set of its tautologies in PSPACE.Comment: In Proceedings DCM 2014, arXiv:1504.0192

Constructive Provability Logic

We present constructive provability logic, an intuitionstic modal logic that validates the L\"ob rule of G\"odel and L\"ob's provability logic by permitting logical reflection over provability. Two distinct variants of this logic, CPL and CPL*, are presented in natural deduction and sequent calculus forms which are then shown to be equivalent. In addition, we discuss the use of constructive provability logic to justify stratified negation in logic programming within an intuitionstic and structural proof theory.Comment: Extended version of IMLA 2011 submission of the same titl

The First-Order Hypothetical Logic of Proofs

The Propositional Logic of Proofs (LP) is a modal logic in which the modality □A is revisited as [​[t]​]​A , t being an expression that bears witness to the validity of A . It enjoys arithmetical soundness and completeness, can realize all S4 theorems and is capable of reflecting its own proofs ( ⊢A implies ⊢[​[t]​]A , for some t ). A presentation of first-order LP has recently been proposed, FOLP, which enjoys arithmetical soundness and has an exact provability semantics. A key notion in this presentation is how free variables are dealt with in a formula of the form [​[t]​]​A(i) . We revisit this notion in the setting of a Natural Deduction presentation and propose a Curry–Howard correspondence for FOLP. A term assignment is provided and a proof of strong normalization is given.Fil: Steren, Gabriela. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales. Departamento de Computación; ArgentinaFil: Bonelli, Eduardo Augusto. Universidad Nacional de Quilmes. Departamento de Ciencia y Tecnología; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentin

On formal aspects of the epistemic approach to paraconsistency

This paper reviews the central points and presents some recent developments of the epistemic approach to paraconsistency in terms of the preservation of evidence. Two formal systems are surveyed, the basic logic of evidence (BLE) and the logic of evidence and truth (LET J ), designed to deal, respectively, with evidence and with evidence and truth. While BLE is equivalent to Nelson’s logic N4, it has been conceived for a different purpose. Adequate valuation semantics that provide decidability are given for both BLE and LET J . The meanings of the connectives of BLE and LET J , from the point of view of preservation of evidence, is explained with the aid of an inferential semantics. A formalization of the notion of evidence for BLE as proposed by M. Fitting is also reviewed here. As a novel result, the paper shows that LET J is semantically characterized through the so-called Fidel structures. Some opportunities for further research are also discussed