Search for Trust: An Analysis and Comparison of CA System Alternatives and Enhancements

The security of the Public Key Infrastructure has been reevaluated in response to Certification Authority (CA) compromise which resulted in the circulation of fraudulent certificates. These rogue certificates can and have been used to execute Man-in-the-Middle attacks and gain access to users’ sensitive information. In wake of these events, there has been a call for change to the extent of either securing the current system or altogether replacing it with an alternative design. This paper will explore the following proposals which have been put forth to replace or improve the CA system with the goal of aiding in the prevention and detection of MITM attacks and improving the trust infrastructure: Convergence, Perspectives, Mutually Endorsed Certification Authority Infrastructure (MECAI), DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE), DNS Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) Resource Records, Public Key Pinning, Sovereign Keys, and Certificate Transparency. Provided are brief descriptions of each proposal, along with an indication of the pros and cons of each system. Following this, a new metric is applied which, according to a set of criteria, ranks each proposal and gives readers an idea of the costs and benefits of implementing the proposed system and the potential strengths and weaknesses of the design. We conclude with recommendations for further research and remark on the proposals with the most potential going forward

Is Europe ready to provide a pan-European Identity Management System?

European public administrations must manage citizens' digital identities, particularly considering interoperability among different countries. Owing to the diversity of electronic identity management (eIDM) systems, when users of one such system seek to communicate with governments using a different system, both systems must be linked and understand each other. To achieve this, the European Union is working on an interoperability framework. This article provides an overview of eIDM systems' current state at a pan-European level. It identifies and analyzes issues on which agreement exists, as well as those that aren't yet resolved and are preventing the adoption of a large-scale model

Introducing new technology into italian certified electronic mail: a proposal

Over the last decade, an increasing number of Certified E-Mail systems (CEM) have been implemented in Europe and worldwide, but their diffusion and validity are mainly restricted in a national arena. Despite the effort of European Union (EU) that recently defined a specification for guaranteeing interoperability of CEM systems between Member States, its adoption has not be not yet fuelled, mainly since any CEM system receives a legal value by its State legislation. It is difficult to extend the legal value of CEM security mechanisms, e.g. receipts with timestamps which are considered evidences and legal proofs in disputes that may arise from different Parties inside a State, unless a common political and legal agreement will be created. At this aim, recently EU introduce the new Regulation on Electronic Identification and Trust Services (eIDAS), to address this issue. We believe that the first step for encouraging a more large adoption between communities is to implement CEMs using standard worldwide recognized solutions.In this paper we propose a technical evolution of the Italian CEM, called Posta Elettronica Certificata (PEC) moving from a close mechanisms to the adoption of a more standardized, distributed solution, based on DNS Security Extensions (DNSSec). This proposal would have a minimal impact on the legislation, restricted to the annex that defines PEC technical rules.

Security in peer-to-peer communication systems

P2PSIP (Peer-to-Peer Session Initiation Protocol) is a protocol developed by the IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) for the establishment, completion and modi¿cation of communication sessions that emerges as a complement to SIP (Session Initiation Protocol) in environments where the original SIP protocol may fail for technical, ¿nancial, security, or social reasons. In order to do so, P2PSIP systems replace all the architecture of servers of the original SIP systems used for the registration and location of users, by a structured P2P network that distributes these functions among all the user agents that are part of the system. This new architecture, as with any emerging system, presents a completely new security problematic which analysis, subject of this thesis, is of crucial importance for its secure development and future standardization. Starting with a study of the state of the art in network security and continuing with more speci¿c systems such as SIP and P2P, we identify the most important security services within the architecture of a P2PSIP communication system: access control, bootstrap, routing, storage and communication. Once the security services have been identi¿ed, we conduct an analysis of the attacks that can a¿ect each of them, as well as a study of the existing countermeasures that can be used to prevent or mitigate these attacks. Based on the presented attacks and the weaknesses found in the existing measures to prevent them, we design speci¿c solutions to improve the security of P2PSIP communication systems. To this end, we focus on the service that stands as the cornerstone of P2PSIP communication systems¿ security: access control. Among the new designed solutions stand out: a certi¿cation model based on the segregation of the identity of users and nodes, a model for secure access control for on-the-¿y P2PSIP systems and an authorization framework for P2PSIP systems built on the recently published Internet Attribute Certi¿cate Pro¿le for Authorization. Finally, based on the existing measures and the new solutions designed, we de¿ne a set of security recommendations that should be considered for the design, implementation and maintenance of P2PSIP communication systems.Postprint (published version

Design, Analysis, and Implementation of ARPKI: An Attack-Resilient Public-Key Infrastructure

The current Transport Layer Security (TLS) Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI) is based on a weakest-link security model that depends on over a thousand trust roots. The recent history of malicious and compromised Certification Authorities has fueled the desire for alternatives. Creating a new, secure infrastructure is, however, a surprisingly challenging task due to the large number of parties involved and the many ways that they can interact. A principled approach to its design is therefore mandatory, as humans cannot feasibly consider all the cases that can occur due to the multitude of interleavings of actions by legitimate parties and attackers, such as private key compromises (e.g., domain, Certification Authority, log server, other trusted entities), key revocations, key updates, etc. We present ARPKI, a PKI architecture that ensures that certificate-related operations, such as certificate issuance, update, revocation, and validation, are transparent and accountable. ARPKI efficiently supports these operations, and gracefully handles catastrophic events such as domain key loss or compromise. Moreover ARPKI is the first PKI architecture that is co-designed with a formal model, and we verify its core security property using the T AMARIN prover. We prove that ARPKI offers extremely strong security guarantees, where compromising even n-1 trusted signing and verifying entities is insufficient to launch a man-in-the-middle attack. Moreover, ARPKI’s use deters misbehavior as all operations are publicly visible. Finally, we present a proof-of-concept implementation that provides all the features required for deployment. Our experiments indicate that ARPKI efficiently handles the certification process with low overhead. It does not incur additional latency to TLS, since no additional round trips are required

A Study of Blockchain Framework–Hyperledger Fabric and Implementation as Educational Network

Blockchain, the foundation for Bitcoin, has gained lots of attention recently. Blockchain works as a distributed ledger technology that allows information exchange to take place in a distributed way, and ledger is immutable. Blockchain database removes the necessity of the centralized system; therefore, applications based on Blockchain are getting high in number. This paper covers an discuss in detail of blockchain technology, and its consensus algorithms along with workflow, how trust has will be upon a system having no centralized system. This paper also studies various frameworks being built upon the blockchain systems and how they are helpful in solving many organizational issues and Developing of an application on an existing blockchain framework which is an access based system, has information regarding academic records, certifications and eligibility requirement examination records belong to a person, who can share with any organization, eliminating the need of physical documents

Blockchain-Enabled DPKI Framework

Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs), which rely on digital signature technology and establishment of trust and security association parameters between entities, allow entities to interoperate with authentication proofs, using standardized digital certificates (with X.509v3 as the current reference). Despite PKI technology being used by many applications for their security foundations (e.g. WEB/HTTPS/TLS, Cloud-Enabled Services, LANs/WLANs Security, VPNs, IP-Security), there are several concerns regarding their inherent design assumptions based on a centralized trust model. To avoid some problems and drawbacks that emerged from the centralization assumptions, a Decentralized Public Key Infrastructure (DPKI), is an alternative approach. The main idea for DPKIs is the ability to establish trust relations between all parties, in a web-of-trust model, avoiding centralized authorities and related root-of-trust certificates. As a possible solution for DPKI frameworks, the Blockchain technology, as an enabler solution, can help overcome some of the identified PKI problems and security drawbacks. Blockchain-enabled DPKIs can be designed to address a fully decentralized ledger for managed certificates, providing data-replication with strong consistency guarantees, and fairly distributed trust management properties founded on a P2P trust model. In this approach, typical PKI functions are supported cooperatively, with validity agreement based on consistency criteria, for issuing, verification and revocation of X509v3 certificates. It is also possible to address mechanisms to provide rapid reaction of principals in the verification of traceable, shared and immutable history logs of state-changes related to the life-cycle of certificates, with certificate validation rules established consistently by programmable Smart Contracts executed by peers. In this dissertation we designed, implemented and evaluated a Blockchain-Enabled Decentralized Public Key Infrastructure (DPKI) framework, providing an implementation prototype solution that can be used and to support experimental research. The proposal is based on a framework instantiating a permissioned collaborative consortium model, using the service planes supported in an extended Blockchain platform leveraged by the Hyperledger Fabric (HLF) solution. In our proposed DPKI framework model, X509v3 certificates are issued and managed following security invariants, processing rules, managing trust assumptions and establishing consistency metrics, defined and executed in a decentralized way by the Blockchain nodes, using Smart Contracts. Certificates are issued cooperatively and can be issued with group-oriented threshold-based Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) signatures, as group-oriented authentication proofs. The Smart Contracts dictate how Blockchain peers participate consistently in issuing, signing, attestation, validation and revocation processes. Any peer can validate certificates obtaining their consistent states consolidated in closed blocks in a Meckle tree structure maintained in the Blockchain. State-transition operations are managed with serializability guarantees, provided by Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) consensus primitives

IoTsafe, Decoupling Security from Applications for a Safer IoT

The use of robust security solutions is a must for the Internet of Things (IoT) devices and their applications: regulators in different countries are creating frameworks for certifying those devices with an acceptable security level. However, even for already certified devices, security protocols have to be updated when a breach is found or a certain version becomes obsolete. Many approaches for securing IoT applications are nowadays based on the integration of a security layer [e.g., using transport layer security, (TLS)], but this may result in difficulties when upgrading the security algorithms, as the whole application has to be updated. This fact may shorten the life of IoT devices. As a way to overcome these difficulties, this paper presents IoTsafe, a novel approach relying on secure socket shell (SSH), a feasible alternative to secure communications in IoT applications based on hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP and HTTP/2). In order to illustrate its advantages, a comparison between the traditional approach (HTTP with TLS) and our scheme (HTTP with SSH) is performed over low-power wireless personal area networks (6loWPAN) through 802.15.4 interfaces. The results show that the proposed approach not only provides a more robust and easy-To-update solution, but it also brings an improvement to the overall performance in terms of goodput and energy consumption. Core server stress tests are also presented, and the server performance is also analyzed in terms of RAM consumption and escalation strategies