Analysis of the Dynamics of Cognitive Processes

Jonker, C.M. [Promotor]Treur, J. [Promotor

On Computer-Aided Methods for Modeling and Analysis of Organizations

Treur, J. [Promotor

Toward Accessible Multilevel Modeling in Systems Biology: A Rule-based Language Concept

Promoted by advanced experimental techniques for obtaining high-quality data and the steadily accumulating knowledge about the complexity of life, modeling biological systems at multiple interrelated levels of organization attracts more and more attention recently. Current approaches for modeling multilevel systems typically lack an accessible formal modeling language or have major limitations with respect to expressiveness. The aim of this thesis is to provide a comprehensive discussion on associated problems and needs and to propose a concrete solution addressing them

Mental content : consequences of the embodied mind paradigm

The central difference between objectivist cognitivist semantics and embodied cognition consists in the fact that the latter is, in contrast to the former, mindful of binding meaning to context-sensitive mental systems. According to Lakoff/Johnson's experientialism, conceptual structures arise from preconceptual kinesthetic image-schematic and basic-level structures. Gallese and Lakoff introduced the notion of exploiting sensorimotor structures for higherlevel cognition. Three different types of X-schemas realise three types of environmentally embedded simulation: Areas that control movements in peri-personal space; canonical neurons of the ventral premotor cortex that fire when a graspable object is represented; the firing of mirror neurons while perceiving certain movements of conspecifics. ..

Wide computation: a mechanistic account

This Ph.D. thesis explores a novel way of thinking about computation in cognitive science. It argues for what I call ‘the mechanistic account of wide computationalism’, or simply wide mechanistic computation. The key claim is that some cognitive and perceptual abilities are produced by or are the result of computational mechanisms that are, in part, located outside the individual; that computational systems, the ones that form the proper units of analysis in cognitive science, are particular types of functional mechanisms that, on occasion, spread out across brain, body, and world. Wide mechanistic computation is the result of bringing together two distinct strands of thinking about computation: (i) ‘wide’ views, which hold that computational systems can, on occasion, include parts of the surrounding environment; and (ii) ‘mechanistic’ views, which hold that computational explanation is a species of mechanistic explanation, and that computational mechanisms are a special type of functional mechanism. I argue that wide mechanistic computation draws support from several sources. First, I examine research on animal and human psychology and show that several organisms’ behaviours are properly treated as being the output of wide computational mechanisms. Second, I defend the view from several philosophical charges, including worries about its explanatory parsimony and empirical testability. Finally, I argue for the view’s theoretical credentials by showing that it can help resolve specific problems that have recently troubled 4E cognition. The result is an argument for not only the coherence but also empirical plausibility of wide mechanistic computation. On route to its main objective, the thesis also accomplishes a number of related tasks, including: (i) providing a framework for organising and conceptualising different views of computation, (ii) securing the conceptual foundations of mechanistic computation by addressing an outstanding challenge called the ‘abstraction problem’, (iii) sounding a cautionary note about recent predictive processing accounts of extended cognition and (iv) arguing against a particular conception of levels often used within cognitive science, what is labelled the ‘hierarchical correspondence view of levels’.

Cognition and consciousness : developing a conceptual framework

English: The role of consciousness within the process of cognition has been very unclear to date. On the one hand, the phenomenological experience of consciousness is very real but on the other hand, theories of cognition seem to struggle to account for consciousness. Consciousness and related mentalistic phenomena have been neglected to a great extent in the past. It is only recently that cognitive theorists voiced their concern about the neglect of consciousness within cognitive studies and psychology. This study assumed that the difficulty to account for consciousness within cognition is due to the inadequacy of theoretical perspectives. The aim of this study was then to develop a conceptual framework within which the relationship between cognition and consciousness can be viewed, which can also open avenues for theory construction and empirical investigation. To obtain this goal, a particular strategy was followed. The assumption from which the argument in this study originated was that cognition and consciousness must be viewed from a systemic emergentist perspective. From this assumption certain systemic emergentist principles followed which include emergence, structure, function, the fusion between structure and function, the constitution of systemic wholes, and interaction. Two principles, or perspectives, namely structure and function, were used in an heuristic fashion to discuss approaches to consciousness. These two perspectives need to be incorporated in an understanding and definition of consciousness. The same strategy was followed with the analysis of four mainstream approaches to cognition, namely the information processing approach, the move beyond information processing, symbolicism and connectionism. It was hypothesised that the ability to account for the systemic emergentist principles within a particular approach determines its ability to incorporate consciousness within the process of cognition. The nature of structure, function and emergence was clarified from the perspective of General Systems Theory and Emergent lnteractionism. The various approaches to cognition contributed in different ways to the understanding of the systemic emergentist principles. A conceptual model, namely the systemic emergentist model, was developed, based on a principle of a fused function and structure. This means that a system has a microstructure consisting of active and functional elements. The concept of a fused function and structure overcomes the traditional separation of structure and function/process. This fusion enables emergence to take place. Due to the configuration of elements (processes) a system as a whole and its properties emerge. Systems form subsystems in a hierarchical fashion which allows for interaction between levels of systems. Emergents cannot be reduced to the elements of a system. The model was evaluated against the characteristics of cognition and consciousness determined on the psychological and phenomenological levels of analysis. This showed that consciousness is functional and an integral part of the process of cognition. In terms of the requirements for a conceptual model as a rudimentary explanatory and heuristic device, it was found that the systemic emergentist model was able to satisfy these requirements to a large extent. The model was also able to indicate further avenues for research and point out certain deficiencies in itself.Afrikaans: Tot op hede was die rol van bewussyn in die proses van kognisie onduidelik. Aan die een kant word bewussyn fenomenologies as werklik ervaar, maar aan die ander kant is dit vir kognitiewe teoriee moeilik om vir bewussyn verantwoording te doen. Bewussyn en verwante verstandelike verskynsels is in die verlede tot 'n groat mate afgeskeep. Dit is egter slegs onlangs dat kognitiewe teoretici hul besorgdheid oor die verwaarlosing van bewussyn in kognitiewe studies en sielkunde uitgespreek het. Hierdie studie neem aan dat ontoereikende teoretiese perspektiewe verantwoordelik is vir die onvermoe om rekenskap te gee van bewussyn in kognisie. Die doel van hierdie studie was om 'n konseptuele raamwerk te ontwikkel waarbinne die verwantskap tussen kognisie en bewussyn beskou kan word en waarmee nuwe rigtings vir teoriekonstruksie en empiriese ondersoek aangedui kan word. 'n Spesifieke strategie is gevolg om hierdie doel te bereik. Hierdie studie vertrek van die aanname dat kognisie en bewussyn vanuit 'n sistemiese verskynings- (emergentist) perspektief beskou moet word. Vanuit hierdie perspektief kom sekere sistemiese verskyningsbeginsels na vore wat verskyning, struktuur, funksie, die samesmelting van struktuur en funksie, die konstituering van sistemiese gehele, en interaksie insluit. Twee beginsels of perspektiewe, naamlik struktuur en funksie, is op 'n heuristiese wyse gebruik om benaderings tot bewussyn te bespreek. Hierdie twee perspektiewe behoort in die begrip en definiering van bewussyn ingesluit te word. Dieselfde strategie is gevolg met die ontleding van vier hoofstroombenaderings tot kognisie, naamlik die informasieverwerkingsbenadering, die beweging verby informasieverwerking, simbolisisme, en konneksionisme. Dit is gehipotetiseer dat 'n spesifieke benadering se vermoe om verantwoording te doen vir die sistemiese verskyningsbeginsels, die vermoe om bewussyn in die proses van kognisie in te sluit, bepaal. Die aard van struktuur, funksie en verskyning is verhelder deur 'n bespreking van Algemene Sisteemteorie en Verskynings-lnteraksionisme. Die verskillende benaderings tot kognisie het op verskillende wyses tot die begrip van die sistemiese verskyningsbeginsels bygedra. 'n Konseptuele model, naamlik die sistemiese verskyningsmodel, is ontwikkel wat gebaseer is op die beginsel van 'n verenigde struktuur en funksie. Dit beteken dat 'n sisteem 'n mikrostruktuur het wat uit aktiewe en funksionele elemente bestaan. Die beginsel van 'n verenigde struktuur en funksie oorbrug die tradisionele skeiding tussen struktuur en funksiejproses. Die samesmelting het verskyning tot gevolg. Weens die konfigurasie van elemente (prosesse), verskyn 'n sisteem as geheel met sy eienskappe. Sisteme vorm subsisteme op hierargiese wyse wat wisselwerking tussen vlakke van sisteme bewerkstellig. Verskynings kan nie tot die elemente van 'n sisteem gereduseer word nie. Die model is geevalueer met die kenmerke van kognisie en bewussyn wat op 'n sielkundige en fenomenologiese vlak van ontleding bepaal is. Dit het aangetoon dat bewussyn funksioneel is en integraal is tot kognisie. Dit is bevind dat die sistemiese verskynsingsmodel die meeste van die vereistes van 'n konseptuele model as 'n rudimentere verklarings- en heuristiese meganisme kon bevredig. Die model was ook in staat om verdere rigtings vir navorsing aan te dui, asook om sekere gebreke in die model self aan te dui.Thesis (DPhil)--University of Pretoria, 1995.PsychologyDPhilUnrestricte

Agency and Organisation: The Dialectics of Nature and Life

In recent decades, there have been major theoretical changes within evolutionary biology. In this dissertation, I critically reconstruct these developments through philosophy to assess how it may inform these debates. The overall aim is to show the mutual relevance between current trends in biology and the dialectical approach to nature. I argue that the repetition of the neglected tradition of organicism is anticipated both by a dialectical tradition within science and by Hegel’s philosophy – and that these theories may together inform the ongoing shift within evolutionary biology called the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (EES). I stage the discussion by outlining the tenets and history of the modern synthesis (MS) and the alternative: the extended evolutionary synthesis (EES). It takes us into topics such as autonomy, organisation, reduction, and autopoiesis. Based on these discussions, I make the case that the most promising alternative to the MS is the so-called organisational approach formulated within theoretical biology and apply dialectics to strengthen this claim. In my view, they share a fundamental premise: Biology must surpass the physical worldview and adopt a more complex model to comprehend life as an ongoing regeneration of organisation and an expression of self-determination. To bring out the philosophical stakes of this shift, I take on Hegel’s writings on nature, life, and purposiveness and relate them to contemporary thinkers. The main contribution of this work lies not in a particularly novel reading of any of the theories I examine but in bringing them together – both within philosophy and biology and between them – and systematically mapping how philosophy and the humanities should deal with the natural sciences. The new kind of naturalism suggested here, which places life at its core, also calls for another scientific ideal which strives for unification without subsumption or eradication of differences

Cognitive Foundations for Visual Analytics

In this report, we provide an overview of scientific/technical literature on information visualization and VA. Topics discussed include an update and overview of the extensive literature search conducted for this study, the nature and purpose of the field, major research thrusts, and scientific foundations. We review methodologies for evaluating and measuring the impact of VA technologies as well as taxonomies that have been proposed for various purposes to support the VA community. A cognitive science perspective underlies each of these discussions